area handbook series 

Sudan 

a country study 




Sudan 

a country study 



Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Helen Chapin Metz 




On the cover: An Nilain Mosque, at the site of the confluence 
of the Blue Nile and White Nile in Khartoum 



Fourth Edition, First Printing, 1992. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Sudan : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress ; edited by Helen Chapin Metz. — 4th ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA 
pam ; 550-27) 

" Research completed June 1991." 

"Supersedes the 1982 edition of Sudan: a country study, edited 
by Harold D. Nelson" — T.p. verso. 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 289-304) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0750-X 

1. Sudan. I. Metz, Helen Chapin, 1928- . II. Library of 
Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA 
pam ; 550-27. 

DT154.6.S93 1992 92-21336 
962.4— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-27 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies/ Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other 
published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



111 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the writers 
of the 1982 edition of Sudan: A Country Study, edited by Harold D. 
Nelson. Their work provided general background for the present 
volume. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various government 
agencies and private institutions who gave of their time, research 
materials, and expertise in the production of this book. The in- 
dividuals included Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country 
Studies/ Area Handbook Program for the Department of the Army. 
The authors also wish to thank members of the Federal Research 
Division staff who contributed directly to the preparation of the 
manuscript. These people included Sandra W. Meditz, who re- 
viewed all graphic and textual material and served as liaison with 
the sponsoring agency, Marilyn Majeska, who managed editing 
and book production, and Joshua Sinai, who contributed additional 
research. 

Also involved in preparing the text were editorial assistants 
Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson; Ruth Nieland, who edited 
the chapters; Catherine Schwartzstein, who performed the prepub- 
lication editorial review; and Joan C. Cook, who compiled the 
index. Malinda B. Neale and Linda Peterson of the Library of Con- 
gress Composing Unit prepared the camera-ready copy under the 
supervision of Peggy Pixley. 

Graphics were prepared by David P. Cabitto, and Tim L. Merrill 
reviewed map drafts. David P. Cabitto and Greenhorne and 
O'Mara prepared the final maps. Special thanks are owed to Marty 
Ittner, who prepared the illustrations on the tide page of each chap- 
ter, and Wayne Home, who did the cover art. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of many indi- 
viduals and public and private agencies, especially the Embassy 
of the Republic of Sudan, who allowed their photographs to be used 
in this study. 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile xv 

Introduction xxiii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Thomas Ofcansky 

EARLY HISTORY 3 

Cush 4 

Meroe 5 

Christian Nubia 6 

THE COMING OF ISLAM 9 

The Arabs 9 

The Decline of Christian Nubia 11 

The Rule of the Kashif 11 

The Funj 12 

The Fur 13 

THE TURKIYAH, 1821-85 14 

THE MAHDIYAH, 1884-98 18 

The Khalifa 20 

Reconquest of Sudan 21 

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM, 

1899-1955 23 

Britain's Southern Policy 26 

Rise of Sudanese Nationalism 29 

The Road to Independence 30 

The South and the Unity of Sudan 31 

INDEPENDENT SUDAN 32 

The Politics of Independence 32 

The Abbud Military Government, 1958-64 36 

Return to Civilian Rule, 1964-69 37 

THE NIMEIRI ERA, 1969-85 41 

Revolutionary Command Council 41 

The Southern Problem 43 

Political Developments 46 

National Reconciliation 47 

vii 



THE TRANSITIONAL MILITARY COUNCIL 49 

SADIQ AL MAHDI AND COALITION 

GOVERNMENTS 51 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 55 

Robert 0. Collins 

PHYSICAL SETTING 58 

Geographical Regions 58 

Soils 63 

Hydrology 64 

Climate 65 

POPULATION 67 

ETHNICITY 69 

Language 69 

Ethnic Groups 72 

THE SOCIAL ORDER 88 

Northern Arabized Communities 89 

Southern Communities 93 

Urban and National Elites 96 

Women and the Family 98 

RELIGIOUS LIFE 100 

Islam: Tenets and Practice 100 

Islamic Movements and Religious Orders 104 

Christianity 107 

Indigenous Religions 107 

EDUCATION 110 

Girls' Education 115 

Education Reform 116 

HEALTH 118 

Chapter 3. The Economy 125 

Robert 0. Collins 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 129 

FOREIGN AID 135 

PRICES, EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND UNIONS 137 

Prices 137 

Employment 138 

Wages 139 

Unions 140 

AGRICULTURE, LIVESTOCK, FISHERIES, 

AND FORESTRY 142 

Land Use 144 

Land Tenure 145 

Irrigated Agriculture 147 



viii 



Rainfed Agriculture 151 

Livestock 153 

Fisheries 156 

Forestry 158 

MANUFACTURING 160 

MINING 164 

ENERGY SOURCES AND SUPPLY 166 

Electric Power 166 

Petroleum Use and Domestic Resources 168 

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 172 

Railroads 172 

Roads 176 

Inland Waterways 178 

Civil Aviation 180 

Marine Ports and Shipping 182 

Pipelines 184 

Communications 184 

FINANCE 185 

Banking 185 

Islamic Banking 186 

FOREIGN TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 187 

Foreign Trade 187 

Balance of Payments 190 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 195 

Eric Hooglund 

INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT 199 

Revolutionary Command Council for National 

Salvation 200 

The Presidency 200 

Council of Ministers 201 

Parliamentary Government 201 

Constitutional Development 202 

Regional and Local Administration 203 

THE LEGAL SYSTEM 206 

Courts 210 

Human Rights 211 

SOUTHERN AND WESTERN SUDAN 212 

Southern Sudan 212 

Western Sudan 215 

POLITICAL GROUPS 215 

Umma Party 217 

Democratic Unionist Party 218 

The Muslim Brotherhood 219 



ix 



The Republican Brothers 219 

Secular Political Parties 220 

Sudanese People's Liberation Movement 221 

INFORMATION MEDIA 221 

Newspapers 221 

Radio and Television 222 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 222 

Egypt 223 

Libya 224 

Chad 225 

Relations with Other African States 225 

Relations with Other Arab States 226 

United States 227 

Relations with Other Countries 228 

Chapter 5. National Security 229 

Jean R. Tartter 

THE MILITARY IN NATIONAL LIFE 232 

Development of the Armed Forces 233 

Role in Government 234 

The Armed Forces in Sudanese Society 237 

EXTERNAL SECURITY CONCERNS 239 

CIVIL WARFARE IN THE SOUTH 240 

First Civil War, 1955-72 241 

Renewed Civil Warfare, 1983- 242 

SUDANESE PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES 244 

Army 245 

Air Force 248 

Air Defense Command 250 

Navy 250 

Personnel 251 

Training 253 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 254 

Defense Costs 254 

PARAMILITARY GROUPS 255 

FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE 259 

SUDANESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY 262 

STATE OF INTERNAL SECURITY 264 

INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCIES 266 

Sudan Police Force 266 

Security Organizations 270 

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 271 

Incidence of Crime 273 

Prison System 274 



x 



Appendix. Tables 277 

Bibliography 289 

Glossary 305 

Index 309 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Sudan, 1991 xxii 

2 The Mahdist State, 1881-98 22 

3 Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1955 28 

4 Topography and Drainage 60 

5 Principal Ethnolinguistic Groups, 1991 76 

6 Transportation System, 1991 174 

7 Organization of the Government, 1991 208 

8 The Civil War in Southern Sudan, Spring 1991 244 

9 Organization of the Armed Forces, 1991 246 

10 Military Ranks and Insignia, 1991 256 



xi 



Preface 



This edition of Sudan: A Country Study replaces the previous edi- 
tion, published in 1982. Like its predecessor, the present book at- 
tempts to treat in a compact and objective manner the dominant 
historical, social, economic, political, and national security aspects 
of contemporary Sudan. Sources of information included schol- 
arly books, journals, and monographs; official reports and docu- 
ments of governments and international organizations; and foreign 
and domestic newspapers and periodicals. Relatively up-to-date 
economic data were lacking. 

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief com- 
ments on some of the more valuable sources for further reading 
appear at the conclusion of each chapter. Measurements are given 
in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist those 
who are unfamiliar with the metric system (see table 1 , Appen- 
dix). The Glossary provides brief definitions of terms that may be 
unfamiliar to the general reader. 

The transliteration of Arabic words and phrases posed a partic- 
ular problem. For many of the words — such as Muhammad, Mus- 
lim, Quran, and shaykh — the authors followed a modified version 
of the system adopted by the United States Board on Geographic 
Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographic Names for 
British Official Use, known as the BGN/PCGN system; the modifi- 
cation entails the omission of all diacritical markings and hyphens. 
In numerous instances, however, the names of persons or places 
are so well known by another spelling that to have used the 
BGN/PCGN system may have created confusion. The reader will 
find Khartoum for the city rather than Al Khartum (the latter form 
is used for the state by that name), Roseires Dam rather than Ar 
Rusayris, and the Mahdi rather than Muhammad Ahmad ibn as 
Sayyid Abd Allah. Place-names pose another problem in that the 
government changed the administrative divisions of Sudan in 
February 1991. The country was then divided into nine states, 
generally with names and borders similar to the historical provinces 
of the colonial period and early independence. Readers will thus 
find Bahr al Ghazal and Kurdufan, for example, referred to either 
as states or as provinces depending on the context. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of June 
1991. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been up- 
dated. The Introduction discusses significant events that have oc- 
curred since the completion of research, and the Country Profile 
and Glossary include updated information as available. 



Xlll 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Democratic Republic of Sudan. 

Short Form: Sudan. 

Term for Citizens: Sudanese. 

Capital: Khartoum. 

Date of Independence: January 1, 1956. 

Geography 

Size: Total area 2,505,813 square kilometers; land area 2,376,000 
square kilometers; coastline 716 kilometers; largest country in Africa. 

NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



xv 



Topography: Plateau and plains predominate. Mountainous areas 
behind Red Sea coast, in far south, and in far west. Only interior 
highlands of consequence are Nuba Mountains west of White Nile 
River. All significant streams flow to White Nile and Blue Nile 
rivers, which join just north of Khartoum to form River Nile. Ex- 
tensive swamps in south, especially along Bahr al Ghazal (southern- 
most part of White Nile). 

Climate: Rainfall ranges from rare and occasional in far northern 
desert to relatively abundant and frequent (rainy seasons of six to 
nine months) in southern third of Sudan. In most years central 
third has enough rain for agriculture but lack of rain in 1980s and 
1991 caused years of drought. Dust storms (often preceding rain- 
storms) common in north and northern parts of central Sudan, 
reducing visibility and causing much discomfort. Mean tempera- 
tures and daily maximums generally high; desert temperatures often 
quite cool at night. 

Society 

Population: Census of 1983 set population at 21.6 million peo- 
ple; July 1990 population estimate approximately 25 million. An- 
nual growth rate between 2.8 and 3.1 percent. Half of population 
under eighteen years of age. About 20 percent of population urban, 
concentrated chiefly in three cities — Khartoum, Omdurman, and 
Khartoum North — constituting national capital area. 

Languages: About 400 languages, but Arabic primary and offi- 
cial language. English common second language in south. Other 
languages include Bedawiye used by Beja and various dialects of 
Niger-Kurdufanian and Nilo-Saharan. 

Ethnic Groups: Largest ethnic category in 1983 (nearly 40 per- 
cent of total, nearly 55 percent in north) comprises those considering 
themselves Arabs, but category internally split by regional and tribal 
loyalties and affiliation to various Muslim politico-religious groups. 
Major Muslim (but non-Arab) groups are Nubians in far north, 
nomadic Beja in northeast, and Fur in west. Southern non-Muslim 
groups include Dinka (more than 10 percent of total population 
and 40 percent in south), Nuer, and numerous smaller Nilotic and 
other ethnic groups. 

Religion: More than half of total population Muslim, most living 
in north where Muslims constitute 75 percent or more of popula- 
tion. Relatively few Christians, most living in south. Most people 



xvi 



in south and substantial minority in north adherents of various in- 
digenous religions. 

Education: Six-year primary education increasingly available, but 
in early 1990s the south and many northern communities still 
suffered from shortage of schools and teachers; many schools in 
south destroyed by civil war. Small proportion of primary school 
graduates continued in three-year junior secondary and upper 
secondary schools or attended technical schools. Most schools in 
urban locations; many lacked adequately trained teachers. Univer- 
sities producing adequate numbers of highly educated graduates 
but Sudanese with skills relevant to largely agricultural economy 
still in short supply. Estimate of adult literacy about 30 percent. 

Health: By 1991 civil war had destroyed most medical facilities 
in the south, and famine in 1980s and 1991 had serious impact 
on general health. Weak modern medical infrastructure suffering 
personnel shortages and urban-rural imbalance; most personnel 
and facilities concentrated in capital area. Malaria and gastrointes- 
tinal diseases prevalent through much of country; tuberculosis wide- 
spread in north but also occurs in south; schistosomiasis (snail fever) 
more restricted to territory near White Nile and Blue Nile rivers 
and adjacent irrigated areas; sleeping sickness spreading in south; 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) also increasing. 

Economy 

Salient Features: Government-dominated mixed economy. 
Modern agriculture sector and most of modern industry controlled 
by government corporations directly or through joint ventures; vir- 
tually all small- and medium-sized industry, most services, tradi- 
tional agriculture, and handicrafts controlled privately. Civil war 
in south, massive influx of refugees from neighboring countries, 
and drought in 1980s and 1991 have hampered economic develop- 
ment. New economic recovery program announced June 1990 to 
end economic stagnation, develop agriculture, liberalize trade, abol- 
ish most government monopolies, progressively eliminate budget 
deficit, and develop energy resources. 

Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Forestry: Agriculture and 
livestock raising provided livelihood for 61 percent of working popu- 
lation and roughly 95 percent of exports in early 1990s. Agricul- 
ture characterized by modern market-oriented sector of irrigated 
and mechanized rainfed farming concentrated in central part of 
country and large traditional sector engaged in subsistence activi- 
ties elsewhere. Principal modern sector crops: cotton, sorghum, 



xvii 



peanuts, sugarcane, wheat, sesame. Traditional sector crops: sor- 
ghum, millet, sesame, peanuts. Fisheries still largely subsistence 
occupation. Apart from gum arabic, a major export, forests used 
mainly for fuel. 

Manufacturing: Public enterprises dominant in modern manufac- 
turing activity, mainly foodstuffs, beverages, textiles. Output of 
government plants generally well below capacities because of raw 
materials shortages, power outages, lack of spare parts, and lack 
of competent managerial staff and skilled laborers. Three-quarters 
of large-scale modern manufacturing in Al Khartum State. 

Mining: Contributed less than 1 percent to gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 1990. Most petroleum exploration operations ended in 
1984 because of civil war in south and had not resumed as of 
mid- 1991. 

Energy: Chief sources of energy in 1992: domestic wood, char- 
coal, hydroelectric power, imported petroleum; large hydroelec- 
tric potential only partially exploited. Central area of country served 
by electric power grid; some towns elsewhere had local generating 
facilities. 

Foreign Trade: Agricultural products (cotton, gum arabic, 
peanuts, sesame, livestock) dominate exports. Large trade deficit 
since late 1970s, accentuated by increased costs of petroleum im- 
ports. Main destinations of exports in 1986: Saudi Arabia, Japan, 
Britain, other European Community (EC) members. Main sup- 
pliers: Saudi Arabia (petroleum), Britain, other EC members, 
United States, Japan, China. 

Transportation 

Railroads: In 1991 government-owned Sudan Railways operated 
about 4,800 kilometers of 1.067-meter-gauge rail lines from Port 
Sudan to most major interior production and consumption centers 
except in far south. Also 716 kilometers of 1 .6096-meter- gauge plan- 
tation line. Substantial loss of rail traffic to road transport after 
mid-1970s attributable to inefficient operations, but railroad still 
important for low-cost volume movement of agricultural exports 
and for inland delivery of heavy capital equipment, construction 
materials, and other goods for economic development. 

Roads: In 1991 road system of between 20,000 and 25,000 kilo- 
meters, of which more than 2,000 kilometers paved or asphalted 
and about 3,700 kilometers gravel. Remaining roads fair-weather 
earth and sand tracks. 



xvin 



Inland Waterways: In 1991 about 1,750 kilometers navigable, but 
service on White Nile River in south largely discontinued by civil 
war. 

Civil Aviation: Government-owned Sudan Airways in 1991 
provided scheduled domestic air transport service to about twenty 
towns; international service by Sudan Airways and foreign airlines. 
Khartoum International principal airport; seven other airports had 
paved runways. 

Marine Ports and Shipping: Port Sudan and Sawakin on Red 
Sea only deepwater ports; some modern port equipment available 
but most cargo handling manual. National merchant marine (ten 
ships of 122,200 deadweight tons in 1990) operated to Red Sea, 
Mediterranean, European ports. 

Pipelines: Petroleum-products pipeline, 815 kilometers long, from 
Port Sudan to Khartoum; intermediate offtake point at Atbarah. 

Government and Politics 

Government: All executive and legislative powers vested in Revolu- 
tionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC-NS), a 
fifteen-member body of military officers. RCC-NS chairman Lieu- 
tenant General Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir designated presi- 
dent of the republic and prime minister. RCC-NS appointed 
members of Council of Ministers, or cabinet, governors of states, 
and judges of courts. In mid-February 1992, Bashir announced 
formation of appointed 300-member Transitional National Assem- 
bly. No plans for new elections announced as of mid- 1992. Govern- 
ment's authority in southern one- third of Sudan in mid- 1992 
concentrated around towns, a number of which had been retaken 
from the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) during 
1991-92 campaign. 

Administrative Divisions: In 1991 RCC-NS decreed division of 
Sudan into nine states. Each state further subdivided into provinces 
and local government areas or districts. 

Justice: Court system consisted of civil and special courts. Civil 
courts required to appjy Islamic law, or sharia, but also permitted 
to consider customary law in reaching decisions. Apex of civil ju- 
dicial system was High Court of Appeal. Lower courts consisted 
of state courts of appeal and at local level, major courts and mag- 
istrate's courts. Special courts, under military jurisdiction, dealt 
with offenses affecting national security or involving official cor- 
ruption. 



xix 



Politics: Although RCC-NS banned all political parties in 1989, 
it tolerated political activity by National Islamic Front (NIF), a 
coalition dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Leaders of other 
parties had reorganized abroad or in southern areas outside govern- 
ment control. Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) 
drew support from predominandy non-Muslim and non-Arab 
population of the south. 

Foreign Affairs: Prior to 1989 coup, Sudan had relatively close 
relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and United States, and had 
history of tense relations with Libya. RCC-NS changed orienta- 
tion of Sudan's foreign policy, particularly by supporting Iraq dur- 
ing Persian Gulf War of 1990-91. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
retaliated by suspending economic assistance, which constituted 
crucial component of government's budget. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In 1991 Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF) 
totaled approximately 71,500 personnel; army had about 65,000; 
air force and air defense command each had about 3,000; navy 
had about 500. 

Major Tactical Units: SPAF organized into six regional commands 
having divisional structures. Main units: two armored brigades, 
one mechanized infantry brigade, one airborne brigade, one air 
assault brigade, seventeen infantry brigades, three artillery regi- 
ments, two antiaircraft artillery brigades, and one engineering regi- 
ment. Strengths of brigades, battalions, and companies varied 
greatly. Air force organized into two fighter- ground attack squad- 
rons and two fighter squadrons, of which only one functioning, 
plus transport squadron, unarmed helicopter squadron, and training 
aircraft. Air defense command equipped with radar-directed anti- 
aircraft guns and Soviet SA-2 missiles. Naval forces, under army 
command, had some functioning river patrol boats but little or no 
capacity to patrol Red Sea coast. Much of armed forces equipment 
nonoperational because of poor maintenance and lack of spare parts. 

Civil War: Since 1983 armed rebellion has been conducted by 
forces of Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) with estimated 
strength of 50,000 to 60,000 in 1991. SPLA controlled most rural 
areas of the south, government forces holding major towns. In 
1991-92 government forces launched campaign and captured many 
SPLA-held centers. SPLA armed with light weapons, shoulder- 
fired antiaircraft missiles, some artillery and rocket launchers, and 
a few armored vehicles. Government forces assisted by tribal militia 



xx 



groups, which were guilty of many atrocities against civilians in 
the south. Government also organized in 1989 paramilitary body 
called Popular Defence Forces that participated in 1991-92 cam- 
paign in the south. 

Military Assistance: Most military equipment supplied by Soviet 
Union, 1968-71; limited cooperation with Soviet Union continued 
until 1977. Egypt and China subsequently became prominent sup- 
pliers. In early 1980s, United States became principal source of 
aid, notably aircraft, tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery. United 
States aid sharply reduced in 1983 and formally terminated in 1989. 

Defense Costs: Official data unavailable; defense budget estimated 
at US$610 million in 1989, constituting 7.2 percent of gross na- 
tional product. 

Internal Security Forces: National police (Sudan Police Force) 
totaled about 30,000. State Security Organisation main instrument 
of domestic intelligence and internal security until 1985. After 1989 
military coup, separate Islamic-oriented security bodies formed to 
suppress opposition to regime. 



xxi 




CENTRAL ■ ( 
AFRICAN ; 
REPUBUC ~^'( 



International 

boundary 

Administrative 

boundary 

State boundary 

® National capital 

® State capital 

50 100 150 Kilometers 



50 100 150 Miles 



A, ALISTIWAI 1 

"V y~ ..<n *- -\ KENYA s 
ZAIRE (UGANDA) ' t 

I Boundary representation 

w • nothecessa 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Sudan, 1991 



xxii 



Introduction 



SUDAN, LIKE MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES, consists of 
numerous ethnic groups. Unlike most states, however, Sudan has 
two distinct divisions: the north, which is largely Arab and Mus- 
lim, and the south, which consists predominantly of black Nilotic 
peoples, some of whom are members of indigenous faiths and others 
who are Christians. British policy during the Anglo-Egyptian con- 
dominium (1899-1955) intensified the rift because Britain estab- 
lished separate administrations for the two areas and forbade 
northerners to enter the south. In the 1990s, many southerners con- 
tinued to fear being ruled by northerners, who lacked familiarity 
with their beliefs and ethnic traditions and sought to impose north- 
ern institutions on them. 

Given its proximity to Egypt and the centrality of the Nile River 
that both countries share, it is not surprising that culturally Egypt 
has influenced Sudan significantly, especially the northern part of 
the country. Ancient Cush, located in present-day northern Sudan, 
was strongly influenced by Egypt for about 1,000 years beginning 
ca. 2700 B.C. Although the Hyksos kings of Egypt temporarily 
broke off contact, Cush subsequently was incorporated into Egypt's 
New Kingdom as a province about 1570 B.C. and remained under 
Egyptian control until about 1100 B.C. In a move that reversed 
the pattern of Egyptian dominance, a Cushite king conquered 
Upper Egypt in 730 B.C.; in 590 B.C., however, the Cushite cap- 
ital was sacked by the Egyptians and the court moved farther south 
along the Nile to Meroe. 

By the sixth century A.D. , Meroe had broken up into three king- 
doms collectively referred to as Nubia. The people of Nubia adopted 
Christianity and were ministered to largely by Egyptian clergy. 
The kingdoms reached their peak in the ninth and tenth centu- 
ries. Prior to the coming of Islam, the people had contact with the 
Arabs primarily in the form of trade. Sudan became known as a 
source of ivory, gold, gems, aromatic gum, and cattle, all products 
that were transported to markets in Egypt and Arabia. Following 
the Muslim conquest of the area, in 1276 the Mamluk rulers of 
Egypt gave Nubia to a Muslim overlord. The Nubians themselves 
converted to Islam only gradually; a majority of them remained 
Christian until the fifteenth or sixteenth century. During the six- 
teenth century, the Muslim religious brotherhoods spread through 
northern Nubia, and the Ottoman Empire exerted its jurisdiction 
through military leaders whose rule endured for three centuries. 



xxiii 



In 1820 Muhammad Ali, who ruled Egypt on behalf of the Otto- 
mans, sent 4,000 troops to Sudan to clear the area of Mamluks. 
The invasion resulted in Ottoman-Egyptian rule of Sudan from 
1821 to 1885; the rule was accompanied by the introduction of secu- 
lar courts and a large bureaucracy. The 1880s saw the rise of the 
Mahdist movement, consisting of disciples of Muhammad Ahmad 
ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah, a Sudanese who proclaimed himself the 
Mahdi or "guided one," and launched a jihad against the Otto- 
man rulers. Britain perceived the Mahdists as a threat to stability 
in the region and sent first Charles George Gordon and then Her- 
bert Kitchener to Sudan to assert British control. The British con- 
quest led to the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium 
and, initially, to military rule of Sudan, followed by civilian ad- 
ministration. Britain largely ignored southern Sudan until after 
World War I, leaving Western missionary societies to establish 
schools and medical facilities in the area. 

After World War I, Sudanese nationalism, which favored either 
independence or union with Egypt, gathered popular support. 
Recognizing the inevitable, Britain signed a self-determination 
agreement with Sudan in 1952, followed by the Anglo-Egyptian 
accord in 1953 that set up a three-year transition period to self- 
government. Sudan proclaimed its independence January 1, 1956. 
The country had two short-lived civilian coalition governments be- 
fore a coup in November 1958 brought in a military regime under 
Major General Ibrahim Abbud and a collective body known as the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Abbud' s government sought 
to arabize the south and in 1964 expelled all Western missionaries. 
Northern repression of the south led to open civil war in the 
mid-1960s and the rise of various southern resistance groups, the 
most powerful of which was the Anya Nya guerrillas, who sought 
autonomy. Civilian rule returned to Sudan between 1964 and 1969, 
and political parties reappeared. In the 1965 elections, Muham- 
mad Ahmad Mahjub became prime minister, succeeded in June 
1966 by Sadiq al Mahdi, a descendant of the Mahdi. In the 1968 
elections, no party had a clear majority, and a coalition govern- 
ment took office under Mahjub as prime minister. 

In May 1969, the Free Officers' Movement led by Jaafar an 
Nimeiri staged a coup and established the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC). In July 1971, a short-lived procommunist mili- 
tary coup occurred, but Nimeiri quickly regained control, was 
elected to a six-year term as president, and abolished the RCC. 
Meanwhile in the south, Joseph Lagu, a Christian, had united 
several opposition elements under the Southern Sudan Liberation 
Movement. In March 1972, the southern resistance movement 



xxiv 



concluded an agreement with the Nimeiri regime at Addis Ababa, 
and a cease-fire followed. A Constituent Assembly was created in 
August 1972 to draft a constitution at a time when the growing 
opposition to military rule was reflected in strikes and student un- 
rest. Despite this dissent, Nimeiri was reelected for another six- 
year term in 1977. 

During the early stages of his new term, Nimeiri worked toward 
reconciliation with the south. As the south became stronger, 
however, he considered it a threat to his regime; and in June 1983, 
having abolished the Southern Regional Assembly, he redivided 
the southern region into its three historical provinces. The Sudanese 
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudanese Peo- 
ple's Liberation Army (SPLA), founded in 1983, opposed this di- 
vision. They intensified their opposition following the imposition 
of Muslim sharia law throughout the country, and the civil war 
in the south broke out again with renewed vigor. In early 1985, 
while Nimeiri was returning from a visit to the United States, a 
general strike occurred that the government could not quell, fol- 
lowed by a successful military coup led by Lieutenant General Abd 
ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab. A Transitional Military Council 
was created, but the government proved incapable of establishing 
a national political consensus or of dealing with the deteriorating 
economic situation and the famine threatening southern and western 
Sudan. In March 1986, in the Koka Dam Declaration, the govern- 
ment and the SPLM called for a Sudan free from "discrimination 
and disparity" and the repeal of the sharia. 

Sadiq al Mahdi formed what proved to be a weak coalition 
government following the April 1986 elections. An agreement with 
the SPLM was signed by Sadiq al Mahdi' s coalition partners at 
Addis Ababa in November 1988; the agreement called for a cease- 
fire and freezing the application of the sharia. Sadiq al Mahdi' s 
failure to end the civil war in the south or improve the economic 
and famine situations led to the overthrow of the government at 
the end of June 1989 by Colonel Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir. 

Sudan's economic straits reflected its position as Africa's larg- 
est nation geographically, but one possessed of large areas of desert 
and semidesert east and west of the Nile and in the south the world's 
largest swamp, As Sudd, which led to tropical rain forests in the 
southernmost area. As a result, although the Nile itself with its 
tributaries — the Blue Nile and the White Nile, which joined at 
Khartoum — constituted a vital communications link for the country 
and a source of water for agriculture, the cultivable area of Sudan 
was somewhat limited. Moreover, in years of drought the agricul- 
turally productive sector declines appreciably, causing the likeli- 
hood of severe famine. 



xxv 



In accordance with the focal role played by the Nile, about one- 
third of Sudan's 1990 estimated population of 25 million lived 
around Khartoum and in Al Awsat State (see fig. 1). The latter 
included the rich agricultural region of Al Jazirah, south of Khar- 
toum between the Blue Nile and the White Nile. Although only 
one-fifth of the population lived in urban areas, two-thirds of the 
total population resided within 300 kilometers of Khartoum. About 
600 ethnic groups speaking around 400 languages were represented. 
Arabic was the official language of the country, with English spoken 
widely in the south. Ethnic statistics for the 1990s were lacking, 
but in 1983 Arabs constituted about two-fifths of the total popula- 
tion, representing the majority in the north where the next largest 
group was the Nile Nubians. Much of the remainder of Sudan's 
population consisted of non-Muslim Nilotic peoples living in 
southern Sudan or in the hilly areas west of the Blue Nile or near 
the Ethiopian border. Among the largest of these ethnic groups 
were the Dinka and the Nuer, followed by the Shilluk. Many of 
these groups migrated with their herds, seeking areas of rainfall, 
and therefore it was difficult to establish their numbers accurately. 

In the early 1990s, agriculture and livestock raising provided the 
major sources of livelihood for about four-fifths of the population. 
Wherever possible, Nile waters were used for irrigation, and the 
government has sponsored a number of irrigation projects. Com- 
mercial crops such as cotton, peanuts, sugarcane, sorghum, and 
sesame were grown, and gum arabic was obtained from Acacia Senegal 
trees. Most of these products along with livestock destined primarily 
for Saudi Arabia also represented Sudan's major exports. 

Manufacturing concentrated on food-processing enterprises and 
textiles, as well as some import substitution industries such as ce- 
ment, chemicals, and fertilizers. Industry, however, contributed 
less than one-tenth to gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) 
in the early 1990s, in comparison with agriculture's more than three- 
tenths contribution. Sudan was among the world's poorest coun- 
tries according to the World Bank (see Glossary), with an annual 
per capita income of US$310 in FY (fiscal year — see Glossary) 1991 . 

Several factors accounted for the relative economic insignificance 
of the industrial sector. Historically, during the colonial period, 
Britain had discouraged industrialization, preferring to keep Sudan 
as a source of raw materials and a market for British manufactured 
goods. Following independence, a paucity of development programs 
as well as better employment opportunities in the Persian Gulf states 
contributed to a shortage of skilled workers. In the early 1990s, 
Sudan also had limited energy sources — only small amounts of 
petroleum in the south between Kurdufan State and Bahr al Ghazal 



xxvi 



State and only a few dams producing hydroelectric power. In ad- 
dition, transportation facilities were limited; there existed only a 
sketchy network of railroads and roads, many of the latter being 
impassable in the rainy season. Inland waterways could also be 
difficult to use because of low water, cataracts, or swamps. The 
lack of a good transportation network hindered not only the mar- 
keting of produce and consumer goods but also the processing of 
such minerals as gold, chrome, asbestos, gypsum, mica, and ura- 
nium. The lack of capital accumulation also limited financial 
resources and necessitated funding by the government, which it- 
self had inadequate revenues. Some northern Sudanese hoped that 
the rise of Islamic banks might result in more capital being invested 
in private industrial development, especially after the World Bank 
refused to extend further loans to the country. 

Sudan's problems with the World Bank occurred initially in 1984. 
The World Bank cited Sudan's large external debt — in June 1992 
the debt was about US$15.3 billion, of which approximately two- 
thirds represented payment arrears — and its failure to take steps 
to restructure its economy as reasons for denying credit. The large 
debt resulted primarily from the nationalization of major sectors 
of the economy in the 1970s and the use of funds borrowed from 
abroad to finance enterprises with low productivity. The govern- 
ment needed to use its revenues to meet the losses of these enter- 
prises. In addition, the civil war, the prolonged drought, widespread 
malnutrition, famine, and the hundreds of thousands of refugees 
further sapped the economy. 

Not until June 1990 did the government act to reform the econ- 
omy by instituting a three-year (FY 1991-93) National Economic 
Salvation Program. The program aimed to reduce the budget 
deficit, privatize nationalized enterprises, heighten the role of the 
private sector, and remove controls on prices, profits, and exports. 
In October 1991, other steps toward economic reform included 
devaluing the official exchange rate from £Sd4.5 to £Sdl5 (for value 
of the Sudanese pound — see Glossary) to the United States dollar 
and reducing subsidies on sugar and petroleum products. In Febru- 
ary 1992, in a further liberalization of the economy, all price con- 
trols were removed and official exchange rates devalued to £Sd90 
to the United States dollar. Officials hoped that these measures 
would not cause the inflation rate, which was about 115 percent 
per year as of March 1992, to worsen. In a further move designed 
to curb inflation, Sudan instituted a new currency, the dinar, worth 
ten Sudanese pounds, in May 1992. 

Although the World Bank refused to authorize new loans for 
Sudan, in July 1991 the Bank granted Sudan US$16 million for 



xxvn 



the Emergency Drought Recovery Project. In addition, in the spring 
of 1992 Sudan received an agricultural credit of US$42 million from 
the African Development Bank and some bilateral aid from Iran 
and Libya. Like the World Bank, the United States and the Euro- 
pean Community had suspended loans to Sudan but had provided 
some humanitarian assistance; the value of United States humani- 
tarian aid in 1991 was estimated to exceed US$150 million. 
Nevertheless, the drought, the famine, and the massive influx into 
the north of refugees from the south as a result of the civil war caused 
the country's already precarious economy to deteriorate further 
and complicated the government's ability to rule. 

Since the military coup of June 30, 1989, the constitution had 
been suspended, political parties banned, and the legislative as- 
sembly dissolved. For practical purposes, in mid- 1992 Bashir made 
political decisions in his capacity as president or head of state, prime 
minister, commander in chief, and chairman of the legislative body 
created by the 1989 coup, the Revolutionary Command Council 
for National Salvation (RCC-NS). The RCC-NS consisted of 
fifteen members who had carried out the coup along with Bashir. 
Several members had ties to the National Islamic Front (NIF), the 
political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist (sometimes 
seen as fundamentalist) activist group. 

Although political parties were illegal under the Bashir govern- 
ment, the NIF represented the equivalent of a party. The nature 
of the relationship between Bashir and the NIF was not clear. Some 
well informed Western observers considered Bashir to be a tool 
of the NIF in spreading its Islamist programs and its strong ad- 
vocacy of the imposition of the sharia. Other observers believed 
that Bashir was using the NIF for his own purposes. The leading 
figure in the NIF was Hassan Abd Allah at Turabi, an Oxford- 
educated Muslim religious scholar and lawyer, who strongly ad- 
vocated the spread of Islamism in the Muslim world. As Turabi 
was ending his tour of the United States and Canada in the spring 
of 1992, he was attacked in Ottawa in late May by a Sudanese 
opponent of the NIF and was seriously injured. Although by late 
July Turabi had resumed meetings with government and Islamic 
officials and speeches to Muslim groups in Khartoum and in Lon- 
don, the effects of his impaired health on the NIF, the RCC-NS, 
and the political scene were uncertain in mid-August. 

In addition to their legislative functions, members of the RCC- 
NS shared with Bashir and members of the Council of Ministers 
functions traditionally associated with the executive branch, such 
as heading government ministries. The Council of Ministers in- 
cluded civilians as well as military officers and in practice was 



xxvm 



subordinate to the RCC-NS. In April 1991, probably in response 
to growing criticism of its authoritarian rule, the RCC-NS con- 
vened a constitutional conference. However, major opposition 
groups boycotted the conference. As on previous occasions, the prin- 
cipal intractable problem proved to be the inability of Muslims and 
non-Muslims to agree on the role of Islamic law as the basis of 
the legal system at both the national and local levels. 

Another vexing problem historically was the relationship of 
regional and local governmental bodies to the national government. 
The Nimeiri regime had created a pyramidal structure with coun- 
cils at various levels. The councils were theoretically elective, but 
in practice the only legal party at the time, the Sudan Socialist 
Union, dominated them. In February 1991, the RCC-NS in- 
troduced a federal structure, creating nine states that resembled 
the nine provinces of Sudan's colonial and early independence years. 
The states were subdivided into provinces and local government 
areas, with officials at all levels appointed by the RCC-NS. 
Although the governors of the three southern states were southern- 
ers, power lay in the hands of the deputy governors who were Mus- 
lim members of the NIF and who controlled finance, trade, and 
cooperatives. Below them the most important ministerial posts in 
the southern states also were held by Muslims, including the post 
of minister of education, culture, youth, guidance, and information. 

In a further step, in mid-February 1992, Bashir announced the 
formation of an appointed 300-member Transitional National As- 
sembly to include all RCC-NS members, federal cabinet ministers, 
and state governors. Bashir also indicated in March that, begin- 
ning in May, popular conferences based on religious values would 
be held in the north and in "secure areas" of the south to elect 
chairmen and members of such conferences. The election process 
would create a "general mobilization of all political institutions." 
Although the agendas for conferences over the succeeding ten-year 
period would be based on national issues set by the head of state 
and local issues raised by the governors, the government touted 
the process as one that would "fulfill the revolution's promise to 
hand over full power to the people." The proposed conference com- 
mittees were somewhat reminiscent of the popular committees 
established by the Popular Defence Act of October 1989. Initially, 
these popular committees had the function of overseeing ration- 
ing, but their mandate was broadened to include powers such as 
arresting enemies of the state. 

The control exerted by the RCC-NS over various parts of the 
country varied. For example, western Sudan, especially Darfur, 
enjoyed considerable autonomy, which at times approached 



xxix 



anarchy, as a result of the various armed ethnic groups and the 
refugee population that existed within it. The situation was even 
more confused in the south, where until 1991 the government had 
controlled the major centers and the SPLM occupied the smaller 
towns and rural areas. The government launched a military cam- 
paign in 1991-92 that succeeded in recapturing many military posts 
that had served as SPLM and SPLA strongholds. The government's 
success resulted in part from the acquisition of substantial mili- 
tary equipment financed by Iran, including weapons and aircraft 
bought from China. Another reason for the successes of the govern- 
ment forces was the split that occurred in August 1991 within the 
SPLA between John Garang's Torit faction (mainly Dinka from 
southern Al Istiwai) and the Nasir group (mainly Nuer and other 
non-Dinka from northern Al Istiwai). The two groups launched 
military attacks against each other, thereby not only destroying their 
common front against the government but also killing numerous 
civilians. The Nasir group had defected from the main SPLA body 
and tried unsuccessfully to overthrow Garang because of the SPLA's 
human rights violations, Garang's authoritarian leadership style, 
and his favoritism toward his ethnic group, the Dinka. Abortive 
peace talks with representatives of both groups as well as the govern- 
ment were held in Abuja, Nigeria, in May and early June 1992. 
(In December 1989, former United States president Jimmy Cart- 
er had attempted without success to mediate peace talks between 
the government and the SPLA.) The Torit faction sought a secu- 
lar state and an end to the sharia; the Nasir group wanted self- 
determination or independence for southern Sudan. During the 
talks, both groups agreed to push for self-determination, but when 
the government rejected this proposal, they decided instead to dis- 
cuss Nigeria's power-sharing plan. 

A major basis of southern dissidence was strong opposition to 
the imposition of the sharia — the SPLA had vowed not to lay down 
its arms until the sharia was abrogated. The other source of con- 
cern was the fear of northern pressure to arabize the education sys- 
tem (the Bashir regime had declared Arabic the language of 
instruction in the south in early 1992), government offices, and 
society in general. These fears had led to the civil war, which, with 
a respite between 1972 and 1983, had been ongoing since 1955. 

The Bashir government's need for assistance in pursuing the war 
in the south determined to a large degree Sudan's foreign policy 
in the 1990s. Bashir recognized that the measures taken in the south, 
which outside observers termed human rights abuses, had alienated 
the West. Historically, the West had been the source of major finan- 
cial support for Sudan. Furthermore, Sudan's siding with Iraq in 



xxx 



the 1991 Persian Gulf War had antagonized Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, principal donors for Sudan's military and economic needs 
in the preceding several decades. 

Bashir therefore turned to Iran, especially for military aid, and, 
to a lesser extent, to Libya. Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani visited Sudan in December 1991, accompanied by sev- 
eral cabinet ministers. The visit led to an Iranian promise of mili- 
tary and economic assistance. Details of the reported aid varied, 
but in July 1992, in addition to the provision of 1 million tons of 
oil annually for military and civil consumption, aid was thought 
to include the financing of Sudanese weapons and aircraft purchases 
from China in the amount of at least US$300 million. Some ac- 
counts alleged that 3,000 Iranian soldiers had also arrived in Janu- 
ary 1992 to engage in the war in the south and that Iran had been 
granted use of Port Sudan facilities and permission to establish a 
communications monitoring station in the area; however, these 
reports were not verified as of mid- August 1992. 

The only other country with which Sudan had close relations 
in the early 1990s was Libya. Following an economic agreement 
the two countries signed in July 1990, head of state Muammar al 
Qadhafi paid an official visit to Khartoum in October. Bashir paid 
a return visit to Libya in November 1991 . Libyan officials arrived 
in Khartoum for talks on unity, primarily economic unity, in Janu- 
ary 1992. 

While the government was cultivating relations with Iran and 
Libya, the SPLM and SPLA were seeking other sources of aid in 
Africa. They had lost their major source of support when the 
government of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia was overthrown 
in May 1991. The SPLM and SPLA subsequendy sought help from 
Kenya, Uganda, and several other African countries, thereby creat- 
ing tensions between those nations and the Bashir regime. Fur- 
thermore, Sudan's relations with Egypt had soured in 1991 as a 
result of the Bashir government's failure to support Egypt's posi- 
tion in the Persian Gulf War. One manifestation of the deteriorat- 
ing relations occurred in April 1992 when Sudan became involved 
in a border confrontation with Egypt. The disagreement resulted 
from an oil concession Sudan had granted to a subsidiary of Can- 
ada's International Petroleum Corporation for exploration of a 
38,400-square-kilometer area onshore and offshore near Halaib on 
the Red Sea coast, an area also claimed by Egypt. 

Initially, Sudan's military was seen as being free from specific 
ethnic or religious identification and thus in a position to accom- 
plish what civilians could not, namely to resolve economic problems 
and to bring peace to the south. Such hopes proved futile, however. 



xxxi 



The growing civil war in the south and the strength of the SPLA 
and the SPLM posed tremendous problems for the military and 
for the internal security forces. The civil war was extremely costiy; 
according to one Sudanese government estimate, it cost approxi- 
mately US$1 million per day. Furthermore, it disrupted the econ- 
omy — Bashir stated in February 1992 that the loss of oil revenues 
alone since 1986 had amounted to more than US$6 billion. In ad- 
dition, based on United States Department of State estimates in 
late 1991, war had displaced as many as 4.5 million Sudanese. 

To counter the SPLA, the government armed various non-Arab 
southern ethnic groups as militias as early as 1985. In addition, 
in October 1989 the Bashir government created a new paramili- 
tary body, the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) to promote the Is- 
lamist aims of the government and the NIF. Although the Bashir 
regime prominendy featured the PDF's participation in the 1991-92 
campaign in the south, informed observers believed the PDF's role 
lacked military significance. 

In view of the ongoing civil war, internal security was a major 
concern of the Bashir regime, which reportedly had been the ob- 
ject of coup attempts in 1990, 1991, and 1992. In this regard, the 
government faced problems on several fronts. There was the out- 
right dissidence or rebellion of several southern ethnic groups. There 
was also the creation in January 1991 of an opposition abroad in 
the form of a government in exile. This body, called the National 
Democratic Alliance, was headed by Lieutenant General Fathi 
Ahmad Ali, formerly commander of the armed forces under Sadiq 
al Mahdi. There also was increasing opposition in the north on 
the part of Sudanese who favored a secular state, including profes- 
sional persons, trade union leaders, and other modernizers. Such 
persons opposed the application of Islamic hudud punishments, the 
growing restrictions on the activities and dress of women, and the 
increasing authoritarianism of the government as reflected, for ex- 
ample, in the repression of criticism through censorship, imprison- 
ment, and death sentences. On a wider scale Sudanese in the north 
staged protests in February 1992 against the price increases on sta- 
ples after price supports were removed. 

As a result of the repressive measures taken by the government 
and the actions of armed government militias in the south as well 
as retaliatory measures of the SPLA forces, the human rights group 
Africa Watch estimated that at least 500,000 civilian deaths had 
occurred between 1986 and the end of 1989. The overall number 
of deaths between 1983 and mid- 1992 was far greater, an outcome 
not only of the civil war, but also of the famine and drought in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. In late 1989, the government, which 



xxxn 



has considered famine relief efforts a highly political issue, ended 
its cooperation with relief efforts from abroad because it feared such 
measures were strengthening southern resistance. The pressure of 
world public opinion, however, obliged Sudan to allow relief ef- 
forts to resume in 1990. 

The United Nations (UN) World Food Programme (WFP) had 
initiated Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in March 1989, which 
had delivered more than 1 10,000 tons of food aid to southern Sudan 
before it was obliged by renewed hostilities to close down opera- 
tions in October 1989. OLS II was launched in late March 1990, 
via the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
to bring in food flights via Kenya and Uganda. In the spring of 

1990, WFP indicated it was helping 4.2 million people in Sudan: 
1 .8 million refugees in Khartoum; 1 .4 million people in rural areas 
of the south; 600,000 who had sought refuge in southern towns; 
and 400,000 in the "transition zone" in Darfur and Kurdufan, 
between the north and the south. 

In addition to these sources of suffering, the government, be- 
ginning in the 1980s, had undertaken campaigns to destroy the 
Dinka and the Fur and Zaghawa ethnic groups in Darfur. As of 

1991, the Bashir regime was also using armed militias to under- 
take depopulation campaigns against the Nuba in southern Kur- 
dufan. Moreover, the government had to deal with the return in 
1991 of Sudanese citizens and their families who had been work- 
ing in Iraq and Kuwait; according to estimates of the International 
Labour Organisation, such persons numbered at least 150,000. Fi- 
nally, during the period from late November 1991 to early 1992, 
the government forcibly uprooted more than 400,000 non-Arab 
southern squatters, who had created shanty towns in the outskirts 
of Khartoum, and transported them to the desert about fifty kilo- 
meters away, creating an international outcry. 

In summary, in August 1992 the Bashir government found it- 
self in a very difficult position. Although the country's economic 
problems had begun to be addressed, the economic situation re- 
mained critical. At the peace negotiations in Abuja, slight progress 
had been made toward ending the civil war in the south, but the 
central concerns about imposition of the sharia and arabization had 
not been resolved. Moreover, the regime appeared to be facing 
growing dissension, not only in the south but from elements in the 
north as well. These considerations raised serious questions about 
the stability of the Bashir government. 

August 14, 1992 Helen Chapin Metz 



xxxiii 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



Tomb of the Mahdi in Omdurman 



THROUGHOUT ITS HISTORY SUDAN has been divided be- 
tween its Arab heritage, identified with northern Sudan, and its 
African heritage to the south. The two groups are divided along 
linguistic, religious, racial, and economic lines, and the cleavage 
has generated ethnic tensions and clashes. Moreover, the geographi- 
cal isolation of Sudan's southern African peoples has prevented them 
from participating fully in the country's political, economic, and 
social life. Imperial Britain acknowledged the north-south division 
by establishing separate administrations for the two regions. In- 
dependent Sudan further reinforced this cleavage by treating African 
southerners as a minority group. 

Another major factor that has affected Sudan's evolution is the 
country's relationship with Egypt. As early as the eighth millen- 
nium B.C., there was contact between Sudan and Egypt. Modern 
relations between the two countries began in 1820, when an Egyp- 
tian army under Ottoman command invaded Sudan. In the years 
following this invasion, Egypt expanded its area of control in Sudan 
down the Red Sea coast and toward East Africa's Great Lakes 
region. The sixty-four-year period of Egyptian rule, which ended 
in 1885, left a deep mark on Sudan's political and economic sys- 
tems. The emergence of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in 1899 
reinforced the links between Cairo and Khartoum. After Sudan 
gained independence in 1956, Egypt continued to exert influence 
over developments in Sudan. 

Similarly, the period of British control (1899-1955) has had a 
lasting impact on Sudan. In addition to pacifying and uniting the 
country, Britain sought to modernize Sudan by using technology 
to facilitate economic development and by establishing demo- 
cratic institutions to end authoritarian rule. Even in 1991, many 
of Sudan's political and economic institutions owed their existence 
to the British. 

Lasdy, Sudan's postindependence history has been shaped largely 
by the southern civil war. This conflict has retarded the country's 
social and economic development, encouraged political instability, 
and led to an endless cycle of weak and ineffective military and 
civilian governments. The conflict appeared likely to continue to 
affect Sudan's people and institutions for the rest of the twentieth 
century. 

Early History 

Archaeological excavation of sites on the Nile above Aswan has 



3 



Sudan: A Country Study 

confirmed human habitation in the river valley during the Paleo- 
lithic period that spanned more than 60,000 years of Sudanese his- 
tory. By the eighth millennium B.C., people of a Neolithic culture 
had settled into a sedentary way of life there in fortified mud-brick 
villages, where they supplemented hunting and fishing on the Nile 
with grain gathering and cattle herding. Contact with Egypt prob- 
ably occurred at a formative stage in the culture's development 
because of the steady movement of population along the Nile River. 
Skeletal remains suggest a blending of negroid and Mediterranean 
populations during the Neolithic period (eighth to third millennia 
B.C.) that has remained relatively stable until the present, despite 
gradual infiltration by other elements. 

Cush 

Northern Sudan's, or Nubia's, earliest record comes from Egyp- 
tian sources, which described the land upstream from the first 
cataract, called Cush, as "wretched." For more than 2,000 years 
after the Old Kingdom (ca. 2700-2180 B.C.), Egyptian political 
and economic activities determined the course of the central Nile 
region's history. Even during intermediate periods when Egyptian 
political power in Cush waned, Egypt exerted a profound cultural 
and religious influence on the Cushite people. 

Over the centuries, trade developed. Egyptian caravans carried 
grain to Cush and returned to Aswan with ivory, incense, hides, 
and carnelian (a stone prized both as jewelry and for arrowheads) 
for shipment downriver. Egyptian traders particularly valued gold 
and slaves, who served as domestic servants, concubines, and sol- 
diers in the pharaoh's army. Egyptian military expeditions pene- 
trated Cush periodically during the Old Kingdom. Yet there was 
no attempt to establish a permanent presence in the area until the 
Middle Kingdom (ca. 2100-1720 B.C.), when Egypt constructed 
a network of forts along the Nile as far south as Samnah, in north- 
ern Sudan, to guard the flow of gold from mines in Wawat. 

Around 1720 B.C., Asian nomads called Hyksos invaded Egypt, 
ending the Middle Kingdom. Links with Cush were severed, and 
forts along the Nile were destroyed. To fill the vacuum left by the 
Egyptian withdrawal, a culturally distinct indigenous kingdom 
emerged at Karmah, near present-day Dunqulah. After Egyptian 
power revived during the New Kingdom (ca. 1570-1100 B.C.), 
the pharaoh Ahmose I incorporated Cush as an Egyptian province 
governed by a viceroy. Although Egypt's administrative control 
of Cush extended down only to the fourth cataract, Egyptian sources 
list tributary districts reaching to the Red Sea and upstream to 
the confluence of the Blue Nile and White Nile rivers. Egyptian 



4 



Historical Setting 



authorities ensured the loyalty of local chiefs by drafting their chil- 
dren to serve as pages at the pharaoh's court. Egypt also expected 
tribute in gold and slaves from local chiefs. 

Once Egypt had established political control over Cush, officials 
and priests joined military personnel, merchants, and artisans and 
setded in the region. The ancient Egyptian language became widely 
used in everyday activities. The Cushite elite adopted Egyptian 
gods and built temples like that dedicated to the sun god Amon 
at Napata, near present-day Kuraymah. The temples remained 
centers of official religious worship until the coming of Christian- 
ity to the region in the sixth century. When Egyptian influence 
declined or succumbed to foreign domination, the Cushite elite 
regarded themselves as champions of genuine Egyptian cultural 
and religious values. 

By the eleventh century B.C., the authority of the New King- 
dom dynasties had diminished, allowing divided rule in Egypt, and 
ending Egyptian control of Cush. There is little information about 
the region's activities over the next 300 years. In the eighth cen- 
tury B.C., however, Cush reemerged as an independent kingdom 
ruled from Napata by an aggressive line of monarchs who gradu- 
ally extended their influence into Egypt. About 750 B.C., a Cushite 
king called Kashta conquered Upper Egypt and became ruler of 
Thebes until approximately 740 B.C. His successor, Painkhy, sub- 
dued the delta, reunited Egypt under the Twenty-fifth Dynasty, 
and founded a line of kings who ruled Cush and Thebes for about 
a hundred years. The dynasty's intervention in the area of modern 
Syria caused a confrontation between Egypt and Assyria. When 
the Assyrians in retaliation invaded Egypt, Taharqa (688-663 
B.C.), the last Cushite pharaoh, withdrew and returned the dy- 
nasty to Napata, where it continued to rule Cush and extended 
its dominions to the south and east. 

Meroe 

Egypt's succeeding dynasty failed to reassert control over Cush. 
In 590 B.C., however, an Egyptian army sacked Napata, compel- 
ling the Cushite court to move to a more secure location at Meroe 
near the sixth cataract. For several centuries thereafter, the Meroitic 
kingdom developed independently of Egypt, which passed succes- 
sively under Persian, Greek, and, finally, Roman domination. Dur- 
ing the height of its power in the second and third centuries B.C . , 
Meroe extended over a region from the third cataract in the north 
to Sawba, near present-day Khartoum, in the south. 

The pharaonic tradition persisted among a line of rulers at 
Meroe, who raised stelae to record the achievements of their reigns 



5 



Sudan: A Country Study 

and erected pyramids to contain their tombs. These objects and 
the ruins of palaces, temples, and baths at Meroe attest to a cen- 
tralized political system that employed artisans' skills and com- 
manded the labor of a large work force. A well-managed irrigation 
system allowed the area to support a higher population density than 
was possible during later periods. By the first century B.C., the 
use of hieroglyphs gave way to a Meroitic script that adapted the 
Egyptian writing system to an indigenous, Nubian-related language 
spoken later by the region's people. Meroe 's succession system was 
not necessarily hereditary; the matriarchal royal family member 
deemed most worthy often became king. The queen mother's role 
in the selection process was crucial to a smooth succession. The 
crown appears to have passed from brother to brother (or sister) 
and only when no siblings remained from father to son. 

Although Napata remained Meroe 's religious center, northern 
Cush eventually fell into disorder as it came under pressure from 
the Blemmyes, predatory nomads from east of the Nile. However, 
the Nile continued to give the region access to the Mediterranean 
world. Additionally, Meroe maintained contact with Arab and In- 
dian traders along the Red Sea coast and incorporated Hellenistic 
and Hindu cultural influences into its daily life. Inconclusive evi- 
dence suggests that metallurgical technology may have been trans- 
mitted westward across the savanna belt to West Africa from 
Meroe 's iron smelteries. 

Relations between Meroe and Egypt were not always peaceful. 
In 23 B.C., in response to Meroe 's incursions into Upper Egypt, 
a Roman army moved south and razed Napata. The Roman com- 
mander quickly abandoned the area, however, as too poor to war- 
rant colonization. 

In the second century A.D., the Nobatae occupied the Nile's 
west bank in northern Cush. They are believed to have been one 
of several well-armed bands of horse- and camel-borne warriors 
who sold protection to the Meroitic population; eventually they 
intermarried and established themselves among the Meroitic peo- 
ple as a military aristocracy. Until nearly the fifth century, Rome 
subsidized the Nobatae and used Meroe as a buffer between Egypt 
and the Blemmyes. Meanwhile, the old Meroitic kingdom con- 
tracted because of the expansion of Axum, a powerful trading state 
in modern Ethiopia to the east. About A. D. 350, an Axumite army 
captured and destroyed Meroe city, ending the kingdom's indepen- 
dent existence. 

Christian Nubia 

By the sixth century, three states had emerged as the political 
and cultural heirs of the Meroitic kingdom. Nobatia in the north, 



6 





Tombs in the north at Meroe of kings who ruled ca. 300-200 B. C. 

Temple of Naqa, southwest of Meroe 
Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 



7 



Sudan: A Country Study 

also known as Ballanah, had its capital at Faras, in what is now 
Egypt; the central kingdom, Muqurra, was centered at Dunqulah, 
the old city on the Nile about 150 kilometers south of modern 
Dunqulah; and Aiwa, in the heartland of old Meroe in the south, 
had its capital at Sawba. In all three kingdoms, warrior aristocra- 
cies ruled Meroitic populations from royal courts where function- 
aries bore Greek titles in emulation of the Byzantine court. 

The earliest references to Nubia's successor kingdoms are con- 
tained in accounts by Greek and Coptic authors of the conversion 
of Nubian kings to Christianity in the sixth century. According 
to tradition, a missionary sent by Byzantine empress Theodora ar- 
rived in Nobatia and started preaching the gospel about 540. It 
is possible that the conversion process began earlier, however, under 
the aegis of Coptic missionaries from Egypt, who in the previous 
century had brought Christianity to the area. The Nubian kings 
accepted the Monophysite Christianity practiced in Egypt and 
acknowledged the spiritual authority of the Coptic patriarch of Alex- 
andria over the Nubian church. A hierarchy of bishops named by 
the Coptic patriarch and consecrated in Egypt directed the church's 
activities and wielded considerable secular power. The church sanc- 
tioned a sacerdotal kingship, confirming the royal line's legiti- 
macy. In turn the monarch protected the church's interests. The 
queen mother's role in the succession process paralleled that of 
Meroe 's matriarchal tradition. Because women transmitted the right 
to succession, a renowned warrior not of royal birth might be nomi- 
nated to become king through marriage to a woman in line of suc- 
cession. 

The emergence of Christianity reopened channels to Mediter- 
ranean civilization and renewed Nubia's cultural and ideological 
ties to Egypt. The church encouraged literacy in Nubia through 
its Egyptian- trained clergy and in its monastic and cathedral schools. 
The use of Greek in liturgy eventually gave way to the Nubian 
language, which was written using an indigenous alphabet that com- 
bined elements of the old Meroitic and Coptic scripts. Coptic, 
however, often appeared in ecclesiastical and secular circles. Ad- 
ditionally, early inscriptions have indicated a continuing knowledge 
of colloquial Greek in Nubia as late as the twelfth century. After 
the seventh century, Arabic gained importance in the Nubian king- 
doms, especially as a medium for commerce. 

The Christian Nubian kingdoms, which survived for many cen- 
turies, achieved their peak of prosperity and military power in the 
ninth and tenth centuries. However, Muslim Arab invaders, who 
in 640 had conquered Egypt, posed a threat to the Christian Nubian 
kingdoms. Most historians believe that Arab pressure forced 



8 



Historical Setting 



Nobatia and Muqurra to merge into the kingdom of Dunqulah 
sometime before 700. Although the Arabs soon abandoned attempts 
to reduce Nubia by force, Muslim domination of Egypt often made 
it difficult to communicate with the Coptic patriarch or to obtain 
Egyptian- trained clergy. As a result, the Nubian church became 
isolated from the rest of the Christian world. 

The Coming of Islam 

The coming of Islam eventually changed the nature of Sudanese 
society and facilitated the division of the country into north and 
south. Islam also fostered political unity, economic growth, and 
educational development among its adherents; however, these 
benefits were restricted largely to urban and commercial centers. 

The spread of Islam began shortly after the Prophet Muham- 
mad's death in 632. By that time, he and his followers had con- 
verted most of Arabia's tribes and towns to Islam (literally, 
submission), which Muslims maintained united the individual 
believer, the state, and society under God's will. Islamic rulers, 
therefore, exercised temporal and religious authority. Islamic law 
(sharia — see Glossary), which was derived primarily from the 
Quran, encompassed all aspects of the lives of believers, who were 
called Muslims ("those who submit" to God's will). 

Within a generation of Muhammad's death, Arab armies had 
carried Islam north and east from Arabia into North Africa. Mus- 
lims imposed political control over conquered territories in the name 
of the caliph (the Prophet's successor as supreme earthly leader 
of Islam). The Islamic armies won a major North African victory 
in 643 in Tripoli (in modern Libya). However, the Muslim sub- 
jugation of all of North Africa took about seventy-five years. The 
Arabs invaded Nubia in 642 and again in 652, when they laid siege 
to the city of Dunqulah and destroyed its cathedral. The Nubians 
put up a stout defense, however, causing the Arabs to accept an 
armistice and withdraw their forces. 

The Arabs 

Contacts between Nubians and Arabs long predated the com- 
ing of Islam, but the arabization of the Nile Valley was a gradual 
process that occurred over a period of nearly 1,000 years. Arab 
nomads continually wandered into the region in search of fresh 
pasturage, and Arab seafarers and merchants traded in Red Sea 
ports for spices and slaves. Intermarriage and assimilation also facili- 
tated arabization. After the initial attempts at military conquest 
failed, the Arab commander in Egypt, Abd Allah ibn Saad, con- 
cluded the first in a series of regularly renewed treaties with the 



9 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Nubians that, with only brief interruptions, governed relations be- 
tween the two peoples for more than 600 years. So long as Arabs 
ruled Egypt, there was peace on the Nubian frontier; however, when 
non- Arabs acquired control of the Nile Delta, tension arose in 
Upper Egypt. 

The Arabs realized the commercial advantages of peaceful rela- 
tions with Nubia and used the treaty to ensure that travel and trade 
proceeded unhindered across the frontier. The treaty also contained 
security arrangements whereby both parties agreed that neither 
would come to the defense of the other in the event of an attack 
by a third party. The treaty obliged both to exchange annual trib- 
ute as a goodwill symbol, the Nubians in slaves and the Arabs in 
grain. This formality was only a token of the trade that developed 
between the two, not only in these commodities but also in horses 
and manufactured goods brought to Nubia by the Arabs and in 
ivory, gold, gems, gum arabic, and cattle carried back by them 
to Egypt or shipped to Arabia. 

Acceptance of the treaty did not indicate Nubian submission to 
the Arabs, but the treaty did impose conditions for Arab friend- 
ship that eventually permitted Arabs to achieve a privileged posi- 
tion in Nubia. For example, provisions of the treaty allowed Arabs 
to buy land from Nubians south of the frontier at Aswan. Arab 
merchants established markets in Nubian towns to facilitate the 
exchange of grain and slaves. Arab engineers supervised the op- 
eration of mines east of the Nile in which they used slave labor 
to extract gold and emeralds. Muslim pilgrims en route to Mecca 
traveled across the Red Sea on ferries from Aydhab and Sawakin, 
ports that also received cargoes bound from India to Egypt. 

Traditional genealogies trace the ancestry of most of the Nile 
Valley's mixed population to Arab tribes that migrated into the 
region during this period. Even many non- Arabic- speaking groups 
claim descent from Arab forebears. The two most important Arabic- 
speaking groups to emerge in Nubia were the Jaali and the Juhayna 
(see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). Both showed physical continuity with 
the indigenous pre-Islamic population. The former claimed descent 
from the Quraysh, the Prophet Muhammad's tribe. Historically, 
the Jaali have been sedentary farmers and herders or townspeople 
settled along the Nile and in Al Jazirah. The nomadic Juhayna 
comprised a family of tribes that included the Kababish, Baqqara, 
and Shukriya. They were descended from Arabs who migrated after 
the thirteenth century into an area that extended from the savanna 
and semidesert west of the Nile to the hill country east of the Blue 
Nile. Both groups formed a series of tribal shaykhdoms that 
succeeded the crumbling Christian Nubian kingdoms and that 



10 



Historical Setting 



were in frequent conflict with one another and with neighboring 
non- Arabs. In some instances, as among the Beja, the indigenous 
people absorbed Arab migrants who settled among them. Beja rul- 
ing families later derived their legitimacy from their claims of Arab 
ancestry. 

Although not all Muslims in the region were Arabic- speaking, 
acceptance of Islam facilitated the arabizing process. There was 
no policy of proselytism, however, and forced conversion was rare. 
Islam penetrated the area over a long period of time through 
intermarriage and contacts with Arab merchants and settlers. Ex- 
emption from taxation in regions under Muslim rule also proved 
a powerful incentive to conversion. 

The Decline of Christian Nubia 

Until the thirteenth century, the Nubian kingdoms proved their 
resilience in maintaining political independence and their commit- 
ment to Christianity. In the early eighth century and again in the 
tenth century, Nubian kings led armies into Egypt to force the 
release of the imprisoned Coptic patriarch and to relieve fellow 
Christians suffering persecution under Muslim rulers. In 1276, 
however, the Mamluks (Arabic for "owned"), who were an elite 
but frequently disorderly caste of soldier- administrators composed 
largely of Turkish, Kurdish, and Circassian slaves, intervened in 
a dynastic dispute, ousted Dunqulah's reigning monarch and deliv- 
ered the crown and silver cross that symbolized Nubian kingship 
to a rival claimant (see The Rule of the Kashif, this ch.). There- 
after, Dunqulah became a satellite of Egypt. 

Because of the frequent intermarriage between Nubian nobles 
and the kinswomen of Arab shaykhs, the lineages of the two elites 
merged and the Muslim heirs took their places in the royal line 
of succession. In 1315 a Muslim prince of Nubian royal blood 
ascended the throne of Dunqulah as king. The expansion of Islam 
coincided with the decline of the Nubian Christian church. A "dark 
age" enveloped Nubia in the fifteenth century during which polit- 
ical authority fragmented and slave raiding intensified. Commu- 
nities in the river valley and savanna, fearful for their safety, formed 
tribal organizations and adopted Arab protectors. Muslims prob- 
ably did not constitute a majority in the old Nubian areas until 
the fifteenth or sixteenth century. 

The Rule of the Kashif 

For several centuries Arab caliphs had governed Egypt through 
the Mamluks. In the thirteenth century, the Mamluks seized con- 
trol of the state and created a sultanate that ruled Egypt until the 



11 



Sudan: A Country Study 

early sixteenth century. Although they repeatedly launched mili- 
tary expeditions that weakened Dunqulah, the Mamluks did not 
directly rule Nubia. In 1517 the Turks conquered Egypt and in- 
corporated the country into the Ottoman Empire as a pashalik 
(province). 

Ottoman forces pursued fleeing Mamluks into Nubia, which had 
been claimed as a dependency of the Egyptian pashalik. Although 
they established administrative structures in ports on the Red Sea 
coast, the Ottomans exerted little authority over the interior. In- 
stead, the Ottomans relied on military kashif (leaders), who con- 
trolled their virtually autonomous fiefs as agents of the pasha in 
Cairo, to rule the interior. The rule of the kashif, many of whom 
were Mamluks who had made their peace with the Ottomans, lasted 
300 years. Concerned with little more than tax collecting and slave 
trading, the military leaders terrorized the population and constandy 
fought among themselves for title to territory. 

The Funj 

At the same time that the Ottomans brought northern Nubia 
into their orbit, a new power, the Funj, had risen in southern Nubia 
and had supplanted the remnants of the old Christian kingdom 
of Aiwa. In 1504 a Funj leader, Amara Dunqas, founded the Black 
Sultanate (As Saltana az Zarqa) at Sannar. The Black Sultanate 
eventually became the keystone of the Funj Empire. By the mid- 
sixteenth century, Sannar controlled Al Jazirah and commanded 
the allegiance of vassal states and tribal districts north to the third 
cataract and south to the swampy grasslands along the Nile. 

The Funj state included a loose confederation of sultanates and 
dependent tribal chieftaincies drawn together under the suzerainty 
of Sannar' s mek (sultan). As overlord, the mek received tribute, levied 
taxes, and called on his vassals to supply troops in time of war. 
Vassal states in turn relied on the mek to setde local disorders and 
to resolve internal disputes. The Funj stabilized the region and in- 
terposed a military bloc between the Arabs in the north, the Ethio- 
pians in the east, and the non-Muslim blacks in the south. 

The sultanate's economy depended on the role played by the 
Funj in the slave trade. Farming and herding also thrived in Al 
Jazirah and in the savanna. Sannar apportioned tributary areas 
into tribal homelands (each one termed a dar; pi., dur), where the 
mek granted the local population the right to use arable land. The 
diverse groups that inhabitated each dar eventually regarded them- 
selves as units of tribes. Movement from one dar to another en- 
tailed a change in tribal identification. (Tribal distinctions in these 
areas in modern Sudan can be traced to this period.) The mek 



12 



Historical Setting 



appointed a chieftain (nazir; pi. , nuzzar) to govern each dar. Nuzzar 
administered dur according to customary law, paid tribute to the 
mek, and collected taxes. The mek also derived income from crown 
lands set aside for his use in each dar. 

At the peak of its power in the mid- seventeenth century, Sannar 
repulsed the northward advance of the Nilotic Shilluk people up 
the White Nile and compelled many of them to submit to Funj 
authority. After this victory, the mek Badi II Abu Duqn (1642-81) 
sought to centralize the government of the confederacy at Sannar. 
To implement this policy, Badi introduced a standing army of slave 
soldiers that would free Sannar from dependence on vassal sultans 
for military assistance and would provide the mek with the means 
to enforce his will. The move alienated the dynasty from the Funj 
warrior aristocracy, which in 1718 deposed the reigning mek and 
placed one of its own ranks on the throne of Sannar. The mid- 
eighteenth century witnessed another brief period of expansion when 
the Funj turned back an Ethiopian invasion, defeated the Fur, and 
took control of much of Kurdufan. But civil war and the demands 
of defending the sultanate had overextended the warrior society's 
resources and sapped its strength. 

Another reason for Sannar' s decline may have been the grow- 
ing influence of its hereditary viziers (chancellors), chiefs of a non- 
Funj tributary tribe who managed court affairs. In 1761 the vizier 
Muhammad Abu al Kaylak, who had led the Funj army in wars, 
carried out a palace coup, relegating the sultan to a figurehead role. 
Sannar' s hold over its vassals diminished, and by the early 
nineteenth century more remote areas ceased to recognize even the 
nominal authority of the mek. 

The Fur 

Darfur was the Fur homeland. Renowned as cavalrymen, Fur 
clans frequently allied with or opposed their kin, the Kanuri of 
Borno, in modern Nigeria. After a period of disorder in the six- 
teenth century, during which the region was briefly subject to 
Borno, the leader of the Keira clan, Sulayman Solong (1596-1637), 
supplanted a rival clan and became Darfur' s first sultan. Sulay- 
man Solong decreed Islam to be the sultanate's official religion. 
However, large-scale religious conversions did not occur until the 
reign of Ahmad Bakr (1682-1722), who imported teachers, built 
mosques, and compelled his subjects to become Muslims. In the 
eighteenth century, several sultans consolidated the dynasty's hold 
on Darfur, established a capital at Al Fashir, and contested the 
Funj for control of Kurdufan. 



13 



Sudan: A Country Study 



The sultans operated the slave trade as a monopoly. They lev- 
ied taxes on traders and export duties on slaves sent to Egypt, and 
took a share of the slaves brought into Darfur. Some household 
slaves advanced to prominent positions in the courts of sultans, 
and the power exercised by these slaves provoked a violent reac- 
tion among the traditional class of Fur officeholders in the late eigh- 
teenth century. The rivalry between the slave and traditional elites 
caused recurrent unrest throughout the next century. 

The Turkiyah, 1821-85 

As a pashalik of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt had been divided 
into several provinces, each of which was placed under a Mamluk 
bey (governor) reponsible to the pasha, who in turn answered to 
the Porte, the term used for the Ottoman government referring 
to the Sublime Porte, or high gate, of the grand vizier's building. 
In approximately 280 years of Ottoman rule, no fewer than 100 
pashas succeeded each other. In the eighteenth century, their 
authority became tenuous as rival Mamluk beys became the real 
power in the land. The struggles among the beys continued until 
1798 when the French invasion of Egypt altered the situation. Com- 
bined British and Turkish military operations forced the withdrawal 
of French forces in 1801, introducing a period of chaos in Egypt. 
In 1805 the Ottomans sought to restore order by appointing 
Muhammad Ali as Egypt's pasha. 

With the help of 10,000 Albanian troops provided by the Otto- 
mans, Muhammad Ali purged Egypt of the Mamluks. In 1811 he 
launched a seven-year campaign in Arabia, supporting his suzerain, 
the Ottoman sultan, in the suppression of a revolt by the Wahhabi, 
an ultraconservative Muslim sect. To replace the Albanian soldiers, 
Muhammad Ali planned to build an Egyptian army with Sudanese 
slave recruits. 

Although a part of present-day northern Sudan was nominally 
an Egyptian dependency, the previous pashas had demanded lit- 
tle more from the kashif who ruled there than the regular remit- 
tance of tribute; that changed under Muhammad Ali. After he had 
defeated the Mamluks in Egypt, a party of them escaped and fled 
south. In 1811 these Mamluks established a state at Dunqulah as 
a base for their slave trading. In 1820 the sultan of Sannar informed 
Muhammad Ali that he was unable to comply with the demand 
to expel the Mamluks. In response the pasha sent 4,000 troops to 
invade Sudan, clear it of Mamluks, and reclaim it for Egypt. The 
pasha's forces received the submission of the kashif, dispersed the 
Dunqulah Mamluks, conquered Kurdufan, and accepted Sannar' s 



14 



Historical Setting 



surrender from the last Funj sultan, Badi IV. The Jaali Arab tribes 
offered stiff resistance, however. 

Initially, the Egyptian occupation of Sudan was disastrous. Under 
the new government established in 1821, which was known as the 
Turkiyah or Turkish regime, soldiers lived off the land and exacted 
exorbitant taxes from the population. They also destroyed many 
ancient Meroitic pyramids searching for hidden gold. Furthermore, 
slave trading increased, causing many of the inhabitants of the fertile 
Al Jazirah, heartland of Funj, to flee to escape the slave traders. 
Within a year of the pasha's victory, 30,000 Sudanese slaves went 
to Egypt for training and induction into the army. However, so 
many perished from disease and the unfamiliar climate that the 
remaining slaves could be used only in garrisons in Sudan. 

As the military occupation became more secure, the government 
became less harsh. Egypt saddled Sudan with a parasitic bureau- 
cracy, however, and expected the country to be self-supporting. 
Nevertheless, farmers and herders gradually returned to Al Jazirah. 
The Turkiyah also won the allegiance of some tribal and religious 
leaders by granting them a tax exemption. Egyptian soldiers and 
Sudanese jahidiyah (slave soldiers; literally, fighters), supplemented 
by mercenaries recruited in various Ottoman domains, manned 
garrisons in Khartoum, Kassala, Al Ubayyid, and at several smaller 
outposts. The Shaiqiyah, Arabic speakers who had resisted Egyp- 
tian occupation, were defeated and allowed to serve the Egyptian 
rulers as tax collectors and irregular cavalry under their own 
shaykhs. The Egyptians divided Sudan into provinces, which they 
then subdivided into smaller administrative units that usually cor- 
responded to tribal territories. In 1835 Khartoum became the seat 
of the hakimadar (governor general); many garrison towns also de- 
veloped into administrative centers in their respective regions. At 
the local level, shaykhs and traditional tribal chieftains assumed 
administrative responsibilities. 

In the 1850s, the pas halik revised the legal systems in Egypt and 
Sudan, introducing a commercial code and a criminal code ad- 
ministered in secular courts. The change reduced the prestige of 
the qadis (Islamic judges) whose sharia courts were confined to deal- 
ing with matters of personal status. Even in this area, the courts 
lacked credibility in the eyes of Sudanese Muslims because they 
conducted hearings according to the Ottoman Empire's Hanafi 
school of law rather than the stricter Maliki school customary in 
the area. 

The Turkiyah also encouraged a religious orthodoxy favored in 
the Ottoman Empire. The government undertook a mosque- 
building program and staffed religious schools and courts with 



15 



Sudan: A Country Study 

teachers and judges trained at Cairo's Al Azhar University. The 
government favored the Khatmiyyah, a traditional religious order, 
because its leaders preached cooperation with the regime. But 
Sudanese Muslims condemned the official orthodoxy as decadent 
because it had rejected many popular beliefs and practices. 

Until its gradual suppression in the 1860s, the slave trade was 
the most profitable undertaking in Sudan and was the focus of Egyp- 
tian interests in the country. The government encouraged economic 
development through state monopolies that had exported slaves, 
ivory, and gum arabic. In some areas, tribal land, which had been 
held in common, became the private property of the shaykhs and 
was sometimes sold to buyers outside the tribe. 

Muhammad Ali's immediate successors, Abbas I (1849-54) and 
Said (1854-63), lacked leadership qualities and paid little atten- 
tion to Sudan, but the reign of Ismail (1863-79) revitalized Egyp- 
tian interest in the country. In 1865 the Ottoman Empire ceded 
the Red Sea coast and its ports to Egypt. Two years later, the 
Ottoman sultan granted Ismail the title of khedive (sovereign 
prince). Egypt organized and garrisoned the new provinces of 
Upper Nile, Bahr al Ghazal, and Equatoria and, in 1874, conquered 
and annexed Darfur. Ismail named Europeans to provincial gover- 
norships and appointed Sudanese to more responsible government 
positions. Under prodding from Britain, Ismail took steps to com- 
plete the elimination of the slave trade in the north of present-day 
Sudan. The khedive also tried to build a new army on the Euro- 
pean model that no longer would depend on slaves to provide man- 
power. However, this modernization process caused unrest. Army 
units mutinied, and many Sudanese resented the quartering of 
troops among the civilian population and the use of Sudanese forced 
labor on public projects. Efforts to suppress the slave trade angered 
the urban merchant class and the Baqqara Arabs, who had grown 
prosperous by selling slaves. 

There is little documentation for the history of the southern 
Sudanese provinces until the introduction of the Turkiyah in the 
north in the early 1820s and the subsequent extension of slave raid- 
ing into the south. Information about their peoples before that time 
is based largely on oral history. According to these traditions, the 
Nilotic peoples — the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, and others — first en- 
tered southern Sudan sometime before the tenth century. During 
the period from the fifteenth century to the nineteenth century, 
tribal migrations, largely from the area of Bahr al Ghazal, brought 
these peoples to their modern locations. Some, like the Shilluk, de- 
veloped a centralized monarchical tradition that enabled them to 
preserve their tribal integrity in the face of external pressures in 



16 



Historical Setting 



the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The non-Nilotic Azande 
people, who entered southern Sudan in the sixteenth century, es- 
tablished the region's largest state. In the eighteenth century, the 
militaristic Avungara people entered and quickly imposed their 
authority over the poorly organized and weaker Azande. Avun- 
gara power remained largely unchallenged until the arrival of the 
British at the end of the nineteenth century. Geographic barriers 
protected the southerners from Islam's advance, enabling them to 
retain their social and cultural heritage and their political and reli- 
gious institutions. During the nineteenth century, the slave trade 
brought southerners into closer contact with Sudanese Arabs and 
resulted in a deep hatred for the northerners. 

Slavery had been an institution of Sudanese life throughout his- 
tory, but southern Sudan, where slavery flourished particularly, 
was originally considered an area beyond Cairo's control. Because 
Sudan had access to Middle East slave markets, the slave trade 
in the south intensified in the nineteenth century and continued 
after the British had suppressed slavery in much of sub-Saharan 
Africa. Annual raids resulted in the capture of countless thousands 
of southern Sudanese and the destruction of the region's stability 
and economy. The horrors associated with the slave trade gener- 
ated European interest in Sudan. 

Until 1843 Muhammad Ali maintained a state monopoly on slave 
trading in Egypt and the pashalik. Thereafter, authorities sold 
licenses to private traders who competed with government- 
conducted slave raids. In 1854 Cairo ended state participation in 
the slave trade, and in 1860, in response to European pressure, 
Egypt prohibited the slave trade. However, the Egyptian army failed 
to enforce the prohibition against the private armies of the slave 
traders. The introduction of steamboats and firearms enabled slave 
traders to overwhelm local resistance and prompted the creation 
of southern ''bush empires" by Baqqara Arabs. 

Ismail implemented a military modernization program and pro- 
posed to extend Egyptian rule to the southern region. In 1869 British 
explorer Sir Samuel Baker received a commission as governor of 
Equatoria Province, with orders to annex all territory in the White 
Nile's basin and to suppress the slave trade. In 1874 Charles George 
Gordon, a British officer, succeeded Baker. Gordon disarmed many 
slave traders and hanged those who defied him. By the time he 
became Sudan's governor general in 1877, Gordon had weakened 
the slave trade in much of the south. 

Unfortunately, Ismail's southern policy lacked consistency. In 
1871 he had named a notorious Arab slave trader, Rahman Mansur 
az Zubayr, as governor of the newly created province of Bahr al 



17 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Ghazal. Zubayr used his army to pacify the province and to 
eliminate his competition in the slave trade. In 1874 he invaded 
Darfur after the sultan had refused to guard caravan routes through 
his territory. Zubayr then offered the region as a province to the 
khedive. Later that year, Zubayr defied Cairo when it attempted 
to relieve him of his post, and he defeated an Egyptian force that 
sought to oust him. After he became Sudan's governor general, 
Gordon ended Zubayr' s slave trading, disbanded his army, and 
sent him back to Cairo. 

The Mahdiyah, 1884-98 

Developments in Sudan during this period cannot be understood 
without reference to the British position in Egypt. In 1869 the Suez 
Canal opened and quickly became Britain's economic lifeline to 
India and the Far East. To defend this waterway, Britain sought 
a greater role in Egyptian affairs. In 1873 the British government 
therefore supported a program whereby an Anglo-French debt com- 
mission assumed responsibility for managing Egypt's fiscal affairs. 
This commission eventually forced Khedive Ismail to abdicate in 
favor of his more politically acceptable son, Tawfiq (1877-92). 

After the removal, in 1877, of Ismail, who had appointed him 
to the post, Gordon resigned as governor general of Sudan in 1880. 
His successors lacked direction from Cairo and feared the political 
turmoil that had engulfed Egypt. As a result, they failed to con- 
tinue the policies Gordon had put in place. The illegal slave trade 
revived, although not enough to satisfy the merchants whom 
Gordon had put out of business. The Sudanese army suffered from 
a lack of resources, and unemployed soldiers from disbanded units 
troubled garrison towns. Tax collectors arbitrarily increased 
taxation. 

In this troubled atmosphere, Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid 
Abd Allah, a faqir or holy man who combined personal magnetism 
with religious zealotry, emerged, determined to expel the Ottomans 
and restore Islam to its primitive purity. The son of a Dunqulah 
boatbuilder, Muhammad Ahmad had become the disciple of 
Muhammad ash Sharif, the head of the Sammaniyah order. Later, 
as a shaykh of the order, Muhammad Ahmad spent several years 
in seclusion and gained a reputation as a mystic and teacher. In 
1880 he became a Sammaniyah leader. 

Muhammad Ahmad 's sermons attracted an increasing number 
of followers. Among those who joined him was Abdallahi ibn 
Muhammad, a Baqqara from southern Darfur. His planning capa- 
bilities proved invaluable to Muhammad Ahmad, who revealed 
himself as Al Mahdi al Muntazar ("the awaited guide in the right 



18 



Historical Setting 



path," usually seen as the Mahdi), sent from God to redeem the 
faithful and prepare the way for the second coming of the Prophet 
Isa (Jesus). The Mahdist movement demanded a return to the sim- 
plicity of early Islam, abstention from alcohol and tobacco, and 
the strict seclusion of women. 

Even after the Mahdi proclaimed a jihad, or holy war, against 
the Turkiyah, Khartoum dismissed him as a religious fanatic. The 
government paid more attention when his religious zeal turned to 
denunciation of tax collectors. To avoid arrest, the Mahdi and a 
party of his followers, the Ansar, made a long march to Kurdufan, 
where he gained a large number of recruits, especially from the 
Baqqara. From a refuge in the area, he wrote appeals to the shaykhs 
of the religious orders and won active support or assurances of neu- 
trality from all except the pro-Egyptian Khatmiyyah. Merchants 
and Arab tribes that had depended on the slave trade responded 
as well, along with the Hadendowa Beja, who were rallied to the 
Mahdi by an Ansar captain, Usman Digna. 

Early in 1882, the Ansar, armed with spears and swords, over- 
whelmed a 7,000-man Egyptian force not far from Al Ubayyid and 
seized their rifles and ammunition. The Mahdi followed up this 
victory by laying siege to Al Ubayyid and starving it into submis- 
sion after four months. The Ansar, 30,000 men strong, then de- 
feated an 8,000-man Egyptian relief force at Sheikan. Next the 
Mahdi captured Darfur and imprisoned Rudolf Slatin, an Austrian 
in the khedive's service, who later became the first Egyptian- 
appointed governor of Darfur Province. 

The advance of the Ansar and the Beja rising in the east im- 
periled communications with Egypt and threatened to cut off gar- 
risons at Khartoum, Kassala, Sannar, and Sawakin and in the 
south. To avoid being drawn into a costly military intervention, 
the British government ordered an Egyptian withdrawal from 
Sudan. Gordon, who had received a reappointment as governor 
general, arranged to supervise the evacuation of Egyptian troops 
and officials and all foreigners from Sudan. 

After reaching Khartoum in February 1884, Gordon realized 
that he could not extricate the garrisons. As a result, he called for 
reinforcements from Egypt to relieve Khartoum. Gordon also 
recommended that Zubayr, an old enemy whom he recognized as 
an excellent military commander, be named to succeed him to give 
disaffected Sudanese a leader other than the Mahdi to rally be- 
hind. London rejected this plan. As the situation deteriorated, 
Gordon argued that Sudan was essential to Egypt's security and 
that to allow the Ansar a victory there would invite the movement 
to spread elsewhere. 



19 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Increasing British popular support for Gordon eventually forced 
Prime Minister William Gladstone to mobilize a relief force under 
the command of Lord Garnet Joseph Wolseley. A "flying column" 
sent overland from Wadi Haifa across the Bayyudah Desert bogged 
down at Abu Tulayh (commonly called Abu Klea), where the 
Hadendowa Beja — the so-called Fuzzy Wuzzies — broke the Brit- 
ish line. An advance unit that had gone ahead by river when the 
column reached Al Matammah arrived at Khartoum on Janu- 
ary 28, 1885, to find the town had fallen two days earlier. The Ansar 
had waited for the Nile flood to recede before attacking the poorly 
defended river approach to Khartoum in boats, slaughtering the 
garrison, killing Gordon, and delivering his head to the Mahdi's 
tent. Kassala and Sannar fell soon after, and by the end of 1885 
the Ansar had begun to move into the southern region. In all Sudan, 
only Sawakin, reinforced by Indian army troops, and Wadi Haifa 
on the northern frontier remained in Anglo-Egyptian hands (see 
fig. 2). 

The Mahdiyah (Mahdist regime) imposed traditional Islamic 
laws. Sudan's new ruler also authorized the burning of lists of 
pedigrees and books of law and theology because of their associa- 
tion with the old order and because he believed that the former 
accentuated tribalism at the expense of religious unity. 

The Mahdiyah has become known as the first genuine Sudanese 
nationalist government. The Mahdi maintained that his movement 
was not a religious order that could be accepted or rejected at will, 
but that it was a universal regime, which challenged man to join 
or to be destroyed. The Mahdi modified Islam's five pillars to sup- 
port the dogma that loyalty to him was essential to true belief (see 
Islamic Movements and Religious Orders, ch. 2). The Mahdi also 
added the declaration "and Muhammad Ahmad is the Mahdi of 
God and the representative of His Prophet' ' to the recitation of 
the creed, the shahada. Moreover, service in the jihad replaced the 
hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, as a duty incumbent on the faithful. 
Zakat (almsgiving) became the tax paid to the state. The Mahdi 
justified these and other innovations and reforms as responses to 
instructions conveyed to him by God in visions. 

The Khalifa 

Six months after the capture of Khartoum, the Mahdi died of 
typhus. The task of establishing and maintaining a government 
fell to his deputies — three caliphs chosen by the Mahdi in emula- 
tion of the Prophet Muhammad. Rivalry among the three, each 
supported by people of his native region, continued until 1891 , when 
Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, with the help primarily of the Baqqara 



20 



Historical Setting 



Arabs, overcame the opposition of the others and emerged as un- 
challenged leader of the Mahdiyah. Abdallahi — called the Khalifa 
(successor) — purged the Mahdiyah of members of the Mahdi's fam- 
ily and many of his early religious disciples. 

Originally, the Mahdiyah was a jihad state, run like a military 
camp. Sharia courts enforced Islamic law and the Mahdi's pre- 
cepts, which had the force of law. After consolidating his power, 
the Khalifa instituted an administration and appointed Ansar (who 
were usually Baqqara) as amirs over each of the several provinces. 
The Khalifa also ruled over rich Al Jazirah. Although he failed 
to restore this region's commercial well-being, the Khalifa organized 
workshops to manufacture ammunition and to maintain river 
steamboats. 

Regional relations remained tense throughout much of the Mah- 
diyah period, largely because of the Khalifa's commitment to using 
the jihad to extend his version of Islam throughout the world. For 
example, the Khalifa rejected an offer of an alliance against the 
Europeans by Ethiopia's negus (king), Yohannes IV. In 1887 a 
60,000-man Ansar army invaded Ethiopia, penetrated as far as 
Gonder, and captured prisoners and booty. The Khalifa then re- 
fused to conclude peace with Ethiopia. In March 1889, an Ethio- 
pian force, commanded by the king, marched on Qallabat; however, 
after Yohannes IV fell in battle, the Ethiopians withdrew. Abd ar 
Rahman an Nujumi, the Khalifa's best general, invaded Egypt 
in 1889, but British-led Egyptian troops defeated the Ansar at Tush- 
kah. The failure of the Egyptian invasion ended the Ansar' s in- 
vincibility. The Belgians prevented the Mahdi's men from 
conquering Equatoria, and in 1893 the Italians repulsed an Ansar 
attack at Akordat (in present-day Eritrea) and forced the Ansar 
to withdraw from Ethiopia. 

Reconquest of Sudan 

In 1892 Herbert Kitchener (later Lord Kitchener) became sirdar, 
or commander, of the Egyptian army and started preparations for 
the reconquest of Sudan. The British decision to occupy Sudan 
resulted in part from international developments that required the 
country be brought under British supervision. By the early 1890s, 
British, French, and Belgian claims had converged at the Nile head- 
waters. Britain feared that the other colonial powers would take 
advantage of Sudan's instability to acquire territory previously an- 
nexed to Egypt. Apart from these political considerations, Britain 
wanted to establish control over the Nile to safeguard a planned 
irrigation dam at Aswan. 



21 



Sudan: A Country Study 




Figure 2. The Mahdist State, 1881-98 

In 1895 the British government authorized Kitchener to launch 
a campaign to reconquer Sudan. Britain provided men and materiel 
while Egypt financed the expedition. The Anglo-Egyptian Nile Ex- 
peditionary Force included 25,800 men, 8,600 of whom were Brit- 
ish. The remainder were troops belonging to Egyptian units that 
included six battalions recruited in southern Sudan. An armed river 
flotilla escorted the force, which also had artillery support. In prepa- 
ration for the attack, the British established army headquarters at 



22 



Historical Setting 



Wadi Haifa and extended and reinforced the perimeter defenses 
around Sawakin. In March 1896, the campaign started; in Sep- 
tember, Kitchener captured Dunqulah. The British then con- 
structed a rail line from Wadi Haifa to Abu Hamad and an 
extension parallel to the Nile to transport troops and supplies to 
Barbar. Anglo-Egyptian units fought a sharp action at Abu Hamad, 
but there was little other significant resistance until Kitchener 
reached Atbarah and defeated the Ansar. After this engagement, 
Kitchener's soldiers marched and sailed toward Omdurman, where 
the Khalifa made his last stand. 

On September 2, 1898, the Khalifa committed his 52,000-man 
army to a frontal assault against the Anglo-Egyptian force, which 
was massed on the plain outside Omdurman. The outcome never 
was in doubt, largely because of superior British firepower. Dur- 
ing the five-hour battle, about 11,000 Mahdists died whereas 
Anglo-Egyptian losses amounted to 48 dead and fewer than 400 
wounded. 

Mopping-up operations required several years, but organized 
resistance ended when the Khalifa, who had escaped to Kurdufan, 
died in fighting at Umm Diwaykarat in November 1899. Many 
areas welcomed the downfall of his regime. Sudan's economy had 
been all but destroyed during his reign, and the population had 
declined by approximately one-half because of famine, disease, 
persecution, and warfare. Moreover, none of the country's tradi- 
tional institutions or loyalties remained intact. Tribes had been 
divided in their attitudes toward Mahdism, religious brotherhoods 
had been weakened, and orthodox religious leaders had vanished. 

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1899-1955 

In January 1899, an Anglo-Egyptian agreement restored Egyp- 
tian rule in Sudan but as part of a condominium, or joint author- 
ity, exercised by Britain and Egypt. The agreement designated 
territory south of the twenty-second parallel as the Anglo-Egyp- 
tian Sudan. Although it emphasized Egypt's indebtedness to Brit- 
ain for its participation in the reconquest, the agreement failed to 
clarify the juridical relationship between the two condominium 
powers in Sudan or to provide a legal basis for continued British 
presence in the south. Britain assumed responsibility for govern- 
ing the territory on behalf of the khedive. 

Article II of the agreement specified that "the supreme military 
and civil command in Sudan shall be vested in one officer, termed 
the Governor-General of Sudan. He shall be appointed by Khedival 
Decree on the recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty's Govern- 
ment and shall be removed only by Khedival Decree with the 



23 



Sudan: A Country Study 

consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government." The British 
governor general, who was a military officer, reported to the For- 
eign Office through its resident agent in Cairo. In practice, however, 
he exercised extraordinary powers and directed the condominium 
government from Khartoum as if it were a colonial administra- 
tion. Sir Reginald Wingate succeeded Kitchener as governor general 
in 1899. In each province, two inspectors and several district com- 
missioners aided the British governor (mudir). Initially, nearly all 
administrative personnel were British army officers attached to the 
Egyptian army. In 1901, however, civilian administrators started 
arriving in Sudan from Britain and formed the nucleus of the Sudan 
Political Service. Egyptians filled middle-level posts while Sudanese 
gradually acquired lower-level positions. 

In the condominium's early years, the governor general and 
provincial governors exercised great latitude in governing Sudan. 
After 1910, however, an executive council, whose approval was 
required for all legislation and for budgetary matters, assisted the 
governor general. The governor general presided over this coun- 
cil, which included the inspector general; the civil, legal, and finan- 
cial secretaries; and two to four other British officials appointed 
by the governor general. The executive council retained legisla- 
tive authority until 1948. 

After restoring order and the government's authority, the Brit- 
ish dedicated themselves to creating a modern government in the 
condominium. Jurists adopted penal and criminal procedural codes 
similar to those in force in British India. Commissions established 
land tenure rules and adjusted claims in dispute because of grants 
made by successive governments. Taxes on land remained the basic 
form of taxation, the amount assessed depending on the type of 
irrigation, the number of date palms, and the size of herds; however, 
the rate of taxation was fixed for the first time in Sudan's history. 
The 1902 Code of Civil Procedure continued the Ottoman sepa- 
ration of civil law and sharia, but it also created guidelines for the 
operation of sharia courts as an autonomous judicial division under 
a chief qadi appointed by the governor general. Religious judges 
and other sharia court officials were invariably Egyptian. 

There was little resistance to the condominium. Breaches of the 
peace usually took the form of intertribal warfare, banditry, or 
revolts of short duration. For example, Mahdist uprisings occurred 
in February 1900, in 1902-3, in 1904, and in 1908. In 1916 Abd 
Allah as Suhayni, who claimed to be the Prophet Isa, launched 
an unsuccessful jihad. 

The problem of the condominium's undefined borders was a 
greater concern. A 1902 treaty with Ethiopia fixed the southeastern 



24 




Portrait of Herbert Kitchener, commander 
of the Anglo- Egyptian army that 
reconquered Sudan in the 1890s 
Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 




boundary with Sudan. Seven years later, an Anglo-Belgian treaty 
determined the status of the Lado Enclave in the south, establish- 
ing a border with the Belgian Congo (present-day Zaire). The 
western boundary proved more difficult to resolve. Darfur was the 
only province formerly under Egyptian control that was not soon 
recovered under the condominium. When the Mahdiyah disin- 
tegrated, Sultan Ali Dinar reclaimed Darfur' s throne, which had 
been lost to the Egyptians in 1874 and, with British approval, held 
the throne under Ottoman suzerainty on condition that he pay an- 
nual tribute to the khedive. When World War I broke out, Ali Dinar 
proclaimed his loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and responded to 
the Porte's call for a jihad against the Allies. Britain, which had 
declared a protectorate over Egypt in 1914, sent a small force against 
Ali Dinar, who died in subsequent fighting. In 1916 the British 
annexed Darfur to Sudan and terminated the Fur sultanate (see 
fig. 3). 

During the condominium period, economic development oc- 
curred only in the Nile Valley's settled areas. In the first two de- 
cades of condominium rule, the British extended telegraph and rail 
lines to link key points in northern Sudan but services did not reach 
more remote areas. Port Sudan opened in 1906, replacing Sawakin 
as the country's principal outlet to the sea. In 1911 the Sudanese 
government and the private Sudan Plantations Syndicate launched 
the Gezira Scheme (Gezira is also seen as Jazirah) to provide a 



25 



Sudan: A Country Study 

source of high-quality cotton for Britain's textile industry (see 
Irrigated Agriculture, ch. 3). An irrigation dam near Sannar, com- 
pleted in 1925, brought a much larger area in Al Jazirah under 
cultivation. Planters sent cotton by rail from Sannar to Port Sudan 
for shipment abroad. The Gezira Scheme made cotton the main- 
stay of the country's economy and turned the region into Sudan's 
most densely populated area. 

In 1922 Britain renounced the protectorate and approved Egypt's 
declaration of independence. However, the 1923 Egyptian consti- 
tution made no claim to Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan. Subse- 
quent negotiations in London between the British and the new 
Egyptian government foundered on the Sudan question. Nation- 
alists who were inflamed by the failure of the talks rioted in Egypt 
and Sudan, where a minority supported union with Egypt. In 
November 1924, Sir Lee Stack, governor general of Sudan and 
sirdar, was assassinated in Cairo. Britain ordered all Egyptian 
troops, civil servants, and public employees withdrawn from Sudan. 
In 1925 Khartoum formed the 4,500-man Sudan Defence Force 
(SDF) under Sudanese officers to replace Egyptian units. 

Sudan was relatively quiet in the late 1920s and 1930s. During 
this period, the colonial government favored indirect rule, which 
allowed the British to govern through indigenous leaders. In Sudan, 
the traditional leaders were the shaykhs — of villages, tribes, and 
districts — in the north and tribal chiefs in the south. The number 
of Sudanese recognizing them and the degree of authority they held 
varied considerably. The British first delegated judicial powers to 
shaykhs to enable them to settle local disputes and then gradually 
allowed the shaykhs to administer local governments under the 
supervision of British district commissioners. 

The mainstream of political development, however, occurred 
among local leaders and among Khartoum's educated elite. In their 
view, indirect rule prevented the country's unification, exacerbated 
tribalism in the north, and served in the south to buttress a less- 
advanced society against Arab influence. Indirect rule also implied 
government decentralization, which alarmed the educated elite who 
had careers in the central administration and envisioned an even- 
tual transfer of power from British colonial authorities to their class. 
Although nationalists and the Khatmiyyah opposed indirect rule, 
the Ansar, many of whom enjoyed positions of local authority, sup- 
ported the concept. 

Britain's Southern Policy 

From the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, the Brit- 
ish sought to modernize Sudan by applying European technology 



26 



Historical Setting 



to its underdeveloped economy and by replacing its authoritarian 
institutions with ones that adhered to liberal English traditions. 
However, southern Sudan's remote and undeveloped provinces — 
Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal, and Upper Nile — received little offi- 
cial attention until after World War I , except for efforts to sup- 
press tribal warfare and the slave trade. The British justified this 
policy by claiming that the south was not ready for exposure to 
the modern world. To allow the south to develop along indigenous 
lines, the British, therefore, closed the region to outsiders. As a 
result, the south remained isolated and backward. A few Arab mer- 
chants controlled the region's limited commercial activities and Arab 
bureaucrats administered whatever laws existed. Christian mission- 
aries, who operated schools and medical clinics, provided limited 
social services in southern Sudan. 

The earliest Christian missionaries were the Verona Fathers, a 
Roman Catholic religious order that had established southern mis- 
sions before the Mahdiyah. Other missionary groups active in the 
south included Presbyterians from the United States and the An- 
glican Church Missionary Society. There was no competition 
among these missions, largely because they maintained separate 
areas of influence. The government eventually subsidized the mis- 
sion schools that educated southerners. Because mission graduates 
usually succeeded in gaining posts in the provincial civil service, 
many northerners regarded them as tools of British imperialism. 
The few southerners who received higher training attended schools 
in the British East African colonies (present-day Kenya, Uganda, 
and Tanzania) rather than in Khartoum, thereby exacerbating the 
north- south division. 

British authorities treated the three southern provinces as a 
separate region. The colonial administration, as it consolidated its 
southern position in the 1920s, detached the south from the rest 
of Sudan for all practical purposes. The period's "closed door" 
ordinances, which barred northern Sudanese from entering or work- 
ing in the south, reinforced this separate development policy. 
Moreover, the British gradually replaced Arab administrators and 
expelled Arab merchants, thereby severing the south 's last economic 
contacts with the north. The colonial administration also dis- 
couraged the spread of Islam, the practice of Arab customs, and 
the wearing of Arab dress. At the same time, the British attempted 
to revitalize African customs and tribal life that the slave trade had 
disrupted. Finally, a 1930 directive stated that blacks in the southern 
provinces were to be considered a people distinct from northern 
Muslims and that the region should be prepared for eventual in- 
tegration with the British East African colonies. 



27 



Sudan: A Country Study 




Figure 3. Anglo- Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1955 



Although potentially a rich agricultural zone, the south 's eco- 
nomic development suffered because of the region's isolation. 
Moreover, a continual struggle went on between British officials 
in the north and south, as those in the former resisted recommen- 
dations that northern resources be diverted to spur southern eco- 
nomic development. Personality clashes between officials in the two 
branches in the Sudan Political Service also impeded the south' s 
growth. Those individuals who served in the southern provinces 



28 



Historical Setting 



tended to be military officers with previous Africa experience on 
secondment to the colonial service. They usually were distrustful 
of Arab influence and were committed to keeping the south under 
British control. By contrast, officials in the northern provinces 
tended to be Arabists, often drawn from the diplomatic and con- 
sular service. Whereas northern provincial governors conferred 
regularly as a group with the governor general in Khartoum, their 
three southern colleagues met to coordinate activities with the gover- 
nors of the British East African colonies. 

Rise of Sudanese Nationalism 

Sudanese nationalism, as it developed after World War I, was 
an Arab and Muslim phenomenon with its support base in the 
northern provinces. Nationalists opposed indirect rule and advo- 
cated a centralized national government in Khartoum responsible 
for both regions. Nationalists also perceived Britain's southern pol- 
icy as artificially dividing Sudan and preventing its unification under 
an arabized and Islamic ruling class. 

Ironically, however, a non-Arab led Sudan's first modern na- 
tionalist movement. In 1921 Ali Abd al Latif, a Muslim Dinka and 
former army officer, founded the United Tribes Society that called 
for an independent Sudan in which power would be shared by tribal 
and religious leaders. Three years later, Ali Abd al Latif s move- 
ment, reconstituted as the White Flag League, organized demon- 
strations in Khartoum that took advantage of the unrest that 
followed Stack's assassination. Ali Abd al Latif s arrest and sub- 
sequent exile in Egypt sparked a mutiny by a Sudanese army bat- 
talion, the suppression of which succeeded in temporarily crippling 
the nationalist movement. 

In the 1930s, nationalism reemerged in Sudan. Educated Su- 
danese wanted to restrict the governor general's power and to ob- 
tain Sudanese participation in the council's deliberations. However, 
any change in government required a change in the condomin- 
ium agreement. Neither Britain nor Egypt would agree to a modifi- 
cation. Moreover, the British regarded their role to be the protection 
of the Sudanese from Egyptian domination. The nationalists feared 
that the eventual result of friction between the condominium powers 
might be the attachment of northern Sudan to Egypt and southern 
Sudan to Uganda and Kenya. Although they settled most of their 
differences in the 1936 Treaty of Alliance, which set a timetable 
for the end of British military occupation, Britain and Egypt failed 
to agree on Sudan's future status. 

Nationalists and religious leaders were divided on the issue of 
whether Sudan should apply for independence or for union with 



29 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Egypt. The Mahdi's son, Abd ar Rahman al Mahdi, emerged as 
a spokesman for independence in opposition to Ali al Mirghani, 
the Khatmiyyah leader, who favored union with Egypt. Coalitions 
supported by each of these leaders formed rival wings of the na- 
tionalist movement. Later, radical nationalists and the Khatmiy- 
yah created the Ashigga, later renamed the National Unionist Party 
(NUP), to advance the cause of Sudanese-Egyptian unification. 
The moderates favored Sudanese independence in cooperation with 
Britain and together with the Ansar established the Umma Party. 

The Road to Independence 

As World War II approached, the SDF assumed the mission of 
guarding Sudan's frontier with Italian East Africa (present-day 
Ethiopia). During the summer of 1940, Italian forces invaded Sudan 
at several points and captured Kassala. However, the SDF pre- 
vented a further advance on Port Sudan. In January 1941 , the SDF, 
expanded to 20,000 troops, retook Kassala and participated in the 
British offensive that routed the Italians in Eritrea and liberated 
Ethiopia. Some Sudanese units later contributed to the British 
Eighth Army's North Africa victory. 

In the immediate postwar years, the condominium government 
made a number of significant changes. In 1942 the Graduates' 
General Conference, a quasi-nationalist movement formed by edu- 
cated Sudanese, presented the government with a memorandum 
that demanded a pledge of self-determination after the war to be 
preceded by abolition of the "closed door" ordinances, an end to 
the separate curriculum in southern schools, and an increase in 
the number of Sudanese in the civil service. The governor general 
refused to accept the memorandum but agreed to a government- 
supervised transformation of indirect rule into a modernized sys- 
tem of local government. Sir Douglas Newbold, governor of Kur- 
dufan Province in the 1930s and later the executive council's civil 
secretary, advised the establishment of parliamentary government 
and the administrative unification of north and south. In 1948, 
over Egyptian objections, Britain authorized the partially elected 
consultative Legislative Assembly representing both regions to 
supersede the advisory executive council. 

The pro-Egyptian NUP boycotted the 1948 Legislative Assem- 
bly elections. As a result, pro-independence groups dominated the 
Legislative Assembly. In 1952 leaders of the Umma-dominated 
legislature negotiated the Self-Determination Agreement with 
Britain. The legislators then enacted a constitution that provided 
for a prime minister and council of ministers responsible to a bi- 
cameral parliament. The new Sudanese government would have 



30 



Historical Setting 



responsibility in all areas except military and foreign affairs, which 
remained in the British governor general's hands. Cairo, which 
demanded recognition of Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan, repudi- 
ated the condominium agreement in protest and declared its reign- 
ing monarch, Faruk, king of Sudan. 

After seizing power in Egypt and overthrowing the Faruk monar- 
chy in late 1952, Colonel Muhammad Naguib broke the deadlock 
on the problem of Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan. Cairo previ- 
ously had linked discussions on Sudan's status to an agreement 
on the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal. Naguib 
separated the two issues and accepted the right of Sudanese self- 
determination. In February 1953, London and Cairo signed an 
Anglo-Egyptian accord, which allowed for a three-year transition 
period from condominium rule to self-government. During the tran- 
sition phase, British and Egyptian troops would withdraw from 
Sudan. At the end of this period, the Sudanese would decide their 
future status in a plebiscite conducted under international super- 
vision. Naguib's concession seemed justified when parliamentary 
elections held at the end of 1952 gave a majority to the pro- 
Egyptian NUP, which had called for an eventual union with Egypt. 
In January 1954, a new government emerged under NUP leader 
Ismail al Azhari. 

The South and the Unity of Sudan 

During World War II, some British colonial officers questioned 
the economic and political viability of the southern provinces as 
separate from northern Sudan. Britain also had become more sen- 
sitive to Arab criticism of the southern policy. In 1946 the Sudan 
Administrative Conference determined that Sudan should be ad- 
ministered as one country. Moreover, the conference delegates 
agreed to readmit northern administrators to southern posts, abolish 
the trade restrictions imposed under the " closed door" ordinances, 
and allow southerners to seek employment in the north. Khartoum 
also nullified the prohibition against Muslim proselytizing in the 
south and introduced Arabic in the south as the official adminis- 
tration language. 

Some southern British colonial officials responded to the Sudan 
Administrative Conference by charging that northern agitation had 
influenced the conferees and that no voice had been heard at the 
conference in support of retaining the separate development pol- 
icy. These British officers argued that northern domination of the 
south would result in a southern rebellion against the government. 
Khartoum therefore convened a conference at Juba to allay the 
fears of southern leaders and British officials in the south and to 



31 



Sudan: A Country Study 



assure them that a postindependence government would safeguard 
southern political and cultural rights. 

Despite these promises, an increasing number of southerners ex- 
pressed concern that northerners would overwhelm them. In par- 
ticular, they resented the imposition of Arabic as the official 
language of administration, which deprived most of the few edu- 
cated English-speaking southerners of the opportunity to enter pub- 
lic service. They also felt threatened by the replacement of trusted 
British district commissioners with unsympathetic northerners. 
After the government had replaced several hundred colonial offi- 
cials with Sudanese, only four of whom were southerners, the 
southern elite abandoned hope of a peaceful, unified, independent 
Sudan. 

The hostility of southerners toward the northern Arab majority 
surfaced violently when southern army units mutinied in August 
1955 to protest their transfer to garrisons under northern officers. 
The rebellious troops killed several hundred northerners, includ- 
ing government officials, army officers, and merchants. The govern- 
ment quickly suppressed the revolt and eventually executed seventy 
southerners for sedition. But this harsh reaction failed to pacify 
the south, as some of the mutineers escaped to remote areas and 
organized resistance to the Arab-dominated government of Sudan. 

Independent Sudan 

The Azhari government temporarily halted progress toward self- 
determination for Sudan, hoping to promote unity with Egypt. 
Although his pro-Egyptian NUP had won a majority in the 1953 
parliamentary elections, Azhari realized that popular opinion had 
shifted against union with Egypt. As a result, Azhari, who had been 
the major spokesman for the "unity of the Nile Valley," reversed 
the NUP's stand and supported Sudanese independence. On De- 
cember 19, 1955, the Sudanese parliament, under Azhari 's leader- 
ship, unanimously adopted a declaration of independence; on 
January 1, 1956, Sudan became an independent republic. Azhari 
called for the withdrawal of foreign troops and requested that the 
condominium powers sponsor a plebiscite in advance of the sched- 
uled date. 

The Politics of Independence 

Sudan achieved independence without the rival political parties 
having agreed on the form and content of a permanent constitu- 
tion. Instead, the Constituent Assembly adopted a document known 
as the Transitional Constitution, which replaced the governor gener- 
al as head of state with a five-member Supreme Commission that 



32 



As Sudd, the world's largest swamp, found in south-central Sudan 

along the White Nile River 
Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 

was elected by a parliament composed of an indirectly elected Senate 
and a popularly elected House of Representatives. The Transitional 
Constitution also allocated executive power to the prime minister, 
who was nominated by the House of Representatives and confirmed 
in office by the Supreme Commission. 

Although it achieved independence without conflict, Sudan in- 
herited many problems from the condominium. Chief among these 
was the status of the civil service. The government placed Sudanese 
in the administration and provided compensation and pensions for 
British officers of the Sudan Political Service who left the country ; 
it retained those who could not be replaced, mosdy technicians and 
teachers. Khartoum achieved this transformation quickly and with 
a minimum of turbulence, although southerners resented the 
replacement of British administrators in the south with northern 
Sudanese. To advance their interests, many southern leaders con- 
centrated their efforts in Khartoum, where they hoped to win con- 
stitutional concessions. Although determined to resist what they 
perceived to be Arab imperialism, they were opposed to violence. 
Most southern representatives supported provincial autonomy and 
warned that failure to win legal concessions would drive the south 
to rebellion. 



33 



Sudan: A Country Study 

The parliamentary regime introduced plans to expand the coun- 
try's education, economic, and transportation sectors. To achieve 
these goals, Khartoum needed foreign economic and technical as- 
sistance, to which the United States made an early commitment. 
Conversations between the two governments had begun in mid- 
1957, and the parliament ratified a United States aid agreement 
in July 1958. Washington hoped this agreement would reduce 
Sudan's excessive reliance on a one-crop (cotton) economy and 
would facilitate the development of the country's transportation 
and communications infrastructure. 

The prime minister formed a coalition government in February 
1956, but he alienated the Khatmiyyah by supporting increasingly 
secular government policies. In June some Khatmiyyah members 
who had defected from the NUP established the People's Demo- 
cratic Party (PDP) under Mirghani's leadership. The Umma and 
the PDP combined in parliament to bring down the Azhari govern- 
ment. With support from the two parties and backing from the 
Ansar and the Khatmiyyah, Abd Allah Khalil put together a coa- 
lition government. 

Major issues confronting Khalil' s coalition government included 
winning agreement on a permanent constitution, stabilizing the 
south, encouraging economic development, and improving rela- 
tions with Egypt. Strains within the Umma-PDP coalition ham- 
pered the government's ability to make progress on these matters. 
The Umma, for example, wanted the proposed constitution to in- 
stitute a presidential form of government on the assumption that 
Abd ar Rahman al Mahdi would be elected the first president. Con- 
sensus was lacking about the country's economic future. A poor 
cotton harvest followed the 1957 bumper cotton crop, which Sudan 
had been unable to sell at a good price in a glutted market. This 
downturn depleted Sudan's reserves and caused unrest over 
government-imposed economic restrictions. To overcome these 
problems and finance future development projects, the Umma called 
for greater reliance on foreign aid. The PDP, however, objected 
to this strategy because it promoted unacceptable foreign influence 
in Sudan. The PDP's philosophy reflected the Arab nationalism 
espoused by Gamal Abdul Nasser, who had replaced Egyptian 
leader Naguib in 1954. Despite these policy differences, the Umma- 
PDP coalition lasted for the remaining year of the parliament's 
tenure. Moreover, after the parliament adjourned, the two par- 
ties promised to maintain a common front for the 1958 elections. 

The electorate gave a plurality in both houses to the Umma and 
an overall majority to the Umma-PDP coalition. The NUP, 
however, won nearly one-quarter of the seats, largely from urban 



34 



Historical Setting 



centers and from Gezira Scheme agricultural workers. In the south, 
the vote represented a rejection of the men who had cooperated 
with the government — voters defeated all three southerners in the 
preelection cabinet — and a victory for advocates of autonomy within 
a federal system. Resentment against the government's taking over 
mission schools and against the measures used in suppressing the 
1955 mutiny contributed to the election of several candidates who 
had been implicated in the rebellion. 

After the new parliament convened, Khalil again formed an 
Umma-PDP coalition government. Unfortunately, factionalism, 
corruption, and vote fraud dominated parliamentary deliberations 
at a time when the country needed decisive action with regard to 
the proposed constitution and the future of the south. As a result, 
the Umma-PDP coalition failed to exercise effective leadership. 

Another issue that divided the parliament concerned Sudanese- 
United States relations. In March 1958, Khalil signed a technical 
assistance agreement with the United States. When he presented 
the pact to parliament for ratification, he discovered that the NUP 
wanted to use the issue to defeat the Umma-PDP coalition and 
that many PDP delegates opposed the agreement. Nevertheless, 
the Umma, with the support of some PDP and southern delegates, 
managed to obtain approval of the agreement. 

Factionalism and bribery in parliament, coupled with the govern- 
ment's inability to resolve Sudan's many social, political, and eco- 
nomic problems, increased popular disillusion with democratic 
government. Specific complaints included Khartoum's decision to 
sell cotton at a price above world market prices. This policy resulted 
in low sales of cotton, the commodity from which Sudan derived 
most of its income. Restrictions on imports imposed to take pres- 
sure off depleted foreign exchange reserves caused consternation 
among town dwellers who had become accustomed to buying for- 
eign goods. Moreover, rural northerners also suffered from an em- 
bargo that Egypt placed on imports of cattle, camels, and dates 
from Sudan. Growing popular discontent caused many antigovern- 
ment demonstrations in Khartoum. Egypt also criticized Khalil and 
suggested that it might support a coup against his government. 
Meanwhile, reports circulated in Khartoum that the Umma and 
the NUP were near agreement on a new coalition that would ex- 
clude the PDP and Khalil. 

On November 17, 1958, the day parliament was to convene, 
a military coup occurred. Khalil, himself a retired army general, 
planned the preemptive coup in conjunction with leading Umma 
members and the army's two senior generals, Ibrahim Abbud and 
Ahmad Abd al Wahab, who became leaders of the military regime. 



35 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Abbud immediately pledged to resolve all disputes with Egypt, in- 
cluding the long-standing problem of the status of the Nile River. 
Abbud abandoned the previous government's unrealistic policies 
regarding the sale of cotton. He also appointed a constitutional com- 
mission, headed by the chief justice, to draft a permanent consti- 
tution. Abbud maintained, however, that political parties only 
served as vehicles for personal ambitions and that they would not 
be reestablished when civilian rule was restored. 

The Abbud Military Government, 1958-64 

The coup removed political decision making from the control 
of the civilian politicians. Abbud created the Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces to rule Sudan. This body contained officers af- 
filiated with the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah. Abbud belonged to 
the Khatmiyyah, whereas Abd al Wahab was a member of the 
Ansar. Until Abd al Wahab 's removal in March 1959, the Ansar 
were the stronger of the two groups in the government. 

The regime benefited during its first year in office from success- 
ful marketing of the cotton crop. Abbud also profited from the 
settlement of the Nile waters dispute with Egypt and the improve- 
ment of relations between the two countries. Under the military 
regime, the influence of the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah lessened. 
The strongest religious leader, Abd ar Rahman al Mahdi, died in 
early 1959. His son and successor, the elder Sadiq al Mahdi, failed 
to enjoy the respect accorded his father. When Sadiq died two years 
later, Ansar religious and political leadership divided between his 
brother, Imam Al Hadi al Mahdi, and his son, the younger Sadiq 
al Mahdi. 

Despite the Abbud regime's early successes, opposition elements 
remained powerful. In 1959 dissident military officers made three 
attempts to displace the Abbud government and to establish a 
"popular government." Although the courts sentenced the lead- 
ers of these attempted coups to life imprisonment, discontent in 
the military continued to hamper the government's performance. 
In particular, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), which sup- 
ported the attempted coups, gained a reputation as an effective an- 
tigovernment organization. To compound its problems, the Abbud 
regime lacked dynamism and the ability to stabilize the country. 
Its failure to place capable civilian advisers in positions of authori- 
ty, to launch a credible economic and social development program, 
and to gain the army's support created an atmosphere that en- 
couraged political turbulence. 

Abbud' s southern policy proved to be his undoing. The govern- 
ment suppressed expressions of religious and cultural differences 



36 



Historical Setting 



and bolstered attempts to arabize society. In February 1964, for 
example, Abbud ordered the mass explusion of foreign mission- 
aries from the south. He then closed parliament to cut off outlets 
for southern complaints. Southern leaders had renewed in 1963 
the armed struggle against the Sudanese government that had con- 
tinued sporadically since 1955. The rebellion was spearheaded from 

1963 by guerrilla forces known as the Anya Nya (the name of a 
poisonous concoction). 

Return to Civilian Rule, 1964-69 

Recognizing its inability to quell growing southern discontent, 
the Abbud regime asked the civilian sector to submit proposals for 
a solution to the southern problem. However, criticism of govern- 
ment policy quickly went beyond the southern issue and included 
Abbud 's handling of other problems, such as the economy and edu- 
cation. Government attempts to silence these protests, which were 
centered in the University of Khartoum, brought a reaction not 
only from teachers and students but also from Khartoum's civil 
servants and trade unionists. The so-called October Revolution of 

1964 centered around a general strike that spread throughout the 
country. Strike leaders identified themselves as the National Front 
for Professionals. Along with some former politicians, they formed 
the leftist United National Front (UNF), which made contact with 
dissident army officers. 

After several days of rioting that resulted in many deaths, Abbud 
dissolved the government and the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces. UNF leaders and army commanders who planned the tran- 
sition from military to civilian rule selected a nonpolitical senior 
civil servant, Sirr al Khatim al Khalifa, as prime minister to head 
a transitional government. 

The new civilian regime, which operated under the 1956 Tran- 
sitional Constitution, tried to end political factionalism by estab- 
lishing a coalition government. There was continued popular 
hostility to the reappearance of political parties, however, because 
of their divisiveness during the Abbud regime. Although the new 
government allowed all parties, including the SCP, to operate, only 
five of fifteen posts in Khatim 's cabinet went to party politicians. 
The prime minister gave two positions to nonparty southerners and 
the remaining eight to members of the National Front for Profes- 
sionals, which included several communists. 

Eventually two political parties emerged to represent the south. 
The Sudan African National Union (SANU), founded in 1963 and 
led by William Deng and Saturino Lahure, a Roman Catholic 
priest, operated among refugee groups and guerrilla forces. The 



37 



Sudan: A Country Study 



Southern Front, a mass organization led by Stanislaus Paya- 
sama that had worked underground during the Abbud regime, func- 
tioned openly within the southern provinces. After the collapse of 
government- sponsored peace conferences in 1965, Deng's wing of 
SANU — known locally as SANU-William — and the Southern Front 
coalesced to take part in the parliamentary elections. SANU re- 
mained active in parliament for the next four years as a voice for 
southern regional autonomy within a unified state. Exiled SANU 
leaders balked at Deng's moderate approach and formed the Azania 
Liberation Front based in Kampala, Uganda. 

Any a Nya leaders remained aloof from political movements. The 
guerrillas were fragmented by ethnic and religious differences. Ad- 
ditionally, conflicts surfaced within Any a Nya between older leaders 
who had been in the bush since 1955, and younger, better edu- 
cated men like Joseph Lagu, a former Sudanese army captain, who 
eventually became a strong guerrilla leader, largely because of his 
ability to get arms from Israel. 

The government scheduled national elections for March 1965 
and announced that the new parliament's task would be to pre- 
pare a new constitution. The deteriorating southern security situ- 
ation prevented elections from being conducted in that region, 
however, and the political parties split on the question of whether 
elections should be held in the north as scheduled or postponed 
until the whole country could vote. The PDP and SCP, both fear- 
ful of losing votes, wanted to postpone the elections, as did southern 
elements loyal to Khartoum. Their opposition forced the govern- 
ment to resign. The president of the reinstated Supreme Commis- 
sion, who had replaced Abbud as chief of state, directed that the 
elections be held wherever possible. The PDP rejected this deci- 
sion and boycotted the elections. 

The 1965 election results were inconclusive. Apart from a low 
voter turnout, there was a confusing overabundance of candidates 
on the ballots. As a result, few of those elected won a majority of 
the votes cast. The Umma captured 75 out of 158 parliamentary 
seats while its NUP ally took 52 of the remainder. The two parties 
formed a coalition cabinet in June headed by Umma leader Mu- 
hammad Ahmad Mahjub, whereas Azhari, the NUP leader, be- 
came the Supreme Commission's permanent president and chief 
of state. 

The Mahjub government had two goals: progress toward solv- 
ing the southern problem and the removal of communists from po- 
sitions of power. The army launched a major offensive to crush 
the rebellion and in the process augmented its reputation for 
brutality among the southerners. Many southerners reported 



38 



Historical Setting 



government atrocities against civilians, especially at Juba and Waw. 
Sudanese army troops also burned churches and huts, closed 
schools, and destroyed crops and cattle. To achieve his second ob- 
jective, Mahjub succeeded in having parliament approve a decree 
that abolished the SCP and deprived the eleven communists of their 
seats. 

In October 1965, the Umma-NUP coalition collapsed because 
of a disagreement over whether Mahjub, as prime minister, or 
Azhari, as president, should conduct Sudan's foreign relations. 
Mahjub continued in office for another eight months but resigned 
in July 1966 after a parliamentary vote of censure, which resulted 
in a split in the Umma. The traditional wing led by Mahjub, under 
the Imam Al Hadi al Mahjub 's spiritual leadership, opposed the 
party's majority. The latter group professed loyalty to the imam's 
nephew, the younger Sadiq al Mahdi, who was the Umma's offi- 
cial leader and who rejected religious sectarianism. Sadiq became 
prime minister with backing from his own Umma wing and from 
NUP allies. 

The Sadiq al Mahdi government, supported by a sizable 
parliamentary majority, sought to reduce regional disparities by 
organizing economic development. Sadiq al Mahdi also planned 
to use his personal rapport with southern leaders to engineer a peace 
agreement with the insurgents. He proposed to replace the Supreme 
Commission with a president and a southern vice president and 
called for the approval of autonomy for the southern provinces. 

The educated elite and segments of the army opposed Sadiq al 
Mahdi because of his gradualist approach to Sudan's political, eco- 
nomic, and social problems. Leftist student organizations and the 
trade unions demanded the creation of a socialist state. Although 
these elements lacked widespread popular support, they represented 
an influential portion of educated public opinion. Their resentment 
of Sadiq increased when he refused to honor a Supreme Court ruling 
that overturned legislation banning the SCP and ousting com- 
munists elected to parliamentary seats. In December 1966, a coup 
attempt by communists and a small army unit against the govern- 
ment failed. The government subsequently arrested many com- 
munists and army personnel. 

In March 1967, the government held elections in thirty-six con- 
stituencies in pacified southern areas. The Sadiq al Mahdi wing 
of the Umma won fifteen seats, the federalist SANU ten, and the 
NUP five. Despite this apparent boost in his support, however, 
Sadiq' s position in parliament had become tenuous because of con- 
cessions he promised to the south in order to bring an end to the 
civil war. The Umma traditionalist wing opposed Sadiq al Mahdi 



39 



Sudan: A Country Study 

because of his support for constitutional guarantees of religious free- 
dom and his refusal to declare Sudan an Islamic state. When the 
traditionalists and the NUP withdrew their support, his govern- 
ment fell. In May 1967, Mahjub became prime minister and head 
of a coalition government whose cabinet included members of his 
wing of the Umma, of the NUP, and of the PDP. In December 
1967, the PDP and the NUP formed the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) under Azhari's leadership. 

By early 1968, widening divisions in the Umma threatened the 
survival of the Mahjub government. Sadiq al Mahdi's wing held 
a majority in parliament and could thwart any government action. 
Mahjub therefore dissolved parliament. However, Sadiq refused 
to recognize the legitimacy of the prime minister's action. As a 
result, two governments functioned in Khartoum — one meeting 
in the parliament building and the other on its lawn — both of which 
claimed to represent the legislature's will. The army commander 
requested clarification from the Supreme Court regarding which 
of them had authority to issue orders. The court backed Mahjub 's 
dissolution; the government scheduled new elections for April. 

Although the DUP won 101 of 218 seats, no single party con- 
trolled a parliamentary majority. Thirty-six seats went to the Umma 
traditionalists, thirty to the Sadiq wing, and twenty-five to the two 
southern parties — SANU and the Southern Front. The SCP secre- 
tary general, Abd al Khaliq Mahjub, also won a seat. In a major 
setback, Sadiq lost his own seat to a traditionalist rival. 

Because it lacked a majority, the DUP concluded an alliance with 
Umma traditionalists, who received the prime ministership for their 
leader, Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub, and four other cabinet posts. 
The coalition's program included plans for government reorgani- 
zation, closer ties with the Arab world, and renewed economic de- 
velopment efforts, particularly in the southern provinces. The 
Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub government also accepted mili- 
tary, technical, and economic aid from the Soviet Union. Sadiq 
al Mahdi's wing of the Umma formed the small parliamentary op- 
position. When it refused to participate in efforts to complete the 
draft constitution, already ten years overdue, the government 
retaliated by closing the opposition's newspaper and clamping down 
on pro- Sadiq demonstrations in Khartoum. 

By late 1968, the two Umma wings agreed to support the Ansar 
chief Imam Al Hadi al Mahdi in the 1969 presidential election. 
At the same time, the DUP announced that Azhari also would seek 
the presidency. The communists and other leftists aligned them- 
selves behind the presidential candidacy of former Chief Justice 



40 



Historical Setting 



Babikr Awadallah, whom they viewed as an ally because he had 
ruled against the government when it attempted to outlaw the SCP. 

The Nimeiri Era, 1969-85 

On May 25, 1969, several young officers, calling themselves the 
Free Officers' Movement, seized power. At the conspiracy's core 
were nine officers led by Colonel Jaafar an Nimeiri, who had been 
implicated in plots against the Abbud regime. Nimeiri 's coup 
preempted plots by other groups, most of which involved army fac- 
tions supported by the SCP, Arab nationalists, or conservative re- 
ligious groups. He justified the coup on the grounds that civilian 
politicians had paralyzed the decision-making process, had failed 
to deal with the country's economic and regional problems, and 
had left Sudan without a permanent constitution. 

Revolutionary Command Council 

The coup leaders, joined by Awadallah, the former chief justice 
who had been privy to the coup, constituted themselves as the ten- 
member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which possessed 
collective executive authority under Nimeiri 's chairmanship. On 
assuming control, the RCC proclaimed the establishment of a 
''democratic republic" dedicated to advancing independent 
"Sudanese socialism." The RCC's first acts included the suspen- 
sion of the Transitional Constitution, the abolition of all govern- 
ment institutions, and the banning of political parties. The RCC 
also nationalized many industries, businesses, and banks. Further- 
more, Nimeiri ordered the arrest of sixty-three civilian politicians 
and forcibly retired senior army officers. 

Awadallah, appointed prime minister to form a new government 
to implement RCC policy directives, wanted to dispel the notion 
that the coup had installed a military dictatorship. He presided over 
a twenty-one-member cabinet that included only three officers from 
the RCC, among them its chairman, Nimeiri, who was also defense 
minister. The cabinet's other military members held the port- 
folios for internal security and communications. Nine members of 
the Awadallah regime were allegedly communists, including one 
of the two southerners in the cabinet, John Garang, minister of 
supply and later minister for southern affairs. Others identified 
themselves as Marxists, Since the RCC lacked political and ad- 
ministrative experience, the communists played a significant role 
in shaping government policies and programs. Despite the influence 
of individual SCP members, the RCC claimed that its coopera- 
tion with the party was a matter of convenience. 



41 



Sudan: A Country Study 

In November 1969, after he claimed the regime could not sur- 
vive without communist assistance, Awadallah lost the prime 
ministership. Nimeiri, who became head of a largely civilian govern- 
ment in addition to being chief of state, succeeded him. Awadallah 
retained his position as RCC deputy chairman and remained in 
the government as foreign minister and as an important link with 
leftist elements. 

Conservative forces, led by the Ansar, posed the greatest threat 
to the RCC. Imam Al Hadi al Mahdi had withdrawn to his Aba 
Island stronghold (in the Nile, near Khartoum) in the belief that 
the government had decided to strike at the Ansar movement. The 
imam had demanded a return to democratic government, the ex- 
clusion of communists from power, and an end to RCC rule. In 
March 1970, hostile Ansar crowds prevented Nimeiri from vis- 
iting the island for talks with the imam. Fighting subsequently 
erupted between government forces and as many as 30,000 Ansar. 
When the Ansar ignored an ultimatum to surrender, army units 
with air support assaulted Aba Island. About 3,000 people died 
during the battle. The imam escaped only to be killed while at- 
tempting to cross the border into Ethiopia. The government ex- 
iled Sadiq al Mahdi to Egypt, where Nasser promised to keep him 
under guard to prevent him from succeeding his uncle as head of 
the Ansar movement. 

After neutralizing this conservative opposition, the RCC con- 
centrated on consolidating its political organization to phase out 
communist participation in the government. This strategy prompted 
an internal debate within the SCP. The orthodox wing, led by party 
secretary general Abd al Khaliq Mahjub, demanded a popular front 
government with communists participating as equal partners. The 
National Communist wing, on the other hand, supported cooper- 
ation with the government. 

Soon after the army had crushed the Ansar at Aba Island, Nimeiri 
moved against the SCP. He ordered the deportation of Abd al 
Khaliq Mahjub. Then, when the SCP secretary general returned 
to Sudan illegally after several months abroad, Nimeiri placed him 
under house arrest. In March 1971, Nimeiri indicated that trade 
unions, a traditional communist stronghold, would be placed under 
government control. The RCC also banned communist- affiliated 
student, women's, and professional organizations. Additionally, 
Nimeiri announced the planned formation of a national political 
movement called the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), which would 
assume control of all political parties, including the SCP. After this 
speech, the government arrested the SCP's central committee and 
other leading communists. 



42 



Historical Setting 



The SCP, however, retained a covert organization that was not 
damaged in the sweep. Before further action could be taken against 
the party, the SCP launched a coup against Nimeiri. The coup 
occurred on July 19, 1971, when one of the plotters, Major Hisham 
al Atta, surprised Nimeiri and the RCC meeting in the presiden- 
tial palace and seized them along with a number of pro-Nimeiri 
officers. Atta named a seven-member revolutionary council, in 
which communists ranked prominently, to serve as the national 
government. Three days after the coup, however, loyal army units 
stormed the palace, rescued Nimeiri, and arrested Atta and his con- 
federates. Nimeiri, who blamed the SCP for the coup, ordered the 
arrest of hundreds of communists and dissident military officers. 
The government subsequently executed some of these individuals 
and imprisoned many others. 

Having survived the SCP-inspired coup, Nimeiri reaffirmed his 
commitment to establishing a socialist state. A provisional consti- 
tution, published in August 1971, described Sudan as a "socialist 
democracy" and provided for a presidential form of government 
to replace the RCC. A plebiscite the following month elected 
Nimeiri to a six-year term as president. 

The Southern Problem 

The origins of the civil war in the south date back to the 1950s. 
On August 18, 1955, the Equatoria Corps, a military unit com- 
posed of southerners, mutinied at Torit. Rather than surrender 
to Sudanese government authorities, many mutineers disappeared 
into hiding with their weapons, marking the beginning of the first 
war in southern Sudan. By the late 1960s, the war had resulted 
in the deaths of about 500,000 people. Several hundred thousand 
more southerners hid in the bush or escaped to refugee camps in 
neighboring countries. 

By 1969 the rebels had developed foreign contacts to obtain 
weapons and supplies. Israel, for example, trained Anya Nya 
recruits and shipped weapons via Ethiopia and Uganda to the rebels. 
Anya Nya also purchased arms from Congolese rebels and inter- 
national arms dealers with monies collected in the south and from 
among southern Sudanese exile communities in the Middle East, 
Western Europe, and North America. The rebels also captured 
arms, equipment, and supplies from government troops. 

Militarily, Anya Nya controlled much of the southern country- 
side while government forces occupied the region's major towns. 
The guerrillas operated at will from remote camps. However, reb- 
el units were too small and scattered to be highly effective in any 



43 



Sudan: A Country Study 

single area. Estimates of Any a Nya personnel strength ranged from 
5,000 to 10,000. 

Government operations against the rebels declined after the 1969 
coup. However, when negotiations failed to result in a settlement, 
Khartoum increased troop strength in the south to about 12,000 
in 1969, and intensified military activity throughout the region. 
Although the Soviet Union had concluded a US$100 million to 
US$150 million arms agreement with Sudan in August 1968, which 
included T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and aircraft, the 
nation had not delivered any equipment to Khartoum by May 1969. 
During this period, Sudan obtained some Soviet-manufactured 
weapons from Egypt, most of which went to the Sudanese air force. 
By the end of 1969, however, the Soviet Union had shipped un- 
known quantities of 85mm antiaircraft guns, sixteen MiG-21s, and 
five Antonov-24 transport aircraft. Over the next two years, the 
Soviet Union delivered an impressive array of equipment to Sudan, 
including T-54, T-55, T-56, and T-59 tanks; and BTR-40 and 
BTR-152 light armored vehicles (see Foreign Military Assistance, 
ch. 5). 

In 1971 Joseph Lagu, who had become the leader of southern 
forces opposed to Khartoum, proclaimed the creation of the 
Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). Anya Nya lead- 
ers united behind him, and nearly all exiled southern politicians 
supported the SSLM. Although the SSLM created a governing in- 
frastructure throughout many areas of southern Sudan, real power 
remained with Anya Nya, with Lagu at its head. 

Despite his political problems, Nimeiri remained committed to 
ending the southern insurgency. He believed he could stop the fight- 
ing and stabilize the region by granting regional self-government 
and undertaking economic development in the south. By October 
1971 , Khartoum had established contact with the SSLM. After con- 
siderable consultation, a conference between SSLM and Sudanese 
government delegations convened at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 
February 1972. Initially, the two sides were far apart, the southern- 
ers demanding a federal state with a separate southern government 
and an army that would come under the federal president's com- 
mand only in response to an external threat to Sudan. Eventually, 
however, the two sides, with the help of Ethiopia's Emperor Haile 
Selassie, reached an agreement. 

The Addis Ababa accords guaranteed autonomy for a southern 
region — composed of the three provinces of Equatoria (present- 
day Al Istiwai), Bahr al Ghazal, and Upper Nile (present-day Aali 
an Nil) — under a regional president appointed by the national presi- 
dent on the recommendation of an elected Southern Regional 



44 




45 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Assembly. The High Executive Council or cabinet named by the 
regional president would be responsible for all aspects of govern- 
ment in the region except such areas as defense, foreign affairs, 
currency and finance, economic and social planning, and inter- 
regional concerns, authority over which would be retained by the 
national government in which southerners would be represented. 
Southerners, including qualified Any a Nya veterans, would be in- 
corporated into a 12,000-man southern command of the Sudanese 
army under equal numbers of northern and southern officers. The 
accords also recognized Arabic as Sudan's official language and 
English as the south' s principal language, which would be used 
in administration and would be taught in the schools. 

Although many SSLM leaders opposed the setdement, Lagu ap- 
proved its terms and both sides agreed to a cease-fire. The national 
government issued a decree legalizing the agreement and creating 
an international armistice commission to ensure the well-being of 
returning southern refugees. Khartoum also announced an am- 
nesty, retroactive to 1955. The two sides signed the Addis Ababa 
accords on March 27, 1972, which was thereafter celebrated as Na- 
tional Unity Day. 

Political Developments 

After the settlement in the south, Nimeiri attempted to mend 
fences with northern Muslim religious groups. The government 
undertook administrative decentralization, popular with the Ansar, 
that favored rural over urban areas, where leftist activism was most 
evident. Khartoum also reaffirmed Islam's special position in the 
country, recognized the sharia as the source of all legislation, and 
released some members of religious orders who had been incar- 
cerated. However, a reconciliation with conservative groups, which 
had organized outside Sudan under Sadiq al Mahdi's leadership 
and were later known as the National Front, eluded Nimeiri. 

In August 1972, Nimeiri sought to consolidate his position by 
creating a Constituent Assembly to draft a permanent constitu- 
tion. He then asked for the government's resignation to allow him 
to appoint a cabinet whose members were drawn from the Con- 
stituent Assembly. Nimeiri excluded individuals who had opposed 
the southern settlement or who had been identified with the SSU's 
pro-Egyptian faction. 

In May 1973, the Constituent Assembly promulgated a draft 
constitution. This document provided for a continuation of pres- 
idential government, recognized the SSU as the only authorized 
political organization, and supported regional autonomy for the 
south. The constitution also stipulated that voters were to choose 



46 



Historical Setting 



members for the 250-seat People's Assembly from an SSU-approved 
slate. Although it cited Islam as Sudan's official religion, the con- 
stitution admitted Christianity as the faith of a large number of 
Sudanese citizens (see Christianity, ch. 2). In May 1974, voters 
selected 125 members for the assembly; SSU-affiliated occupational 
and professional groups named 100; and the president appointed 
the remaining 25. 

Discontent with Nimeiri's policies and the increased military role 
in government escalated as a result of food shortages and the 
southern settlement, which many Muslim conservatives regarded 
as surrender. In 1973 and 1974 there were unsuccessful coup at- 
tempts against Nimeiri. Muslims and leftist students also staged 
strikes against the government. In September 1974, Nimeiri re- 
sponded to this unrest by declaring a state of emergency, purging 
the SSU, and arresting large numbers of dissidents. Nimeiri also 
replaced some cabinet members with military personnel loyal to 
him. 

Conservative opposition to Nimeiri coalesced in the National 
Front, formed in 1974, The National Front included people from 
Sadiq's wing of Umma; the NUP; and the Islamic Charter Front, 
then the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic ac- 
tivist movement. Their activity crystallized in a July 1976 Ansar- 
inspired coup attempt. Government soldiers quickly restored order 
by killing more than 700 rebels in Khartoum and arresting scores 
of dissidents, including many prominent religious leaders. Despite 
this unrest, in 1977 Sudanese voters reelected Nimeiri for a second 
six-year term as president. 

National Reconciliation 

Following the 1976 coup attempt, Nimeiri and his opponents 
adopted more conciliatory policies. In early 1977, government offi- 
cials met with the National Front in London, and arranged for a 
conference between Nimeiri and Sadiq al Mahdi in Port Sudan. 
In what became known as the "national reconciliation," the two 
leaders signed an eight-point agreement that readmitted the op- 
position to national life in return for the dissolution of the Nation- 
al Front. The agreement also restored civil liberties, freed political 
prisoners, reaffirmed Sudan's nonaligned foreign policy, and 
promised to reform local government. As a result of the reconcilia- 
tion, the government released about 1,000 detainees and granted 
an amnesty to Sadiq al Mahdi. The SSU also admitted former sup- 
porters of the National Front to its ranks. Sadiq renounced multi- 
party politics and urged his followers to work within the regime's 
one-party system. 



47 



Sudan: A Country Study 

The first test of national reconciliation occurred during the Febru- 
ary 1978 People's Assembly elections. Nimeiri authorized return- 
ing exiles who had been associated with the old Umma Party, the 
DUP, and the Muslim Brotherhood to stand for election as indepen- 
dent candidates. These independents won 140 of 304 seats, lead- 
ing many observers to applaud Nimeiri 's efforts to democratize 
Sudan's political system. However, the People's Assembly elec- 
tions marked the beginning of further political decline. The SSU's 
failure to sponsor official candidates weakened party discipline and 
prompted many assembly deputies who also were SSU members 
to claim that the party had betrayed them. As a result, an increas- 
ing number of assembly deputies used their offices to advance per- 
sonal rather than national interests. 

The end of the SSU's political monopoly, coupled with rampant 
corruption at all levels of government, cast increasing doubt on 
Nimeiri' s ability to govern Sudan. To preserve his regime, Nimeiri 
adopted a more dictatorial leadership style. He ordered the State 
Security Organisation to imprison without trial thousands of op- 
ponents and dissidents (see Security Organizations, ch. 5). Nimeiri 
also dismissed or transferred any minister or senior military officer 
who appeared to be developing his own power base. Nimeiri selected 
replacements based on their loyalty to him rather than on their 
abilities. This strategy caused the president to lose touch with popu- 
lar feeling and the country's deteriorated political situation. 

On June 5, 1983, Nimeiri sought to counter the south' s grow- 
ing political power by redividing the Southern Region into the three 
old provinces of Bahr al Ghazal, Al Istiwai, and Aali an Nil; he 
had suspended the Southern Regional Assembly almost two years 
earlier. The southern-based Sudanese People's Liberation Move- 
ment (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudanese People's Liber- 
ation Army (SPLA), which emerged in mid- 1983, unsuccessfully 
opposed this redivision and called for the creation of a new united 
Sudan. 

Within a few months, in September 1983 Nimeiri proclaimed 
the sharia as the basis of the Sudanese legal system. Nimeiri 's 
decrees, which became known as the September Laws, were bit- 
terly resented both by secularized Muslims and by the predomi- 
nantly non-Muslim southerners. The SPLM denounced the sharia 
and the executions and amputations ordered by religious courts. 
Meanwhile, the security situation in the south had deteriorated so 
much that by the end of 1983 it amounted to a resumption of the 
civil war. 

In early 1985, antigovernment discontent resulted in a general 
strike in Khartoum. Demonstrators opposed rising food, gasoline, 



48 



Historical Setting 



and transport costs. The general strike paralyzed the country. 
Nimeiri, who was on a visit to the United States, was unable to 
suppress the rapidly growing demonstrations against his regime. 

The Transitional Military Council 

The combination of the south' s redi vision, the introduction 
throughout the country of the sharia, the renewed civil war, and 
growing economic problems eventually contributed to Nimeiri' s 
downfall. On April 6, 1985, a group of military officers, led by 
Lieutenant General Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab, overthrew 
Nimeiri, who took refuge in Egypt. Three days later, Dhahab 
authorized the creation of a fifteen-man Transitional Military Coun- 
cil (TMC) to rule Sudan. During its first few weeks in power, the 
TMC suspended the constitution; dissolved the SSU, the secret 
police, and the parliament and regional assemblies; dismissed 
regional governors and their ministers; and released hundreds of 
political detainees from Kober Prison. Dhahab also promised to 
negotiate an end to the southern civil war and to relinquish power 
to a civilian government in twelve months. The general populace 
welcomed and supported the new regime. Despite the TMG's ener- 
getic beginning, it soon became evident that Dhahab lacked the 
skills to resolve Sudan's economic problems, restore peace to the 
south, and establish national unity. 

By the time Dhahab seized power, Sudan's economy was in 
shambles. The country's international debt was approximately 
US$9 billion. Agricultural and industrial projects funded by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) and the World 
Bank (see Glossary) remained in the planning stages. Most facto- 
ries operated at less than 50 percent of capacity, and agricultural 
output had dropped by 50 percent since 1960. Moreover, famine 
threatened vast areas of southern and western Sudan. 

The TMC lacked a realistic strategy to resolve these problems. 
The Dhahab government refused to accept IMF economic austerity 
measures. As a result, the IMF, which influenced nearly all bilateral 
and multilateral donors, in February 1986, declared Sudan 
bankrupt. Efforts to attract a US$6 billion twenty-five-year invest- 
ment from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 
failed when Sudan mismanaged an initial US$2.3 billion invest- 
ment. A rapid expansion of the money supply and the TMC's in- 
ability to control prices caused a soaring inflation rate. Although 
he appealed to forty donor and relief agencies for emergency food 
shipments, Dhahab was unable to prevent famine from claim- 
ing an estimated 400,000 to 500,000 lives. He also failed to end 



49 



Sudan: A Country Study 

hostilities in the south, which constituted the major drain on Sudan's 
limited resources. 

Shortly after taking power, Dhahab adopted a conciliatory ap- 
proach toward the south. Among other things, he declared a 
unilateral cease-fire, called for direct talks with the SPLM, and 
offered an amnesty to rebel fighters. The TMC recognized the need 
for special development efforts in the south and proposed a national 
conference to review the southern problem. However, Dhahab 's 
refusal to repeal the sharia negated these overtures and convinced 
SPLM leader John Garang that the Sudanese government still 
wanted to subjugate the south. 

Despite this gulf, both sides continued to work for a peaceful 
resolution of the southern problem. In March 1986, the Sudanese, 
government and the SPLM produced the Koka Dam Declaration, 
which called for a Sudan "free from racism, tribalism, sectarian- 
ism and all causes of discrimination and disparity." The declara- 
tion also demanded the repeal of the sharia and the opening of a 
constitutional conference. All major political parties and organi- 
zations, with the exception of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
and the National Islamic Front (NIF), supported the Koka Dam 
Declaration. To avoid a confrontation with the DUP and the NIF, 
Dhahab decided to leave the sharia question to the new civilian 
government. Meanwhile, the SPLA kept up the military pressure 
on the Sudanese government, especially in Aali an Nil, Bahr al 
Ghazal, and Al Istiwai provinces. 

The TMC ' s greatest failure concerned its inability to form a na- 
tional political consensus. In late April 1985, negotiations between 
the TMC and the Alliance of Professional and Trade Unions re- 
sulted in the establishment of a civilian cabinet under the direc- 
tion of Dr. Gazuli Dafalla. The cabinet, which was subordinate 
to the TMC, devoted itself to conducting the government's daily 
business and to preparing for the election. Although it contained 
three southerners who belonged to the newly formed Southern 
Sudanese Political Association, the cabinet failed to win the loyalty 
of most southerners, who believed the TMC only reflected the poli- 
cies of the deposed Nimeiri. As a result, Sudan remained a divided 
nation. 

The other factor that prevented the emergence of a national po- 
litical consensus concerned party factionalism. After sixteen years 
of one-party rule, most Sudanese favored the revival of the multi- 
party system. In the aftermath of Nimeiri' s overthrow, approxi- 
mately forty political parties registered with the TMC and 
announced their intention to participate in national politics. The 
political parties ranged from those committed to revolutionary 



50 



Historical Setting 



socialism to those that supported Islamism. Of these latter, the NIF 
had succeeded the Islamic Charter Front as the main vehicle for 
the Muslim Brotherhood's political aspirations. However, policy 
disagreements over the sharia, the southern civil war, and the coun- 
try's future direction contributed to the confusion that character- 
ized Sudan's national politics. 

In this troubled atmosphere, Dhahab sanctioned the promised 
April 1986 general election, which the authorities spread over a 
twelve-day period and postponed in thirty-seven southern consti- 
tuencies because of the civil war. The Umma Party, headed by 
Sadiq al Mahdi, won ninety-nine seats. The DUP, which was led 
after the April 1985 uprising by Khatmiyyah leader Muhammad 
Uthman al Mirghani, gained sixty-four seats. Dr. Hassan Abd Allah 
at Turabi's NIF obtained fifty-one seats. Regional political par- 
ties from the south, the Nuba Mountains, and the Red Sea Hills 
won lesser numbers of seats. The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) 
and other radical parties failed to score any significant victories. 

Sadiq al Mahdi and Coalition Governments 

In June 1986, Sadiq al Mahdi formed a coalition government 
with the Umma, the DUP, the NIF, and four southern parties. 
Unfortunately, however, Sadiq proved to be a weak leader and 
incapable of governing Sudan. Party factionalism, corruption, per- 
sonal rivalries, scandals, and political instability characterized the 
Sadiq regime. After less than a year in office, Sadiq al Mahdi dis- 
missed the government because it had failed to draft a new penal 
code to replace the sharia, reach an agreement with the IMF, end 
the civil war in the south, or devise a scheme to attract remittances 
from Sudanese expatriates. To retain the support of the DUP and 
the southern political parties, Sadiq formed another ineffective coali- 
tion government. 

Instead of removing the ministers who had been associated with 
the failures of the first coalition government, Sadiq al Mahdi re- 
tained thirteen of them, of whom eleven kept their previous port- 
folios. As a result, many Sudanese rejected the second coalition 
government as being a replica of the first. To make matters worse, 
Sadiq and DUP leader Mirghani signed an inadequate memoran- 
dum of understanding that fixed the new government's priorities 
as affirming the application of the sharia to Muslims, consolidat- 
ing the Islamic banking system, and changing the national flag and 
national emblem. Furthermore, the memorandum directed the 
government to remove Nimeiri's name from all institutions and 
dismiss all officials appointed by Nimeiri to serve in international 
and regional organizations. As expected, antigovernment elements 



51 



Sudan: A Country Study 

criticized the memorandum for not mentioning the civil war, 
famine, or the country's disintegrating social and economic con- 
ditions. 

In August 1987, the DUP brought down the government be- 
cause Sadiq al Mahdi opposed the appointment of a DUP mem- 
ber, Ahmad as Sayid, to the government. For the next nine months, 
Sadiq and Mirghani failed to agree on the composition of another 
coalition government. During this period, Sadiq moved closer to 
the NIF. However, the NIF refused to join a coalition government 
that included leftist elements. Moreover, Turabi indicated that the 
formation of a coalition government would depend on numerous 
factors, the most important of which were the resignation or dis- 
missal of those serving in senior positions in the central and regional 
governments, the lifting of the state of emergency reimposed in 
July 1987, and the continuation of the Constituent Assembly. 

Because of the endless debate over these issues, it was not until 
May 15, 1988, that a new coalition government emerged headed 
by Sadiq al Mahdi. Members of this coalition included the Umma, 
the DUP, the NIF, and some southern parties. As in the past, 
however, the coalition quickly disintegrated because of political bick- 
ering among its members. Major disagreements included the NIF's 
demand that it be given the post of commissioner of Khartoum, 
the inability to establish criteria for the selection of regional gover- 
nors, and the NIF's opposition to the replacement of senior mili- 
tary officers and the chief of staff of the executive branch. 

In November 1988, another more explosive political issue 
emerged when Mirghani and the SPLM signed an agreement in 
Addis Ababa that included provisions for a cease-fire, the freezing 
of the sharia, the lifting of the state of emergency, and the aboli- 
tion of all foreign political and military pacts. The two sides also 
proposed to convene a constitutional conference to decide Sudan's 
political future. The NIF opposed this agreement because of its 
stand on the sharia. When the government refused to support the 
agreement, the DUP withdrew from the coalition. Shortly there- 
after armed forces commander in chief Lieutenant General Fathi 
Ahmad Ali presented an ultimatum, signed by 150 senior military 
officers, to Sadiq al Mahdi demanding that he make the coalition 
government more representative and that he announce terms for 
ending the civil war. 

On March 1 1 , 1989, Sadiq al Mahdi responded to this pressure 
by dissolving the government. The new coalition included the 
Umma, the DUP, and representatives of southern parties and the 
trade unions. The NIF refused to join the coalition because it was 



52 



Historical Setting 



not committed to enforcing the sharia. Sadiq claimed his new 
government was committed to ending the southern civil war by 
implementing the November 1988 DUP-SPLM agreement. He 
also promised to mobilize government resources to bring food relief 
to famine areas, reduce the government's international debt, and 
build a national political consensus. Sadiq' s inability to live up to 
these promises eventually caused his downfall. On June 30, 1989, 
Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir 
overthrew Sadiq and established the Revolutionary Command 
Council for National Salvation to rule Sudan. Bashir' s commit- 
ment to imposing the sharia on the non-Muslim south and to seek- 
ing a military victory over the SPLA, however, seemed likely to 
keep the country divided for the foreseeable future and hamper 
resolution of the same problems faced by Sadiq al Mahdi. 
Moreover, the emergence of the NIF as a political force made com- 
promise with the south more unlikely. 

* * * 

Interested readers may consult several books for a better under- 
standing of Sudan's history. Useful surveys include P.M. Holt's 
and M.W. Daly's, A History of the Sudan; Peter Woodward's, Sudan, 
1898-1989; and Kenneth Henderson's Sudan Republic. Richard 
Hill's Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-1881 assesses Egypt's nineteenth cen- 
tury conquest and occupation of Sudan. For an excellent analysis 
of the British period, see M.W. Daly's Empire on the Nile and Im- 
perial Sudan. The postindependence period is discussed in Mansour 
Khalid's The Government They Deserve; and Gabriel Warburg's Is- 
lam, Nationalism, and Communism in a Traditional Society. Apart from 
these books, the Sudan Notes and Records journal is essential for study- 
ing Sudan's historical development. 

Over the past few years, there has been an increase in the liter- 
ature about southern Sudan. Many of Robert Collins 's studies are 
particularly useful, including Land Beyond the Rivers; Shadows in the 
Grass; and The Waters of the Nile. Two sympathetic assessments of 
southern Sudan's relationship to Khartoum are Dunstan M. Wai's, 
The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan and Abel Alier's, Southern Sudan. 
For an Arab viewpoint, Mohamed Omer Beshir's The Southern 
Sudan: Background to Conflict and The Southern Sudan: From Conflict 
to Peace are pertinent. (For further information and complete cita- 
tions, see Bibliography.) 



53 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




Dinka spearfisherman contemplates the White Nile as a food source. 



THE FIRST AND OVERWHELMING impression of Sudan is 
its physical vastness and ethnic diversity, elements that have shaped 
its regional history from time immemorial. The country encom- 
passes virtually every geographical feature, from the harsh deserts 
of the north to the rain forests rising on its southern borders. Like 
most African countries, Sudan is defined by boundaries that Euro- 
pean powers determined at the end of the nineteenth century. The 
British colonial administration in Sudan, established in 1899, em- 
phasized indirect rule by tribal shaykhs (see Glossary) and chiefs, 
although tribalism had been considerably weakened as an adminis- 
trative institution during the Mahdist period (1884-98). This loosen- 
ing of loyalties exacerbated problems in governmental structure 
and administration and in the peoples' identification as Sudanese. 
To this day, loyalty remains divided among family, clan, ethnic 
group, and religion, and it is difficult to forge a nation because 
the immensity of the land permits many of Sudan's ethnic and tribal 
groups to live relatively undisturbed by the central government. 

The Nile is the link that runs through Sudan and influences the 
lives of Sudan's people, even though many of them farm and herd 
far from the Nile or its two main tributaries, the Blue Nile and 
the White Nile. Not only do nomads come to the river to water 
their herds and cultivators to drain off its waters for their fields, 
but the Nile facilitates trade, administration, and urbanization. 
Consequently, the confluence of the Blue Nile and the White Nile 
became the administrative center of a vast hinterland because the 
area commanded the river, its commerce, and its urban society. 
This location enabled the urban elites to control the scattered and 
often isolated population of the interior while enjoying access to 
the peoples of the outside world. 

Although linked by dependence on the Nile, Sudan's popula- 
tion is divided by ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences. Many 
Sudanese in the north claim Arab descent and speak Arabic, but 
Sudanese Arabs are highly differentiated. Over many generations, 
they have intermingled in varying degrees with the indigenous peo- 
ples. Arabic is Sudan's official language (with Arabic and English 
the predominant languages in the south), but beyond Khartoum 
and its two neighboring cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North 
a variety of languages is spoken. A more unifying factor is Islam, 
which has spread widely among the peoples of northern Sudan. 
But, once again, the Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims of northern 



57 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Sudan form no monolithic bloc. Some, especially in the urban 
centers, are strictly orthodox Muslims, whereas others, mostly in 
the rural areas, are attracted more to Sufism, Islamic mysticism, 
in their search for Allah. Within this branch and tendency of Islam 
are a host of religious sects with their own Islamic rituals and syn- 
cretistic adaptations. 

The Sudanese of the south are of African origin. Islam has made 
only modest inroads among these followers of traditional religions 
and of Christianity, which was spread in the twentieth century by 
European missionaries, and Arabic has not replaced the diverse 
languages of the south. The differences between north and south 
have usually engendered hostility, a clash of cultures that in the 
last 150 years has led to seemingly endless violence. The strong 
regional and cultural differences have inhibited nation building and 
have caused the civil war in the south that has raged since indepen- 
dence, except for a period of peace between 1972 and 1983. The 
distrust between Sudanese of the north and ^iose of the south — 
whether elite or peasants — has deepened wifh the long years of 
hostilities. And the cost of war has drained valuable national 
resources at the expense of health, education, and welfare in both 
regions. 

Physical Setting 

Sudan is Africa's largest country, embracing 2,505,813 square 
kilometers of northeast and central Africa. It consists of a huge plain 
bordered on three sides by mountains: to the east the Red Sea Hills, 
to the west Jabal Marrah, and on the southern frontier the Didinga 
Hills and the Dongotona and Imatong mountains. Jutting up 
abruptly in the south-central region of this vast plain are the iso- 
lated Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills, and far to the southeast, 
the lone Boma Plateau near the Ethiopian border. Spanning eigh- 
teen degrees of latitude, the plain of the Sudan (see Glossary) in- 
cludes from north to south significant regions with distinctive 
characters — northern Sudan, western Sudan, the central clay plains, 
eastern Sudan, the southern clay plains, the Jabal Hadid, or Iron- 
stone Plateau, and the southern hill masses (see fig. 4). 

Geographical Regions 

Northern Sudan, lying between the Egyptian border and Khar- 
toum, has two distinct parts, the desert and the Nile Valley. To 
the east of the Nile lies the Nubian Desert; to the west, the Libyan 
Desert. They are similar — stony, with sandy dunes drifting over 
the landscape. There is virtually no rainfall in these deserts, and 
in the Nubian Desert there are no oases. In the west there are a 



58 



-18 



-24 



I 

24 



30 



International 

boundary 

Administrative 

boundary 


# 

▲ 


Populated place 

Spot elevations 
in meters 


® National capital 


C1 — 


Cataract 




LIBYA 



CHAD 







^ 



-6 



CENTRAL^ 
AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC 

.•"V 



100 200 Miles 




ZAIRE 



100 200 Kilometers 

24 Boundary representation 
I nor necessarily authoritative 



Figure 4. Topography and Drainage 
60 



The Society and Its Environment 



few small watering holes, such as Bir an Natrun. Here the water 
table reaches the surface to form wells that provide water for 
nomads, caravans, and administrative patrols, although insufficient 
to support an oasis and inadequate to provide for a settled popula- 
tion. Flowing through the desert is the Nile Valley, whose alluvial 
strip of habitable land is no more than two kilometers wide and 
whose productivity depends on the annual flood. 

Western Sudan is a generic term describing the regions known 
as Darfur and Kurdufan that comprise 850,000 square kilometers. 
Traditionally, this area has been regarded as a single regional unit 
despite the physical differences. The dominant feature through- 
out this immense area is the absence of perennial streams; thus, 
people and animals must remain within reach of permanent wells. 
Consequently, the population is sparse and unevenly distributed. 
Western Darfur is an undulating plain dominated by the volcanic 
massif of Jabal Marrah towering 900 meters above the Sudanic 
plain; the drainage from Jabal Marrah onto the plain can support 
a settied population. Western Darfur stands in stark contrast to 
northern and eastern Darfur, which are semidesert with littie water 
either from the intermittent streams known as wadis or from wells 
that normally go dry during the winter months. Northwest of Darfur 
and continuing into Chad lies the unusual region called the jizzu 
(see Glossary), where sporadic winter rains generated from the 
Mediterranean frequently provide excellent grazing into January 
or even February. The southern region of western Sudan is known 
as the qoz (see Glossary), a land of sand dunes that in the rainy 
season is characterized by a rolling mantle of grass and has more 
reliable sources of water with its bore holes and hafri (sing. , hafr — 
see Glossary) than does the north. A unique feature of western 
Sudan is the Nuba Mountain range of southeast Kurdufan in the 
center of the country, a conglomerate of isolated dome-shaped, 
sugarloaf hills that ascend steeply and abruptly from the great 
Sudanic plain. Many hills are isolated and extend only a few square 
kilometers, but there are several large hill-masses with internal 
valleys that cut through the mountains high above the plain. 

Sudan's third distinct region is the central clay plains that stretch 
eastward from the Nuba Mountains to the Ethiopian frontier, 
broken only by the Ingessana Hills, and from Khartoum in the 
north to the far reaches of southern Sudan. Between the Dindar 
and the Rahad rivers, a low ridge slopes down from the Ethiopian 
highlands to break the endless skyline of the plains, and the occa- 
sional hill stands out in stark relief. The central clay plains pro- 
vide the backbone of Sudan's economy because they are productive 
where settlements cluster around available water. Furthermore, in 



61 



Sudan: A Country Study 

the heartland of the central clay plains lies the jazirah (see Glos- 
sary), the land between the Blue Nile and the White Nile (literally 
in Arabic "peninsula") where the great Gezira Scheme (also seen 
as Jazirah Scheme) was developed. This project grows cotton for 
export and has traditionally produced more than half of Sudan's 
revenue and export earnings. 

Northeast of the central clay plains lies eastern Sudan, which 
is divided between desert and semidesert and includes Al Butanah, 
the Qash Delta, the Red Sea Hills, and the coastal plain. Al Butanah 
is an undulating land between Khartoum and Kassala that pro- 
vides good grazing for cattle, sheep, and goats. East of Al Butanah 
is a peculiar geological formation known as the Qash Delta. Origi- 
nally a depression, it has been filled with sand and silt brought down 
by the flash floods of the Qash River, creating a delta above the 
surrounding plain. Extending 100 kilometers north of Kassala, the 
whole area watered by the Qash is a rich grassland with bountiful 
cultivation long after the river has spent its waters on the surface 
of its delta. Trees and bushes provide grazing for the camels from 
the north, and the rich moist soil provides an abundance of food 
crops and cotton. 

Northward beyond the Qash lie the more formidable Red Sea 
Hills. Dry, bleak, and cooler than the surrounding land, particu- 
larly in the heat of the Sudan summer, they stretch northward into 
Egypt, a jumbled mass of hills where life is hard and unpredict- 
able for the hardy Beja inhabitants. Below the hills sprawls the 
coastal plain of the Red Sea, varying in width from about fifty- six 
kilometers in the south near Tawkar to about twenty-four kilometers 
near the Egyptian frontier. The coastal plain is dry and barren. 
It consists of rocks, and the seaward side is thick with coral reefs. 

The southern clay plains, which can be regarded as an exten- 
sion of the northern clay plains, extend all the way from northern 
Sudan to the mountains on the Sudan-Uganda frontier, and in the 
west from the borders of Central African Republic eastward to the 
Ethiopian highlands. This great Nilotic plain is broken by several 
distinctive features. First, the White Nile bisects the plain and pro- 
vides large permanent water surfaces such as lakes Fajarial, No, 
and Shambe. Second, As Sudd, the world's largest swamp, pro- 
vides a formidable expanse of lakes, lagoons, and aquatic plants, 
whose area in high flood waters exceeds 30,000 square kilometers, 
approximately the area of Belgium. So intractable was this sudd 
(see Glossary) as an obstacle to navigation that a passage was not 
discovered until the mid-nineteenth century. Then as now, As Sudd 
with its extreme rate of evaporation consumes on average more 
than half the waters that come down the White Nile from the 



62 



The Society and Its Environment 



equatorial lakes. These waters also create a flood plain known as 
the toic that provides grazing when the flood waters retreat to the 
permanent swamp and sluggish river, the Bahr al Jabal, as the 
White Nile is called here. 

The land rising to the south and west of the southern clay plain 
is referred to as the Ironstone Plateau (Jabal Hadid), a name de- 
rived from its laterite soils and increasing elevation. The plateau 
rises from the west bank of the Nile, sloping gradually upward to 
the Congo-Nile watershed. The land is well watered, providing rich 
cultivation, but the streams and rivers that come down from the 
watershed divide and erode the land before flowing on to the Nilotic 
plain to flow into As Sudd. Along the streams of the watershed 
are the gallery forests, the beginnings of the tropical rain forests 
that extend far into Zaire. To the east of the Jabal Hadid and the 
Bahr al Jabal rise the foothills of the mountain ranges along the 
Sudan-Uganda border — the Imatong, Didinga, and Dongotona — 
which rise to more than 3,000 meters. These mountains form a 
stark contrast to the great plains to the north that dominate Sudan's 
geography. 

Soils 

The country's soils can be divided geographically into three 
categories: the sandy soils of the northern and west central areas, 
the clay soils of the central region, and the laterite soils of the south. 
Less extensive and widely separated, but of major economic im- 
portance, is a fourth group consisting of alluvial soils found along 
the lower reaches of the White Nile and Blue Nile rivers, along 
the main Nile to Lake Nubia, in the delta of the Qash River in 
the Kassala area, and in the Baraka Delta in the area of Tawkar 
near the Red Sea in Ash Sharqi State. 

Agriculturally, the most important soils are the clays in central 
Sudan that extend from west of Kassala through Al Awsat and 
southern Kurdufan. Known as cracking soils because of the prac- 
tice of allowing them to dry out and crack during the dry months 
to restore their permeability, they are used in the areas of Al Jazirah 
and Khashm al Qirbah for irrigated cultivation. East of the Blue 
Nile, large areas are used for mechanized rainfed crops. West of 
the White Nile, these soils are used by traditional cultivators to 
grow sorghum, sesame, peanuts, and (in the area around the Nuba 
Mountains) cotton. The southern part of the clay soil zone lies in 
the broad floodplain of the upper reaches of the White Nile and 
its tributaries, covering most of Aali an Nil and upper Bahr al 
Ghazal states. Subject to heavy rainfall during the rainy season, 
the floodplain proper is inundated for four to six months. The large 



63 



Sudan: A Country Study 



swampy area, As Sudd, is permanently flooded, and adjacent areas 
are flooded for one or two months. In general this area is poorly 
suited to crop production, but the grasses it supports during dry 
periods are used for grazing. 

The sandy soils in the semiarid areas south of the desert in north- 
ern Kurdufan and northern Darfur states support vegetation used 
for grazing. In the southern part of these states and the western 
part of southern Darfur are the so-called qoz sands. Livestock rais- 
ing is this area's major activity, but a significant amount of crop 
cultivation, mainly of millet, also occurs. Peanuts and sesame are 
grown as cash crops. The qoz sands are the principal area from 
which gum arabic is obtained through tapping of Acacia Senegal 
(known locally as hashab). This tree grows readily in the region, 
and cultivators occasionally plant hashab trees when land is returned 
to fallow. 

The laterite soils of the south cover most of western Al Istiwai 
and Bahr al Ghazal states. They underlie the extensive moist wood- 
lands found in these provinces. Crop production is scattered, and 
the soils, where cultivated, lose fertility relatively quickly; even the 
richer soils are usually returned to bush fallow within five years. 

Hydrology 

Except for a small area in northeastern Sudan where wadis dis- 
charge the sporadic runoff into the Red Sea or rivers from Ethio- 
pia flow into shallow, evaporating ponds west of the Red Sea Hills, 
the entire country is drained by the Nile and its two main tribu- 
taries, the Blue Nile (Al Bahr al Azraq) and the White Nile (Al 
Bahr al Abyad). The longest river in the world, the Nile flows for 
6,737 kilometers from its farthest headwaters in central Africa to 
the Mediterranean. The importance of the Nile has been recog- 
nized since biblical times; for centuries the river has been a life- 
line for Sudan. 

The Blue Nile flows out of the Ethiopian highlands to meet the 
White Nile at Khartoum. The Blue Nile is the smaller of the two; 
its flow usually accounts for only one-sixth of the total. In August, 
however, the rains in the Ethiopian highlands swell the Blue Nile 
until it accounts for 90 percent of the Nile's total flow. Several dams 
have been constructed to regulate the river's flow — the Roseires 
Dam (Ar Rusayris), about 100 kilometers from the Ethiopian 
border; the Meina al Mak Dam at Sinjah; and the largest, the forty- 
meter-high Sennar Dam constructed in 1925 at Sannar. The Blue 
Nile's two main tributaries, the Dindar and the Rahad, have head- 
waters in the Ethiopian highlands and discharge water into the Blue 



64 



The Society and Its Environment 



Nile only during the summer high-water season. For the remainder 
of the year, their flow is reduced to pools in their sandy riverbeds. 

The White Nile flows north from central Africa, draining Lake 
Victoria and the highland regions of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. 
At Bor, the great swamp of the Nile, As Sudd begins. The river 
has no well-defined channel here; the water flows slowly through 
a labyrinth of small spillways and lakes choked with papyrus and 
reeds. Much water is lost to evaporation. To provide for water trans- 
portation through this region and to speed the river's flow so that 
less water evaporates, Sudan, with French help, began building 
the Jonglei Canal (also seen as Junqali Canal) from Bor to a point 
just upstream from Malakal. However, construction was suspended 
in 1984 because of security problems caused by the civil war in 
the south. 

South of Khartoum, the British built the Jabal al Auliya Dam 
in 1937 to store the water of the White Nile and then release it 
in the fall when the flow from the Blue Nile slackens. Much water 
from the reservoir has been diverted for irrigation projects in cen- 
tral Sudan, however, and much of the remainder evaporates. Hence 
the overall flow released downstream is not great. 

The White Nile has several substantial tributaries that drain 
southern Sudan. In the southwest, the Bahr al Ghazal drains a basin 
larger in area than France. Although the drainage area is exten- 
sive, evaporation takes most of the water from the slow-moving 
streams in this region, and the discharge of the Bahr al Ghazal into 
the White Nile is minimal. In southeast Sudan, the Sobat River 
drains an area of western Ethiopia and the hills near the Sudan- 
Uganda border. The Sobat' s discharge is considerable; at its 
confluence with the White Nile just south of Malakal, the Sobat 
accounts for half the White Nile's water. 

Above Khartoum, the Nile flows through desert in a large S- 
shaped pattern to empty into Lake Nasser behind the Aswan High 
Dam in Egypt. The river flows slowly above Khartoum, dropping 
little in elevation although five cataracts hinder river transport at 
times of low water. The Atbarah River, flowing out of Ethiopia, 
is the only tributary north of Khartoum, and its waters reach the 
Nile for only the six months between July and December. During 
the rest of the year, the Atbarah' s bed is dry, except for a few pools 
and ponds. 

Climate 

Although Sudan lies within the tropics, the climate ranges from 
arid in the north to tropical wet-and-dry in the far southwest. Tem- 
peratures do not vary greatly with the season at any location; the 



65 



Sudan: A Country Study 

most significant climatic variables are rainfall and the length of the 
dry season. Variations in the length of the dry season depend on 
which of two air flows predominates, dry northeasterly winds from 
the Arabian Peninsula or moist southwesterly winds from the Congo 
River basin. 

From January to March, the country is under the influence of 
the dry northeasterlies. There is practically no rainfall countrywide 
except for a small area in northwestern Sudan where the winds 
have passed over the Mediterranean and bring occasional light 
rains. By early April, the moist southwesterlies have reached 
southern Sudan, bringing heavy rains and thunderstorms. By July 
the moist air has reached Khartoum, and in August it extends to 
its usual northern limits around Abu Hamad, although in some 
years the humid air may even reach the Egyptian border. The flow 
becomes weaker as it spreads north. In September the dry north- 
easterlies begin to strengthen and to push south, and by the end 
of December they cover the entire country. Yambio, close to the 
border with Zaire, has a nine-month rainy season (April-December) 
and receives an average of 1,142 millimeters of rain each year; 
Khartoum has a three-month rainy season (July- September) with 
an annual average rainfall of 161 millimeters; Atbarah receives 
showers in August that produce an annual average of only 74 milli- 
meters. 

In some years, the arrival of the southwesterlies and their rain 
in central Sudan can be delayed, or they may not come at all. If 
that happens, drought and famine follow. The decades of the 1970s 
and 1980s saw the southwesterlies frequently fail, with disastrous 
results for the Sudanese people and economy. 

Temperatures are highest at the end of the dry season when 
cloudless skies and dry air allow them to soar. The far south, 
however, with only a short dry season, has uniformly high tem- 
peratures throughout the year. In Khartoum, the warmest months 
are May and June, when average highs are 41 °C and tempera- 
tures can reach 48°C. Northern Sudan, with its short rainy sea- 
son, has hot daytime temperatures year round, except for winter 
months in the northwest where there is precipitation from the 
Mediterranean in January and February. Conditions in highland 
areas are generally cooler, and the hot daytime temperatures dur- 
ing the dry season throughout central and northern Sudan fall rapidly 
after sunset. Lows in Khartoum average 15°C in January and have 
dropped as low as 6°C after the passing of a cool front in winter. 

The haboob, a violent dust storm, can occur in central Sudan 
when the moist southwesterly flow first arrives (May through July). 
The moist, unstable air forms thunderstorms in the heat of the 



66 



The Society and Its Environment 



afternoon. The initial downflow of air from an approaching storm 
produces a huge yellow wall of sand and clay that can temporarily 
reduce visibility to zero. 

Population 

Population information for Sudan has been limited, but in 1990 
it was clear that the country was experiencing a high birth rate and 
a high, but declining, death rate. Infant mortality was high, but 
Sudan was expected to continue its rapid population growth, with 
a large percentage of its people under fifteen years of age, for some 
time to come. The trends indicated an overall low population den- 
sity. However, with famine affecting much of the country, inter- 
nal migration by hundreds of thousands of people was on the 
increase. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
reported that in early 1991, approximately 1,800,000 people were 
displaced in the northern states, of whom it was estimated that 
750,000 were in Al Khartum State, 30,000 each in Kurdufan and 
Al Awsat states, 300,000 each in Darfur and Ash Sharqi states, 
and 150,000 in Ash Shamali State. Efforts were underway to pro- 
vide permanent sites for about 800,000 of these displaced people. 
The civil war and famine in the south were estimated to have dis- 
placed up to 3.5 million southern Sudanese by early 1990. 

In addition to uncertainties concerning the number of refugees, 
population estimates were complicated by census difficulties. Since 
independence there have been three national censuses, in 1955-56, 
1973, and 1983. The first was inadequately prepared and executed. 
The second was not officially recognized by the government, and 
thus its complete findings have never been released. The third cen- 
sus was of better quality, but some of the data has never been ana- 
lyzed because of inadequate resources. 

The 1983 census put the total population at 21.6 million with 
a growth rate between 1956 and 1983 of 2.8 percent per year (see 
table 2, Appendix). In 1990, the National Population Committee 
and the Department of Statistics put Sudan's birth rate at 50 births 
per 1 ,000 and the death rate at 19 per 1 ,000, for a rate of increase 
of 31 per 1,000 or 3.1 percent per year. This is a staggering in- 
crease. When compared with the world average of 1 .8 percent per 
year and the average for developing countries of 2 . 1 percent per 
annum, this percentage made Sudan one of the world's fastest grow- 
ing countries. The 1983 population estimate was thought to be too 
low, but even accepting it and the pre- 1983 growth rate of 2.8 per- 
cent, Sudan's population in 1990 would have been well over 25 
million. At the estimated 1990 growth rate of 3.1 percent, the popu- 
lation would double in twenty-two years. Even if the lower estimated 



67 



Sudan: A Country Study 

rate were sustained, the population would reach 38.6 million by 
2003 and 50.9 million by 2013. 

Both within Sudan and among the international community, it 
was commonly thought that with an average population density 
of nine persons per square kilometer, population density was not 
a major problem. This assumption, however, failed to take into 
account that much of Sudan was uninhabitable and that its people 
were unevenly distributed, with about 33 percent of the nation's 
population occupying 7 percent of the land and concentrated around 
Khartoum and in Al Awsat. In fact, 66 percent of the population 
lived within 300 kilometers of Khartoum (see table 3, Appendix). 
In 1990 the population of the Three Towns (Khartoum, Omdur- 
man, and Khartoum North) was unknown because of the constant 
influx of refugees, but estimates of 3 million, well over half the 
urban dwellers in Sudan, may not have been unrealistic. Neverthe- 
less, only 20 percent of Sudanese lived in towns and cities; 80 per- 
cent still lived in rural areas. 

The birth rate between the 1973 census and the 1987 National 
Population Conference appeared to have remained constant at from 
48 to 50 births per 1,000 population. The fertility rate (the aver- 
age number of children per woman) was estimated at 6.9 in 1983. 
Knowledge of family planning remained minimal. During the pe- 
riod, the annual death rate fell from 23 to 19 per 1,000, and the 
estimated life expectancy rose from 43.5 years to 47 years. 

For more than a decade the gross domestic product (GDP — see 
Glossary) of Sudan had not kept pace with the increasing popula- 
tion, a trend indicating that Sudan would have difficulty in provid- 
ing adequate services for its people. Moreover, half the population 
were under eighteen years of age and therefore were primarily con- 
sumers not producers. Internal migration caused by civil war and 
famine created major shifts in population distribution, producing 
overpopulation in areas that could provide neither services nor em- 
ployment. Furthermore, Sudan has suffered a continuous "brain 
drain" as its finest professionals and most skilled laborers emigrated, 
while simultaneously there has been an influx of more than 1 mil- 
lion refugees, who not only lacked skills but required massive relief. 
Droughts in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s have undermined Sudan's 
food production, and the country would have to double its produc- 
tion to feed its expected population within the next generation. In 
the absence of a national population policy to deal with these 
problems, they were expected to worsen. 

Moreover, throughout Sudan continuous environmental degra- 
dation accompanied the dearth of rainfall. Experts estimated that 
desertification caused by deforestation and drought had allowed 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



the Sahara to advance southward at the rate of ten kilometers per 
year. About 7.8 million Sudanese were estimated to be at risk from 
famine in early 1991, according to the United Nations World Food 
Programme and other agencies. The Save the Children Fund esti- 
mated that the famine in Darfur would cost the lives of "tens of 
thousands" of people in the early 1990s. Analysts believed that the 
lack of rainfall combined with the ravages of war would result in 
massive numbers of deaths from starvation in the 1990s. 

Ethnicity 

Sudan's ethnic and linguistic diversity remained one of the most 
complex in the world in 1991. Its nearly 600 ethnic groups spoke 
more than 400 languages and dialects, many of them intelligible 
to only a small number of individuals. In the 1980s and 1990s some 
of these small groups became absorbed by larger groups, and migra- 
tion often caused individuals reared in one tongue to converse only 
in the dominant language of the new area. Such was the case with 
migrants to the Three Towns. There Arabic was the lingua franca 
despite the use of English by many of the elite. Some linguistic 
groups had been absorbed by accommodation, others by conflict. 
Most Sudanese were, of necessity, multilingual. Choice of language 
played a political role in the ethnic and religious cleavage between 
the northern and southern Sudanese. English was associated with 
being non-Muslim, as Arabic was associated with Islam. Thus lan- 
guage was a political instrument and a symbol of identity. 

Language 

Language differences have served as a partial basis for ethnic 
classification and as symbols of ethnic identity. Such differences 
have been obstacles to the flow of communication in a state as lin- 
guistically fragmented as Sudan. These barriers have been over- 
come in part by the emergence of some languages as lingua francas 
and by a considerable degree of multilingualism in some areas. 

Most languages spoken in Africa fall into four language super- 
stocks. Three of them — Afro-Asiatic, Niger-Kurdufanian, and Nilo- 
Saharan — are represented in Sudan. Each is divided into groups 
that are in turn subdivided into sets of closely related languages. 
Two or more major groups of each superstock are represented in 
Sudan, which has been historically both a north-south and an east- 
west migration crossroad. 

The most widely spoken language in the Sudan is Arabic, a mem- 
ber of the Semitic branch of the Afro-Asiatic language family. 
Cushitic, another major division of the Afro-Asiatic language, is 
represented by Bedawiye (with several dialects), spoken by the 



69 



Sudan: A Country Study 

largely nomadic Beja. Chadic, a third division, is represented by 
its most important single language, Hausa, a West African tongue 
used by the Hausa themselves and employed by many other West 
Africans in Sudan as a lingua franca. 

Niger- Kurdufanian is first divided into Niger-Congo and Kur- 
dufanian. The widespread Niger-Congo language group includes 
many divisions and subdivisions of languages. Represented in Sudan 
are Azande and several other tongues of the Adamawa-Eastern 
language division, and Fulani of the West Atlantic division. The 
Kurdufanian stock comprises only thirty to forty languages spoken 
in a limited area of Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and their environs. 

The designation of a Nilo-Saharan superstock has not been fully 
accepted by linguists, and its constituent groups and subgroups 
are not firmly fixed, in part because many of the languages have 
not been well studied. Assuming the validity of the category and 
its internal divisions, however, eight of its nine major divisions and 
many of their subdivisions are well represented in Sudan, where 
roughly seventy-five languages, well over half of those named in 
the 1955-56 census, could be identified as Nilo-Saharan. Many 
of these languages are used only by small groups of people. Only 
six or seven of them were spoken by 1 percent or more of Sudan's 
1956 population. Perhaps another dozen were the home languages 
of 0.5 to 1 percent. Many other languages were used by a few thou- 
sand or even a few hundred people. 

The number of languages and dialects in Sudan is assumed to 
be about 400, including languages spoken by an insignificant num- 
ber of people. Moreover, languages of smaller ethnic groups tended 
to disappear when the groups assimilated with more dominant eth- 
nic units. 

Several lingua francas have emerged and many peoples have be- 
come genuinely multilingual, fluent in a native language spoken 
at home, a lingua franca, and perhaps other languages. Arabic is 
the primary lingua franca in Sudan, given its status as the coun- 
try's official language and as the language of Islam. Arabic, how- 
ever, has several different forms, and not all who master one are 
able to use another. Among the varieties noted by scholars are clas- 
sical Arabic, the language of the Quran (although generally not a 
spoken language and only used for printed work); Modern Stan- 
dard Arabic, derived from classical Arabic and used by the educated 
in conversation; and at least two kinds of colloquial Arabic in the 
Sudan — that spoken in roughly the eastern half of the country and 
called Sudanese colloquial Arabic and that spoken in western Sudan, 
closely akin to the colloquial Arabic spoken in Chad. There are 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



other colloquial forms. A pidgin called Juba Arabic is peculiar to 
southern Sudan. Although some Muslims might become acquainted 
with classical Arabic in the course of rudimentary religious school- 
ing, very few except the most educated know it except by rote. 

Modern Standard Arabic is in principle the same everywhere 
in the Arab world and presumably permits communication among 
educated persons whose mother tongue is one or another form of 
colloquial Arabic. Despite its international character, however, 
Modern Standard Arabic varies from country to country. It has 
been, however, the language used in Sudan's central government, 
the press, and Radio Omdurman. The latter also broadcast in clas- 
sical Arabic. One observer, writing in the early 1970s, noted that 
Arabic speakers (and others who had acquired the language infor- 
mally) in western Sudan found it easier to understand the Chadian 
colloquial Arabic used by Chad Radio than the Modern Standard 
Arabic used by Radio Omdurman. This might also be the case 
elsewhere in rural Sudan where villagers and nomads speak a local 
dialect of Arabic. 

Despite Arabic's status as the official national language, English 
was acknowledged as the principal language in southern Sudan in 
the late 1980s. It was also the chief language at the University of 
Khartoum and was the language of secondary schools even in the 
north before 1969. The new policy for higher education announced 
by the Sudanese government in 1990 indicated that Arabic would 
be the language of instruction in all institutions of higher learning. 

Nevertheless, in the south, the first two years of primary school 
were taught in the local language. Thereafter, through secondary 
school, either Arabic or English could become the medium of in- 
struction (English and Arabic were regarded as of equal impor- 
tance); the language not used as a medium was taught as a subject. 
In the early 1970s, when this option was established, roughly half 
the general secondary classes (equivalent to grades seven through 
nine) were conducted in Arabic and half in English in Bahr al 
Ghazal and Al Istiwai provinces. In early 1991 , with about 90 per- 
cent of the southern third of the country controlled by the Sudanese 
People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the use of Arabic as a medium 
of instruction in southern schools remained a political issue, with 
many southerners regarding Arabic as an element in northern cul- 
tural domination. 

Juba (or pidgin) Arabic, developed and learned informally, had 
been used in southern towns, particularly in Al Istiwai, for some 
time and had spread slowly but steadily throughout the south, but 
not always at the expense of English. The Juba Arabic used in the 



71 



Sudan: A Country Study 

marketplace and even by political figures addressing ethnically 
mixed urban audiences could not be understood by northern 
Sudanese. 

Ethnic Groups 

The definition and boundaries of ethnic groups depend on how 
people perceive themselves and others. Language, cultural charac- 
teristics, and common ancestry may be used as markers of ethnic 
identity or difference, but they do not always define groups of peo- 
ple. Thus, the people called Atuot and the much larger group called 
Nuer speak essentially the same language, share many cultural 
characteristics, and acknowledge a common ancestry, but each group 
defines itself and the other as different. Identifying ethnic groups 
in Sudan is made more complicated by the multifaceted character 
of internal divisions among Arabic- speaking Muslims, the largest 
population that might be considered a single ethnic group. 

The distinction between Sudan's Muslim and non- Muslim people 
has been of considerable importance in the country's history and 
provides a preliminary ordering of the ethnic groups. It does not, 
however, correspond in any simple way to distinctions based on 
linguistic, cultural, or racial criteria nor to social or political solidar- 
ity. Ethnic group names commonly used in Sudan and by foreign 
analysts are not always used by the people themselves. This fact 
is particularly true for non- Arabs known by names coined by Arabs 
or by the British, who based the names on terms used by Arabs 
or others not of the group itself. Thus, the Dinka and the Nuer, 
the largest groups in southern Sudan, call themselves, respectively, 
Jieng and Naath. 

Muslim Peoples 
Arabs 

In the early 1990s, the largest single category among the Mus- 
lim peoples consisted of those speaking some form of Arabic. Ex- 
cluded were a small number of Arabic speakers originating in Egypt 
and professing Coptic Christianity. In 1983 the people identified 
as Arabs constituted nearly 40 percent of the total Sudanese popu- 
lation and nearly 55 percent of the population of the northern 
provinces. In some of these provinces (Al Khartum, Ash Shamali, 
Al Awsat), they were overwhelmingly dominant. In others (Kur- 
dufan, Darfur), they were less so but made up a majority. By 1990 
Ash Sharqi State was probably largely Arab. It should be empha- 
sized, however, that the acquisition of Arabic as a second language 
did not necessarily lead to the assumption of Arab identity. 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



Despite common language, religion, and self- identification, Arabs 
did not constitute a cohesive group. They were highly differentiated 
in their modes of livelihood and ways of life. Besides the major 
distinction dividing Arabs into sedentary and nomadic, there was 
an old tradition that assigned them to tribes, each said to have a 
common ancestor. 

The two largest of the supratribal categories in the early 1990s 
were the Juhayna and the Jaali (or Jaalayin). The Juhayna category 
consisted of tribes considered nomadic, although many had become 
fully settled. The Jaali encompassed the riverine, sedentary peo- 
ples from Dunqulah to just north of Khartoum and members of 
this group who had moved elsewhere. Some of its groups had be- 
come sedentary only in the twentieth century. Sudanese saw the 
Jaali as primarily indigenous peoples who were gradually arabized. 
Sudanese thought the Juhayna were less mixed, although some 
Juhayna groups had become more diverse by absorbing indigenous 
peoples. The Baqqara, for example, who moved south and west 
and encountered the Negroid peoples of those areas were scarcely 
to be distinguished from them. 

A third supratribal division of some importance was the Kawahla, 
consisting of thirteen tribes of varying size. Of these, eight tribes 
and segments of the other five were found north and west of Khar- 
toum. There people were more heavily dependent on pastoralism 
than were the segments of the other five tribes, who lived on either 
side of the White Nile from south of Khartoum to north of Kusti. 
This cluster of five groups (for practical purposes independent tribes) 
exhibited a considerable degree of self-awareness and cohesion in 
some circumstances, although that had not precluded intertribal 
competition for local power and status. 

The ashraf (sing. , sharif), who claim descent from the Prophet 
Muhammad, were found in small groups (lineages) scattered among 
other Arabs. Most of these lineages had been founded by religious 
teachers or their descendants. A very small group of descendants 
of the Funj Dynasty also claimed descent from the Umayyads, an 
early dynasty of caliphs based in present-day Syria. That claim 
had little foundation, but it served to separate from other Arabs 
a small group living on or between the White Nile and the Blue 
Nile. The term ashraf was also applied in Sudan to the family of 
Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah, known as the Mahdi 
(1848-85; see The Mahdiyah, ch. 1). 

The division into Jaali and Juhayna did not appear to have a sig- 
nificant effect on the ways in which individuals and groups regarded 
each other. Conflicts between tribes generally arose from competi- 
tion for good grazing land, or from the competing demands of 



73 



Sudan: A Country Study 

nomadic and sedentary tribes on the environment. Among nomadic 
and recendy sedentary Arabs, tribes and subtribes competed for 
local power (see The Social Order, this ch.). 

Membership in tribal and subtribal units is generally by birth, 
but individuals and groups may also join these units by adoption, 
clientship, or a decision to live and behave in a certain way. For 
example, when a sedentary Fur becomes a cattle nomad, he is per- 
ceived as a Baqqara. Eventually the descendants of such newcomers 
are regarded as belonging to the group by birth. 

Tribal and subtribal units divide the Arab ethnic category ver- 
tically, but other distinctions cut across Arab society and its tribal 
and subtribal components horizontally by differences of social sta- 
tus and power. Still another division is that of religious associa- 
tions (see Islamic Movements and Religious Orders, this ch.). 

Nubians 

In the early 1990s, the Nubians were the second most signifi- 
cant Muslim group in Sudan, their homeland being the Nile River 
valley in far northern Sudan and southern Egypt. Other, much 
smaller groups speaking a related language and claiming a link with 
the Nile Nubians have been given local names, such as the Birqid 
and the Meidab in Darfur State (see fig. 5). Almost all Nile Nubians 
speak Arabic as a second language; some near Dunqulah have been 
largely arabized and are referred to as Dunqulah. 

In the mid-1960s, in anticipation of the flooding of their lands 
after the construction of the Aswan High Dam, 35,000 to 50,000 
Nile Nubians resettled at Khashm al Qirbah on the Atbarah River 
in what was then Kassala Province. It is not clear how many 
Nubians remained in the Nile Valley. Even before the resetdement, 
many had left the valley for varying lengths of time to work in the 
towns, although most sought to maintain a link with their tradi- 
tional homeland. In the 1955-56 census, more Nile Nubians were 
counted in Al Khartum Province than in the Nubian country to 
the north. A similar pattern of work in the towns was apparently 
followed by those resettled at Khashm al Qirbah. Many Nubians 
there retained their tenancies, having kin oversee the land and hiring 
non-Nubians to work it. The Nubians, often with their families, 
worked in Khartoum, the town of Kassala, and Port Sudan in jobs 
ranging from domestic service and semi-skilled labor to teaching 
and civil service, which required literacy. Despite their knowledge 
of Arabic and their devotion to Islam, Nubians retained a consider- 
able self-consciousness and tended to maintain tightly knit com- 
munities of their own in the towns. 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



Beja 

The Beja probably have lived in the Red Sea Hills since ancient 
times. Arab influence was not significant until a millennium or so 
ago, but it has since led the Beja to adopt Islam and genealogies 
that link them to Arab ancestors, to arabize their names, and to 
include many Arabic terms in their language. Although some Arabs 
figure in the ancestry of the Beja, the group is mosdy descended 
from an indigenous population, and they have not become gener- 
ally arabized. Their language (Bedawiye) links them to Cushitic- 
speaking peoples farther south. 

In the 1990s, most Beja belonged to one of four groups — the 
Bisharin, the Amarar, the Hadendowa, and the Bani Amir. The 
largest group was the Hadendowa, but the Bisharin had the most 
territory, with settled tribes living on the Atbarah River in the far 
south of the Beja range and nomads living in the north. A good 
number of the Hadendowa were also setded and engaged in agricul- 
ture, particularly in the coastal region near Tawkar, but many re- 
mained nomads. The Amarar, living in the central part of the Beja 
range, seemed to be largely nomads, as were the second largest 
group, the Bani Amir, who lived along the border with northern 
Ethiopia. The precise proportion of nomads in the Beja popula- 
tion in the early 1990s was not known, but it was far greater rela- 
tively than the nomadic component of the Arab population. The 
Beja were characterized as conservative, proud, and aloof even 
toward other Beja and very reticent in relations with strangers. They 
were long reluctant to accept the authority of central governments. 

Fur 

The Fur, ruled until 1916 by an independent sultanate and 
oriented politically and culturally to peoples in Chad, were a seden- 
tary, cultivating group long setded on and around the Jabal Marrah. 
Although the ruling dynasty and the peoples of the area had long 
been Muslims, they have not been arabized. Livestock has played 
a small part in the subsistence of most Fur. Those who acquired 
a substantial herd of cattle could maintain it only by living like 
the neighboring Baqqara Arabs, and those who persisted in this 
pattern eventually came to be thought of as Baqqara. 

Zaghawa 

Living on the plateau north of the Fur were the seminomadic 
people calling themselves Beri and known to the Arabs as Zaghawa. 
Large numbers of the group lived in Chad. Herders of cattle, 
camels, sheep, and goats, the Zaghawa also gained a substantial 
part of their livelihood by gathering wild grains and other products. 



75 



Sudan: A Country Study 



International 
boundary 

Administrative 
boundary 

Semitic-Nilotic lin- 
guistic boundary 

Arabic-speaking area 

National capital 

NUER Major ethnic group 

Baka Secondary ethnic group 

100 200 Kilometers 




NOTE: Because of their scattered distribution, 
Hausa and Fulani are not shown on the map. 

Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative. 



Figure 5. Principal Ethnolinguistic Groups, 1991 



Cultivation had become increasingly important but remained risky, 
and the people reverted to gathering in times of drought. Converted 
to Islam, the Zaghawa nevertheless retain much of their traditional 
religious orientation. 

Masalit, Daju, and Berti 

Of other peoples living in Darfur in the 1990s who spoke Nilo- 
Saharan languages and were at least nominally Muslim, the most 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



important were the Masalit, Daju, and Berti. All were primarily 
cultivators living in permanent villages, but they practiced animal 
husbandry in varying degrees. The Masalit, living on the Sudan- 
Chad border, were the largest group. Historically under a minor 
sultanate, they were positioned between the two dominant sultanates 
of the area, Darfur and Wadai (in Chad). A part of the territory 
they occupied had been formerly controlled by the Fur, but the 
Masalit gradually encroached on it in the first half of the twen- 
tieth century in a series of local skirmishes carried out by villages 
on both sides, rather than by the sultanates. In 1990-91 much of 
Darfur was in a state of anarchy, with many villages being attacked. 
There were many instances in which Masalit militias attacked Fur 
and other villages (see Western Sudan, ch. 4). 

The Berti consisted of two groups. One lived northeast of Al 
Fashir; the other had migrated to eastern Darfur and western Kur- 
dufan provinces in the nineteenth century. The two Berti groups 
did not seem to share a sense of common identity and interest. 
Members of the western group, in addition to cultivating subsis- 
tence crops and practicing animal husbandry, gathered gum arabic 
for sale in local markets. The Berti tongue had largely given way 
to Arabic as a home language. 

The term Daju was a linguistic designation that was applied to 
a number of groups scattered from western Kurdufan and south- 
western Darfur states to eastern Chad. These groups called them- 
selves by different names and exhibited no sense of common 
identity. 

West Africans 

Living in Sudan in 1990 were nearly a million people of West 
African origin. Together, West Africans who have become Sudanese 
nationals and resident nonnationals from West Africa made up 6.5 
percent of the Sudanese population. In the mid-1970s, West Afri- 
cans had been estimated at more than 10 percent of the popula- 
tion of the northern provinces. Some were descendants of persons 
who had arrived five generations or more earlier; others were re- 
cent immigrants. Some had come in self-imposed exile, unable to 
accommodate to the colonial power in their homeland. Others had 
been pilgrims to Mecca, settling either en route or on their return. 
Many came over decades in the course of the great dispersion of 
the nomadic Fulani; others arrived, particularly after World War 
II, as rural and urban laborers or to take up land as peasant culti- 
vators. 

Nearly 60 percent of people included in the West African category 
were said to be of Nigerian origin (locally called Borno after the 



77 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Nigerian emirate that was their homeland). Given Hausa domi- 
nance in northern Nigeria and the widespread use of their language 
there and elsewhere, some non-Hausa might also be called Hausa 
and describe themselves as such. But the Hausa themselves, par- 
ticularly those long in Sudan, preferred to be called Takari. The 
Fulani, even more widely dispersed throughout West Africa, may 
have originated in states other than Nigeria. Typically, the term 
applied to the Fulani in Sudan was Fallata, but Sudanese also used 
that term for other West Africans. 

The Fulani nomads were found in many parts of central Sudan 
from Darfur to the Blue Nile, and they occasionally competed with 
indigenous populations for pasturage. In Darfur groups of Fulani 
origin adapted in various ways to the presence of the Baqqara tribes. 
Some retained all aspects of their culture and language. A few had 
become much like Baqqara in language and in other respects, 
although they tended to retain their own breeds of cattle and ways 
of handling them. Some of the Fulani groups in the eastern states 
were sedentary, descendants of sedentary Fulani of the ruling group 
in northern Nigeria. 

Non-Muslim Peoples 

In the 1990s, most of Sudan's diverse non-Muslim peoples lived 
in southern Sudan, but a number of small groups resided in the 
hilly areas south of the Blue Nile on or near the border with Ethio- 
pia. Another cluster of peoples commonly called the Nuba, but so- 
cially and culturally diverse, lived in the Nuba Mountains of southern 
Kurdufan State. 

Nilotes 

Nilote is a common name for many of the peoples living on or 
near the Bahr al Jabal and its tributaries. The term refers to peo- 
ple speaking languages of one section of the Nilotic subbranch of 
the Eastern Sudanic branch of Nilo-Saharan and sharing a myth 
of common origin. They are marked by physical similarity and 
many common cultural features. Many had a long tradition of 
cattlekeeping, including some for whom cattle were no longer of 
practical importance. Because of their adaptation to different cli- 
mates and their encounters, peaceful and otherwise, with other peo- 
ples, there was also some diversity among the Nilotes. 

Despite the civil war and famine, the Nilotes still constituted more 
than three-fifths of the population of southern Sudan in 1990. One 
group — the Dinka — made up roughly two-thirds of the total cate- 
gory, 40 percent or more of the population of the area and more 
than 10 percent of Sudan's population. The Dinka were widely 



78 



A Shilluk, member of a leading southern ethnic group, 
prepares to launch his canoe. 
Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 



79 



Sudan: A Country Study 

distributed over the northern portion of the southern region, par- 
ticularly in Aali an Nil and Bahr al Ghazal. The next largest group, 
only one-fourth to one-third the size of the Dinka, were the Nuer. 
The Shilluk, the third largest group, had only about one-fourth 
as many people as the Nuer, and the remaining Nilotic groups were 
much smaller. 

The larger and more dispersed the group, however, the more 
internally varied it had become. The Dinka and Nuer, for exam- 
ple, did not develop a centralized government encompassing all 
or any large part of their groups. The Dinka are considered to have 
as many as twenty-five tribal groups. The Nuer have nine or ten 
separately named groups. 

Armed conflict between and within ethnic groups continued well 
into the twentieth century. Sections of the Dinka fought sections 
of the Nuer and each other. Other southern groups also expanded 
and contracted in the search for cattle and pasturage. The Nuer 
absorbed some of the Dinka, and some present-day sections of the 
Nuer have significant Dinka components. 

Relations among various southern groups were affected in the 
nineteenth century by the intrusion of Ottomans, Arabs, and even- 
tually the British. Some ethnic groups made their accommodation 
with the intruders and others did not, in effect pitting one southern 
ethnic group against another in the context of foreign rule. For 
example, some sections of the Dinka were more accommodating 
to British rule than were the Nuer. These Dinka treated the resist- 
ing Nuer as hostile, and hostility developed between the two groups 
as result of their differing relationships to the British. The grant- 
ing of Sudanese independence in 1956, and the adoption of cer- 
tain aspects of Islamic law, or the sharia, by the central government 
in 1983 greatly influenced the nature of relations among these 
groups in modern times. 

The next largest group of Nilotes, the Shilluk (self-named Collo), 
were not dispersed like the Dinka and the Nuer, but settled mainly 
in a limited, uninterrupted area along the west bank of the Bahr 
al Jabal, just north of the point where it becomes the White Nile 
proper. A few lived on the eastern bank. With easy access to fairly 
good land along the Nile, they relied much more heavily on culti- 
vation and fishing than the Dinka and the Nuer did, and they had 
fewer cattle. The Shilluk had truly permanent settlements and did 
not move regularly between cultivating and cattle camps. 

Unlike the larger groups, the Shilluk, in the Upper Nile, were 
traditionally ruled by a single politico-religious head (reth), believed 
to become at the time of his investiture as king the representative, 
if not the reincarnation, of the mythical hero Ny iking, putative 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 

founder of the Shilluk. The administrative and political powers of 
the reth have been the subject of some debate, but his ritual status 
was clear enough: his health was believed to be closely related to 
the material and spiritual welfare of the Shilluk. It is likely that 
the territorial unity of the Shilluk and the permanence of their settie- 
ments contributed to the centralization of their political and ritual 
structures. In the late 1980s, the activities against the SPLA by 
the armed militias supported by the government seriously alienated 
the Shilluk in Malakal. 

Bari, Kuku, Kakwa, and Mandari 

Several peoples living mainly to the south and east of the Nilotes 
spoke languages of another section of the Nilotic subbranch of 
Eastern Sudanic. Primary among them were the Bari and the closely 
related Kuku, Kakwa, and Mandari. The Bari and Mandari, who 
lived near the Nilotes, had been influenced by them and had some- 
times been in conflict with them in the past. The more southerly 
Kuku and Kakwa lived in the highlands, where cultivation was 
more rewarding than cattle-keeping or where cattle diseases pre- 
cluded herding. 

Murle, Didinga, and Others 

Two other tribes, the Murle and the Didinga, spoke Eastern Su- 
danic languages of subbranches other than Nilotic. The Murle had 
dwelt in southern Ethiopia in the nineteenth century and some were 
still there in the 1990s. Others had moved west and had driven 
out the local Nilotes, whom they reportedly regarded with contempt, 
and had acquired a reputation as warriors. Under environmental 
pressure, the Murle raided other groups in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. 

Along the mountainous border with Ethiopia in Al Awsat State 
lived several small heterogeneous groups. Some, like the Uduk, 
spoke languages of the Koman division of Nilo-Saharan and were 
believed to have been in the area since antiquity. Others, like the 
Ingessana, were refugees driven into the hills by the expansion of 
other groups. Most of these peoples straddling the Sudan-Ethiopia 
border had experienced strife with later-arriving neighbors and 
slave-raiding by the Arabs. All adapted by learning the languages 
of more dominant groups. 

Azande 

In western Al Istiwai and Bahr al Ghazal states lived a number 
of small, sometimes fragmented groups. The largest of these groups 
were the Azande, who comprised 7 to 8 percent of the population 



81 



Sudan: A Country Study 



of southern Sudan and were the dominant group in western Al 
Istiwai. 

The Azande had emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen- 
turies when groups of hunters, divided into aristocrats and com- 
moners, entered the northeastern part of present-day Zaire (and 
later southwestern Sudan) and conquered the peoples already there. 
Although the aristocrats provided ruling kings and nobles, they 
did not establish an inclusive, centralized state. The means of suc- 
cession to kingship, however, encouraged Azande expansion. A 
man succeeded to his father's throne only when he had vanquished 
those of his brothers who chose to compete for it. The brothers — 
princes without land or people but with followers looking for the 
fruits of conquest — would find and rule hitherto unconquered 
groups. Thus, the Azande became a heterogeneous people. 

Their earlier military and political successes notwithstanding, 
the Azande in the twentieth century were poor, largely dependent 
on cultivation (hunting was no longer a feasible source of food), 
and afflicted by sleeping sickness. The British colonial authorities 
instituted a project, known as the Azande Scheme, involving cot- 
ton growing and resettlement in an effort to deal with these 
problems. The program failed, however, for a variety of reasons, 
including an inadequate understanding of Azande society, econ- 
omy, and values on the part of the colonial planners. Azande soci- 
ety deteriorated still further, a deterioration reflected in a declining 
birth rate. Azande support of the Any a Nya guerrilla groups, as 
well as conflicts with the Dinka, also served to worsen the Azande 's 
situation. In the early 1980s, there was talk of resurrecting a re- 
vised Azande project but the resumption of the civil war in 1983 
prevented progress. 

Bviri and Ndogo 

Several other groups of cultivators in southwestern Sudan spoke 
languages closely akin to that of the Azande but lacked a dominant 
group. The most important seemed to be the Bviri. They and a 
smaller group called Ndogo spoke a language named after the lat- 
ter; other, smaller communities spoke dialects of that tongue. These 
communities did not share a sense of common ethnic identity, 
however. 

Others 

The other groups in southwestern Sudan spoke languages of the 
central branch of Nilo-Saharan and were scattered from the western 
Bahr al Ghazal (the Kreish) to central Al Istiwai (the Moru and 
the Avukaya) to eastern Al Istiwai (the Madi). In between, in Al 



82 



An Azande chief in the south standing near a hut being completed 

for his new wife 
Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 

Istiwai, were such peoples as the Bongo and the Baka. The lan- 
guages of Moru and Madi were so close, as were aspects of their 
cultures, that they were sometimes lumped together. The same was 
true of the Bongo and the Baka, but there was no indication that 
either pair constituted a self-conscious ethnic group. 

Nuba 

Living in the Nuba Mountains of southern Kurdufan State were 
perhaps three dozen small groups collectively called the Nuba but 
varying considerably in their culture and social organization. For 
example, some were patrilineally organized, others adhered to 
matrilineal patterns, and a very few — the southeastern Nuba — 
had both patrilineal and matrilineal groupings in the same com- 
munity. The Kurdufanian languages these people spoke were not 
generally mutually intelligible except for those of some adjacent 
communities. 

Despite the arabization of the people around them, only small 
numbers of Nuba had adopted Arabic as a home language, and 
even fewer had been converted to Islam. Some had, however, served 
in the armed forces and police. Most remained cultivators; animal 
husbandry played only a small part in their economy. 



83 



Sudan: A Country Study 



Migration 

One of the most important and complicating factors in defining 
ethnicity is the dramatic increase in the internal migration of 
Sudanese within the past twenty years. It has been estimated that 
in 1973 alone well over 10 percent of the population moved away 
from their ethnic groups to mingle with other Sudanese in the big 
agricultural projects or to work in other provinces. Most of the 
migrants sought employment in the large urban areas, particularly 
in the Three Towns, which attracted 30 percent of all internal 
migrants. The migrants were usually young; 60 percent were be- 
tween the ages of fifteen and forty-four. Of that number, 46 per- 
cent were females. The number of migrants escalated greatly in 
the latter 1980s because of drought and famine, the civil war in 
the south, and Chadian raiders in the west. Thus, as in the past, 
the migrants left their ethnic groups for economic, social, and psy- 
chological reasons, but now with the added factor of personal 
survival. 

Another ethnic group involved in migration was that of the 
Falasha, who were Ethiopian Jews. In January 1985, it was re- 
vealed that the Sudanese government had cooperated with Ethio- 
pia, Israel, and the United States in transporting several thousand 
Falasha through Sudan to Israel. Their departure occurred initially 
on a small scale in 1979 and 1982 and in larger numbers between 
1983 and 1985. In Sudan the Falasha had been placed in temporary 
refugee settlements and reception centers organized by the Sudanese 
government. 

In addition to the problems of employment, housing, and ser- 
vices that internal migration created, it had an enormous impact 
on ethnicity. Although migrants tended to cluster with their kins- 
folk in their new environments, the daily interaction with Sudanese 
from many other ethnic groups rapidly eroded traditional values 
learned in the villages. In the best of circumstances, this erosion 
might lead to a new sense of national identity as Sudanese, but 
the new communities often lacked effective absorptive mechanisms 
and were weak economically. Ethnic divisions were thus reinforced, 
and at the same time social anomie was perpetuated. 

Refugees from other countries, like internal migrants, were a 
factor that further complicated ethnic patterns. In 1991 Sudan was 
host to about 763,000 refugees from neighboring countries, such 
as Ethiopia and Chad. Included among the refugees were about 
175,000 soldiers, most of whom fled following the overthrow of the 
Ethiopian government in May 1991. Over the past several years, 
approximately 426,000 Sudanese had fled their country, becoming 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia. Many of them began returning 
to Sudan in June 1991. Incoming refugees were at first hospitably 
received but they gradually came to be regarded as unwelcome vis- 
itors. The refugees required many social services, a need only par- 
tially met by international humanitarian agencies, which also had 
to care for Sudanese famine victims. The presence of foreign refu- 
gees, who had little prospect of returning to their own countries, 
thus created not only social but also political instability. 

Regionalism and Ethnicity 

The long war in Sudan had a profound effect not only on ethnic 
groups but also on political action and attitudes. With the excep- 
tion of a fragile peace established by negotiations between southern 
Sudanese insurgents (the Any a Nya) and the Sudan government 
at Addis Ababa in 1972, and lasting until the resumption of the 
conflict in 1983, southern Sudan has been a battlefield. The con- 
flict has deeply eroded traditional ethnic patterns in the region, 
and it has extended northward, spreading incalculable political and 
economic disruption. It has, moreover, caused the dislocation and 
often the obliteration of the smaller, less resistant ethnic groups. 

The north- south distinction and the hostility between the two 
regions were grounded in religious conflict as well as a conflict be- 
tween peoples of differing culture and language. The language and 
culture of the north were based on Arabic and the Islamic faith, 
whereas the south had its own diverse, mostly non- Arabic languages 
and cultures. It was with few exceptions non-Muslim, and its reli- 
gious character was indigenous (traditional or Christian). Adequate 
contemporary data were lacking, but in the early 1990s possibly 
no more than 10 percent of southern Sudan's population was Chris- 
tian. Nevertheless, given the missions' role in providing educa- 
tion in the south, most educated persons in the area, including the 
political elite, were nominally Christians (or at least had Christian 
names). Several African Roman Catholic priests figured in southern 
leadership, and the churches played a significant role in bringing 
the south' s plight to world attention in the civil war period (see 
The Southern Problem, ch. 1). Sudan's Muslim Arab rulers thus 
considered Christian mission activity to be an obstacle to the full 
arabization and Islamization of the south. 

Occasionally, the distinction between north and south has been 
framed in racial terms. The indigenous peoples of the south are 
blacks, whereas those of the north are of Semitic stock. Northern pop- 
ulations fully arabized in language and culture, such as the Baqqara, 
however, could not be distinguished physically from some of the 
southern and western groups. Many sedentary Arabs descended from 



85 



Sudan: A Country Study 



the pre-Islamic peoples of that area who were black, as were the 
Muslim but nonarabized Nubians and the Islamized peoples of 
Darfur. 

It is not easy to generalize about the importance of physical at- 
tributes in one group's perceptions of another. But physical ap- 
pearance often has been taken as an indicator of cultural, religious, 
and linguistic status or orientation. Arabs were also likely to see 
southerners as members of the population from which they once 
took slaves and to use the word for slave, abd, as a pejorative in 
referring to southerners. 

North-south hostilities predate the colonial era. In the nineteenth 
century and earlier, Arabs saw the south as a source of slaves and 
considered its peoples inferior by virtue of their paganism if not 
their color. Organized slave raiding ended in the late nineteenth 
century, but the residue of bitterness remained among southern- 
ers, and the Arab view of southerners as pagans persisted. 

During British rule, whatever limited accommodation there may 
have been between Arabs and Africans was neither widespread nor 
deep enough to counteract a longer history of conflict between these 
peoples. At the same time, for their own reasons, the colonial au- 
thorities discouraged integration of the ethnically different north 
and south (see Britain's Southern Policy, ch. 1). 

Neither Arab attitudes of superiority nor British dominance in 
the south led to loss of self-esteem among southerners. A number 
of observers have remarked that southern peoples, particularly 
Nilotes, such as the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk, naturally object to 
the assumption by the country's Arab rulers that the southern peo- 
ples ought to be prepared to give up their religious orientation and 
values. 

Interethnic tensions also have occurred in the north. Disaffec- 
tion in Darfur with the Arab-dominated Khartoum government 
led in the late 1980s to Darfur becoming a virtually autonomous 
province. There has also been a history of regionally based politi- 
cal movements in the area. The frustrations of a budding elite 
among the Fur, the region's largest ethnic group, and Fur- Arab 
competition may account for that disaffection and for Darfur region- 
alism. After World War II, many educated Fur made a point of 
mastering Arabic in the hope that they could make their way in 
the Arab-dominated political, bureaucratic, and economic world; 
they did not succeed in their quest. Further, by the late 1960s, as 
cash crops were introduced, land and labor were becoming objects 
of commercial transactions. As this happened, the Arabs and the 
Fur competed for scarce resources and, given their greater promi- 
nence and power, the Arabs were regarded by the Fur as exploiters. 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



The discovery of oil in the late 1970s (not appreciably exploited 
by 1991 because of the civil war leading to the departure of Chevron 
Overseas Petroleum Corporation personnel) added another resource 
and further potential for conflict. Opposition to the imposition by 
Nimeiri of the sharia in 1983, and the later attempts at Islamiza- 
tion of the country in the late 1980s, as well as the government's 
poor handling of the devastating famine of 1990 deeply alienated 
the Fur from the national government. 

There were other tensions in northern Sudan generated not by 
traditional antipathies but by competition for scarce resources. For 
example, there was a conflict between the Rufaa al Huj, a group 
of Arab pastoralists living in the area between the Blue Nile and 
the White Nile, and Fallata (Fulani) herders. The movements of 
the Fallata intersected with the seasonal migrations of the Rufaa 
al Huj . Here ethnic differences aggravated but did not cause com- 
petition. 

The reluctance of southern groups to accept Arab domination 
did not imply southern solidarity. The opportunities for power and 
wealth in the new politics and bureaucracy in southern Sudan were 
limited; some groups felt deprived of their shares by an ethnic group 
in power. Moreover, ethnic groups at one time or another com- 
peted for more traditional resources, contributing to a heritage of 
hostility toward one another. 

In the early 1990s, one of the main sources of ethnic conflict in 
the south was the extent to which the Dinka dominated southern 
politics and controlled the allocation of rewards, whether of govern- 
ment posts or of other opportunities. In the 1955-56 census, the 
Dinka constituted a little more than 40 percent of the total popu- 
lation of the three provinces that in 1990 constituted southern 
Sudan: Bahr al Ghazal, Aali an Nil, and Al Istiwai. Because no 
other group approached their number, if their proportion of the 
regional total had not changed appreciably, the Dinka would be 
expected to play a large part in the new politics of southern Sudan. 
Some of the leading figures in the south, such as Abel Alier, head 
of southern Sudan's government until 1981, and SPLA leader John 
Garang, were Dinka (although the SPLA made an effort to shed 
its Dinka image by cultivating supporters in other groups). It is 
not known whether the twenty-five Dinka tribal groups were equally 
represented in the alleged Dinka predominance. Some groups, such 
as the Nuer, a comparable Nilotic people and traditional rivals of 
the Dinka, had been deprived of leadership opportunities in colonial 
times because they were considered intractable, were then not 
numerous, and lived in inaccessible areas (various small groups 
in Bahr al Ghazal and northern Aali an Nil provinces). In contrast, 



87 



Sudan: A Country Study 

some small groups in Al Istiwai Province had easier access to edu- 
cation and hence to political participation because of nearby mis- 
sions. The first graduating class of the university in Juba, for 
example, had many more Azande students from Al Istiwai Province 
than from Bahr al Ghazal and Aali an Nil. 

The Social Order 

Local ethnic communities remained in the early 1990s the fun- 
damental societies in rural Sudan, whether they were fully settled, 
semisedentary, or nomadic. Varying in size but never very large, 
such communities formerly interacted with others of their kind in 
hostile or symbiotic fashion, raiding for cattle, women, and slaves 
or exchanging products and sometimes intermarrying. In many 
cases, particularly in the north, local communities were incorpo- 
rated into larger political systems, paying taxes to the central 
authority and adapting their local political arrangements to the 
needs of the central government. Even if they were not incorpo- 
rated into major tribes or groups, many people considered them- 
selves part of larger groupings, such as the Juhayna, the Jaali, or 
the Dinka, which figured in a people's system of ideas and myths 
but not their daily lives. In the north the Muslim religious orders 
were important. They brought religion to the people, and their lead- 
ers acted as mediators between local communities. Despite these 
connections, however, the local village or nomadic community was 
the point of reference for most individuals. 

Most of these communities were based on descent, although oc- 
cupation of a common territory became increasingly important in 
long- settled communities. Descent groups varied in hierarchical 
arrangement. In some, the people were essentially equal. In others, 
various lineages held political power, with their members filling 
certain offices. Lineage groups might also control religious ritual 
in the community. On the one hand, people who held ritual or 
political offices often had privileged access to economic resources. 
On the other hand, many communities granted formal or infor- 
mal authority to those who were already wealthy and who used 
their wealth generously and with tactical skill. 

Theoretically, descent- group societies are cohesive units whose 
members act according to group interests. In practice, however, 
individuals often had their own interests, and these interests some- 
times became paramount. An individual might, however, use the 
ideal of descent-group solidarity to justify his behavior, and an am- 
bitious person might use the descent- group framework to organize 
support for himself. Sudanese communities always have experienced 
a good deal of change, either because of forces like the Muslim 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



orders, or as a result of dynamics within the groups themselves, 
like the expansion of Nuer communities. 

The Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899-1955) weakened the 
role of hitherto autonomous communities and created a more sta- 
ble social order. Warfare and raiding between communities largely 
ended. Leadership in raids was no longer a way to acquire wealth 
and status. Although many local communities remained subsistence 
oriented, they became more aware of the world economy. Their 
members were introduced to new resources and opportunities, 
however scarce, that reoriented their notions of power, status, and 
wealth and of the ways they were acquired. If one invested in a 
truck rather than in a camel and engaged in trading rather than 
herding, one's relationship to kin and community changed. 

The central authorities — links with the world economy and with 
services like education and communications — were located in the 
cities and large towns. Urban centers therefore became the sources 
of change in the condominium era, and it was there that new oc- 
cupations emerged. These new occupations had not yet changed 
the social strata, however. 

In rural areas several large-scale development projects were in- 
troduced, resulting in major rearrangements of communities and 
authority structures. The most significant example was the Gezira 
Scheme, located between the Blue Nile and the White Nile, and 
considered the world's largest single-management farming enter- 
prise (about 790 hectares were covered by the project). The scheme 
involved small-scale farmer tenants producing cotton under the ad- 
ministration of the Sudan Gezira Board, a state subsidiary. 

Northern Arabized Communities 

Distinctions may be drawn among long-settled arabized com- 
munities, those settled in the past half century, and those — the 
minority — that remained nomadic. Recendy settled groups might 
still participate in nomadic life or have close connections with no- 
madic kin. 

Formerly, where long- settled and nomadic or beduin commu- 
nities came in contact with each other, relations were hostile or 
cool, reflecting earlier competition for resources. More recently, 
a degree of mutual dependency had developed, usually involving 
exchanges of foodstuffs. 

Along the White Nile and between the White Nile and Blue Nile, 
sections of nomadic tribes had become sedentary. This transition 
occurred either because of the opportunities for profitable cultiva- 
tion or because nomads had lost their animals and turned to culti- 
vation until they could recoup their fortunes and return to nomadic 



89 



Sudan: A Country Study 

life. Having settled, some communities found sedentary life more 
materially rewarding. Sometimes nomads lacking livestock worked 
for sedentary Arabs, and where employer and employee were of 
the same or similar tribes, the relationship could be close. It was 
understood that when such a laborer acquired enough livestock, 
he would return to nomadic life. In other cases, a fully settied former 
nomad with profitable holdings allowed his poorer kin to main- 
tain his livestock, both parties gaining from the transaction. 

Arab nomads in Sudan in the early 1990s were generally camel 
or cattle herders. They might own sheep and goats also for eco- 
nomic reasons, but these animals were not otherwise valued. Typi- 
cally, camel herders migrated to the more arid north, whereas catde 
herders traveled farther south where camel herding was not feasible. 

The ancestors of the Baqqara tribes began as nomadic camel 
herders. When they moved south to raid for slaves, they found 
camel travel inappropriate and took cattle as well as people from 
the southerners. They have been cattle herders since the eighteenth 
century. Their environment permitted cultivation also, and most 
Baqqara grew some of their food. Camel herders, in contrast, rarely 
sowed a crop, although they might gather wild grain and obtain 
grains from local cultivators. 

In the 1990s, the communities of arabized nomads were simi- 
lar. In principle, all units from the smallest to the largest were based 
on patrilineal descent. The largest entity was the tribe. A tribe was 
divided into sections, and each of these, into smaller units. If a 
tribe were small, it became a naziriyah (administrative unit — see 
Glossary); if large, its major sections became naziriyat. The sec- 
tions below the naziriyah became umudiyat (sing. , umudiyah — see Glos- 
sary). Below that were lineages, often headed by a shaykh, which 
had no formal position in the administrative hierarchy. The smallest 
unit, which the Baqqara called usrah, was likely to consist of a man, 
his sons, their sons, and any daughters who had not yet married. 
(Patrilineal cousins were preferred marriage partners.) The usrah 
and the women who married into it constituted an extended family. 

All divisions had rights to all tribal territory for grazing purposes 
as long as they stayed clear of cultivated land; however, through 
frequent use, tribal sections acquired rights to specific areas for 
gardens. Members of an usrah, for example, returned year after 
year to the same land, which they regarded as their home. 

The constant subdividing of lineages gave fluidity to nomadic 
society. Tribal sections seceded, moved away, and joined with others 
for various reasons. The composition and size of even the smallest 
social units varied according to the season of the year and the natural 
environment. Individuals, families, and larger units usually moved 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



in search of a more favorable social environment, but also because 
of quarrels, crowding, or personal attachments. The size and com- 
position of various groups, and ultimately of the tribe itself, de- 
pended on the amount of grazing land available and on the policies 
and personalities of the leaders. 

Traditionally, a man rich in cattle always had been sure to at- 
tract followers. The industry, thrift, and hardiness needed to build 
a large herd have been considered highly desirable qualities. At 
the same time, a rich man would be expected to be generous. If 
he lived up to that expectation, his fame would spread, and he would 
attract more followers. But wealth alone did not gain a nomad power 
beyond the level of a camp or several related camps. Ambition, 
ability to manipulate, hardheaded shrewdness, and attention to such 
matters as the marriage of his daughters to possible allies were also 
required. 

In the precondominium era, leaders of various sections of a tribe 
had prestige but relatively little authority, in part because those 
who did not like them could leave. The colonial authorities stabi- 
lized the floating power positions in the traditional system. For pur- 
poses of taxation, justice, and public order, the new government 
needed representative authorities over identifiable groups. Local- 
ity could not serve as a basis in a nomadic society, so the govern- 
ment settled on the leaders of patrilineal descent groups and gave 
them a formal power they had previously lacked. 

Among the nomadic Kababish camel herders (a loose confeder- 
ation of tribes fluctuating in size, composition, and location), the 
definition of the tribe as a single unit by the colonial authorities 
and the appointment of an ambitious and capable individual as 
nazir led to a major change in social structure. Tribal sections and 
subsections were gradually eroded, leaving the individual house- 
hold as the basic unit, ruled by the nazir and his primitive bureau- 
cracy. The ruling lineage developed a concept of aristocracy, became 
very wealthy, and in effect spoke for its people in all contexts. 

The administrative structure of the naziriyah and umudiyah ended 
shortly after the establishment of President Jaafar an Nimeiri's 
government in 1969, but the families of those who had held formal 
authority retained a good deal of local power. This authority or 
administrative structure was officially revived in 1986 by the coali- 
tion government of Sadiq al Mahdi. 

Of continuing importance in economic and domestic matters and 
often in organizing political factions were minimal lineages, each 
comprehending three (at best four) generations. The social status 
of these lineages depended on whether they stemmed from old set- 
tler families or from newer ones. In villages composed of families 



91 



Sudan: A Country Study 



or lineages of several tribes, marriage would likely take place within 
the tribe. 

A class structure existed within villages. Large holdings were 
apt to be in the hands of merchants or leaders of religious brother- 
hoods, whose connections were wider and who did not necessarily 
live in the villages near their land. Although no longer nomadic, 
the ordinary villager preferred not to cultivate the land himself, 
however. Before the abolition of slavery, slaves did much of the 
work. Even after emancipation some ex- slaves or descendants of 
slaves remained as servants of their former masters or their descen- 
dants. Some villagers hired West Africans to do their work. Ex- 
slaves and seminomads or gypsies {halabi, usually smiths) living 
near the village were looked down on, and marriage with them 
by members of other classes was out of the question. A descen- 
dant of slaves could acquire education and respect, but villagers 
did not consider him a suitable partner for their daughters. Slave 
women had formerly been taken as concubines by villagers, but 
it was not clear that they were acceptable as wives. 

Landholders in government- sponsored projects did not own the 
property but were tenants of the government. The tenants might 
be displaced Nubians, settled non-Arab nomads — as in Khashm 
al Qirbah — settled or nomadic Arabs, or West Africans. Many of 
these people used hired labor, either West Africans or nomads tem- 
porarily without livestock. In many instances, the original tenant 
remained a working farmer even if he used wage labor. In others, 
however, the original tenant might leave management in the hands 
of a kinsman and either live as a nomad or work and live in a city, 
a lifestyle typical of Nubians. 

Although all settled communities were linked to the government, 
the projects involved a much closer relation between officials and 
villagers because officials managed the people as well as the enter- 
prise. In effect, however, officials were outsiders, dominating the 
community but not part of it. They identified with the civil ser- 
vice rather than the community. 

West Africans working in Arab settled communities formed co- 
hesive communities of their own, and their relations with Arab 
tenants appeared to be restricted to their work agreements, even 
though both groups were Muslims. Cotton cultivation, practiced 
on most of the farms, was labor intensive, and because available 
labor was often scarce, particularly during the picking season, the 
West African laborers could command good wages. Their wages 
were set by agreements between the tenants who held the land and 
the headmen of the West African communities, and these agree- 
ments tended to set the wage scale for Arab laborers as well. 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



In the White Nile area, more recently settled by nomadic groups, 
aspects of nomadic social organization persisted through the con- 
dominium era. As among the nomads, leadership went to those 
who used their wealth generously and judiciously to gain the sup- 
port of their lineages. In this case, however, wealth often took the 
form of grain rather than livestock. Most major lineages had such 
leaders, and those that did not were considered at a disadvantage. 
In addition to the wealthy, religious leaders (shaykhs) also had in- 
fluence in these communities, particularly as mediators, in con- 
trast to secular leaders who were often authoritarian. 

The establishment of the naziriyah and umudiyah system tended 
to fix leadership in particular families, but there were often con- 
flicts over which members should hold office. In the case of the 
Kawahla tribes of the White Nile, the ruling family tended to set- 
tle these differences in order to maintain its monopoly of impor- 
tant positions, and it took on the characteristics of a ruling lineage. 
Other lineages, however, tended to decline in importance as the 
system of which they had been a part changed. The ruling lineage 
made a point of educating its sons, so that they could find posi- 
tions in business or in government. Although the Nimeiri govern- 
ment abolished the older system of local government, it appears 
that the former ruling lineage continued to play a leading role in 
the area. 

Southern Communities 

In preindependence Sudan, most southern communities were 
small, except for the large conglomerate of Nilotes, Dinka, and 
Nuer who dominated the Bahr al Ghazal and the Aali an Nil 
provinces and the Azande people of Al Istiwai Province. During 
the condominium, the colonial administration imposed stronger 
local authority on the communities. It made local leaders chiefs 
or headmen and gave them executive and judicial powers — 
tempered by local councils, usually of elders — to administer their 
people, under the scrutiny of a British district commissioner. As 
in the north, the relatively fluid relationships and boundaries among 
southern Sudanese became more stabilized. 

There is no systematic record of how independence, civil war, 
and famine have affected the social order of southern peoples. The 
gradual incorporation of southerners into the national system — if 
only as migrant laborers and as local craftpeople — and increased 
opportunities for education have, however, affected social arrange- 
ments, ideas of status, and political views. 

An educated elite had emerged in the south, and in 1991 , some 
members of this elite were important politicians and administrators 



93 



Sudan: A Country Study 

at the regional and national levels; however, other members had 
emigrated to escape northern discrimination. How the newer elite 
was linked to the older one was not clear. Secular chieftainships 
had been mostly gifts of the colonial authorities, but the sons of 
chiefs took advantage of their positions to get a Western educa- 
tion and to create family ties among local and regional elites. 

Southern Sudan's development of an elite based on education 
and government office was facilitated by the absence of an indige- 
nous trading and entrepreneurial class, who might have challenged 
the educated elite. Southern merchants were mostly Arabs or others 
of nonsouthern origin. In addition, the south lacked the equiva- 
lent of the northern Muslim leaders of religious orders, who also 
might have claimed a share of influence. Instead of several elites 
owing their status and power to varied sources and constituencies, 
the south developed an elite that looked for its support to persons 
of its own ethnic background and to those who identified with the 
south 's African heritage. It was difficult to assess in the early 1990s, 
however, whether the civil war still allowed any elite southerners 
to gain much advantage. 

In traditional Nilotic society clans were of two kinds. One kind, 
a minority but a large one, consisted of clans whose members had 
religious functions and furnished the priests of subtribes, sections, 
and sometimes of tribes. These priests have been called chiefs or 
masters of the fishing spear, a reference to the ritual importance 
of that instrument. Clans of the other kind were warrior group- 
ings. The difference was one of function rather than rank. A spear- 
master prayed for his people going to war or in other difficult 
situations and mediated between quarreling groups. He could func- 
tion as a leader, but his powers lay in persuasion, not coercion. 
A spearmaster with a considerable reputation for spiritual power 
was deferred to on many issues. In rare cases — the most impor- 
tant was that of the Shilluk — one of the ritual offices gained in- 
fluence over an entire people, and its holder was assigned the 
attributes of a divine king. 

A special religious figure — commonly called a prophet — has 
arisen among some of the Nilotic peoples from time to time. Such 
prophets, thought to be possessed by a sky spirit, often had much 
wider influence than the ritual officeholders, who were confined 
to specific territorial segments. They gained substantial reputations 
as healers and used those reputations to rally their people against 
other ethnic groups and sometimes against the Arabs and the Euro- 
peans. The condominium authorities considered prophets subver- 
sive even when their message did not apparently oppose authority 
and hence suppressed them. 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



Another social pattern common to the Nilotes was the age-set 
system. Traditionally, males were periodically initiated into sets 
according to age; with the set, they moved through a series of stages, 
assuming and shedding rights and responsibilities as the group ad- 
vanced in age. The system was closely linked to warfare and raid- 
ing, which diminished during the condominium. In modern times 
the civil war and famine further undermined the system, and its 
remnants seemed likely to fade as formal education became more 
accessible. 

Historically, the Dinka have been the most populous Nilotic peo- 
ple, so numerous that social and political patterns varied from one 
tribal group to another. Among the Dinka, the tribal group was 
composed of a set of independent tribes that settled in a continu- 
ous area. The tribe, which ranged in size from 1,000 to 25,000 
persons, traditionally had only two political functions. First, it con- 
trolled and defended the dry season pastures of its constituent sub- 
tribes; second, if a member of the tribe killed another member, 
the issue would be resolved peacefully. Homicide committed by 
someone outside the tribe was avenged, but not by the tribe as a 
whole. The colonial administration, seeking equitable access to ade- 
quate pasturage for all tribes, introduced a different system and 
thus eliminated one of the tribe's two responsibilities. In post- 
independence Sudan, the handling of homicide as a crime against 
the state made the tribe's second function also irrelevant. The utili- 
zation and politicization of ethnic groups as units of local govern- 
ment have supported the continuation of tribal structures into the 
1990s; however, the tribal chiefs lacked any traditional functions, 
except as sage advisers to their people in personal and family mat- 
ters. In the contemporary period, some attempts have been made 
to transform these ethnic tribal structures in order to produce a 
national or at least a greater summational identity. For instance, 
in the early formation of the Sudanese People's Liberation Move- 
ment (SPLM), one of the main ideological tenets was the need to 
produce a new nonnorthern riverine area solidarity based on the 
mobilization of diverse ethnic groups in deprived areas. Although 
its success has been limited, to achieve this new sense of solidarity 
it has attempted to recruit not only southerners, but also the Fur, 
Funj, Nuba, and Beja communities. 

The subtribes were the largest significant political segments, and 
they were converted into subchiefdoms by the colonial government. 
Although the subchiefs were stripped of most of their administra- 
tive authority during the Nimeiri regime (1969-85) and replaced 
by loyal members of the Sudan Socialist Union, the advice of sub- 
chiefs was sought on local matters. Thus, a three-tiered system was 



95 



Sudan: A Country Study 

created: the traditional authorities, the Sudanese civil service, and 
the political bureaucrats from Khartoum. During the 1980s, this 
confused system of administration dissolved into virtual anarchy 
as a result of the replacement of one regime by another, civil war, 
and famine. In the south, however, the SPLM created new local 
administrative structures in areas under its control. In general, thus, 
although severely damaged, the traditional structure of Nilotic so- 
ciety remained relatively unchanged. Loyalties to one's rural eth- 
nic community were deeply rooted and were not forgotten even 
by those who fled for refuge to northern urban centers. 

Urban and National Elites 

In this regionally and ethnically differentiated country, peoples 
and communities have been identified as Sudanese only by virtue 
of orientation to and control by a common government. They 
seemed not to share significant elements of a common value sys- 
tem, and economic ties among them were tenuous. If a national 
society and elites were emerging, it was in the Three Towns con- 
stituting the national capital area. It was in Khartoum, Khartoum 
North, and Omdurman that the national politicians, high-level 
bureaucrats, senior military, educated professionals, and wealthy 
merchants and entrepreneurs lived, worked, and socialized. Even 
those who had residences elsewhere maintained second homes in 
Omdurman. 

These elites had long recognized the usefulness of maintaining 
a presence in the capital area, invariably living in Omdurman, a 
much more Arab city than Khartoum. The other, truly urban elites 
also tended to live in Omdurman, but the concentration of north- 
ern Sudan's varied elites in one city did not necessarily engender 
a common social life. As in many Arab and African cities, much 
of Omdurman 's population lived in separate if not wholly isolated 
quarters. 

Two components of the elite structure were not dominantly 
urban, however, although they were represented in the cities. These 
were the heads of important religious groups, whose constituen- 
cies and sources of power and wealth were largely rural, and what 
may be termed tribal elites, who carried some weight on the na- 
tional level by virtue of their representing regional or sectional in- 
terests. 

To the extent that the elites were Muslim and Arab — most were 
both — they shared a religion and language, but they were other- 
wise marked by differences in interest and outlook. Even more 
divergent were the southerners. Most elite southerners were non- 
Muslims, few spoke Arabic fluently, and they were regarded — 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



and saw themselves — not primarily as a professional or bureaucratic 
elite, but as a regional one. Many were said to prefer a career in 
the south to a post in Khartoum. These southern elites exercised 
political power directly or gave significant support to those who 
did. But so diverse and sometimes conflicting were their interests 
and outlooks that they did not constitute a cohesive class. 

Changing Sudanese society had not developed a consensus on 
what kinds of work, talents, possessions, and background were more 
worthy than others and therefore conferred higher status. There 
had long been merchants, entrepreneurs, and religious leaders in 
Sudan. The latter had a special status, but wealth and the influence 
and power it generated had come to carry greater status in the 
Sudan of 1991 than did religious position. The educated secular 
elite was a newer phenomenon, and some deference was given its 
members by other elites. In the Muslim north, the educated ranged 
from devotees of Islamic activism to Islamic reformers and a few 
avowed secularists. Despite the respect generally given the edu- 
cated, those at either extreme were likely to make members of other 
elites uncomfortable. 

The younger, larger generation of the educated elite were not 
all offspring of the older, smaller educated elite. Many were sons 
(and sometimes daughters) of businessmen, wealthy landowners, 
and the tribal elite. It had not been established where the interests 
of first- generation educated persons lay, whether with a growing 
educated elite or with their families of very different backgrounds. 
A peculiar feature of the educated Sudanese was the fact that large 
numbers lived outside Sudan for years at a time, working in Mid- 
dle Eastern oil-producing states, Europe, or North America. Some 
of their earnings came back to Sudan, but it was not clear that they 
had much to do with the formation or characteristics of a specifi- 
cally Sudanese elite. 

Tribal and ethnic elites carried weight in specific localities and 
might be significant if the states were to achieve substantial au- 
tonomy; however, their importance on the national scene was ques- 
tionable. 

Socializing and intermarriage among members of the different 
elites would have been significant in establishing a cohesive upper 
class. But that had not happened yet, and movement in that direc- 
tion had suffered a severe blow when the government of Colonel 
Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir that came to power on June 30, 
1989, imprisoned and executed leaders of the elite. Until the Bashir 
government displaced it in favor of Islamists, the elite regarded 
itself as the arbiter of social acceptance into the company of those 



97 



Sudan: A Country Study 

riverine Arab families who had long lived in the Omdurman- 
Khartoum area, had substantial income from landholding, and had 
participated in the higher reaches of government during the con- 
dominium or engaged in the professions of medicine, law, and the 
university. Men from these families were well educated. Few en- 
gaged in business, which tended to be in the hands of families of 
at least partial Egyptian ancestry. 

Beginning in the late 1960s, northern Muslims of non-Egyptian 
background began to acquire substantial wealth as businessmen, 
often as importers and exporters. By the early 1980s, perhaps twenty 
of them were millionaires. These men had been relatively young 
when they began their entrepreneurial activity, and unlike mem- 
bers of the older elite families, they were not well educated. By 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, many of these business- 
men had started sending their children to Britain or the United 
States for their education. Reflecting trends in other societies, 
whereas the sons of the older elite had been educated mainly for 
government careers, by the 1980s business education was increas- 
ingly emphasized. In contrast to the more secular elites in the profes- 
sions, the civil service, and the military, however, many members 
of these newer economic elites gravitated toward religion and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 

Typically, the older elite intermarried and excluded those whose 
backgrounds they did not know, even if the families were wealthy 
and successful in business, religion, or education. Gradually, after 
independence, Arabic speakers of other sedentary families acquired 
higher education, entered the bureaucracy or founded lucrative 
businesses, and began to participate to a limited degree in the so- 
cial circle of the older families. The emphasis on * 'good family" 
persisted, however, in most marriages. Sedentary Arabs were ac- 
ceptable, as were some persons of an older mixture of Arab and 
Nile Nubian ancestry, for example, the people around Dunqulah. 
But southern and western Sudanese — even if Muslims — and mem- 
bers of nomadic groups (particularly the darker Baqqara Arabs) 
were not. A southern Sudanese man might be esteemed for his 
achievements and other qualities, but he was not considered an 
eligible husband for a woman of a sedentary Arab family. There 
were some exceptions, as there had been decades ago, but they were 
generally perceived as such. 

Women and the Family 

In Sudan, the extended family provided social services. Tradi- 
tionally, the family was responsible for the old, the sick, and the 
mentally ill, although many of these responsibilities had been eroded 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 

by urbanization. Whether in rural or urban society, however, the 
burden of these social services fell upon the women. 

Except for a small number of liberated, educated young women 
from families of the elite, women remained within the household 
and were segregated at all festivities, eating after the men. This 
was particularly the case with Muslim households. Men entertained 
in their own quarters, and males of an extended family ate together. 
In a small family, the husband ate alone or, more frequently, took 
his bowl to join his male neighbors. 

A young university couple might live much as in the West, in 
a house without relatives, and might live, eat, and entertain to- 
gether. Nevertheless, traditional patterns were deeply rooted, and 
the husband would often be away visiting his male friends in the 
market and cafes. At home a servant helped with the children. 
Although the educated young married or unmarried woman had 
greater mobility because of her job, she was not exempt from the 
traditional restrictions and the supremacy of the Muslim husband. 
She was aware that her education and job were not a license to 
trespass upon male-dominated social norms. 

In some respects, the uneducated woman had greater freedom 
so long as it was with her peers; for even among well-to-do fami- 
lies, a young woman was restricted to her household and female 
friends until transferred to similar seclusion in the house of her hus- 
band. Paradoxically, this segregation could create a spirit of in- 
dependence, particularly among educated women, for there were 
a host of aunts, cousins, and grandmothers to look after the chil- 
dren and allow the mothers to work outside the home. Neverthe- 
less, social traditions governed the way of life of Sudanese women. 
The segregation and subordination of women in Sudanese society 
should not obscure the fact that women dominated the household 
just as their men commanded public life. The home and the rear- 
ing of children were their domains— so long as they upheld male- 
oriented social norms. 

Two traditional customs among Sudanese women had an enor- 
mous impact upon their private and social relationships — the zar 
cult and female "circumcision." Zar was the name given to the 
ceremony conducted only by women practitioners required to pacify 
evil spirits and to cleanse women of afflictions caused by demons 
or jinn. Zar cults were numerous throughout Muslim Africa. Ill- 
nesses, including depression, infertility, and other organic and psy- 
chological disorders, were attributed to possession by hostile spirits. 
Although zar ceremonies varied widely, they not only freed the one 
possessed but were great social occasions where women could com- 
municate together as men did within male circles. 



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Sudan: A Country Study 



Female circumcision, or infibulation (excising the external genita- 
lia and sewing the vagina shut) was widely practiced throughout 
Muslim Africa, and especially among Sudan's northern Arab pop- 
ulation. Enormous pressure was put on the twelve-year-old or 
younger girl, as well as older women and their families, to observe 
these ceremonies and practices. 

The issue of female circumcision was controversial, however, 
because of the physical and psychological problems it caused 
women. Midwives performed the operations, which often led to 
shock, hemorrhage, and septicemia. They created innumerable ob- 
stetrical problems before and after childbirth and throughout life. 
Despite international conferences, legislation, and efforts to eradi- 
cate these practices, however, in the early 1990s they appeared to 
be on the increase, not only in Sudan but in Africa, generally. At 
the same time, the adoption of Western medicine by growing edu- 
cated classes was increasingly promoting awareness of the harm- 
ful effects of infibulation on women; the spread of Islam, however, 
inhibited the eradication of this practice. 

In southern Sudan, the role of women differed dramatically from 
that in the north. Although women were subordinate to men, they 
enjoyed much greater freedom within southern Sudan's societies. 
Female circumcision was not practiced and no zar cult existed, 
although the spirits were regularly consulted about private and pub- 
lic affairs through practitioners. Women had greater freedom of 
movement and, indeed, participated to a limited degree in the coun- 
cils of lineage. Husbands consulted their wives on matters pertaining 
to public affairs. Many women also played important roles in the 
mediation of disputes. 

Religious Life 

Somewhat more than half Sudan's population was Muslim in the 
early 1990s. Most Muslims, perhaps 90 percent, lived in the north, 
where they constituted 75 percent or more of the population. Data 
on Christians was less reliable; estimates ranged from 4 to 10 per- 
cent of the population. At least one-third of the Sudanese were still 
attached to the indigenous religions of their forebears. Most Chris- 
tian Sudanese and adherents of local religious systems lived in 
southern Sudan. Islam had made inroads into the south, but more 
through the need to know Arabic than a profound belief in the tenets 
of the Quran. The SPLM, which in 1991 controlled most of southern 
Sudan, opposed the imposition of the sharia (Islamic law). 

Islam: Tenets and Practice 

Sudanese Muslims are adherents of the Sunni branch of Islam, 
sometimes called orthodox, by far the larger of the two major 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



branches; the other branch is Shia (see Glossary), which is not 
represented in Sudan. Sunni Islam in Sudan is not marked by a 
uniform body of belief and practice, however. Some Muslims op- 
posed aspects of Sunni orthodoxy, and rites having a non-Islamic 
origin were widespread, being accepted as if they were integral to 
Islam, or sometimes being recognized as separate. Moreover, Sunni 
Islam in Sudan (as in much of Africa) has been characterized by 
the formation of religious orders or brotherhoods, each of which 
made special demands on its adherents. 

Sunni Islam requires of the faithful five fundamental obligations 
that constitute the five pillars of Islam. The first pillar, the shahada 
or profession of faith, is the affirmation "There is no god but God 
(Allah) and Muhammad is his prophet." It is the first step in be- 
coming a Muslim and a significant part of prayer. The second ob- 
ligation is prayer at five specified times of the day. The third enjoins 
almsgiving. The fourth requires fasting during daylight hours in 
the month of Ramadan. The fifth requires a pilgrimage to Mecca 
for those able to perform it, to participate in the special rites that 
occur during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar. 

Most Sudanese Muslims who are born to the faith meet the first 
requirement. Conformity to the second requirement is more vari- 
able. Many males in the cities and larger towns manage to pray 
five times a day — at dawn, noon, midafternoon, sundown, and 
evening. Only one of these prayer times occurs during the usual 
working day of an urban dweller. A cultivator or pastoralist may 
find it more difficult to meet the requirements. Regular prayer is 
considered the mark of a true Muslim; it is usually accomplished 
individually or in small groups. Congregational prayer takes place 
at the Friday mosque when Muslims (usually men, but occasion- 
ally women separately located) gather, not only for the noon prayer, 
but also to hear readings and a sermon by the local imam (see Glos- 
sary). Muslims fast during the ninth month of the Muslim calen- 
dar, Ramadan, the time during which the first revelations to 
Muhammad occurred. It is a period during which most Muslims 
must abstain from eating, drinking, smoking, and sexual activity 
during the daylight hours. The well-to-do perform litde work dur- 
ing this period, and many businesses close or operate on reduced 
schedules. Because the months of the lunar calendar revolve through 
the solar year, Ramadan occurs during various seasons over a period 
of a decade or so. In the early 1990s, observance appeared to be 
widespread, especially in urban areas and among sedentary Su- 
danese Muslims. 

Historically, in the Muslim world almsgiving meant both a spe- 
cial tax for the benefit of the poor and voluntary giving to the needy, 



101 



Sudan: A Country Study 

but its voluntary aspect alone survives. Alms may be given at any 
time, but there are specific occasions in the Islamic year or in the 
life of the donor when they are more commonly dispensed. Gifts, 
whether of money or food, may be made on such occasions as the 
feasts that end Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mecca, or in pen- 
ance for some misdeed. These offerings and others are typically 
distributed to poor kin and neighbors. 

The pilgrimage to Mecca is less costly and arduous for the Su- 
danese than it is for many Muslims. Nevertheless, it takes time (or 
money if travel is by air), and the ordinary Sudanese Muslim has 
generally found it difficult to accomplish, rarely undertaking it be- 
fore middle age. Some have joined pilgrimage societies into which 
members pay a small amount monthly and choose one of their num- 
ber when sufficient funds have accumulated to send someone on 
the pilgrimage. A returned pilgrim is entided to use the honorific 
title hajj or hajjih for a woman. 

Another ceremony commonly observed is the great feast Id al 
Adha (also known as Id al Kabir), representing the sacrifice made 
during the last days of the pilgrimage. The centerpiece of the day 
is the slaughter of a sheep, which is distributed to the poor, kin, 
neighbors, and friends, as well as the immediate family. 

Islam imposes a standard of conduct encouraging generosity, 
fairness, and honesty. Sudanese Arabs, especially those who are 
wealthy, are expected by their coreligionists to be generous. 

In accordance with Islamic law, most Sudanese Muslims do not 
eat pork or shellfish. Conformity to the prohibitions on gambling 
and alcohol is less widespread. Usury is also forbidden by Islamic 
law, but Islamic banks have developed other ways of making money 
available to the public (see Islamic Banking, ch. 3). 

Sunni Islam insists on observance of the sharia, which governs 
not only religious activity narrowly conceived but also daily per- 
sonal and social relationships. In principle, the sharia stems not 
from legislative enactment or judicial decision but from the Quran 
and the hadith — the accepted sayings of Muhammad. That prin- 
ciple has given rise to the conventional understanding, advocated 
by Islamists, that there is no distinction between the religious and 
the secular in a truly Islamic society. Until 1983 modern criminal 
and civil, including commercial, law generally prevailed in Sudan. 
In the north, however, the sharia was expected to govern what is 
usually called family and personal law, i.e., matters such as mar- 
riage, divorce, and inheritance. In the towns and in some seden- 
tary communities sharia was accepted, but in other sedentary 
communities and among nomads local custom was likely to 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



prevail — particularly with respect to inheritance (see The Legal Sys- 
tem, ch. 4). 

In September 1983, Nimeiri imposed the sharia throughout the 
land, eliminating the civil and penal codes by which the country 
had been governed in the twentieth century. Traditional Islamic 
punishments were imposed for theft, adultery, homicide, and other 
crimes. The zealousness with which these punishments were car- 
ried out contributed to the fall of Nimeiri. Nevertheless, no suc- 
cessor government, including that of Bashir, has shown inclination 
to abandon the sharia. 

Islam is monotheistic and insists that there can be no interces- 
sors between an individual and God. Nevertheless, Sudanese Islam 
includes a belief in spirits as sources of illness or other afflictions 
and in magical ways of dealing with them. The imam of a mosque 
is a prayer leader and preacher of sermons. He may also be a teacher 
and in smaller communities combines both functions. In the latter 
role, he is called a faqih (p\.,fuqaha), although a faqih need not be 
an imam. In addition to teaching in the local Quranic school 
(khalwa — see Glossary), the faqih is expected to write texts (from 
the Quran) or magical verses to be used as amulets and cures. His 
blessing may be asked at births, marriages, deaths, and other im- 
portant occasions, and he may participate in wholly non-Islamic 
harvest rites in some remote places. All of these functions and ca- 
pacities make the, faqih the most important figure in popular Islam. 
But he is not a priest. His religious authority is based on his puta- 
tive knowledge of the Quran, the sharia, and techniques for deal- 
ing with occult threats to health and well-being. The notion that 
the words of the Quran will protect against the actions of evil spirits 
or the evil eye is deeply embedded in popular Islam, and the amu- 
lets prepared by the faqih are intended to protect their wearers 
against these dangers. 

In Sudan as in much of African Islam, the cult of the saint is 
of considerable importance, although some Muslims would reject 
it. The development of the cult is closely related to the presence 
of the religious orders; many who came to be considered saints on 
their deaths were founders or leaders of religious orders who in 
their lifetimes were thought to have baraka, a state of blessedness 
implying an indwelling spiritual power inherent in the religious 
office. Baraka intensifies after death as the deceased becomes a wali 
(literally friend of God, but in this context translated as saint). The 
tomb and other places associated with the saintly being become 
the loci of the person's baraka, and in some views he or she be- 
comes the guardian spirit of the locality. The intercession of the 
wali is sought on a variety of occasions, particularly by those seeking 



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Sudan: A Country Study 

cures or by barren women desiring children. A saint's annual holy 
day is the occasion of a local festival that may attract a large gather- 
ing. 

Better-educated Muslims in Sudan may participate in prayer at 
a saint's tomb but argue that prayer is directed only to God. Many 
others, however, see the saint not merely as an intercessor with 
and an agent of God, but also as a nearly autonomous source of 
blessing and power, thereby approaching popular as opposed to 
orthodox Islam. 

Islamic Movements and Religious Orders 

Islam made its deepest and longest lasting impact in Sudan 
through the activity of the Islamic religious brotherhoods or orders. 
These orders emerged in the Middle East in the twelfth century 
in connection with the development of Sufism, a mystical current 
reacting to the strongly legalistic orientation of orthodox Islam. The 
orders first came to Sudan in the sixteenth century and became 
significant in the eighteenth. Sufism seeks for its adherents a closer 
personal relationship with God through special spiritual disciplines. 
The exercises (dhikr) include reciting prayers and passages of the 
Quran and repeating the names, or attributes, of God while per- 
forming physical movements according to the formula established 
by the founder of the particular order. Singing and dancing may 
be introduced. The outcome of an exercise, which lasts much longer 
than the usual daily prayer, is often a state of ecstatic abandon. 

A mystical or devotional way (sing. , tariqa; pi. , turuq) is the basis 
for the formation of particular orders, each of which is also called 
a tariqa. The specialists in religious law and learning initially looked 
askance at Sufism and the Sufi orders, but the leaders of Sufi orders 
in Sudan have won acceptance by acknowledging the significance 
of the sharia and not claiming that Sufism replaces it. 

The principal turuq vary considerably in their practice and in- 
ternal organization. Some orders are tightly organized in hierar- 
chical fashion; others have allowed their local branches considerable 
autonomy. There may be as many as a dozen turuq in Sudan. Some 
are restricted to that country; others are widespread in Africa or 
the Middle East. Several turuq, for all practical purposes indepen- 
dent, are offshoots of older orders and were established by men 
who altered in major or minor ways the tariqa of the orders to which 
they had formerly been attached. 

The oldest and most widespread of the turuq is the Qadiriyah 
founded by Abd al Qadir al Jilani in Baghdad in the twelfth cen- 
tury and introduced into Sudan in the sixteenth. The Qadiriyah 's 
principal rival and the largest tariqa in the western part of the country 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



was the Tijaniyah, a sect begun by Ahmad at Tijani in Morocco, 
which eventually penetrated Sudan in about 1810 via the western 
Sahel (see Glossary). Many Tijani became influential in Darfur, 
and other adherents settled in northern Kurdufan. Later on, a class 
of Tijani merchants arose as markets grew in towns and trade ex- 
panded, making them less concerned with providing religious 
leadership. Of greater importance to Sudan was the tariqa estab- 
lished by the followers of Sayyid Ahmad ibn Idris, known as Al 
Fasi, who died in 1837. Although he lived in Arabia and never 
visited Sudan, his students spread into the Nile Valley establish- 
ing indigenous Sudanese orders, the Majdhubiyah, the Idrisiyah, 
and the Khatmiyyah. 

Much different in organization from the other brotherhoods is 
the Khatmiyyah (or Mirghaniyah after the name of the order's 
founder). Established in the early nineteenth century by Muham- 
mad Uthman al Mirghani, it became the best organized and most 
politically oriented and powerful of the turuq in eastern Sudan (see 
The Turkiyah, 1821-85, ch. 1). Mirghani had been a student of 
Sayyid Ahmad ibn Idris and had joined several important orders, 
calling his own order the seal of the paths (Khatim at Turuq — 
hence Khatmiyyah). The salient features of the Khatmiyyah are 
the extraordinary status of the Mirghani family, whose members 
alone may head the order; loyalty to the order, which guarantees 
paradise; and the centralized control of the order's branches. 

The Khatmiyyah had its center in the southern section of Ash 
Sharqi State and its greatest following in eastern Sudan and in por- 
tions of the riverine area. The Mirghani family were able to turn 
the Khatmiyyah into a political power base, despite its broad geo- 
graphical distribution, because of the tight control they exercised 
over their followers. Moreover, gifts from followers over the years 
have given the family and the order the wealth to organize politi- 
cally. This power did not equal, however, that of the Mirghani' s 
principal rival, the Ansar, or followers of the Mahdi, whose present- 
day leader was Sadiq al Mahdi, the great-grandson of Muham- 
mad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah, al Mahdi, who drove the 
Egyptian administration from Sudan in 1885. 

Most other orders were either smaller or less well organized than 
the Khatmiyyah. Moreover, unlike many other African Muslims, 
Sudanese Muslims did not all seem to feel the need to identify with 
one or another tariqa, even if the affiliation were nominal. Many 
Sudanese Muslims preferred more political movements that sought 
to change Islamic society and governance to conform to their own 
visions of the true nature of Islam. 



105 



Sudan: A Country Study 

One of these movements, Mahdism, was founded in the late 
nineteenth century. It has been likened to a religious order, but 
it is not a tariqa in the traditional sense. Mahdism and its adher- 
ents, the Ansar, sought the regeneration of Islam, and in general 
were critical of the turuq. Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd 
Allah, a faqih, proclaimed himself to be Al Mahdi al Muntazar ("the 
awaited guide in the right path," usually seen as the Mahdi), the 
messenger of God and representative of the Prophet Muhammad, 
not simply a charismatic and learned teacher, an assertion that be- 
came an article of faith among the Ansar. He was sent, he said, 
to prepare the way for the second coming of the Prophet Isa (Jesus) 
and the impending end of the world. In anticipation of Judgment 
Day, it was essential that the people return to a simple and rigorous, 
even puritanical Islam (see The Mahdiyah, 1884-98, ch. 1). The 
idea of the coming of a Mahdi has roots in Sunni Islamic tradi- 
tions. The issue for Sudanese and other Muslims was whether 
Muhammad Ahmad was in fact the Mahdi. 

In the century since the Mahdist uprising, the neo-Mahdist move- 
ment and the Ansar, supporters of Mahdism from the west, have 
persisted as a political force in Sudan. Many groups, from the Baq- 
qara cattle nomads to the largely sedentary tribes on the White 
Nile, supported this movement. The Ansar were hierarchically or- 
ganized under the control of Muhammad Ahmad 's successors, who 
have all been members of the Mahdi family (members of the ashraj). 
The ambitions and varying political perspectives of different mem- 
bers of the family have led to internal conflicts, and it appeared 
that Sadiq al Mahdi, putative leader of the Ansar since the early 
1970s, did not enjoy the unanimous support of all Mahdists. Mah- 
dist family political goals and ambitions seemed to have taken 
precedence over the movement's original religious mission. The 
modern-day Ansar were thus loyal more to the political descen- 
dants of the Mahdi than to the religious message of Mahdism. 

A movement that spread widely in Sudan in the 1960s, respond- 
ing to the efforts to secularize Islamic society, was the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Al Ikhwan al Muslimin), founded by Hasan al Banna 
in Egypt in the 1920s. Originally it was conceived as a religious 
revivalist movement that sought to return to the fundamentals of 
Islam in a way that would be compatible with the technological 
innovations introduced from the West. Disciplined, highly moti- 
vated, and well financed, the Muslim Brotherhood, known as the 
Brotherhood, became a powerful political force during the 1970s 
and 1980s, although it represented only a small minority of 
Sudanese. In the government that was formed in June 1989, fol- 
lowing a bloodless coup d'etat, the Brotherhood exerted influence 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



through its political expression, the National Islamic Front (NIF) 
party, which included several cabinet members among its adher- 
ents (see Political Groups, ch. 4). 

Christianity 

Christianity was most prevalent among the peoples of Al Istiwai 
State — the Madi, Moru, Azande, and Bari. The major churches 
in the Sudan were the Roman Catholic and the Anglican. Southern 
communities might include a few Christians, but the rituals and 
world view of the area were not in general those of traditional 
Western Christianity. The few communities that had formed around 
mission stations had disappeared with the dissolution of the mis- 
sions in 1964. The indigenous Christian churches in Sudan, with 
external support, continued their mission, however, and had opened 
new churches and repaired those destroyed in the continuing civil 
conflict. Originally, the Nilotic peoples were indifferent to Chris- 
tianity, but in the latter half of the twentieth century many people 
in the educated elite embraced its tenets, at least superficially. En- 
glish and Christianity have become symbols of resistance to the 
Muslim government in the north, which has vowed to destroy both. 
Unlike the early civil strife of the 1960s and 1970s, the insurgency 
in the 1980s and the 1990s has taken on a more religiously con- 
frontational character. 

Indigenous Religions 

Each indigenous religion is unique to a specific ethnic group or 
part of a group, although several groups may share elements of 
belief and ritual because of common ancestry or mutual influence. 
The group serves as the congregation, and an individual usually 
belongs to that faith by virtue of membership in the group. Be- 
lieving and acting in a religious mode is part of daily life and is 
linked to the social, political, and economic actions and relation- 
ships of the group. The beliefs and practices of indigenous religions 
in Sudan are not systematized, in that the people do not generally 
attempt to put together in coherent fashion the doctrines they hold 
and the rituals they practice. 

The concept of a high spirit or divinity, usually seen as a crea- 
tor and sometimes as ultimately responsible for the actions of lesser 
spirits, is common to most Sudanese groups. Often the higher di- 
vinity is remote, and believers treat the other spirits as autono- 
mous, orienting their rituals to these spirits rather than to the high 
god. Such spirits may be perceived as forces of nature or as 
manifestations of ancestors. Spirits may intervene in people's lives, 
either because individuals or groups have transgressed the norms 



107 



Sudan: A Country Study 

of the society or because they have failed to pay adequate atten- 
tion to the ritual that should be addressed to the spirits. 

The Nilotes generally acknowledge an active supreme deity, who 
is therefore the object of ritual, but the beliefs and rituals differ 
from group to group. The Nuer, for example, have no word cor- 
responding solely and exclusively to God. The word sometimes so 
translated refers not only to the universal governing spirit but also 
to ancestors and forces of nature whose spirits are considered aspects 
of God. It is possible to pray to one spirit as distinct from another 
but not as distinct from God. Often the highest manifestation of 
spirit, God, is prayed to directly. God is particularly associated 
with the winds, the sky, and birds, but these are not worshiped. 
The Dinka attribute any remarkable occurrence to the direct in- 
fluence of God and will sometimes mark the occasion with an appro- 
priate ritual. Aspects of God (the universal spirit) are distinguished, 
chief of which is Deng (rain). For the Nuer, the Dinka, and other 
Nilotes, human beings are as ants to God, whose actions are not 
to be questioned and who is regarded as the judge of all human 
behavior. 

Cattle play a significant role in Nilotic rituals. Catde are sacrificed 
to God as expiatory substitutes for their owners. The function is 
consistent with the significance of cattle in all aspects of Nilotic life. 
Among the Nuer, for example, and with some variations among 
the Dinka, cattle are the foundation of family and community life, 
essential to subsistence, marriage payments, and personal pride. 
The cattle shed is a shrine and meeting place, the center of the 
household; a man of substance, head of a family, and a leading 
figure in the community is called a "bull." Every man and the 
spirits themselves have ox names that denote their characteristic 
qualities. These beliefs and institutions give meaning to the sym- 
bolism of the rubbing of ashes on a sacrificial cow's back in order 
to transfer the burden of the owner's sins to the animal. 

The universal god of the Shilluk is more remote than that of the 
Nuer and Dinka and is addressed through the founder of the Shil- 
luk royal clan. Nyiking, considered both man and god, is not clearly 
distinguished from the supreme deity in ritual, although the Shil- 
luk may make the distinction in discussing their beliefs. The king 
(reth) of the Shilluk is regarded as divine, an idea that has never 
been accepted by the Nuer and Dinka. 

All of the Nilotes and other peoples as well pay attention to an- 
cestral spirits, the nature of the cult varying considerably as to the 
kinds of ancestors who are thought to have power in the lives of 
their descendants. Sometimes it may be the founding ancestors of 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



the group whose spirits are potent. In many cases it is the recently 
deceased ancestors who are active and must be placated. 

Of the wide range of natural forces thought to be activated by 
spirits, perhaps the most common is rain. Although southern Sudan 
does not suffer as acutely as northern Sudan from lack of rain, there 
has sometimes been a shortage, particularly during the 1970s and 
1980s and in 1990; this shortage has created hardship, famine, and 
death amidst the travail of civil war. For this reason, rituals con- 
nected with rain have become important in many ethnic groups, 
and ritual specialists concerned with rain or thought to incarnate 
the spirit of rain are important figures. 

The distinction between the natural and the supernatural that 
has emerged in the Western world is not relevant to the traditional 
religions. Spirits may have much greater power than human beings, 
but their powers are perceived not as altering the way the world 
commonly works but as explaining occurrences in nature or in the 
social world. 

Some men and women are also thought to have extraordinary 
powers. How these powers are believed to be acquired and exer- 
cised varies from group to group. In general, however, some peo- 
ple are thought to have inherited the capacity to harm others and 
to have a disposition to do so. Typically they are accused of in- 
flicting illnesses on specific individuals, frequently their neighbors 
or kin. In some groups, it is thought that men and women who 
have no inherent power to harm may nevertheless do damage to 
others by manipulating images of the victim or items closely as- 
sociated with that person. 

Occasionally an individual may be thought of as a sorcerer. When 
illness or some other affliction strikes in a form that is generally 
attributed to a sorcerer, there are ways (typically some form of divi- 
nation) of confirming that witchcraft was used and identifying the 
sorcerer. 

The notions of sorcery are not limited to the southern Sudanese, 
but are to be found in varying forms among peoples, including 
nomadic and other Arabs, who consider themselves Muslims. A 
specific belief widespread among Arabs and other Muslim peoples 
is the notion of the evil eye. Although a physiological peculiarity 
of the eye (walleye or cross-eye) may be considered indicative of 
the evil eye, any persons expressing undue interest in the private 
concerns of another may be suspected of inflicting deliberate harm 
by a glance. Unlike most witchcraft, where the perpetrator is known 
by and often close to the victim, the evil eye is usually attributed 
to strangers. Children are thought to be the most vulnerable. 



109 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Ways exist to protect oneself against sorcery or the evil eye. Many 
magico-religious specialists — diviners and sorcerers — deal with these 
matters in Sudanese societies. The diviner is able to determine 
whether witchcraft or sorcery is responsible for the affliction and 
to discover the source. He also protects and cures by providing 
amulets and other protective devices for a fee or by helping a vic- 
tim punish (in occult fashion) the sorcerer in order to be cured of 
the affliction. If it is thought that an evil spirit has possessed a per- 
son, an exorcist may be called in. In some groups these tasks may 
be accomplished by the same person; in others the degree of speciali- 
zation may be greater. In northern Sudan among Muslim peoples, 
the faqih may spend more of his time as diviner, dispenser of amu- 
lets, healer, and exorcist than as Quranic teacher, imam of a 
mosque, or mystic. 

Education 

The public and private education systems inherited by the 
government after independence were designed more to provide civil 
servants and professionals to serve the colonial administration than 
to educate the Sudanese. Moreover, the distribution of facilities, 
staff, and enrollment was biased in favor of the needs of the ad- 
ministration and a Western curriculum. Schools tended to be 
clustered in the vicinity of Khartoum and to a lesser extent in other 
urban areas, although the population was predominandy rural. This 
concentration was found at all levels but was most marked for those 
in situations beyond the four-year primary schools where instruc- 
tion was in the vernacular. The north suffered from shortages of 
teachers and buildings, but education in the south was even more 
inadequate. During the condominium, education in the south was 
left largely to the mission schools, where the level of instruction 
proved so poor that as early as the mid- 1930s the government im- 
posed provincial education supervisors upon the missionaries in 
return for the government subsidies that they sorely needed. The 
civil war and the ejection of all foreign missionaries in February 
1964 further diminished education opportunities for southern Su- 
danese. 

Since World War II, the demand for education has exceeded 
Sudan's education resources. At independence in 1956, education 
accounted for only 15.5 percent of the Sudanese budget, or £Sd45 
million (for value of the Sudanese pound — see Glossary), to sup- 
port 1,778 primary schools (enrollment 208,688), 108 intermedi- 
ate schools (enrollment 14,632), and 49 government secondary 
schools (enrollment 5,423). Higher education was limited to the 
University of Khartoum, except for less than 1,000 students sent 



110 



Anglican mission school at Yei, southern Sudan 
Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 

abroad by wealthy parents or on government scholarships. The 
adult literacy rate in 1956 was 22.9 percent, and, despite the ef- 
forts of successive governments, by 1990 it had risen only to about 
30 percent in the face of a rapidly expanding population. 

The philosophy and curriculum beyond primary school followed 
the British educational tradition. Although all students learned 
Arabic and English in secondary and intermediate schools, the lan- 
guage of instruction at the University of Khartoum was English. 
Moreover, the increasing demand for intermediate, secondary, and 
higher education could not be met by Sudanese teachers alone, at 
least not by the better educated ones graduated from the elite 
teacher-training college at Bakht ar Ruda. As a result, education 
in Sudan continued to depend upon expensive foreign teachers. 

When the Nimeiri-led government took power in 1969, it con- 
sidered the education system inadequate for the needs of social and 
economic development. Accordingly, an extensive reorganization 
was proposed, which would eventually make the new six-year 
elementary education program compulsory and would pay much 
more attention to technical and vocational education at all levels. 
Previously, primary and intermediate schools had been preludes 
to secondary training, and secondary schools prepared students for 
the university. The system produced some well- trained university 



111 



Sudan: A Country Study 

graduates, but little was done to prepare for technical work or skilled 
labor the great bulk of students who did not go as far as the univer- 
sity or even secondary school. 

By the late 1970s, the government's education system had been 
largely reorganized. There were some preprimary schools, main- 
ly in urban areas. The basic system consisted of a six-year curric- 
ulum in primary schools and a three-year curriculum in junior 
secondary schools. From that point, qualified students could go 
on to one of three kinds of schools: the three-year upper secon- 
dary, which prepared students for higher education; commercial 
and agricultural technical schools; and teacher- training secondary 
schools designed to prepare primary- school teachers. The latter two 
institutions offered four-year programs. Postsecondary schools 
included universities, higher technical schools, intermediate teacher- 
training schools for junior secondary teachers, and higher teacher- 
training schools for upper-secondary teachers (see table 4, Appendix). 

Of the more than 5,400 primary schools in 1980, less than 14 
percent were located in southern Sudan, which had between 20 
and 33 percent of the country's population. Many of these southern 
schools were established during the Southern Regional adminis- 
tration (1972-81). The renewal of the civil war in mid- 1983 de- 
stroyed many schools, although the SPLA operated schools in areas 
under its control. Nevertheless, many teachers and students were 
among the refugees fleeing the ravages of war in the south. 

In the early 1980s, the number of junior (also called general) 
secondary schools was a little more than one-fifth the number of 
primary schools, a proportion roughly consistent with that of general 
secondary to primary- school population (260,000 to 1,334,000). 
About 6.5 percent of all general secondary schools were in the south 
until 1983. 

There were only 190 upper- secondary schools in the public sys- 
tem in 1980, but it was at this level that private schools of varying 
quality proliferated, particularly in the three cities of the capital 
area. Elite schools could recruit students who had selected them 
as a first choice, but the others took students whose examination 
results at the end of junior secondary school did not gain them entry 
to the government's upper secondary schools. 

In 1980, despite the emphasis on technical education proposed 
by the government and encouraged by various international advi- 
sory bodies, there were only thirty-five technical schools in Sudan, 
less than one-fifth the number of academic upper secondary schools. 
In 1976-77 eight times as many students entered the academic stream 
as entered the technical schools, creating a profound imbalance in 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



the marketplace. Moreover, prospective employers often found 
technical school graduates inadequately trained, a consequence of 
sometimes irrelevant curricula, low teacher morale, and lack of 
equipment. Performance may also have suffered because of the low 
morale of students, many of whom tended to see this kind of school- 
ing as second choice at best, a not surprising view given the sys- 
tem's past emphasis on academic training and the low status of 
manual labor, at least among much of the Arab population. The 
technical schools were meant to include institutions for training 
skilled workers in agriculture, but few of the schools were directed 
to that end, most of them turning out workers more useful in the 
urban areas. 

The hope for universal and compulsory education had not been 
realized by the early 1980s, but as a goal it led to a more equitable 
distribution of facilities and teachers in rural areas and in the south. 
During the 1980s, the government established more schools at all 
levels and with them, more teacher- training schools, although these 
were never sufficient to provide adequate staff. But the process was 
inherently slow and was made slower by limited funds and by the 
inadequate compensation for staff; teachers who could find a market 
for their skills elsewhere, including places outside Sudan, did not 
remain teachers within the Sudanese system. 

The proliferation of upper-level technical schools has not dealt 
with what most experts saw as Sudan's basic education problem: 
providing a primary education to as many Sudanese children as 
possible. Establishing more primary schools was, in this view, more 
important that achieving equity in the distribution of secondary 
schools. Even more important was the development of a primary- 
school curriculum that was geared to Sudanese experience and took 
into account that most of those who completed six years of school- 
ing did not go further. The realistic assumption was that Sudan's 
resources were limited and that expenditures on the postprimary 
level limited expenditures on the primary level, leaving most 
Sudanese children with an inadequate education. In the early 1990s, 
this situation had not significantly changed. 

In the mid-1970s, there were four universities, eleven colleges, 
and twenty-three institutes in Sudan. The universities were in the 
capital area, and all of the institutions of higher learning were in 
the northern provinces. Colleges were specialized degree- granting 
institutions. Institutes granted diplomas and certificates for periods 
of specialized study shorter than those commonly demanded at 
universities and colleges. These postsecondary institutions and 
universities had provided Sudan with a substantial number of well- 
educated persons in some fields but left it short of technical personnel 



113 



Sudan: A Country Study 

and specialists in sciences relevant to the country's largely rural 
character. 

By 1980 two new universities had opened, one in Al Awsat 
Province at Wad Madani, the other in Juba in Al Istiwai Province, 
and in 1981 there was talk of opening a university in Darfur, which 
was nearly as deprived of educational facilities as the south. By 
1990 some institutes had been upgraded to colleges, and many had 
become part of an autonomous body called the Khartoum Insti- 
tute of Technical Colleges (also referred to as Khartoum Polytech- 
nic). Some of its affiliates were outside the capital area, for example, 
the College of Mechanical Engineering at Atbarah, northeast of 
Khartoum, and Al Jazirah College of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources at Abu Naamah in Al Awsat. 

The oldest university was the University of Khartoum, which 
was established as a university in 1956. In 1990 it enrolled about 
12,000 students in degree programs ranging from four to six years 
in length. Larger but less prestigious was the Khartoum branch 
of the University of Cairo with 13,000 students. The size of the 
latter and perhaps its lack of prestige reflected the fact that many 
if not most of its students worked to support themselves and at- 
tended classes in the afternoon and at night, although some day 
classes were introduced in 1980. At the Khartoum branch only tu- 
ition was free, whereas all costs at the fully residential University 
of Khartoum were paid for by the government. At the Institute 
of Higher Technical Studies, which had 4,000 students in 1990, 
tuition was free, and a monthly grant helped to defray but did not 
fully cover other expenses. The smallest of the universities in the 
capital area was the specialized Islamic University of Omdurman, 
which existed chiefly to train Muslim religious judges and scholars. 

The University of Juba, established in 1977, graduated its first 
class in 1981. It was intended to provide education for develop- 
ment and for the civil service for southern Sudan, although it was 
open to students from the whole country. In its first years, it en- 
rolled a substantial number of civil servants from the south for fur- 
ther training, clearly needed in an area where many in the civil 
service had had little educational opportunity in their youth. After 
the outbreak of hostilities in the south in 1983, the university was 
moved to Khartoum, a move that had severely curtailed its instruc- 
tional programs, but the university continued to operate again in 
Juba in the late 1980s. Al Jazirah College of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources was also intended to serve the country as a whole, but 
its focus was consistent with its location in the most significant 
agricultural area in Sudan. 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



Of particular interest was the dynamic growth and expansion 
of Omdurman Ahlia University. It was established by academics, 
professionals, and businesspeople in 1982 upon the hundredth an- 
niversary of the founding of the city of Omdurman and was in- 
tended to meet the ever-growing demand for higher education and 
training. The university was to be nongovernmental, job oriented, 
and self-supporting. Support came mainly from private donations, 
foreign foundations, and the government, which approved the allot- 
ment of thirty acres of prime land on the western outskirts of 
Omdurman for the campus. Its curriculum, taught in English and 
oriented to job training pertinent to the needs of Sudan, had at- 
tracted more than 1,800 students by 1990. Its emphasis on training 
in administration, environmental studies, physics and mathematics, 
and library science had proven popular. 

Girls' Education 

Traditionally, girls' education was of the most rudimentary kind, 
frequently provided by a khalwa, or religious school, in which 
Quranic studies were taught. Such basic schools did not prepare 
girls for the secular learning mainstream, from which they were 
virtually excluded. Largely through the pioneering work of Shaykh 
Babikr Badri, the government had provided five elementary schools 
for girls by 1920. Expansion was slow, however, given the bias for 
boys and the conservatism of Sudanese society, with education re- 
maining restricted to the elementary level until 1 940 . It was only 
in 1940 that the first intermediate school for girls, the Omdurman 
Girls' Intermediate School, opened. By 1955, ten intermediate 
schools for girls were in existence. In 1956, the Omdurman Second- 
ary School for Girls, with about 265 students, was the only girls' 
secondary school operated by the government. By 1960, 245 
elementary schools for girls had been established, but only 25 junior 
secondary or general schools and 2 upper- secondary schools. There 
were no vocational schools for girls, only a Nurses' Training Col- 
lege with but eleven students, nursing not being regarded by many 
Sudanese as a respectable vocation for women. During the 1960s 
and 1970s, girls' education made considerable gains under the edu- 
cation reforms that provided 1 ,086 primary schools, 268 intermedi- 
ate schools, and 52 vocational schools for girls by 1970, when girls' 
education claimed approximately one-third of the total school 
resources available. Although by the early 1990s the numbers had 
increased in the north but not in the war-torn south, the ratio had 
remained approximately the same. 

This slow development of girls' education was the product of 
the country's tradition. Parents of Sudanese girls tended to look 



115 



Sudan: A Country Study 

upon girls' schools with suspicion if not fear that they would cor- 
rupt the morals of their daughters. Moreover, preference was given 
to sons, who by education could advance themselves in society to 
the pride and profit of the family. This girls could not do; their 
value was enhanced not at school but at home, in preparation for 
marriage and the dowry that accompanied the ceremony. The girl 
was a valuable asset in the home until marriage, either in the kitchen 
or in the fields. Finally, the lack of schools has discouraged even 
those who desired elementary education for their daughters. 

This rather dismal situation should not obscure the successful 
efforts of schools such as the Ahfad University College in Omdur- 
man, founded by Babikr Badri as an elementary school for girls 
in the 1920s. By 1990 it had evolved as the premier women's univer- 
sity college in Sudan with an enrollment of 1,800. It had a mix- 
ture of academic and practical programs, such as those that educated 
women to teach in rural areas. 

Education Reform 

The revolutionary government of General Bashir announced 
sweeping reforms in Sudanese education in September 1990. In 
consultation with leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic 
teachers and administrators, who were the strongest supporters of 
his regime, Bashir proclaimed a new philosophy of education. He 
allocated £Sd400 million for the academic year 1990-91 to carry 
out these reforms and promised to double the sum if the current 
education system could be changed to meet the needs of Sudan. 

The new education philosophy was to provide a frame of refer- 
ence for the reforms. Education was to be based on the perma- 
nence of human nature, religious values, and physical nature. The 
reform could be accomplished only by a Muslim curriculum, which 
in all schools, colleges, and universities would consist of two parts: 
an obligatory and an optional course of study. The obligatory course 
to be studied by every student was to be based on revealed 
knowledge concerning all disciplines. All the essential elements of 
the obligatory course would be drawn from the Quran and the 
recognized books of the hadith. The optional course of study would 
permit the student to select certain specializations according to in- 
dividual aptitudes and inclinations. Whether the government could 
carry out such sweeping reforms throughout the country in the face 
of opposition from within the Sudanese education establishment 
and the dearth of resources for implementing such an ambitious 
project remained to be seen. Membership in the Popular Defence 
Forces, a paramilitary body allied to the National Islamic Front, 
became a requirement for university admission. By early 1991, 



116 



Hospital at Li Yubu, near the border with Central African Republic, 
cares for lepers and victims of sleeping sickness. 
Leprosy patients outside the bush dispensary 
Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 



117 



Sudan: A Country Study 



Bashir had decreed that the number of university students be dou- 
bled and that Arabic replace English as the language of instruc- 
tion in universities. He dismissed about seventy faculty members 
at the University of Khartoum who opposed his reforms. 

Health 

The high incidence of debilitating and sometimes fatal diseases 
that persisted in the 1 980s and had increased dramatically by 1 99 1 
reflected difficult ecological conditions and inadequate diets. The 
diseases resulting from these conditions were hard to control without 
substantial capital inputs, a much more adequate health care sys- 
tem, and the education of the population in preventive medicine. 

By 1991 health care in Sudan had all but disintegrated. The civil 
war in southern Sudan destroyed virtually all southern medical fa- 
cilities except those that the SPLA had rebuilt to treat their own 
wounded and the hospitals in the three major towns — Malakal, 
Waw, and Juba — controlled by government forces. These facili- 
ties were virtually inoperable because of the dearth of the most basic 
medical supplies. A similar situation existed in northern Sudan, 
where health care facilities, although not destroyed by war, had 
been rendered almost impotent by the economic situation. Sudan 
lacked the hard currency to buy the most elementary drugs, such 
as antimalarials and antibiotics, and the most basic equipment, such 
as syringes. Private medical care in the principal towns continued 
to function but was also hampered by the dearth of pharmaceuti- 
cals. In addition, the Bashir government harassed the private sec- 
tor, particularly the Sudan Medical Association, which was dis- 
solved and many of its members jailed. Compounding the rapid 
decline in health care have been the years of famine during most 
of the 1980s, culminating in the great famine of 1991, which was 
caused by drought and widespread crop failures in Bahr al Ghazal 
State and in Darfur and Kurdufan. The famine was so widespread 
that, according to various estimates, 1.5 million to 7 million 
Sudanese would perish. 

Widespread malnutrition also made the people more vulnerable 
to the many debilitating and fatal diseases present in Sudan. The 
most common illnesses were malaria, prevalent throughout the 
country; various forms of dysentery or other intestinal diseases, 
also widely prevalent; and tuberculosis, more common in the north 
but also found in the south. More restricted geographically but af- 
fecting substantial portions of the population in the areas of oc- 
currence were schistosomiasis (snail fever), found in the White Nile 
and Blue Nile areas and in irrigated zones between the two Niles, 
and trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), originally limited to the 



118 



The Society and Its Environment 



southern borderlands but spreading rapidly in the 1980s in the 
forested regions of southern Sudan. It was estimated that by 1991 
nearly 250,000 persons had been affected by sleeping sickness. Not 
uncommon were such diseases as cerebrospinal meningitis, measles, 
whooping cough, infectious hepatitis, syphilis, and gonorrhea. 

Even in years of normal rainfall, many Sudanese in the rural 
areas suffered from temporary undernourishment on a seasonal 
basis, a situation that worsened when drought, locusts, or other 
disasters struck crops or animals. More dangerous was malnutri- 
tion among children, defined as present when a child's body weight 
was less than 80 percent of the expected body weight for the age. 
The weight criterion in effect stood for a complex of nutritional 
deficiencies that might lead direcdy to death or make the child sus- 
ceptible to diseases from which he or she could not recover. A 
Sudanese government agency estimated that half the population 
under fifteen — roughly one-fourth of the total population — suffered 
from malnutrition in the early 1980s. This figure increased sub- 
stantially during the famine of 1991. 

Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) was present in 
Sudan, primarily in the southern states bordering Uganda and 
Zaire, where the disease had reached epidemic proportions. There 
had been a steady increase in AIDS in Khartoum because of the 
hundreds of thousands of people emigrating to the capital to es- 
cape the civil war and famine. The use of unsterile syringes and 
untested blood by health care providers clearly contributed to its 
spread. In spite of the increase in the spread of AIDS, the Sudanese 
government in 1991 lacked a coherent national AIDS control policy. 

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the government undertook 
programs to deal with specific diseases in limited areas, with help 
from the World Health Organization and other sources. It also in- 
itiated more general approaches to the problems of health main- 
tenance in rural areas, particularly in the south. These efforts began 
against a background of inadequate and unequal distribution of 
medical personnel and facilities, and events of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s caused an almost complete breakdown in health care. 
In 1982 there were nearly 2,200 physicians in Sudan, or roughly 
one for each 8,870 persons. Most physicians were concentrated in 
urban areas in the north, as were the major hospitals, including 
those specializing in the treatment of tuberculosis, eye disorders, 
and mental illness. In 1981 there were 60 physicians in the south 
for a population of roughly 5 million, or one for approximately 83,000 
persons. In 1976 there were 2,500 medical assistants, the crucial 
participants in a system that could not assume the availability of 
an adequate number of physicians in the foreseeable future. After 



119 



Sudan: A Country Study 

three years of training and three to four years of supervised hospi- 
tal experience, medical assistants were expected to be able to diag- 
nose common endemic diseases and to provide simple treatments 
and vaccinations. There were roughly 12,800 nurses in 1982 and 
about 7,000 midwives, trained and working chiefly in the north. 

In principle, medical consultation and therapeutic drugs were 
free. There were, however, private clinics and pharmacies, and 
they were said to be growing in number in the capital area in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The ever worsening shortage of medi- 
cal personnel and of pharmaceuticals had, however, limited the 
effectiveness of free treatment. In urban areas, physicians and med- 
ical assistants could be seen only after a long wait at the hospitals 
or clinics at which they served. In rural areas, extended travel as 
well as long waits were common. In urban and rural areas, the 
drugs prescribed were often not obtainable from hospital pharma- 
cies. In the Khartoum area, they could be obtained at considera- 
ble cost from private pharmacies. In addition to the problems of 
cost, however, were those posed by difficulties of transportation 
and inadequate storage facilities. In the south, especially during 
the rainy season, the roads were often impassable. There and else- 
where, the refrigeration necessary for many pharmaceuticals was 
not available. All of these difficulties were compounded by inade- 
quacies of stock rotation and inspection. Members of the country's 
elite overcame these problems by taking advantage of medical treat- 
ment abroad. 

In the mid-1970s, the Ministry of Health began a national pro- 
gram to provide primary health care with emphasis on preventive 
medicine. The south was expected to be the initial beneficiary of 
the program, given the dearth of health personnel and facilities 
there, but other areas were not to be ignored. The basic compo- 
nent in the system was the primary health care center staffed by 
community health workers and expected to serve about 4,000 per- 
sons. Community health care workers received six months of for- 
mal training followed by three months of practical work at an 
existing center, after which they were assigned to a new center. 
Refresher courses were also planned. The workers were to pro- 
vide health care information and certain medicines and would refer 
cases they could not deal with to dispensaries and hospitals. In prin- 
ciple, there would be one dispensary for every 24,000 persons. Of 
the forty primary health care centers and dispensaries to be com- 
pleted by 1984, about half were in place by 1981 . In addition, local 
(district) hospitals were to be improved. The program in the south 
was supported by the Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- 
many), which also provided medical advisers. In 1981 the program 



120 



Doctors at a bush dispensary inspecting a pneumonia patient outside his hut 

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 

was most advanced in eastern Al Istiwai Province, but it was too 
early to assess the effects on the health of the people, and the pro- 
gram had virtually disappeared by 1991. 

Two local programs for the control of endemic disease were also 
undertaken in the late 1970s and early 1980s. One was in the area 
of the Gezira Scheme, where it was estimated that 50 to 70 per- 
cent of the people suffered from schistosomiasis, a health problem 
aggravated by the presence of malaria and dysentery. The Blue 
Nile Health Care Project, a ten-year program inaugurated in early 
1980, was intended to deal with all of these waterborne diseases 
simultaneously. Because people bathed in and drank the water in 
the irrigation canals, which were contaminated by human waste, 
a major change in their habits was required, as well as the provi- 
sion of healthful drinking water and sanitary facilities that did not 
drain into the canals. Diarrheal diseases were to be treated with 
rehydration salts that should diminish considerably the very high 
rate of infant deaths. As of 1991, the persistent civil war and the 
collapse of the Sudanese economy made the inauguration of these 
projects doubtful. Other programs to provide relief to disease and 
famine victims in Sudan were organized by foreign aid agencies 
such as the United Nations World Food Programme, the Save the 
Children Fund, Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, and the 



121 



Sudan: A Country Study 

French medical group, Medecins sans Frontieres (Doctors Without 
Borders). Sudan in 1991 faced serious problems in providing its 
people with adequate health care as well as education and an ac- 
ceptable standard of living. 

* * * 

Extensively detailed and systematic analyses of contemporary 
Sudanese society or any large segment of it were not available as 
of 1991. The Bashir government's systematic purge of the civil ser- 
vice, the professional associations, the academic community, and 
the trade unions disrupted and curtailed the flow of statistics and 
information from ministries and other government and nongovern- 
mental organizations. Such research material has also been impeded 
by the civil war in southern Sudan and the recurring famines. 
Nevertheless, many monographs have been written on specific 
Sudanese subjects ranging from anthropology to zoology. 

As a description of the physical and geographical nature of Sudan, 
K.M. Barbour's The Republic of the Sudan: A Regional Geography re- 
mains the standard work, supplemented by J.M.G. Lebon's Land 
Use in the Sudan. Because the Nile flows are crucial to Sudan, they 
have been extensively studied, producing a voluminous literature. 
Information on this subject is synthesized in two works: John Water- 
bury, Hydropolitics and the Nile Valley and Robert O. Collins, The 
Waters of the Nile: Hydropolitics and the Jonglei Canal, 1900-1988. 

Interpretations of the population situation by several authors are 
found in Population of the Sudan: A Joint Project on Mapping and Analyzing 
the 1983 Census Data and in articles in the Sudan Journal of Population 
Studies. 

Most ethnic studies are monographs that describe a particular 
ethnic group. Those include Edward E. Evans-Pritchard's The Nuer 
and Francis Mading Deng's The Dinka of the Sudan. For a more re- 
cent and sensitive treatment of ethnicity in Sudan, see articles in 
The Middle East Journal, autumn 1990; the perceptive novel by Fran- 
cis Mading Deng, Cry of the Owl; and Abel Alier's Southern Sudan: 
Too Many Agreements Dishonoured. 

Anne Cloudsley's Women of Omdurman: Life, Love, and the Cult 
of Virginity, Asma El Dareer's Woman, Why Do You Weep? Circumci- 
sion and Its Consequences, and Hanny Lightfoot Klein's Prisoners of 
Ritual: An Odyssey into Female Genital Circumcision in Africa are perhaps 
the three most informative studies of women's role in Sudan. 

Although it is somewhat outdated (he does not discuss the Mus- 
lim Brotherhood, which appeared in Sudan only in the 1950s), J. 
Spencer Trimingham's Islam in the Sudan remains the best refer- 
ence on orthodox Islam and the Sufi brotherhoods. Anthropologist 



122 



The Society and Its Environment 



Godfrey Lienhardt's Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka 
explores the importance of religion among the largest ethnic group 
in Sudan. 

The history of education in southern Sudan is covered in Lilian 
Passmore Sanderson and Neville Sanderson's Education, Religion, 
and Politics in Southern Sudan, 1899-1964. To assess the contemporary 
reordering of the education system, one should examine M. Ab- 
dalghaffar Othman's Current Philosophies, Patterns, and Issues in Higher 
Education. 

The two standard historical studies of the Sudan Medical Ser- 
vice are Ahmed Bayoumi's The History of Sudan Health Services and 
Herbert Chavasse Squire's The Sudan Medical Service. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



123 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Worker picking cotton, one of Sudan 's leading exports 



THE ECONOMY OF SUDAN continued to be in disarray in 
mid- 1991 . The principal causes of the disorder have been the vio- 
lent, costly civil war, an inept government, an influx of refugees 
from neighboring countries as well as internal migration, and a 
decade of below normal annual rainfall with the concomitant failure 
of staple food and cash crops. 

The economic and political upheavals that characterized Sudan 
in the 1980s have made statistical material either difficult to ob- 
tain or unreliable. Prices and wages in the marketplace fluctuated 
constantly, as did the government's revenue. Consequently, in- 
formation concerning Sudan's economy tends to be more histori- 
cal than current. 

In the 1970s, economic growth had been stimulated by a large 
influx of capital from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, invested with the 
expectation that Sudan would become "the breadbasket" of the 
Arab world, and by large increments of foreign aid from the Unit- 
ed States and the European Community (EC). Predictions of con- 
tinuing economic growth were sustained by loans from the World 
Bank (see Glossary) and generous contributions from such disparate 
countries as Norway, Yugoslavia, and China. Sudan's greatest eco- 
nomic resource was its agriculture, to be developed in the vast arable 
land that either received sufficient rainfall or could be irrigated from 
the Nile. By 1991 Sudan had not yet claimed its full water share 
(18.5 billion cubic meters) under the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement 
between Egypt and Sudan. 

Sudan's economic future in the 1970s was also energized by the 
Chevron Overseas Petroleum Corporation's discovery of oil on the 
borderlands between the provinces of Kurdufan and Bahr al Ghazal. 
Concurrently, the most thoroughly researched hydrological project 
in the Third World, the Jonglei Canal (also seen as Junqali Canal), 
was proceeding ahead of schedule, planned not only to provide water 
for northern Sudan and Egypt, but also to improve the life of the 
Nilotic people living in the canal area. New, large agricultural 
projects had been undertaken in sugar at Kinanah and cotton 
at Rahad. Particularly in southern Sudan, where the Addis Aba- 
ba accords of March 27, 1972, had seemingly ended the insur- 
gency, a sense of optimism and prosperity prevailed, dashed, 
however, when the civil war resumed in 1983. The Khartoum 
government controlled these development projects, but entre- 
preneurs could make fortunes through the intricate network of 



127 



Sudan: A Country Study 

kinship and political relations that has traditionally driven Sudan's 
social and economic machinery. 

In the early 1970s, public enterprises dominated the modern 
sector, including much of agriculture and most of large-scale in- 
dustry, transport, electric power, banking, and insurance. This sit- 
uation resulted from the private sector's inability to finance major 
development and from an initial government policy after the 1969 
military coup to nationalize the financial sector and part of exist- 
ing industry. Private economic activities were relegated to modern 
small- and medium-scale industry. The private sector dominated 
road transport and domestic commerce and virtually controlled 
traditional agriculture and handicrafts. 

In the 1980s, however, Sudan underwent severe political and 
economic upheavals that shook its traditional institutions and its 
economy. The civil war in the south resumed in 1983, at a cost 
of more than £Sdll million per day (for value of the Sudanese 
pound — see Glossary). The main participant in the war against the 
government was the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), 
the armed wing of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement 
(SPLM), under John Garang's leadership. The SPLA made steady 
gains against the Sudanese army until by 1991 it controlled nearly 
one- third of the country. 

The dearth of rainfall in the usually productive regions of the 
Sahel (see Glossary) and southern Sudan added to the country's 
economic problems. Refugees, both Sudanese and foreigners from 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad, further strained the Sudanese 
budget. International humanitarian agencies have rallied to Sudan's 
aid, but the government rejected their help. 

When Jaafar an Nimeiri was overthrown in April 1985, his po- 
litical party disappeared, as did his elaborate security apparatus. 
The military transitional government and the democratically elected 
coalition government of Sadiq al Mahdi that succeeded the exiled 
Nimeiri failed to address the country's economic problems. Produc- 
tion continued to decline as a result of mismanagement and natural 
disasters. The national debt grew at an alarming rate because 
Sudan's resources were insufficient to service it. Not only did the 
SPLA shut down Chevron's prospecting and oil production, but 
it also stopped work on the Jonglei Canal. 

On June 30, 1989, a military coup d'etat led by Colonel (later 
Lieutenant General) Umar al Bashir overthrew the government 
of Sadiq al Mahdi. Ideologically tied to the Muslim Brotherhood 
and dependent for political support on the Brotherhood's party, 
the National Islamic Front, the Bashir regime has methodically 
purged those agencies that dealt primarily with the economy — the 



128 



The Economy 



civil service, the trade unions, the boards of publicly owned enter- 
prises, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and the 
central bank. Under Bashir's government, Sudan's economy has 
been further strained by the most severe famine of this century, 
the continuation of the war in the south, and a foreign policy that 
has left Sudan economically, if not politically, isolated from the 
world community. 

Economic Development 

Historically, the colonial government was not interested in 
balanced economic growth and instead concentrated its develop- 
ment efforts on irrigated agriculture and the railroad system 
throughout the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (see The Anglo- 
Egyptian Condominium, 1899-1955, ch. 1). Incidental government 
investment had gone mainly into ad hoc projects, such as the con- 
struction of cotton gins and oilseed-pressing mills as adjuncts of 
the irrigation program. A limited amount of rainfed mechanized 
farming, similarly on an ad hoc basis, had also been developed dur- 
ing World War II. After the war, two development programs — 
actually lists of proposed investments — were drawn up for the peri- 
ods 1946-50 and 1951-55. These plans appear to have been a be- 
lated effort to broaden the country's economic base in preparation 
for eventual Sudanese independence. Both programs were seriously 
hampered by a lack of experienced personnel and materials and 
had little real impact. Independently, the private sector had ex- 
panded irrigated agriculture, and some small manufacturing oper- 
ations had been started, but only three larger industrial enterprises 
(meat and cement plants and a brewery) had been constructed, 
all between 1949 and 1952. As a result, at independence the new 
Sudanese government's principal development inheritance was the 
vast irrigated Gezira Scheme (also seen as Jazirah Scheme) and 
Sudan Railways. 

Not until 1960 did the new government attempt to prepare a 
national development plan. Since that time, three plans have been 
formulated, none of which has been carried through to comple- 
tion. Work on the first of these, the Ten- Year Plan of Economic 
and Social Development, for the fiscal years (FY — see Glossary) 
1961-70, began in late 1960, but the plan was not formally adopt- 
ed until September 1 962 , well over a year after its scheduled start- 
ing date. The total ten-year investment was set at £Sd565 million, 
at the time equivalent to more than US$1.6 billion. The private 
sector was expected to provide 40 percent of the amount. Unfor- 
tunately, the goals were overly ambitious, and the government had 
few experienced planners. The plan as prepared was not adhered 



129 



Sudan: A Country Study 

to, and implementation was actually carried out through invest- 
ment programs that were drawn up annually and funded through 
the development budget. Projects not in the original plan were fre- 
quently included. Investment was at a high rate in the first years, 
well beyond projections, and a number of major undertakings had 
been completed by mid-plan, including the Khashm al Qirbah and 
Manaqil irrigation projects, a sugar factory at the former site, 
another at Al Junayd irrigation project, and the Roseires (also called 
Ar Rusayris) Dam. 

As the 1960s progressed, a lack of funds threatened the continu- 
ation of development activities. Government current expenditure 
had increased much faster than receipts, in part because of the in- 
tensification of the civil war in the south, and government surpluses 
to finance development vanished. At the same time, there was a 
shortfall in foreign investment capital. The substantial foreign 
reserves held at the beginning of the plan period were depleted, 
and the government resorted to deficit financing and foreign bor- 
rowing. The situation had so deteriorated by 1967 that implemen- 
tation of the Ten- Year Plan was abandoned. Sudan's international 
credit worthiness became open to question. 

Despite major financial problems, real economic gains were 
nevertheless made during the Ten- Year Plan, and per capita in- 
come rose from the equivalent of US$86 in 1960 to about US$104 
at the end of the decade. Late in the 1960s, the government pre- 
pared a new plan covering FY 1968 to FY 1972. This plan was 
discarded after the military coup led by Nimeiri in May 1969. In- 
stead, the government adopted the Five- Year Plan of Economic 
and Social Development, 1970-74. This plan, prepared with the 
assistance of Soviet planning personnel, sought to achieve the major 
goals of the May revolution (creation of an independent national 
economy; steady growth of prosperity; and further development 
of cultural, education, and health services) through socialist de- 
velopment. 

During the plan's first two years, expenditures remained low, 
affected largely by uncertainties that stemmed from the civil war. 
After the war ceased in early 1972, the government felt that the 
plan failed to provide for transportation improvements and large- 
scale productive projects. In 1973, the government therefore estab- 
lished the Interim Action Program, which extended the original 
plan period through FY 1976. New objectives included the remo- 
val of transportation bottlenecks, attainment of self-sufficiency 
in the production of several agricultural and industrial consumer 
items, and an increase in agricultural exports. To accomplish these 
goals, proposed public sector investment increased from £Sd215 



130 



The Economy 



million to £Sd463 million (however, actual expenditures during 
the five years, excluding technical assistance, were £Sd250 million). 
Private sector projected investment was estimated at £Sdl70 mil- 
lion originally, but the nationalizations carried out in 1970 and 
1971 discouraged private investment in productive undertakings. 
Foreign private capital investment became negligible, and domes- 
tic private capital was put mostly into areas considered less sub- 
ject to takeover, such as service enterprises, housing, traditional 
agriculture, and handicrafts (see Manufacturing, this ch.). The 
denationalizations since 1972 resulted in increased private foreign 
investment in development. The final investment total during the 
first five years was considerably above the original plan projection. 
The plan failed to achieve its goal of a 7.6 percent annual growth 
rate in gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary), however, and 
was extended to 1977. 

From FY 1973, after introduction of the Interim Action Pro- 
gram, through 1977, development expenditures grew to more than 
1 billion Sudanese pounds. The government initiated several irri- 
gation projects at Rahad, Satit southeast of Khashm al Qirba, Ad 
Damazin, and Kinanah; and established factories at Sannar, 
Kinanah, at Shandi on the Nile northeast of Khartoum, Kusti, 
Kaduqli, Nyala, and Rabak on the White Nile south of Khar- 
toum. Roads between Khartoum and Port Sudan were paved with 
tarmacadam and excavation began on the Jonglei Canal. The origi- 
nal plan called for almost half of investment to be provided by sur- 
pluses in the central government budget. Although this assumption 
appeared highly optimistic in view of the modest surpluses attained 
during the last half of the 1960s, tax revenues did increase as 
projected. 

Earnings from public corporations, however, fell short of projec- 
tions, and growth in government current expenditures greatly ex- 
ceeded revenue growth. As a result, not only were there no surpluses 
in the public sector, but the government had to borrow from the 
Bank of Sudan to cover the current expenditure account. Foreign 
capital, although abundant, also did not equal the spending on de- 
velopment, and, contrary to the expectations of the plan's drafters, 
the government had to resort to domestic borrowing to proceed 
with project implementation. 

In early 1977, the government published the successor Six- Year 
Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1977-82. Its goals and 
projections also appeared optimistic because of the worsening 
domestic economic situation, which was marked by growing in- 
flation. The inflation stemmed in large part from deficit develop- 
ment financing (printing money), increasing development costs 



131 



Sudan: A Country Study 



because of worldwide price rises, and rising costs for external cap- 
ital. During the plan's second year, FY 1978, there was no eco- 
nomic growth as the deficit development financing in the mid- and 
late 1970s led Sudan into a deepening economic crisis. At the same 
time, external debt pressures mounted, and Sudan failed to meet 
its scheduled payments (see Foreign Trade and Balance of Pay- 
ments, this ch.). A substantial cutback in further development ex- 
penditures became unavoidable. The result was an abandonment 
of Six- Year Plan projections, a restriction of expenditures gener- 
ally to the completion of projects under way, improvement of the 
performance of existing operational projects, elimination of trans- 
port constraints, and a series of short-term "rolling" programs that 
particularly emphasized exports. 

In October 1983, the government announced a three-year pub- 
lic investment program, but efforts to Islamize the economy in 1984 
impeded its implementation, and after the Nimeiri overthrow in 
April 1985, the program was suspended (see table 5, Appendix). 
In August 1987, an economic recovery program was initiated. This 
program was followed, beginning in October 1988, by a three-year 
recovery program to reform trade policy and regulate the exchange 
rate, reduce the budget deficit and subsidies, and encourage ex- 
ports and privatization. There was little possibility for early eco- 
nomic recovery offered by the military government of Colonel Umar 
al Bashir that took office on June 30, 1989. The government's eco- 
nomic policies proposed to Islamize the banking system, but for- 
eign business interests viewed this measure as a disincentive to do 
business in Sudan because no interest would be paid on new loans. 
Furthermore, Islamic banks and other economic supporters of the 
regime were to be granted disproportionate influence over the econ- 
omy, a policy that led to widespread resentment among other sec- 
tors. Finally, the government did not go far enough to satisfy the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) or other major 
creditors that it had sufficiently reduced subsidies on basic com- 
modities, thus reducing its budget deficit. Bashir had announced 
an economic recovery program in mid- 1990, but in 1991 its results 
were still awaited. 

The late 1970s had seen corruption become widespread. Although 
always present, corruption never had been a major characteristic 
of the Sudanese economic scene. The enormous sums that poured 
into Sudan in the late 1970s from the Arab oil-exporting countries, 
the United States, and the European Community, however, provid- 
ed opportunities for the small clique that surrounded Nimeiri to 
enrich themselves. This corruption fell into three principal cate- 
gories: embezzlement of public funds, most of which left the 



132 



The Economy 



country; agricultural acquisition schemes; and investment in the 
mercantile sphere. 

The most common ways of embezzling public funds were ac- 
quiring liquid assets from banks or government agencies, selling 
the state's assets, selling state land, and smuggling. The siphon- 
ing off of liquid assets usually required the connivance of a high 
government official. Between 1975 and 1982, more than 800 cases 
were reported of embezzlement of, on the average, more than 
£Sd 1,000. In one case, principal bank officials embezzled £Sd3 mil- 
lion; another bank made a loan of £Sd200 million to a business- 
man whose business was fictitious. 

State property sold by embezzlers included gasoline and medi- 
cines. State officials also sold real estate in residential areas at be- 
low the market price. An impressive residence would then be built 
on the property for rental to diplomatic officials or executives of 
multinational companies. In the past, small operators penetrating 
the vast and unpatrolled borders of Sudan had carried out smug- 
gling, but in the late 1980s it became a vast and sophisticated bus- 
iness. Of the smuggling operations uncovered, one involved £Sd2.5 
million in cloth, another £Sdl million in matches, and a third 
£Sd0.5 million in automobiles. 

Another highly profitable form of corruption was the selling of 
state farmlands, each about 30,000 feddans (1 feddan is equivalent 
to 0.42 hectare). Mechanized Farming Corporation (MFC) offi- 
cials sold large numbers of feddans at low prices to senior officials 
in Khartoum; many of the latter exploited the land for profit at 
the expense of the peasantry and caused profound ecological de- 
terioration. 

As corruption ran rampant during the late 1970s until Nimeiri 
was overthrown, commercial companies, particularly in the export- 
import trade, profited through their influence on public policy and 
through special permits they received. The Islamic institutions that 
dominated Sudanese banking facilitated this corruption (see Islamic 
Banking, this ch.). These banks, of which the most important was 
the Faisal Islamic Bank, possessed privileges not enjoyed by 
Sudanese national banks, such as exemption from taxation and the 
right to transfer profits abroad. An example of the combination 
of political power and financial capital was the Islamic Develop- 
ment Company. Established in 1983 as a limited shareholding com- 
pany with an authorized capitalization of US$1 billion, the company 
was chartered to invest in agriculture, industry, services, construc- 
tion, and Islamic banks. In practice, it concentrated on the ex- 
port-import trade, where high profits could be made quickly and 
easily, in contrast to the slow returns of agricultural development 



133 



Sudan: A Country Study 

projects. The board of directors consisted of ten persons, four 
Sudanese and six foreign nationals, mostly Saudis, including a son 
of the late King Faisal ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud. Of the Sudanese, 
three belonged to the National Islamic Front, and the fourth was 
the son of the leader of the Khatmiyyah, a Muslim religious group 
associated with the National Unionist Party. All had connections 
with Islamic banks and the Sudanese parliament. Their purpose 
was to strengthen the Islamist movement's economic power by ty- 
ing their commercial enterprise to the state in order to achieve a 
privileged position in the marketplace. They accomplished this aim 
by granting shares valued at US$100,000 to founding members 
and to prominent persons, ranging from the republic's president 
to wealthy Muslim businessmen. 

In spite of the growth of the Islamic banking movement, be- 
tween 1978 and 1985, agricultural and industrial production had 
declined in per capita terms. Imports during much of the 1980s 
were three times the level of exports. By 1991 the value of the 
Sudanese pound against the dollar had sunk to less than 10 per- 
cent of its 1978 value, and the country's external debt had risen 
to US$13 billion, the interest on which could be paid only by rais- 
ing new loans. 

Two reasons for this decline were the droughts and accompany- 
ing famine occurring in the 1980s and 1991, and the influx of more 
than 1 million refugees from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad, and Ugan- 
da, in addition to the persons displaced by the continuing war in 
southern Sudan who were estimated to number between 1 . 5 mil- 
lion and 3.5 million. Nevertheless, the decline in Sudan's agricul- 
tural and industrial production had begun before these calamities. 
Few development projects were completed on time and those that 
were failed to achieve projected production. After 1978 the GDP 
steadily fell so that the vast sums of money borrowed could not 
be repaid by increased productivity. Sudan found itself in a cycle 
of increasing debt and declining production. 

These economic problems had two fundamental causes. First, 
in planning littie thought was given to the impact of any one project 
on the whole economy and even less to the burden such huge 
projects would place on a fragile infrastructure. Some ministries 
undertook projects by unilaterally negotiating loans without refer- 
ence to the Central Planning Agency. Second, remittances by 
Sudanese laborers in the Persian Gulf (thousands of workers were 
based in Kuwait and Iraq, until many of them were expelled) placed 
a stress on Sudan's economy because the government was forced 
to relax its stringent currency controls to induce these workers to 



134 



The Economy 



repatriate their earnings. Such funds were largely invested in con- 
sumer goods and housing, rather than in development projects. 

Foreign Aid 

Foreign capital has played a major role in development. The great 
reliance on it and the general ease with which it was acquired were 
major factors contributing to the severe financial problems that beset 
the country after the mid-1970s. Sudan obtained public sector loans 
for development from a wide variety of international agencies and 
individual governments. Until the mid-1970s, the largest single 
source had been the World Bank, including the International De- 
velopment Association (IDA) and the International Finance Cor- 
poration (IFC). By 1975 the World Bank and its organs had 
furnished the equivalent of US$300 million. Excluding repayments, 
the outstanding amount had risen to US$786 million in 1981, as 
major commitments to projects including agriculture, transporta- 
tion, and electric power were made (chiefly by IDA, which account- 
ed by 1981 for more than US$594 million of the outstanding total). 

The Arab oil-producing states, as their balance of payments sur- 
pluses grew in the 1970s following increases in world petroleum 
prices, also became significant suppliers of development capital 
through bilateral loans and Arab international institutions. The 
largest of the latter was the Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
Development (AFESD), through which was proposed the 1976 pro- 
gram to develop Sudan as a breadbasket for the Arab world. The 
implementing agency, the Arab Authority for Agricultural Invest- 
ment and Development (AAAID), was established in Khartoum, 
based on an agreement signed in November 1976 by twelve Arab 
states. After the mid-1970s, Saudi Arabia, one of the founders of 
AAAID, through its Saudi Development Fund became the largest 
source of investment capital, apparently convinced that Sudan's 
development could complement its own, especially in making up 
its large food deficits. Unfortunately, the ambitious plans for 
Sudan's becoming the Arab world's major food source faded by 
the mid-1980s into an economic nightmare as agricultural produc- 
tion declined sharply. 

In 1977 the United States resumed economic (and military) aid 
to Sudan. This aid followed a ten-year lapse beginning with a break 
in diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1967, with re- 
lations restored in July 1972 (see United States, ch. 4). In 1977 
the United States had become concerned about geopolitical trends 
in the region, particularly potential Libyan or Marxist Ethiopian 
attempts to overthrow the pro- Western Nimeiri government. In 
the five-year period 1977-81, United States economic aid amounted 



135 



Sudan: A Country Study 

to almost US$270 million, of which two-thirds was in the form of 
grants. By 1984, when the United States had become Sudan's larg- 
est source of foreign aid, the country's worsening economic and 
political situation, particularly Nimeiri's domestic policies with 
regard to the south and the imposition of the sharia (Islamic law) 
on society, caused the United States to suspend US$194 million 
of aid. In 1985, following Nimeiri's visit to Washington, the United 
States provided Sudan with food aid, insecticides, and fertilizers. 
After Nimeiri's overthrow in April 1985 and Sudan's failure to make 
repayments on loans, the United States discontinued non-food aid. 
The aid had been administered by the United States Agency for 
International Development (AID). It not only included direct funds 
for projects and project assistance through commodity imports 
(mainly wheat under the Food for Peace Program), but also gener- 
ated local currency that was used to support general development 
activities. AID continued providing humanitarian relief assistance 
to distressed regions in Sudan through early 1991. 

Britain also made substantial aid contributions to Sudan, nota- 
bly the sum of US$140 million to the Power III Project in the 1980s 
(see Electric Power, this ch.). In January 1991, Britain suspended 
its development aid to Sudan, which had amounted to US$58 mil- 
lion in 1989, while continuing humanitarian aid. This policy change 
was caused by a number of factors, including alleged terrorist ac- 
tivities by Sudanese agents against Sudanese expatriates in Brit- 
ain. In addition to Britain, France, West Germany, Norway, Japan, 
and other countries have provided significant economic or hu- 
manitarian aid to Sudan (Britain, West Germany, and the Nether- 
lands also have been Sudan's main sources of imports). Japan is 
a major buyer of Sudanese cotton, while Sudan imports Japanese 
machinery. In early 1990, to ease Sudan's debt burden, the Da- 
nish government cancelled Sudan's outstanding debt totalling more 
than US$22.9 million. Other major financial assistance came from 
Arab countries, especially from Saudi Arabia (Sudan's largest im- 
porter) and Kuwait. By December 1982, Sudan owed the Persian 
Gulf states US$2 billion. Saudi Arabia's assistance after 1980 mainly 
took the form of balance of payments support and petroleum ship- 
ments, rather than project aid. The total amount of aid from Arab 
states dropped in 1988 to only US$127 million, the lowest figure 
since the late 1970s. Arab aid totaled US$215 million in 1985, 
US$208 million in 1986, and US$228 million in 1987. Sudan's sup- 
port of Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf war alienated the Gulf states 
and Saudi Arabia, sharply curtailing their economic aid to Khar- 
toum. The increasingly close ties between Sudan and Iran in the 
early 1990s also concerned the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia and 



136 



The Economy 



was a factor in their diminished financial aid to Khartoum. Eco- 
nomic cooperation was initiated with Libya in the late 1980s, with 
Libya becoming Sudan's third largest supplier in 1989. 

In mid- 1991 the World Bank announced its decision to close its 
Khartoum office by December 31 , 1991 . The decision resulted from 
the deterioration in relations between Sudan and international 
monetary bodies following cessation of debt repayment by Khar- 
toum to the World Bank and the IMF. 

Among communist countries, prior to the collapse of communist 
regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, China had been 
the most important provider of development funds. By 1971 it had 
furnished loans equivalent to US$82 million, and through 1981 
an additional US$300 million was reported to have been made avail- 
able. Sudan valued these loans because they were interest free and 
had long grace periods before repayments started. Economic cooper- 
ation with China continued into the 1980s. Sudan and China signed 
a trade cooperation protocol in March 1989, with technical agree- 
ments also renewed. A commercial protocol between the two coun- 
tries was signed in April 1990. China remained a significant 
importer of Sudanese cotton in the mid-1980s, and Sudan import- 
ed about US$76 million in goods from China in 1988. Relations 
between Sudan and the Soviet Union improved markedly follow- 
ing Nimeiri's overthrow in 1985, but the overthrow did not result, 
as Khartoum had hoped, in Soviet economic assistance, but rather 
in a decrease in United States aid. 

Prices, Employment, Wages, and Unions 
Prices 

The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning' s Department 
of Statistics compiled monthly data on consumer prices in Sudan 
based on approximately 100 items on sale in the capital area's three 
cities, Omdurman, Khartoum, and Khartoum North. This report 
contained two indexes covering the cost of consumer goods used 
by Sudanese having incomes below and above £Sd500 a year. At 
the beginning of the 1970s, annual price rises were moderate. From 
1973 onward, the inflation rate grew because of continuing world- 
wide inflation, an increase in the money supply resulting from the 
central government's deficit financing and from borrowing by state 
corporations, shortages of consumer goods, and problems of sup- 
ply caused by transport deficiencies. Late in the 1970s, increased 
private sector borrowing added to the pressures on prices. In the 
six-year period from 1972 to 1977, inflation increased at an aver- 
age rate of almost 24 percent a year for the low-income group and 



137 



Sudan: A Country Study 

22 percent for the higher group. In 1979 the official rate was 30.8 
percent and 33.6 percent for the low and high groups, respective- 
ly. The reported rates were somewhat lower in 1980: 25.4 and 26.3 
percent, respectively. 

A series of currency devaluations took place, beginning in 1979, 
as part of the new financing agreement with the IMF (see Balance 
of Payments, this ch.). The economic results of the devaluations 
did not meet expectations, however, leading by the late 1980s to 
resistance to IMF demands for further devaluations. The accom- 
panying austerity measures during the 1980s included attempts 
gradually to remove subsidies on food and other products, reduc- 
tions in public expenditures, real wages, and nonessential imports, 
as well as an effort to reinvigorate the export sector. Such efforts, 
however, had little impact on Sudan's economic viability as far 
as international financial lenders were concerned. 

Annual inflation was estimated at 300 percent in mid- 1991, with 
the market value of the Sudanese pound deteriorating at a con- 
stant rate. Sudan's debt burden, estimated at US$4 billion in 1981 , 
rose to US$13 billion by mid- 1990, with debt arrears to the IMF 
alone since 1984 totalling more than US$1.1 billion, a situation 
that led the IMF to threaten to expel Sudan unless it settled its 
debt arrears. In September 1990, the IMF adopted a Declaration 
of Noncooperation regarding Sudan, as a prelude to expulsion. In 
May 1991 , an IMF delegation arrived in Khartoum for discussions 
with the government, which by then had repaid the IMF a token 
US$15 million and reaffirmed its determination to cooperate with 
the IMF. The IMF then postponed for six months its decision on 
whether to expel Sudan. The deterioration in Sudan's debt posi- 
tion also placed in doubt future World Bank lending to Sudan, with 
existing loans still secure. 

Employment 

The size of the country's economically active labor force has been 
difficult to estimate because of different definitions of participa- 
tion in economic activity and the absence of accurate data from 
official sources, particularly the 1973 and 1983 censuses. In rural 
areas, large numbers of women and girls were engaged in tradi- 
tional productive occupations, but apparently many have not been 
included in counts of the active work force. 

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated in 1 980 
that the work force was about 6 million persons, or approximately 
33 percent of the population. This figure included about 300,000 
unemployed. It also included the many male Sudanese working 
in other Arab states, a loss to Sudan that may have amounted to 



138 



The Economy 



as much as 50 percent of its professional and skilled work force. 
The drop in world oil prices in the 1980s caused the Persian Gulf 
states to cut back drastically on their expatriate workers, leading 
in turn to increased unemployment in Sudan. In mid- 1989 a total 
of 7,937,000 people were employed in Sudan, according to an ILO 
estimate. In the early 1990s, Sudan's employment situation was 
exacerbated by the 1 99 1 Persian Gulf War, which resulted in the 
departure of the thousands of Sudanese workers based in Kuwait 
and Iraq, leaving many of their possessions behind. Sudan's sup- 
port of Iraq also contributed to the departure of thousands of 
Sudanese workers from Saudi Arabia. 

Unemployment figures were affected by the severe drought that 
spread throughout Sudan in the 1980s. In 1983-84, for example, 
several million people migrated from the worst hit areas in both 
the west and the east to Khartoum and other urban areas along 
the Nile. Many remained in these areas once the drought had eased, 
living in shanty towns and contributing to unemployment or under- 
employment in the cities. In addition, more than 1 million people 
from the south migrated to the north, as a result of the civil war 
and famine in these areas. 

Agriculture was the predominant activity in Sudan, although 
its share of the labor force has gradually declined as other sectors 
of economic activity have expanded. In the 1955-56 census — the 
only complete count of the labor force for which data have been 
published (detailed results of the 1973 and 1983 censuses had not 
been released as of mid- 1991) — almost 86 percent of those then 
considered as part of the work force were involved in agriculture, 
livestock raising, forestry, fisheries, or hunting. The Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning estimated that by 1969-70 the 
total had declined to somewhat less than 70 percent and that at 
the end of the 1970s the sector accounted for less than 66 percent. 
In mid- 1989, the ILO estimated that about 4,872,000 people were 
employed in agriculture. Services, which included a government 
work force that grew about 10 percent a year in the 1970s, emerged 
as the second largest area of activity, encompassing an estimated 
10.4 percent of those economically active in 1979-80, compared 
with 4.6 percent in 1955-56. Nonagricultural production — manu- 
facturing, mining, electric power, and construction — accounted for 
6.7 percent during 1979-80 and about 5.6 percent in 1955-56. 

Wages 

In 1991 reliable figures for wages in Sudan were difficult to ob- 
tain. Public sector wages have been generally higher than those 
of the privately employed, except in a few large private firms. 



139 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Until late 1974, when the Minimum Standard of Wages Order 
(Presidential Order No. 21) was issued, there had not been a mini- 
mum wage in the private sector, although in a few occupations such 
as stevedoring at Port Sudan, official wage orders had set certain 
minimums. The 1974 minimum, established at £Sdl6.50 a month, 
was equivalent to the minimum entry wage for public sector jobs. 
It applied, however, basically only to workers in establishments 
having ten or more employees in the Khartoum area, Al Jazirah, 
and certain other urban centers. Its geographical limitations together 
with important exemptions — employees below the age of eighteen, 
all those in enterprises having fewer than ten workers, seasonal 
agricultural workers, and some others — excluded about three- 
quarters of all wage earners. Employers were allowed to raise wages 
that were below the minimum to the prescribed level in three steps 
to be achieved by October 1977. In 1979 the minimum wage was 
raised to £Sd28 a month, and a minimum daily rate of £Sdl.50 
was established for unskilled workers. 

In mid- 1978 rising inflation and worker unrest led the govern- 
ment to inaugurate the Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme 
(JECS), through which a substantial two-stage increase in public 
sector wages was to be effected. Considerable discontent with grad- 
ings appeared to have arisen, and for many people, little improve- 
ment in salaries occurred. One of the problems reportedly was the 
misjudgments in the JECS reclassification process that resulted in 
commitment of all allocated funds for the program well before the 
program had been half completed. In early 1979, members of the 
domestic bank workers' union and hospital technicians, among 
others, carried out strikes, and in August the powerful 32,000- 
member Sudan Railway Workers' Union (SRWU) also walked out. 
The government promised SRWU members that they would be 
given the second half of the JECS raise, but the strike was ended 
by the use of armed troops. SRWU again went on strike in May- 
June 1981 , in part also because of continued discontent with JECS 
actions. The strike, which was also ended by use of the military, 
was declared illegal and the union dissolved. Various leaders were 
arrested. The government then appointed a preparatory commit- 
tee to reestablish the SRWU. 

Unions 

Trade union activity was banned by the Bashir government fol- 
lowing its rise to power in the 1989 coup, and many union offi- 
cials were imprisoned. Prior to 1989, the trade unions that were 
active were nevertheless under state control, most having been es- 
tablished in their latest incarnation by the government in 1971. 



140 



The Economy 



The labor union movement originated in 1946 with the formation 
by some Sudan Railways employees of the Workers' Affairs As- 
sociation, the predecessor of the SRWU. Two years later the Trades 
and Tradesmen's Union Ordinance of 1948, which was based large- 
ly on the British model and the concepts of voluntary association 
and limited government intervention in union affairs, gave offi- 
cial sanction to unions. The 1948 ordinance permitted formation 
of unions by as few as ten individuals, and a proliferation of most- 
ly small, ineffective bodies emerged. The major exception was the 
rail union, which, as an official body, became Sudan's wealthiest 
and most powerful union. In 1949 the workers' association helped 
form the national Workers' Congress, which in 1950 became the 
Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation (SWTUF). Dominated 
by communists, the SWTUF was closely associated with the 
Sudanese Communist Party (SCP). The SWTUF failed to receive 
government recognition, and its interests and actions tended strong- 
ly to be along political lines. After national independence, the fed- 
eration had frequent confrontations with the new government, 
including a successful general strike in October 1958. This strike 
was one of the factors that contributed to the military takeover of 
the government the following month (see The Abbud Military 
Government, 1958-64, ch. 1). 

At the time of the 1958 coup, the SWTUF controlled roughly 
70 percent of all labor union membership. The new military govern- 
ment repealed the 1948 ordinance, dissolved all unions, and de- 
tained many of the federation's leaders. Some union organization 
was again permitted after 1960 but it was prohibited for white-collar 
workers, and federations were not allowed. Upon restoration of 
the civilian government in 1964, the 1948 ordinance was reinstat- 
ed, and the SWTUF reemerged. Union membership increased 
rapidly and had risen to about 250,000 workers in about 500 to 
600 unions by 1970. Most were small (three-quarters had fewer 
than 200 members), financially weak, and generally not very ef- 
fective. The few larger unions were in the public sector, led by the 
SRWU. 

SWTUF leadership remained in communist hands. The SCP 
was allied with the group that carried out the military coup of May 
1969, and the SWTUF and the unions were welcomed as partners 
in the proclaimed socialist struggle to better the conditions of the 
workers. Strikes, however, were prohibited by a presidential or- 
der issued shortly after the 1969 takeover. The relationship was 
abruptly ended after the abortive communist coup in mid- 1971. 
The government dissolved the SWTUF and executed a number 
of its leaders. 



141 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Late in 1971, the government promulgated the Trade Unions 
Act, under which directives were issued in 1973 that established 
eighty-seven unions based on sectoral, occupational, and indus- 
trial lines. Somewhat more than half were "employees' " unions 
(for white-collar employees), and the rest were "workers' " un- 
ions (for blue-collar workers). The existing unions were variously 
merged into the specified groupings. The act contained measures 
to strengthen unionism, including a provision for compulsory dues 
and employer-paid time off to serve as union officials. The SWTUF 
was reinstituted for the "workers' " unions, and the Sudanese Fed- 
eration of Employees and Professionals Trade Unions formed in 
1975 for the white-collar group. Their representation of union in- 
terests was carried on within guidelines set by the government and 
the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), the mass political party estab- 
lished by the government in 1972. In the late 1970s, they led strikes, 
which, although illegal, resulted in settlement of issues through 
negotiations with the government. The last major attempt by or- 
ganized labor to strike occurred in June 1 98 1 , but the strike by 
the Sudan Railways Workers' Union was broken by the Nimeiri 
government, which arrested its leaders. 

Prior to 1989, the SWTUF, in its weakened state, included forty- 
two trade unions, representing more than 1.7 million workers in 
the public and private sectors. The federation was affiliated with 
the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the Or- 
ganization of African Trade Union Unity. 

Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Forestry 

In the early 1990s, agriculture and livestock raising were the main 
sources of livelihood in Sudan for about 61 percent of the working 
population. Agricultural products regularly accounted for about 
95 percent of the country's exports. Industry was mostly agricul- 
turally based, accounting for 15 percent of GDP in 1988. The aver- 
age annual growth of agricultural production declined in the 1980s 
to 0.8 percent for the period 1980-87, as compared with 2.9 per- 
cent for the period 1965-80. Similarly, the sector's total contribu- 
tion to GDP declined over the years, as the other sectors of the 
economy expanded. Total sectoral activities, which contributed an 
estimated 40 percent of GDP in the early 1970s, had fluctuated 
during the 1980s and represented about 36 percent in 1988 (see 
table 6, Appendix). Crop cultivation was divided between a modern, 
market-oriented sector comprising mechanized, large-scale irrigated 
and rainfed farming (mainly in central Sudan) and small-scale farm- 
ing following traditional practices that was carried on in the other 



142 




Experimental farm in Yambio, western Al Istiwai State 

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 
Cotton growing in Al Jazirah, where international funding 
has helped rehabilitate irrigation systems 
Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington 



143 



Sudan: A Country Study 

parts of the country where rainfall or other water sources were suffi- 
cient for cultivation. 

Large investments continued to be made in the 1980s in 
mechanized, irrigated, and rainfed cultivation, with their combined 
areas accounting for roughly two-thirds of Sudan's cultivated land 
in the late 1980s. The early emphasis on cotton growing on irrigated 
land had decreased. Although cotton remained the most impor- 
tant crop, peanuts, wheat, and sugarcane had become major crops, 
and considerable quantities of sesame also were grown (see table 
7, Appendix). Rainfed mechanized farming continued to produce 
mostly sorghum, and short-fiber cotton was also grown. Produc- 
tion in both subsectors increased domestic supplies and export 
potentials. The increase appeared, however, to have been achieved 
mainly by expanding the cultivated area rather than by increasing 
productivity. To stimulate productivity, in 1981 the government 
offered various incentives to cultivators of irrigated land, who were 
almost entirely government tenants. Subsistence cultivators pro- 
duced sorghum as their staple crop, although in the northerly, 
rainfed, cultivated areas millet was the principal staple. Subsistence 
farmers also grew peanuts and sesame. 

Livestock raising, pursued throughout Sudan except in the ex- 
tremely dry areas of the north and the tsetse-fly-infested area in 
the far south, was almost entirely in the traditional sector. Because 
livestock raising provided employment for so many people, mod- 
ernization proposals have been based on improving existing prac- 
tices and marketing for export, rather than moving toward the 
modern ranching that requires few workers. 

Fishing was largely carried out by the traditional sector for sub- 
sistence. An unknown number of small operators also used the coun- 
try's major reservoirs in the more populated central region and 
the rivers to catch fish for sale locally and in nearby larger urban 
centers. The few modern fishing ventures, mainly on Lake Nubia 
and in the Red Sea, were small. 

The forestry subsector comprised both traditional gatherers of 
firewood and producers of charcoal — the main sources of fuel for 
homes and some industry in urban areas — and a modern timber 
and sawmilling industry, the latter government owned. Approxi- 
mately 21 million cubic meters of wood, mainly for fuel, were cut 
in 1987. Gum arabic production in FY 1986-87 was about 40,000 
tons. In the late 1980s, it became the second biggest export after 
cotton in most years, amounting to about 1 1 percent of total exports. 

Land Use 

By 1991 only partial surveys of Sudan's land resources had been 



144 



The Economy 



made, and estimates of the areas included in different land-use 
categories varied considerably. Figures for potentially arable land 
ranged from an estimate of 35.9 million hectares made in the 
mid-1960s to a figure of 84 million hectares published by the Minis- 
try of Agriculture and Natural Resources in 1974. Estimates of 
the amount actually under cultivation varied in the late 1980s, rang- 
ing from 7.5 million hectares, including roughly 10 or 11 percent 
in fallow, to 12.6 million hectares. 

Substantial variations also existed in land classified as actually 
used or potentially usable for livestock grazing. The ministry and 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have 
classified about 24 million hectares as pastureland. The 1965 esti- 
mate of land use classified 101.4 million hectares as grazing land, 
and in 1975 an ILO-United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) interagency mission to Sudan estimated the total poten- 
tial grazing land at between 120 million and 150 million hectares. 

Forestland estimates also differed greatly, from less than 60 mil- 
lion hectares by staff of the Forestry Administration to about 915 
million hectares by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources and the FAO (see Forestry, this ch.). Dense stands of 
trees covered only between 20 million and 24 million hectares of 
the total foresdand. Differences in land classification may have been 
accounted for by use of some woodland areas for grazing and some 
traditional grazing lands for raising crops. Given the dearth of rain- 
fall during the 1980s and early 1990s, the ecological damage from 
mechanized farming, and the steady march of desertification, dis- 
crepancies in these statistics had little meaning in 1991. 

It was generally agreed, however, that in the late 1980s Sudan 
still had a substantial amount of land suitable for future cropping. 
The ILO-UNDP mission believed that two-thirds of the potential 
area for livestock grazing, however, was already in use. In addi- 
tion to land suitable for cultivation and livestock grazing, Sudan 
also had about 76 million to 86 million hectares of desert. Addi- 
tionally, an area of about 2.9 million hectares was covered by 
swamps and inland water, and about 280,000 hectares were oc- 
cupied by urban setdements and other man-made features. 

Land Tenure 

The right to own property, to bequeath it to heirs, and to in- 
herit it was established by the Permanent Constitution of 1973; 
this right was suspended in 1985. Sudan had long had a system 
of land registration through which an individual, an enterprise, 
or the government could establish tide to a piece of land. Such regis- 
tration had been extensive in northern Sudan, especially in Al 



145 



Sudan: A Country Study 



Khartum, Al Awsat, and Ash Shamali provinces. Before 1970 all 
other land (unregistered) belonged to the state, which held owner- 
ship in trust for the people, who had customary rights to it. In 1970 
the Unregistered Land Act declared that all waste, forest, and un- 
registered lands were government land. Before the act's passage, 
the government had avoided interfering with individual customary 
rights to unregistered land, and in the late 1980s it again adhered 
to this policy. 

The government owned most of the land used by the modern 
agricultural sector and leased it to tenants (for example, the Gezira 
Scheme) or to private entrepreneurs, such as most operators of large- 
scale mechanized rainfed farming. In the late 1980s, however, the 
great area of land used for pasture and for subsistence cultivation 
was communally owned under customary land laws that varied 
somewhat by location but followed a broadly similar pattern. In 
agricultural communities, the right to cultivate an area of unused 
land became vested in the individual who cleared it for use. The 
rights to such land could be passed on to heirs, but ordinarily the 
land could not be sold or otherwise disposed of. The right was also 
retained to land left in fallow, although in Bahr al Ghazal, Aali 
an Nil, and Al Istiwai there were communities where another in- 
dividual could claim such land by clearing it. 

Among the transhumant (see Glossary) communities of the north, 
the rights to cultivated land were much the same, but the dominant 
position of livestock in community activities had introduced cer- 
tain other communal rights that included common rights to graz- 
ing land, the right-of-way to water and grazing land, the right to 
grass on agricultural land unless the occupier cut and stacked it, 
and the right to crop residues unless similarly treated. In the western 
savannas, private ownership of stands of hashab trees could be 
registered, an exception to the usual government ownership of the 
forests. But dead wood for domestic fuel and the underlying grass 
were common property. Water, a matter of greatest importance 
to stock raisers, was open to all if free standing, but wells that had 
been dug and the associated drinking troughs were private property 
and were retained by the digger season after season. In northern 
Sudan, especially in the western region where increasing popula- 
tion and animal numbers have placed pressure on the land, viola- 
tions of customary laws and conflicts between ethnic groups over 
land rights have been growing. Resolution of these problems has 
been attempted by local government agencies but only on a case- 
by-case basis. 



146 



Control device for switching water flow to one of the many canals used for 

irrigation in Al Jazirah, south of Khartoum 
Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington 

Irrigated Agriculture 

In 1991 Sudan had a large modern irrigated agriculture sector 
totaling more than 2 million hectares out of about 84 million hect- 
ares that are potentially arable. About 93 percent of the irrigated 
area was in government projects; the remaining 7 percent belonged 
to private operations. The Nile and its tributaries were the source 
of water for 93 percent of irrigated agriculture, and of this the Blue 
Nile accounted for about 67 percent. Gravity flow was the main 
form of irrigation, but about one-third of the irrigated area was 
served by pumps. 

The waters of the Nile in Sudan have been used for centuries 
for traditional irrigation, taking advantage of the annual Nile flood. 
Some use of this method still continued in the early 1990s, and 
the traditional shaduf(a. device to raise water) and waterwheel were 
also used to lift water to fields in local irrigation projects but were 
rapidly being replaced by more efficient mechanized pump sys- 
tems. Among the first efforts to employ irrigation for modern com- 
mercial cropping was the use of the floodwaters of the Qash River 
and the Baraka River (both of which originate in Ethiopia) in 
eastern Sudan to grow cotton on their deltas (see fig. 4). This project 



147 



Sudan: A Country Study 

was started in the late 1860s by the Egyptian governor and con- 
tinued until interrupted by the turbulent period of the 1880s, leading 
to the reconquest of the country by the British in 1899. Cultiva- 
tion was resumed in 1896 in the Baraka Delta in the Tawkar area, 
but in the Qash Delta it only resumed after World War I. Between 
1924 and 1926, canals were built in the latter delta to control the 
flood; sandstorms made canals unfeasible in the Baraka. Between 
the 1940s and the 1970s, various projects were developed to irrigate 
land. In 1982 both deltas yielded only one crop a year, watered 
by the flood. Adequate groundwater, however, offered the even- 
tual possibility of using pump irrigation from local wells for addi- 
tional cropping or for supplementing any flood shortages. 

The drought that affected Sudan in the 1980s was a natural di- 
saster that had a crushing effect on the country's irrigation sys- 
tems. In 1990-91 , for instance, water was so scarce in the Tawkar 
area that for the first time in 100 years the crops failed. 

As of 1990, the country's largest irrigation project had been de- 
veloped on land between the Blue and White Nile rivers south of 
their confluence at Khartoum. This area is generally flat with a 
gentle slope to the north and west, permitting natural gravity irri- 
gation, and its soils are fertile cracking clays well suited to irriga- 
tion. The project originated in 1911, when a private British 
enterprise, Sudan Plantations Syndicate, found cotton suited to the 
area and embarked on what in the 1920s became the Gezira 
Scheme, intended principally to furnish cotton to the British tex- 
tile industry. Backed by a loan from the British government, the 
syndicate began a dam on the Blue Nile at Sannar in 1913. Work 
was interrupted by World War I, and the dam was not completed 
until 1925. The project was limited by a 1929 agreement between 
Sudan and Egypt that restricted the amount of water Anglo- 
Egyptian Sudan could use during the dry season. By 1931 the 
project had expanded to 450,000 hectares, the maximum that then 
could be irrigated by the available water, although 10,000 more 
hectares were added in the 1950s. The project was nationalized 
in 1950, and was operated by the Sudan Gezira Board as a govern- 
ment enterprise. In 1959 a new agreement with Egypt greatly in- 
creased the allotment of water to Sudan, as did the completion in 
the early 1960s of the Manaqil Extension on the western side of 
the Gezira Scheme. By 1990 the Manaqil Extension had an irrigated 
area of nearly 400,000 hectares, and with the 460,000 hectares even- 
tually attained by the original Gezira Scheme, the combined projects 
accounted for half the country's total land under irrigation. 

In the early 1960s, the government set up a program to resettle 
Nubians displaced by Lake Nubia (called Lake Nasser in Egypt), 



148 



The Economy 



which was formed by the construction of the Aswan High Dam 
in Egypt. To provide farmland for the Nubians, the government 
constructed the Khashm al Qirbah Dam on the Atbarah River and 
established the Haifa al Jadidah (New Haifa) irrigation project. 
Located west of Kassala, this project was originally designed to 
irrigate about 164,000 hectares. In 1982 it was the only large irri- 
gation project in the country that did not use the waters of the Blue 
Nile or White Nile. The resettlement was effected mainly after com- 
pletion of the Khashm al Qirbah Dam in 1964. Part of the irrigat- 
ed area was also assigned to local inhabitants. The main commercial 
crops initially introduced included cotton, peanuts, and wheat. In 
1965 sugarcane was added, and a sugar factory having a design 
capacity of 60,000 tons was built to process it. The project ena- 
bled 200,000 hectares of land to be irrigated for the first time. Heavy 
silting as well as serious problems of drainage and salinity occurred. 
As a result, by the late 1970s the reservoir had lost more than 40 
percent of its original storage capacity and was unable to meet the 
project water requirements. These problems persisted in the early 
1990s. 

The multipurpose Roseires Dam was built in 1966 and power- 
generating facilities were installed in 1971 . Both the water and the 
power were needed to implement the Rahad River irrigation project 
located east of the Rahad River, a tributary of the Blue Nile. The 
Rahad entered the Blue Nile downstream from the dam, and dur- 
ing the dry season had an insufficient flow for irrigation purposes. 
Work on the initial 63,000 hectares of the project began in the early 
1970s, the first irrigation water was received in 1977, and by 1981 
about 80 percent of the prepared area was reported to be irrigated. 
(In May 1988, the World Bank agreed to provide additional fund- 
ing for this and other irrigation projects.) Water for the project 
was pumped from the Blue Nile, using electric power from the 
Roseires plant, and was transported by an eighty-kilometer-long 
canal to the Rahad River (en route underpassing the Dindar River, 
another Blue Nile tributary). The canal then emptied into the Ra- 
had above a new barrage that diverted the combined flow from 
the two sources into the project's main irrigation canal. Irrigation 
was by gravity flow, but instead of flat field flooding, furrow irri- 
gation was used because it permitted more effective use of 
machinery. 

In the 1920s, private irrigation projects using diesel pumps also 
had begun to appear in Al Khartum Province, mainly along the 
White Nile, to provide vegetables, fruit, and other foods to the cap- 
ital area. In 1937 a dam was built by the Anglo-Egyptian con- 
dominium upstream from Khartoum on the White Nile at Jabal 



149 



Sudan: A Country Study 

al Awliya to regulate the supply of water to Egypt during the Au- 
gust to April period of declining flow. Grazing and cultivated land 
along the river was flooded for almost 300 kilometers. The govern- 
ment thereupon established seven pump irrigation projects, par- 
tially financed by Egypt, to provide the area's inhabitants with an 
alternative to transhumance. 

This irrigation project eventually proved successful, making pos- 
sible large surpluses of cotton and sorghum and encouraging pri- 
vate entrepreneurs to undertake new projects. High cotton profits 
during the Korean War (1950-53) increased private interest along 
the Blue Nile as well, and by 1958 almost half the country's ir- 
rigated cotton was grown under pump irrigation. During the 1960s, 
however, downward fluctuations in world cotton prices and dis- 
putes between entrepreneurs and tenants led to numerous failures 
of pump irrigation projects. In 1968 the government assumed 
ownership and operation of the projects. The government estab- 
lished the Agricultural Reform Corporation for this purpose, and 
the takeover began that year with the larger estates. Subsequent- 
ly, as leases expired, the corporation acquired smaller projects, until 
May 1970 when all outstanding leases were revoked. A considera- 
ble number of small pump operations that developed on privately 
owned land, chiefly along the main Nile but also on the Blue Nile, 
continued to operate. 

Since the 1950s, the government has constructed a number of 
large pump projects, mostly on the Blue Nile. These have includ- 
ed the Junayd project on the east bank of the Blue Nile east of the 
Gezira Scheme. This project, with an irrigated area of about 36,000 
hectares, went into operation in 1955 to provide an alternative liveli- 
hood for nomadic pastoralists in the area. It produced cotton until 
1960, when about 8,400 hectares were converted to sugarcane. A 
sugar factory built to process the crop (with a potential capacity 
of 60,000 tons of sugar a year) opened in 1962. In the early 1970s, 
the Japanese-assisted As Suki project, also of 36,000 hectares, was 
established upstream from Sannar to grow cotton, sorghum, and 
oilseeds. In the mid-1970s, the government constructed a second 
project near Sannar of about 20,000 hectares. In addition to cot- 
ton and other crops such as peanuts, about 8,400 hectares of the 
area were devoted to raising sugarcane. The cane-processing fac- 
tory, with a design capacity of 1 10,000 tons of sugar a year, opened 
in 1976. Several smaller Blue Nile projects added more than 80,000 
additional hectares to Sudan's overall irrigated area during this 
time. 

In the 1970s, when the consumption and import of sugar grew 
rapidly, domestic production became a priority, and two major 



150 



The Economy 



pump-irrigated sugar plantations were established on the White 
Nile in the Kusti area. The Hajar Asalaya Sugar Project, begun 
in 1975, had an irrigated area of about 7,600 hectares. The sugar 
factory, completed in 1977, had a potential annual capacity of 
110,000 tons. The Kinanah Sugar Project, which had almost 16,200 
hectares under irrigation in 1981 and had a future potential of over 
33,000 hectares, was one of the world's largest sugar-milling and 
refining operations. In 1985-86 production reached more than 
330,000 tons a year. This project, first proposed in 1971, was be- 
set with funding problems and overruns that increased overall costs 
from the equivalent of US$113 million estimated in 1973 to more 
than US$750 million when the plant opened officially in early 1981 . 

The Kinanah Sugar Project, unlike the country's four other 
government-owned sugar projects, was a joint venture among the 
governments of Sudan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, and the Arab 
Investment Company, the Sudan Development Corporation, 
Kinanah Limited, and the AAAID, including local Sudanese banks. 
An initial trial run in the 1979-80 cane season produced 20,000 
tons of sugar. Yield increased to an estimated 135,000 to 150,000 
tons the following season. Production at the Hajar Asalaya facto- 
ry did not get under way until the 1979-80 season because of cane 
and sugar-processing difficulties. Problems have also affected the 
other three state sugar factories, but as a result of proposed World 
Bank management, the output total of these four government oper- 
ations for the 1984-85 season improved to nearly 200,000 tons. 
Output declined to 159,000 tons in 1985-86 because of the drought. 
In 1989 sugarcane production reached 400,000 tons. 

Rainfed Agriculture 

Cultivation dependent on rainfall falls into two categories. Most 
Sudanese farmers have always relied on rainfed farming. In addi- 
tion to these traditional farmers, a large modern mechanized rainfed 
agriculture sector has developed since 1944-45, when a govern- 
ment project to cultivate the cracking clays of central Sudan start- 
ed in the Al Qadarif area of Ash Sharqi Province, largely to meet 
the food needs of army units stationed in the British colonies in 
eastern Africa (present-day Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda). An 
average of about 6,000 hectares a year was cultivated between 1945 
and 1953, producing chiefly sorghum, under a sharecropping ar- 
rangement between the government and farmers who had been 
allocated land in the project. These estates proved cosdy, however, 
and in 1954 the government began encouraging the private sector 
to take up mechanized farming in the area, a policy that continued 
after Sudan gained independence in 1956. Under the new approach, 



151 



Sudan: A Country Study 

the government established several state farms to demonstrate 
production methods and to conduct research. Research activities 
have been very limited, however, because of staffing and funding 
problems, and the farms have been operated essentially as regular 
production units. 

The private sector response was positive, and by 1960 mechanized 
farming had spread into other areas of the cracking clay zone in 
Ash Sharqi and Al Awsat provinces. The government set aside rec- 
tangular areas that were divided into plots of 420 hectares (later 
raised in places to 630 hectares) each. Half of these plots were leased 
to private farmers, the other half left in fallow. After four years, 
the originally leased land was to be returned to fallow and the farmer 
was to receive a new lease to an adjacent fallow area. When the 
demand for land grew faster than it could be demarcated, areas 
outside the designated project limits were taken over by private 
individuals. The four-year lease proved unpopular because it meant 
new investment in clearing land every four years, and apparently 
much of the worked land continued to be cultivated while fallow 
land was also placed under cultivation. By 1968 more than 750,000 
hectares were being cultivated, of which it was estimated that more 
than 200,000 hectares constituted unauthorized holdings. The aver- 
age agricultural production growth rate declined, however, from 
2.9 percent in the period between 1965 and 1980, to 0.8 percent 
in the period between 1980 and 1987, the latest available figures. 
Reportedly, for the 1991-92 season, the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Natural Resources planned for about 7.3 million hectares of 
food crops to be planted, with about 1.6 million hectares planted 
in the irrigated sector and about 5 . 7 million hectares in the rain- 
fed areas. 

The investment requirements for mechanized farming favored 
prosperous cultivators, and eventually most farms came to be oper- 
ated by entrepreneurs who raised capital through mortgageable 
property or other assets in the urban centers. Through arrange- 
ments with other individuals, these entrepreneurs frequendy 
managed to control additional plots beyond the legal limit of two. 
Their ability to obtain capital also permitted them to abandon 
depleted land and to move into newly demarcated uncleared areas, 
a practice that had a deleterious impact upon the environment, 
deprived the indigenous inhabitants of work opportunities, and in- 
creased desertification. In 1968, to expand the operator base and 
to introduce more control over land allocation, crops, and farm- 
ing methods, the government established the Mechanized Farm- 
ing Corporation (MFC), an autonomous agency under the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Natural Resources. From 1968 through 1978, 



152 



The Economy 



the IDA made three loans to the government to enable the MFC 
to provide technical assistance, credit for landclearing and 
machinery, and marketing aid to individual farmers and coopera- 
tive groups. The MFC also became the operator of state farms. 

In the late 1970s, about 2.2 million hectares had been allocated 
for mechanized farming, and about 420,000 hectares more had been 
occupied without official demarcation. About 1.9 million hectares 
in all were believed to be under cultivation in any one season. Of 
the officially allocated land, more than 70 percent was held by pri- 
vate individuals. Private companies had also begun entering the 
field, and some allocations had been made to them. State farms 
accounted for another 7.5 percent. About 15 percent of the total 
allocated land was in MFC-IDA projects. The largest proportion 
of mechanized farming was in Ash Sharqi Province, 43 percent; 
the next largest in Al Awsat Province, 32 percent; and about 20 
percent was in Aali an Nil Province. Mechanized farming had also 
been initiated in southern Kurdufan Province through a project 
covering small-scale farmers in the area of the Nuba Mountains, 
but under a different government program. Proposals also had been 
made for MFC projects using mechanized equipment in other areas 
of southern Kurdufan (some have already been tried) and southern 
Darfur provinces. There were serious feasibility problems in view 
of competition for land and conflicts with traditional farming prac- 
tices, difficult soil conditions, and the probable negative effect on 
the large numbers of livestock of nomads. 

Only a few crops had been found suitable for cultivation in the 
cracking clay area. Sorghum had been the principal one, and dur- 
ing the early 1980s it was planted on an average of about 80 per- 
cent of the sown area. Sesame and short-fiber cotton were also 
grown successfully but in relatively smaller quantities, sesame on 
about 15 percent of the land and cotton on about 5 percent. Soil 
fertility has reportedly been declining because of the continued 
planting of sorghum and the lack of crop rotation. Yields have ap- 
parently decreased, but in view of the area's greatly varying cli- 
matic conditions and the uncertain production data, definitive 
conclusions on trends appeared premature. 

Livestock 

In the early 1990s, drought caused a dramatic decline in livestock 
raising in Sudan, following a period in the early 1980s when 
livestock provided all or a large part of the livelihood of more than 
40 percent of the country's population. Livestock raising was over- 
whelmingly in the traditional sector, and, although initial steps had 
been taken to improve productivity and develop market orientation, 



153 



Sudan: A Country Study 

for the modern monetized economy the sector represented largely 
a potential asset. In 1983 Sudan's more than 50 million animals 
comprised the second largest national herd in Africa, next in size 
to that of Ethiopia. An FAO estimate in 1987 indicated that there 
were about 20.5 million cattle, 19 million sheep, 14 million goats, 
and 3 million camels. Other animals included 660,000 donkeys, 
21,000 horses, a small number of pigs (kept by such non-Muslim 
peoples as the Nuba) and 32,000 chickens. By 1991 these num- 
bers had been reduced by perhaps one-third by the drought of 
1990-91; the August 1988 floods in the south, described as the worst 
in Sudan's history; and the ravages of civil war in the south. Poultry 
was raised mainly by farm families and villagers. A small modern 
sector consisted of limited government commercial operations and 
a few semicommercial private ventures. 

Sudanese cattle are of two principal varieties: Baqqara and Ni- 
lotic. The Baqqara and two subvarieties constituted about 80 per- 
cent of the country's total number of cattle. This breed was found 
chiefly in the western savanna regions and in fewer, although sig- 
nificant, numbers farther to the east from Aali an Nil to Kassala 
in Ash Sharqi. The Nilotic, constituting approximately 20 percent 
of all cattle, were common in the eastern hill and plains areas of 
southeastern Al Istiwai, which were free of the tsetse fly, and in 
those parts of the Bahr al Ghazal and Aali an Nil lying outside 
the tsetse-fly zone. Because of periodic rinderpest epidemics, the 
total number of cattle was relatively small until about 1930, when 
it stood at an estimated 2 million. A vaccination program begun 
about that time and mass inoculations during the succeeding de- 
cades resulted in a great increase in numbers, which by 1970 had 
reached about 12 million. 

In the vast areas used by pastoral herders (estimated to be 80 
million to 100 million hectares), cattle husbandry was conducted 
in an economic, cultural, and social context that had evolved over 
generations. The system included an emphasis on increasing herd 
size as an investment for future family security. Small surpluses 
(usually bulls) were available for subsistence use, exchange, or sale 
for local consumption or export. Cattle were also used for mar- 
riage payments and among the Nilotes for rituals. Numbers of cattle 
also helped to establish or increase status and power in a social sys- 
tem in which cattle were the measure of wealth. 

Most Nilotic cattle were kept by transhumant groups. Migra- 
tions, related to the wet and dry seasons, usually did not exceed 
150 to 160 kilometers. The majority of the Baqqara strain of cattle 
belonged to the Baqqara Arabs (see Northern Arabized Commu- 
nities, ch. 2). The latter were largely nomadic, but since at least 



154 




Market, or suq, in Yambio, with townspeople engaged in bargaining 
Cattle suq in Juba, capital of Al Istiwai State 
Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 



155 



Sudan: A Country Study 

the early 1900s had had a settled base on which crop cultivation 
was practiced. The farmers, their relatives, or their agents moved 
the cattle over traditional migratory routes northward during the 
rainy season and southward to the area of the Bahr al Arab as the 
dry season progressed. Migrations in either direction might amount 
to 400 kilometers. The expansion of mechanized rainfed agricul- 
ture in the region used by the Baqqara, continued government ef- 
forts to enlarge the cultivated area, and pressures on the land from 
the growing population gradually reduced grazing areas. At the 
same time, traditional cultural forces brought about a steady in- 
crease in cattle numbers. The result was increasing overstocking 
and pasture depletion, until the outbreak of civil war in 1983 and 
the devastating droughts of the 1980s and early 1990s decimated 
not only the Nilotic herds but also livestock throughout Sudan. 
Many families and indeed whole ethnic groups who had tradition- 
ally survived on their cattle, sheep, goats, or camels, lost all of their 
herds and were forced to migrate to the Three Towns (Omdur- 
man, Khartoum, and Khartoum North) in search of sustenance. 

Sheep were herded chiefly by transhumants in Darfur and Kur- 
dufan. Large numbers were found in the drier areas at greater ele- 
vations than the usual cattle zone. Several breeds were raised, but 
the predominant and preferred one was the so-called desert sheep, 
which had both good weight and good milk yield. Villagers in Al 
Awsat also raised large numbers of sheep, mostly on a nonmigra- 
tory basis. Fodder was obtained from crop residues on irrigated 
and rainfed farms and from vegetation along the rivers and canals. 
Goats, of which there were three principal breeds (desert, Nubi- 
an, and Nilotic), were found throughout the country south of the 
northern desert areas. They were raised mainly by sedentary fami- 
lies for milk and meat. Goat meat, although less popular than mut- 
ton, formed part of the diet of most families, particularly those 
having low incomes. Goat milk was an important source of protein, 
and many families in urban areas kept a few goats for their milk. 

Camels were largely concentrated in the desert and subdesert 
regions of northern Darfur, northern Kurdufan, and southern Ash 
Sharqi. They were kept almost entirely by nomadic and semi- 
nomadic peoples, for whom the animal represented the preferred 
mode of transport. Camels were also important for milk and for 
meat. Camel ownership and numbers were sources of prestige in 
nomadic societies. 

Fisheries 

Sudan's total production of fish, shellfish, and other fishing 
products reached an estimated 24,000 tons per year in 1988, the 



156 



The Economy 



latest available yearly figures. This figure compared with estimates 
of a potential yearly catch exceeding 100,000 tons. The principal 
source of fish was the Nile River system. In central and northern 
Sudan, several lakes and reservoirs have been formed by the dam- 
ming of the river and its branches: the 180-kilometer section of 
Lake Nubia on the main Nile in Sudan and the reservoirs behind 
the Roseires and Sennar dams on the Blue Nile, the Jabal al Awliya 
Dam on the White Nile, and the Khashm al Qirbah Dam on the 
Atbarah tributary of the main Nile. These bodies of water accounted 
for about 1 1 ,000 tons of fish against a calculated potential of about 
29,000 tons. 

Production from Lake Nubia through 1979, the latest figures 
available in 1991, was only 500 tons a year, or about one-tenth 
of the estimated potential. Inhabitants around the lake, which had 
formed gradually in the 1960s, had no previous experience in fish- 
ing, and the first significant commercial exploitation of the lake's 
resources was undertaken by the government's Fisheries Adminis- 
tration. In 1973 a private company also started operations. In the 
mid- and late 1970s, an ice plant and a cold storage facility were 
built at Wadi Haifa with assistance from China. China also fur- 
nished thirty-five two- ton fishing vessels, a number of transport 
launches, and other fishing equipment. Cooling plants were con- 
structed at Khartoum and Atbarah to hold fish that were brought 
from Wadi Haifa by railroad. Although ice was used in the ship- 
ments, substantial loss occurred, especially during the hotter 
months. To what extent fish production from the lake and availa- 
bility to consumers were increased by these new facilities was not 
known in 1991. 

The largest potential source of freshwater fish was southern 
Sudan, whose extensive river network and flooded areas in As Sudd 
were believed able to provide 100,000 to 300,000 tons annually 
on a sustained basis. Statistics on actual production were unavail- 
able in 1991 ; much was consumed locally, although limited quan- 
tities of dried and salted fish were exported to Zaire where it was 
in great demand. 

The country's second source of fish, the Red Sea coastal area, 
was relatively unexploited until the late 1970s. Annual production 
toward the end of the decade amounted to about 500 tons of fish, 
shellfish (including pearl oysters), and other marine life. In 1978 
the British Ministry of Overseas Development began a joint project 
with the government Fisheries Administration to raise output by 
making boats, motors, and equipment available to fishermen. In- 
cluded was an ice plant built at Sawakin to furnish local fishermen 
with ice for their catch. By 1982 the project was well advanced, 



157 



Sudan: A Country Study 

and about 2,000 tons of fish were taken annually. A sustained catch 
of 5,000 tons might eventually be possible. 

Forestry 

Sudan has a large quantity of natural forest, much of which re- 
mained almost totally unexploited in 1991. Since the early 1900s, 
extensive areas of woodland and forest have been converted to 
agricultural use. Large amounts of land classifiable as woodland 
have also been cleared in the development of large-scale mechanized 
rainfed farming in Ash Sharqi and Al Awsat states, and smaller 
amounts in Aali an Nil and southern Kurdufan states. In the late 
1970s, FAO estimated that the country's forests and woodlands 
totaled about 915,000 square kilometers, or 38.5 percent of the land 
area. This figure was based on the broad definition of forest and 
woodland as any area of vegetation dominated by trees of any size. 
It also included an unknown amount of cleared land that was ex- 
pected to have forest cover again "in the foreseeable future." An 
estimate in the mid-1970s by the Forestry Administration, however, 
established the total forest cover at about 584,360 square kilome- 
ters, or 24.6 percent of the country's land area. More than 129,000 
square kilometers (about one-quarter) of this amount were locat- 
ed in the dry and semiarid regions of northern Sudan. These forests 
were considered valuable chiefly as protection for the land against 
desertification, but they also served as a source of fuel for pastoral 
peoples in those regions. The continued population pressure on 
the land has resulted in an accelerated destruction of forestland, 
particularly in the Sahel, because charcoal remained the predom- 
inant fuel. The loss of forestland in the marginal areas of the north, 
accelerated by mechanized farming and by drought, resulted in 
a steady encroachment of the Sahara southward at about ten kilom- 
eters a year in the 1980s. 

The productive forest extended below the zone of desert encroach- 
ment to the southern border. It included the savanna woodlands 
of the central and western parts of the country, which were domi- 
nated by various species of acacia, among them Acacia Senegal, the 
principal source of gum arabic. Gum arabic was Sudan's second 
largest export product, accounting for 80 percent of the world's 
supply. It is nontoxic, noncalorific, and nonpolluting, having no 
odor or taste. It is used widely in industry for products ranging 
from mucilage (for postage stamps) to foam stabilizers to excipient 
in medicines and dietetic foods. In 1986-87 Sudan produced more 
than 40,000 tons marketed through the Gum Arabic Company. 
In the late 1980s, the drought severely curtailed production. 



158 




Fisherman with his nets on the Nile in northern Sudan 
Port Sudan on the Red Sea, Sudan 's major port 
Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington 



159 



Sudan: A Country Study 

The principal area of productive forest and woodland, however, 
was in the more moist southern part of the country. Covering an 
area of more than 200,000 square kilometers and consisting main- 
ly of broadleaf deciduous hardwoods, it remained largely undevel- 
oped in 1990. Timber processed by government mills in the area 
included mahogany for furniture and other hardwoods for railroad 
ties, furniture, and construction. Domestic production of timber 
fell far short of local needs in the 1970s, and as much as 80 percent 
of the domestic requirement was met by imports. 

Plantations established by the government Forestry Administra- 
tion in the mid-1970s totaled about 16,000 hectares of hardwoods 
and 500 to 600 hectares of softwoods; most were in the south. They 
included stands of teak and in the higher elevations of the Imatong 
Mountains, exotic pines. Eucalyptus stands had also been estab- 
lished in the irrigated agricultural areas to serve as windbreaks and 
to supply firewood. A gradually increasing forest reserve had been 
developed, and by the mid-1970s it covered more than 13,000 
square kilometers. Additional protection of forest and woodland 
areas was provided by several national parks and game reserves 
that encompassed 54,000 square kilometers in the mid-1970s. 

Since 1983 the civil war has virtually halted forestry production 
in southern Sudan, which provided the majority of the country's 
forestry products. According to FAO estimates, however, in 1987 
Sudan produced 41,000 cubic meters of sawed timber, 1,906,000 
cubic meters of other industrial roundwood, and more than 18 mil- 
lion cubic meters of firewood. Each of these categories showed a 
substantial increase from production levels in the 1970s. The in- 
satiable demand was for charcoal, the principal cooking fuel, and 
the one major forest product not dependent upon the south. Be- 
cause wood of any kind could be turned to charcoal, the acacia 
groves of the Sahel have been used extensively for this purpose, 
with a resulting rapid advance of deforestation. To improve govern- 
ment forestry conservation and management policy, as well as the 
issue of land use, in 1990-91 plans were under way to establish 
a forestry resource conservation project, funded and cofinanced 
by several international development agencies and donors. 

Manufacturing 

The development of modern manufacturing received littie direct 
encouragement in Sudan during the condominium period. British 
economic policies were aimed basically at expanding the production 
of primary products, mainly cotton, for export. Imports and tradi- 
tional handicraft industries met the basic needs for manufactured 
goods. Indirectly, however, the vast Gezira Scheme cotton- growing 



160 



The Economy 



project induced the construction of ginneries, of which more than 
twenty were in operation by the early 1930s. A secondary develop- 
ment was the establishment of several cottonseed oil-pressing mills. 
During World War II, small import substitution industries arose, 
including those manufacturing soap, carbonated drinks, and other 
consumer items. These operations did not survive the competition 
from imports after the war's end. Foreign private interests invest- 
ed in a few larger enterprises that included a meat-processing fac- 
tory, a cement plant, and a brewery, all opened between 1949 and 
1952. 

At independence the Sudanese government supported an indus- 
trial development policy to be effected through the private sector. 
To facilitate this process, Khartoum adopted the Approved En- 
terprises (Concessions) Act of 1956, to encourage private Sudanese 
and foreign investment. The act placed few restrictions on foreign 
equity holdings. By 1961, however, the government had conclud- 
ed that the private sector lacked interest or funds to establish en- 
terprises important to the national economy, and so it entered the 
manufacturing field. The first government project was a tannery 
opened that year, and this was followed in 1962 by a sugar fac- 
tory. In 1962 Khartoum formed the Industrial Development Cor- 
poration (IDC) to manage government plants. During the decade, 
several additional government enterprises were built, including a 
second sugar factory, two fruit and vegetable canneries, a date- 
processing plant, an onion-dehydrating plant, a milk-processing 
plant, and a cardboard factory. During this time, the private sec- 
tor also made substantial investment, which resulted in factories 
making textiles and knitwear, shoes, soap, soft drinks, and flour. 
Other private enterprises included printing facilities and additional 
oil-pressing mills. Among the largest private undertakings was the 
foreign-financed and foreign-built oil refinery at Port Sudan, which 
opened in 1964. Well over half the private sector investment dur- 
ing the decade came from foreign sources. 

Government participation in the manufacturing sector increased 
dramatically after the 1969 military coup and the adoption of a 
policy aimed at placing the country's economic development in 
government hands, although private ownership continued. Dur- 
ing 1970 and 1971, Khartoum nationalized more than thirty pri- 
vate enterprises. In 1972, however, to counter the drop in foreign 
private investment that followed, Nimeiri announced that private 
capital would again be accorded favorable treatment, and the 
government passed the Development and Promotion of Industrial 
Investment Act of 1972, containing even more liberal provisions 
than precoup legislation. 



161 



Sudan: A Country Study 

As the economy remained dependent on private capital, as well 
as capital investment from developed nations, the government in- 
corporated further incentives for the favorable treatment of such 
capital in a 1974 revision of the industrial investment act and added 
provisions against arbitrary nationalization. Moreover, in 1972 
Khartoum denationalized some enterprises nationalized earlier and 
returned them to their former owners under an arrangement for 
joint government-private ownership. One of the largest of these 
enterprises was the Bata Shoe Company, which was returned in 
1978 as a reorganized joint company in which Bata held a 51 per- 
cent interest and the government 49 percent. The most successful 
such enterprise, however, was the Bittar Group, which in 1990 had 
become the largest undertaking in Sudan. Begun in the 1920s, na- 
tionalized in 1969 but returned to its owners in 1973, it has diver- 
sified into products ranging from exports of vegetable oils to imports 
of wheat, sugar, and insecticides. The firm has been active in a 
wide range of projects involving agriculture, electricity, and such 
industrial products as household and office equipment, soap, and 
detergents. 

Throughout the 1970s, the government continued to establish 
new public enterprises, some state-owned, others in conjunction 
with private interests, and some having foreign government par- 
ticipation, especially by the Arab oil-producing states. The new 
plants included three sugar factories, among which was the Kinanah 
sugar-milling and refining factory; two tanneries; a flour mill; and 
more than twenty textile plants. A joint venture with United States 
interests built Sudan's first fertilizer plant south of Khartoum, which 
was in operation by 1986. Private investment continued, particu- 
larly in textiles. About 300 million meters of cloth were produced 
annually in the 1970s, but output fell to 50 million meters in 1985. 
In 1988 the textile industry functioned at about 25 percent of ca- 
pacity. The latter figure reflected the effects of the civil war, the 
dearth of hard currency for spare parts to maintain machinery, 
and the debt crisis. 

Since independence Sudan's modern manufacturing establish- 
ment has emphasized the processing of agricultural products and 
import substitution. The production of foodstuffs, beverages, and 
clothing has accounted for a large part of total output. Significant 
import substitution industries included cement, chemicals, and dry 
battery manufacture; glass-bottle-making; petroleum refining; and 
fertilizer production. In the late 1980s, estimates of the contribu- 
tion of modern manufacturing to GDP varied from about 7 to 8 
percent a year, including mining (compared to about 2 percent in 
1956). Employment in the sector had risen during that period from 



162 



Craftsman engaged in jewelry making, Omdurman 
Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington 

possibly 9,000 in 1956 to 185,000 in 1977, including wage earners 
in government enterprises. Almost three-quarters of large-scale 
modern manufacturing was located in Al Khartum, attracted by 
market size, higher per capita income, better transportation and 
power infrastructure, and access to financial and government 
services. 

Total manufacturing output, however, had not met expectation 
by the end of the 1970s and steadily declined in the 1980s. Overall 
output in some subsectors had grown as new facilities began oper- 
ating, but the goal of self- sufficiency had generally not been at- 
tained. Shortages of domestic and imported raw materials, power 
failures, transportation delays, lack of spare parts, and shortages 
of labor ranging from qualified managerial staff and skilled work- 
ers to casual laborers had been drawbacks to effective operations 
and increased output. Losses of skilled labor and management to 
the Persian Gulf states have been particularly debilitating. In the 
1980s, many factories operated below capacity — frequently at well 
under 50 percent of their potential. In some instances, low produc- 
tion also was related to poor project planning. For example, the 
government cannery at Kuraymah in Ash Shamali was already con- 
structed when scientists found that the surrounding farming area 
could not produce the quantity of crops the plant could process. 



163 



Sudan: A Country Study 

The milk-processing facility at Babanusah south of Khartoum had 
a similar record of poor planning. Efforts to improve the trans- 
portation and power infrastructure, whose deficiencies have been 
major contributors to the manufacturing problems, and rehabili- 
tation of existing plants were among the basic goals of the 1977-82 
Six- Year Plan of Economic and Social Development (see Economic 
Development; Foreign Aid, this ch.). That plan was never effec- 
tively implemented. Some progress has been reported, but in 1990 
the production problems faced earlier by manufacturing persisted. 

Mining 

In 1990 the mining industry accounted for less than 1 percent 
of the total GDP. A wide range of minerals existed in Sudan, but 
the size of reserves had not been determined in most cases. The 
discovery of commercially exploitable quantities of petroleum in 
the late 1970s offered some hope that the sector would play an in- 
creased role in the economy in the future (see Petroleum Use and 
Domestic Resources, this ch.). However, from February 1984, some 
months after concessions were allotted, oil exploration operations 
had been suspended in the south, where the largest deposits were 
located, as a result of the region's security problems. Nonhydro- 
carbon minerals of actual or potential commercial value included 
gold, chrome, copper, iron, manganese, asbestos, gypsum, mica, 
limestone, marble, and uranium. Gold had been mined in the Red 
Sea Hills since pharaonic times. Between 1900 and 1954, several 
British enterprises worked gold mines in the area and extracted 
a considerable quantity of the metal — one mine alone reportedly 
produced three tons of gold between 1924 and 1936. Gold also has 
been mined along the borders between Sudan and Uganda and 
Zaire, but not in commercially profitable amounts. During the 
1970s, the government's Geological Survey Administration located 
more than fifty potential gold-producing sites in different parts of 
the country. Several joint ventures between the Sudanese Mining 
Corporation, a government enterprise, and foreign companies were 
launched in the 1980s; these undertakings produced gold at Gebeit 
and several other mines near the Red Sea Hills beginning in 1987. 
In 1988 about 78,000 tons of gold ore were mined in Sudan. In 
late 1990, Sudan and two French mining companies formed a joint 
venture company to exploit gold reserves in the Khawr Ariab wadi 
in the Red Sea Hills. 

Chrome ore was mined in the Ingessana Hills in Al Awsat. In 
the late 1970s, output was reportedly more than 20,000 tons a year, 
of which more than four-fifths were produced by the Ingessana Hills 
Mines Corporation, a subsidiary of Sudanese Mining Corporation. 



164 



The Economy 



A private operation produced the remainder. The ore was export- 
ed, chiefly to Japan and Western Europe. In the 1980s, the estab- 
lishment of ferrochrome processing facilities had been discussed 
with Japanese interests, but the estimated 700,000 tons of reserves 
were insufficient for profitable long-term operations. By 1983, when 
the civil war brought a halt to all production in the Ingessana Hills, 
chrome production had declined about 50 percent to only 10,000 
tons per year. In 1988 production of chromium ore was estimated 
at 5,000 metric tons. Asbestos had also been found in the Inges- 
sana Hills area. It was reportedly of good commercial grade, and 
mining possibilities were under study by a Canadian subsidiary 
of the United States firm of Johns-Manville. A small pilot extrac- 
tion plant had been built, but larger scale operations were depen- 
dent on locating adequate reserves and on the ending of the civil 
war. 

Large gypsum deposits, estimated to contain reserves of 220 mil- 
lion tons, were found along the Red Sea coast. Reportedly of high 
purity, the ore was mined mainly north of Port Sudan. In the late 
1980s, about 20,000 tons were produced annually, about 6,000 tons 
by the Sudanese Mining Corporation and the remainder by pri- 
vate operations. Gypsum was used mostly in the production of ce- 
ment. Limestone, found in substantial quantities in Sudan, was 
mined both for use in making cement and for other construction 
materials. Marble was also quarried for the latter purpose. 

There has been some commercial mining of mica, exploitable 
deposits of which had been located in Ash Shamali Province by 
a UN mineral survey team between 1968 and 1972. The Sudanese 
Mining Corporation produced about 1,000 tons of scrap mica in 
FY 1978, but output reportedly slumped thereafter to about 400 
tons annually. Manganese and iron ore, of which several large 
deposits exist in different parts of the country, have been mined 
at times but only on a small basis by international standards. There 
were more than 500 million tons of iron ore deposits in the Fodik- 
wan area of the Red Sea Hills, and beginning in the late 1980s 
a project had been planned to produce between 120,000 and 200,000 
tons a month. Exploitation of Sudan's mineral deposits, however, 
depended in large part on foreign companies willing to undertake 
such risks in the face of the country's mounting problems and on 
international market factors. 

Uranium ores have been discovered in the area of the Nuba 
Mountains and at Hufrat an Nahas in southern Kurdufan. Mi- 
nex Company of the United States obtained a 36,000-square- 
kilometer exploratory concession in the Kurdufan area in 1977, 
and the concession was increased to 48,000 square kilometers in 



165 



Sudan: A Country Study 

1979. Uranium reserves are also believed to exist near the western 
borders with Chad and Central African Republic. Another poten- 
tial source of mineral wealth was the Red Sea bed. In 1974 offi- 
cials established a joint Sudanese- Saudi Arabian agency to develop 
those resources, which included zinc, silver, copper, and other 
minerals. Explorations below the 2,000-meter mark have indicat- 
ed that large quantities of the minerals are present, but as of 1990 
no actual extraction had been undertaken. 

Energy Sources and Supply 

In 1990 the chief sources of energy were wood and charcoal, 
hydroelectric power, and imported oil. Wood and charcoal were 
principally used by households for heating and cooking. Substan- 
tial quantities of wood fuels, amounting to roughly one-fifth of the 
country's annual consumption, were also used by commercial 
operations — chiefly baking and brickmaking and, to a lesser ex- 
tent, tobacco curing. Some use was also made of other vegetable 
matter including sugarcane bagasse, which met a significant part 
of the energy needs of the sugar mills, and cotton stalks, used lo- 
cally by households. Consumption of wood and charcoal has con- 
tinued to increase as the population has grown, and some concern 
has been voiced at the gradual depletion of forest and woodland 
resources serving the large towns. Overuse of the sparser vegeta- 
tion in the semidesert grazing areas reportedly was resulting in some 
fuel deficiencies in those regions, as well as in desertification. 

The country's hydroelectric potential has been only partially ex- 
ploited. Major undeveloped hydropower sources existed at the 
several cataracts on the main Nile downstream from Khartoum. 
Natural gas was discovered in the early 1960s along the Red Sea 
coast in a fruitless search for petroleum. In the mid-1970s, further 
quantities were found during additional oil explorations, but de- 
velopment was not considered at the time to be commercially feasi- 
ble. In October 1988, Sudan announced that natural gas production 
would start in one year; presumably this would come from the 85 
billion cubic meters of gas reserves Chevron had earlier estimated. 
The 1979 and later petroleum discoveries in southern and south- 
western Sudan added a new potential domestic energy source. 
However, these deposits to date have yielded little oil because 
petroleum companies, such as Chevron, had suspended oilfield ex- 
plorations in these regions because of the civil war. Sudan had no 
known deposits of coal or lignite as of the early 1990s. 

Electric Power 

The only sizable area of the country having electric power 



166 



The Economy 



available to the public was the central region along the Blue Nile 
from Khartoum south to Ad Damazin. The central region in the 
early 1990s accounted for approximately 87 percent of Sudan's total 
electricity consumption. The area was served by the country's only 
major interconnected generating and distributing system, the Blue 
Nile Grid. This system provided power to both the towns and the 
irrigation projects in the area, including the Gezira Scheme. 
Another small, local, interconnected system furnished power in the 
eastern part of the country that included Al Qadarif, Kassala, and 
Haifa al Jadidah. The remaining customers were in fewer than 
twenty widely scattered towns having local diesel-powered gener- 
ating facilities: Shandi, Atbarah, and Dunqulah in the north; 
Malakal, Juba, and Waw in the south; Al Fashir and Nyala in 
Darfur; Al Ubayyid and Umm Ruwabah in Kurdufan; a few towns 
along the White Nile south of Khartoum; and Port Sudan. About 
fifty other urban centers in outlying regions, each having popula- 
tions of more than 5,000, still did not have a public electricity sup- 
ply in 1982, the latest year for which statistical information was 
available. Rural electrification was found only in some of the vil- 
lages associated with the main irrigation projects. 

Approximately 75 percent of the country's total electric power 
was produced by the Public Electricity and Water Corporation 
(PEWC), a state enterprise. The remaining 25 percent was gener- 
ated for self-use by various industries including food-processing 
and sugar factories, textile mills, and the Port Sudan refinery. Pri- 
vate and PEWC electricity generation increased about 50 percent 
in the 1980s, to an estimated 900 gigawatt hours in 1989 in at- 
tempts to counter frequent cuts in electric power. PEWC also han- 
dled all regular electricity distribution to the public. In 1989 PEWC 
power stations had a total generating capacity of 606 megawatts, 
of which about 53 percent was hydroelectric and the remainder 
thermal. 

The largest hydroelectric plant was at Roseires Dam on the Blue 
Nile; it had a capacity of 250 megawatts. Other hydroelectric sta- 
tions were located at the Sennar Dam farther downstream and at 
Khashm al Qirbah Dam on the Atbarah River; the latter was part 
of the small power grid in the Al Qadarif- Kassala area. The Sen- 
nar and Roseires dams were constructed originally to provide irri- 
gation, Sennar in 1925 and Roseires in 1966. Electric-power 
generating facilities were added only when increasing consumer 
demands had made them potentially viable (Sennar in 1962 and 
Roseires in 1971), yet power generation in Sudan has never satis- 
fied actual needs. 



167 



Sudan: A Country Study 

The Blue Nile Grid, in addition to its Roseires and Sennar 
hydroelectric plants, had thermal plants at Burri in eastern Khar- 
toum, where work on a 40 -megawatt extension began in 1986, and 
in Khartoum North, where a 60-megawatt thermal station began 
operation in 1985. In the late 1980s, two additional stations produc- 
ing 40 to 60 megawatts each were under consideration for Khar- 
toum North. 

The demand for electricity on the Blue Nile system increased 
greatly in the late 1970s, and power shortages have been acute from 
1978 onward. Shortages have been blamed in part on management 
inefficiency and lack of coordination between the PEWC and irri- 
gation authorities and other government agencies. Demand con- 
tinued to grow strongly during the 1980s as development projects 
were completed and became operational and the population of the 
Three Towns increased dramatically. New generating facilities were 
completed in 1986 under the Power III Project, almost doubling 
generating capacity in the Blue Nile Grid. The project included 
work on the Roseires units, funded by IDA, and on the Burri and 
Khartoum North installations, funded by the British Overseas De- 
velopment Administration. In 1983, recognizing the need for more 
electricity, the government began seeking support for the Power 
IV Project to be funded by the World Bank, the African Develop- 
ment Bank, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germa- 
ny) to bring the entire electrical system up to its full generating 
capacity. The plan was later scaled back from the initial cost of 
US$100 million and renamed Power V Project. 

Petroleum Use and Domestic Resources 

In 1982 roughly four-fifths of the nation's energy requirement 
for industry, modern agriculture, transportation, government ser- 
vices, and households (in addition to wood fuel, charcoal, and the 
like) was provided by imported petroleum and petroleum products. 
Approximately 10 percent of these imports were used to generate 
electricity. Foreign exchange costs for oil imports rose dramatical- 
ly after 1973 and by 1988 amounted to almost 46 percent of earn- 
ings from merchandise exports. Dependence on external sources 
might lessen when the security situation permits Sudan's domes- 
tic petroleum resources to be exploited. 

The search for oil began in 1 959 in the Red Sea littoral and con- 
tinued intermittently into the 1970s. In 1982 several oil compa- 
nies were prospecting large concessions offshore and on land from 
the Tawkar area near the Ethiopian border to the northern part 
of the Red Sea Hills. No significant discoveries were reported. In 
1974 Chevron, a subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of California, 



168 






_. : 



Sennar Dam on the Blue Nile, one of Sudan 's oldest dams and major source 

of electric power for eastern Sudan 
Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington 
Waterworks at Maridi, west of Juba 
Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 



169 



Sudan: A Country Study 

began exploration of a 5 16, 000- square-kilometer concession (later 
reduced to 280,000 square kilometers by voluntary relinquishment) 
in southern and southwestern Sudan. Drilling began in 1977, and 
the first commercial flow was obtained in July 1979 at Abu Jabirah 
in southern Kurdufan Province. In 1980 major finds were made 
at the company's Unity Field near Bentiu in Aali an Nil Province, 
where further drilling by early 1981 had brought in forty-nine wells 
having a combined flow of more than 12,000 barrels a day. The 
company has estimated this field's reserves at from 80 to 100 mil- 
lion barrels, but exploration farther south placed the reserves at 
more than 250 million barrels. Other oil companies— including 
some from the United States, Canada, and France — have also ob- 
tained concessions, and by 1982 almost one-third of Sudan had 
been assigned for exploration. Oil exploration and production have 
been hampered, however, by the almost total lack of infrastruc- 
ture and by the civil war in the south of the country. Chevron had 
found small aircraft and helicopters essential for transport, the latter 
for moving portable rigs and equipment and for general use dur- 
ing the rainy season when all roads and locally constructed air strips 
were washed out. 

The domestic processing of crude petroleum began in late 1964 
when the Port Sudan oil refinery went into operation. The refinery, 
which was financed, built, and managed by the British Petroleum 
and Royal Dutch Shell companies — from July 1976 as a joint equal 
shareholding project with the government — had a capacity of about 
21,440 barrels per day. Its capacity was well in excess of Sudan's 
needs at the time it was built, and refined products were exported. 
Local demand had quintupled by 1990, well beyond the plant's 
capacity. As a result, more than one-third of the gas oil (used in 
diesel motors and for heating) and well over two-fifths of the kero- 
sene required for domestic use had to be imported. A substantial 
quantity of other products refined by the plant in excess of Sudan's 
own needs were exported. 

The domestic petroleum discoveries led to intensive discussion 
within the government concerning the establishment of a new 
refinery. Southern Sudan pressed for construction near the oilfields 
in the south, but it was decided finally to locate the refinery at Kusti 
on the White Nile about 315 kilometers south of Khartoum. In 
August 1981, the White Nile Petroleum Company (WNPC) was 
set up by the central government as a subsidiary of the Sudanese 
National Oil Company to handle the undertaking. The govern- 
ment held a two-fifths share in WNPC , Chevron Overseas Petrole- 
um Corporation another two-fifths, and the International Finance 
Corporation the remaining one-fifth. Plans called for a 550-kilometer 



170 



The Economy 



pipeline to be built from the oilfields to the new refinery. By early 
1982, however, the estimated costs of the refinery and pipeline had 
risen to at least the equivalent of US$ 1 billion as against an earlier 
project allotment of about one-third that figure. 

The Kusti refinery was predicated on production for domestic 
consumption. Its estimated capacity (in early 1982) of between 
15,000 and 25,000 barrels a day would meet only part of Sudan's 
overall requirements, however, and the quality of the petroleum 
would restrict economic production to certain products. Hence the 
Port Sudan refinery would have to continue operating. In view of 
the greatly increased cost estimates of the new plant, the World 
Bank in 1982 undertook a study of an alternative plan that might 
be more attractive to foreign capital. Under this plan, the proposed 
pipeline would run to Port Sudan, and an extension to the exist- 
ing refinery would make it possible to export surplus refined 
products and even earn foreign-exchange credits. Contracts were 
let for the construction of the pipeline, but the government can- 
celed them in September 1986. Further seismic studies were under- 
taken in the swamps (As Sudd) of Aali an Nil, but all of Chevron's 
exploration and development activities came to an abrupt end in 
February 1984 when guerrillas from the southern Sudanese insur- 
gent group known as Any a Nya II attacked the main forward 
Chevron base across the Bahr al Ghazal River from Bentiu, kill- 
ing four Chevron employees. Chevron immediately terminated its 
development program and, despite repeated demands by succes- 
sive Sudanese governments, has refused to return to work its con- 
cession until the safety of its personnel can be guaranteed by a 
settlement of the Sudanese civil war. Total, the French oil compa- 
ny, shut down its operations several months later. 

The Nimeiri government pressured foreign oil companies to re- 
sume exploration and drilling and hoped to encourage them to do 
so in part by forming the National Oil Company of Sudan (NOCS) 
in a joint venture with Saudi Arabian entrepreneur Adnan 
Khashoggi. After Nimeiri was overthrown, the new government 
dissolved NOCS but continued to press companies to renew work. 
As a result, Chevron stated in late 1987 that it would begin a sixty- 
day, two- well drilling program in southern Kurdufan in 1988, but 
postponed the work because of the spread of civil war. Several other 
foreign companies indicated an interest in petroleum exploration 
in 1988, following the completion of a three-year World Bank study 
of Sudan's hydrocarbon potential. The minister of energy and min- 
ing had announced in May 1987 that Sudan's confirmed oil reserves 
totaled 2 billion barrels, with an estimated 500 million barrels 
recoverable. 



171 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Transportation and Communications 

Sudan's transport infrastructure in 1990 included an extensive 
railroad system that served the more important populated areas 
except in the far south, a meager road network (very little of which 
consisted of all-weather roads), a natural inland waterway — the Nile 
River and its tributaries — and a national airline that provided both 
international and domestic service. Complementing this infrastruc- 
ture was Port Sudan, a major deep-water port on the Red Sea, 
and a small but modern national merchant marine. Additionally, 
a pipeline transporting petroleum products extended from the port 
to Khartoum (see fig. 6). 

Only minimal efforts had been expended through the early 1980s 
to improve existing and, according to both Sudanese and foreign 
observers, largely inefficiendy operated transport facilities. Increas- 
ing emphasis on economic development placed a growing strain 
on the system, and beginning in the mid-1970s a substantial propor- 
tion of public investment funds was allocated for transport sector 
development. Some progress toward meeting equipment goals had 
been reported by the beginning of the 1980s, but substantial fur- 
ther modernization and adequately trained personnel were still re- 
quired. Until these were in place, inadequate transportation was 
expected to constitute a major obstacle to economic development. 

Railroads 

The country had two railroads. The main system, Sudan Rail- 
ways, which was operated by the government-owned Sudan Rail- 
ways Corporation, provided services to most of the country's 
production and consumption centers. The other railroad, the Gezira 
Light Railway, was owned by the Sudan Gezira Board and served 
the Gezira Scheme and its Manaqil Extension. Railroads domi- 
nated commercial transport, although competition from the high- 
ways has been increasing rapidly. The preeminence of the railroad 
system was based on historical developments that led to its con- 
struction as an adjunct to military operations, although the first 
line, built in the mid- 1870s from Wadi Haifa to a point about 
fifty-four kilometers upstream on the Nile River, was initially a 
commercial undertaking. This line, which had not proved viable 
commercially, was extended in the mid- 1880s and again in the 
mid- 1890s to support the Anglo-Egyptian military campaigns 
against the Mahdiyah (see The Mahdiyah, 1884-98, ch. 1). Of lit- 
tle other use, it was abandoned in 1905. 

The first segment of the present-day Sudan Railways, from Wadi 
Haifa to Abu Hamad, was also a military undertaking; it was built 



172 



The Economy 



by the British for use in General Herbert Kitchener's drive against 
the Mahdiyah in the late 1890s. The line was pushed to Atbarah 
during the campaign and after the defeat of the Mahdiyah in 1898 
was continued to Khartoum, which it reached on the last day of 
1899. The line was built to 1 .067-meter-gauge track specifications, 
the result apparently of Kitchener's pragmatic use of the rolling 
stock and rails of that gauge from the old line. This gauge was used 
in all later Sudanese mainline construction. 

The line opened a trade route from central Sudan through Egypt 
to the Mediterranean and beyond. It became uneconomical, 
however, because of the distance and the need for transshipment 
via the Nile, and in 1904 construction of a new line from Atbarah 
to the Red Sea was undertaken. In 1906 the new line reached re- 
cently built Port Sudan to provide a direct connection between 
Khartoum and ocean-going transport. 

During the same decade, a line was also built from Khartoum 
southward to Sannar, the heart of the cotton- growing region of Al 
Jazirah. A westward continuation reached Al Ubayyid, then the 
country's second largest city and center of gum arabic production, 
in 1911. In the north, a branch line that tied the navigable stretch 
of the Nile between the fourth and third cataracts into the trans- 
port system was built from near Abu Hamad to Kuraymah. Traffic 
in this case, however, was largely inbound to towns along the river, 
a situation that still prevailed in 1990. 

In the mid- and late 1920s, a spur of the railroad was built from 
Taqatu Hayya, a point on the main line 200 kilometers southwest 
of Port Sudan, southward to the cotton-producing area near Kas- 
sala, then on to the grain region of Al Qadarif, and finally to a 
junction with the main line at Sannar. Much of the area's traffic, 
which formerly had passed through Khartoum, has since moved 
over this line directly to Port Sudan. 

The final spurt of railroad construction began in the 1950s. It 
included extension of the western line to Nyala (1959) in Darfur 
Province and of a southwesterly branch to Waw (1961), southern 
Sudan's second largest city, located in Bahr al Ghazal Province. 
This work essentially completed the Sudan Railways network, which 
in 1990 totaled about 4,800 route kilometers. 

Conversion of Sudan Railways to diesel fuel started in the late 
1950s, but a few mainline steam locomotives continued in use in 
1990, serving lines having lighter weight rails. Through the 1960s, 
the railroads essentially had a monopoly on transportation of export 
and import trade, and operations were profitable. In the early 1970s, 
losses were experienced, and, although the addition of new diesel 
equipment in 1976 was followed by a return to profitability, another 



173 



Sudan: A Country Study 




9 'Nimule s\ v *-w 
- Y " v v ^ KENYA 

ZAIRE / <^ 

/to* necessarily auihorifatfv-e ^> \ 



Figure 6. Transportation System, 1991 



downturn had occurred by the end of the decade. The losses were 
attributed in part to inflationary factors, the lack of spare parts, 
and the continuation of certain lines characterized by only light 
traffic, but retained for economic development needs and for so- 
cial reasons. 

The chief cause of the downturn appeared to have been loss of 
operational efficiency. Worker productivity had declined. For ex- 
ample, repair of locomotives was so slow that only about half of the 



174 



The Economy 



total number were usually operational. Freight car turnaround time 
had lengthened considerably, and the reported slowness of manage- 
ment to meet growing competition from road transport was also 
a major factor. The road system, although generally more expen- 
sive, was used increasingly for low- volume, high- value goods be- 
cause it could deliver more rapidly — two or three days from Port 
Sudan to Khartoum, compared with seven or eight days for ex- 
press rail freight and up to two weeks for ordinary freight. At the 
end of the 1980s, moreover, only 1 to 2 percent of freight trains 
arrived on time. The gradual erosion of freight traffic was evident 
in the drop from more than 3 million tons carried annually at the 
beginning of the 1970s to about 2 million tons at the end of the 
decade. The 1980s also saw a steady erosion of tonnage as a result 
of a combination of inefficient management, union intransigence, 
the failure of agricultural projects to meet production goals, the 
dearth of spare parts, and the continuing civil war. 

Despite the rapidly growing use of roads, the railroads have re- 
mained of paramount importance because of their ability to move 
the large volume of agricultural exports at lower cost and to trans- 
port inland the increasing imports of heavy capital equipment and 
construction materials for development, such as requirements for 
oil exploration and drilling operations. Efforts to improve the rail 
system reported in the late 1970s and the 1980s included laying 
heavier rails, repairing locomotives, purchasing new locomotives, 
modernizing signaling equipment, expanding training facilities, and 
improving locomotive and rolling-stock repair facilities. One project 
would double-track the line from Port Sudan to the junction of the 
branch route to Sannar, thus in effect doubling the Port Sudan- 
Khartoum rail line. Substantial assistance has been furnished for 
these and other stock and track improvement projects by foreign 
governments and organizations, including the European Develop- 
ment Fund, the Development Finance Company, the AFESD, the 
International Development Association, Britain, France, and Japan. 
Implementation of much of this work has been hampered by politi- 
cal instability in the 1980s, debt, the dearth of hard currency, the 
shortage of spare parts, and import controls. Railroads were estima- 
ted in mid- 1989 to be operating at less than 20 percent of capacity. 

The Gezira Light Railway, one of the largest light railroads in 
Africa, evolved from tracks laid in the 1920s construction of the 
canals for the Gezira Scheme. At the time, the railroad had about 
135 route kilometers of 1 .6096-meter-gauge track. As the size of 
the project area increased, the railroad was extended and by the 
mid-1960s consisted of a complex system totaling 716 route kilo- 
meters. Its primary purpose has been to serve the farm area by 



175 



Sudan: A Country Study 

carrying cotton to ginneries and fertilizers, fuel, food, and other 
supplies to the villages in the area. Operations usually have been 
suspended during the rainy season. 

Roads 

In 1990 Sudan's road system totaled between 20,000 and 25,000 
kilometers, comprising an extremely sparse network for the size 
of the country. Asphalted all-weather roads, excluding paved streets 
in cities and towns, amounted to roughly 2,000 kilometers, of which 
the Khartoum-Port Sudan road accounted for almost 1,200 kilom- 
eters. There were between 3,000 and 4,000 kilometers of gravel 
roads located mostly in the southern region where lateritic road- 
building materials were abundant. In general, these roads were 
usable all year round, although travel might be interrupted at times 
during the rainy season. Most of the gravel roads in southern Sudan 
have become unusable after being heavily mined by the insurgent 
southern forces of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) 
(see Civil Warfare in the South, ch. 5). The remaining roads were 
little more than fair-weather earth and sand tracks. Those in the 
clayey soil of eastern Sudan, a region of great economic impor- 
tance, were impassable for several months during the rains. Even 
in the dry season, earthen roads in the sandy soils found in vari- 
ous parts of the country were generally usable only by motor vehi- 
cles equipped with special tires. 

Until the early 1970s, the government had favored the railroads, 
believing they better met the country's requirements for transpor- 
tation and that the primary purpose of roads was to act as feeders 
to the rail system. The railroads were also a profitable government 
operation, and road competition was not viewed as desirable. In 
the mid- 1930s, a legislative attempt had been made to prevent 
through-road transport between Khartoum and Port Sudan. The 
law had little effect, but the government's failure to build roads 
hindered the development of road transportation. The only major 
stretch of road that had been paved by 1970 was between Khar- 
toum and Wad Madani. This road had been started under a United 
States aid program in 1962, but work had stopped in 1967 when 
Sudanese-United States relations were broken over the June 1967 
Arab-Israeli War. United States equipment was not removed, 
however, and was used by government workers to complete the 
road in 1970. 

Disillusionment with railroad performance led to a new empha- 
sis on roads in a readjustment of the Five-Year Plan in 1973 — the 
so-called Interim Action Program — and a decision to encourage 
competition between rail and road transport as the best way to 



176 



Warning that river had flooded the road 
Courtesy Robert O.Collins 
Relief truck of the Norwegian People's Aid near Kapoeta in eastern A I Istiwai 

in the 1990 rainy season 
Courtesy Roger Winter 



177 



Sudan: A Country Study 

improve services. Paving of the dry- weather road between Khar- 
toum and Port Sudan via Al Qadarif and Kassala was the most 
significant immediate step; this project included upgrading of the 
existing paved Khartoum-Wad Madani section. From Wad Madani 
to Port Sudan, the road was constructed in four separate sections, 
each by different foreign financing, and in the case of the Wad 
Madani- Al Qadarif section, by direct participation of the Chinese. 
Other section contractors included companies from Italy, West Ger- 
many, and Yugoslavia. The last section opened in late 1980. 

Other important road-paving projects of the early 1980s included 
a road from Wad Madani to Sannar and an extension from San- 
nar to Kusti on the White Nile completed in 1984. Since then the 
paved road has been extended to Umm Ruwabah with the inten- 
tion to complete an all-weather road to Al Ubayyid. Paradoxically, 
most truckers in 1990 continued to pass from Omdurman to Al 
Ubayyid through the Sahelian scrub and the qoz (see Glossary) to 
avoid the taxes levied for use of the faster and less damaging paved 
road from Khartoum via Kusti. 

A number of main gravel roads radiating from Juba were also 
improved. These included roads to the towns southwest of Juba 
and a road to the Ugandan border. In addition, the government 
built a gravel all-weather road east of Juba that reaches the Kenyan 
border. There it joined an all-weather road to Lodwar in Kenya 
connecting it with the Kenyan road system. All these improvements 
radiating from Juba, however, have been vitiated by the civil war, 
in which the roads have been extensively mined by the SPLA and 
the bridges destroyed. In addition, because roads have not been 
maintained, they have seriously deteriorated. 

Small private companies, chiefly owner-operated trucks, fur- 
nished most road transport. The government has encouraged pri- 
vate enterprise in this industry, especially in the central and eastern 
parts of the country, and the construction of all-weather roads has 
reportedly led to rapid increases in the number of hauling busi- 
nesses. The Sudanese-Kuwaiti Transport Company, a large govern- 
ment enterprise financed largely by Kuwait, began operations in 
1975 with 100 large trucks and trailers. Most of its traffic was be- 
tween Khartoum and Port Sudan. Use of road transport and bus 
services is likely to increase as paved roads are completed south 
of Khartoum in the country's main agricultural areas. 

Inland Waterways 

The Nile River, traversing Sudan from south to north, provides 
an important inland transportation route. Its overall usefulness, 
however, has been limited by natural features, including a number 



178 



The Economy 



of cataracts in the main Nile between Khartoum and the Egyptian 
border. The White Nile to the south of Khartoum has shallow 
stretches that restrict the carrying capacities of barges, especially 
during the period of low water, and the river has sharp bends. Most 
of these southern impediments have been eliminated by Chevron, 
which as part of its oil exploration and development program 
dredged the White Nile shoals and established navigational bea- 
cons from Kusti to Bentiu. A greater impediment has been the 
spread of the water hyacinth, which impedes traffic. Man-made 
features have also introduced restrictions, the most important of 
which was a dam constructed in the 1930s on the White Nile about 
forty kilometers upriver from Khartoum. This dam has locks, but 
they have not always operated well, and the river has been little 
used from Khartoum to the port of Kusti, a railroad crossing 319 
kilometers upstream. The Sennar and Roseires dams on the Blue 
Nile are without locks and restrict traffic on that river. 

In 1983 only two sections of the Nile had regular commercial 
transport services. The more important was the 1,436-kilometer 
stretch of the White Nile from Kusti to Juba (known as the Southern 
Reach), which provided the only generally usable transport con- 
nection between the central and southern parts of the country. Vir- 
tually all traffic, and certainly scheduled traffic, ended in 1984, 
when the SPLA consistently sank the exposed steamers from sanc- 
tuaries along the river banks. River traffic south of Kusti had not 
resumed in mid- 1991 except for a few heavily armed and escorted 
convoys. 

At one time, transport services also were provided on tributar- 
ies of the White Nile (the Bahr al Ghazal and the Jur River) to 
the west of Malakal. These services went as far as Waw but were 
seasonal, depending on water levels. They were finally discontinued 
during the 1970s because vegetation blocked waterways, particu- 
larly the fast- growing water hyacinth. On the main Nile, a 287- 
kilometer stretch from Kuraymah to Dunqulah, situated between 
the fourth and third cataracts and known as the Dunqulah Reach, 
also had regular service, although this was restricted during the 
low- water period in February and March. Transport facilities on 
both reaches were operated after 1973 by the parastatal (mixed 
government and privately owned company) River Transport Cor- 
poration (RTC). Before that they had been run by the SRC, es- 
sentially as feeders to the rail line. River cargo and passenger traffic 
have varied from year to year, depending in large part on the avail- 
ability and capacity of transport vessels. During the 1970s, roughly 
100,000 tons of cargo and 250,000 passengers were carried annu- 
ally. By 1984, before the Southern Reach was closed, the number 



179 



Sudan: A Country Study 



of passengers had declined to less than 60,000 per year and the 
tonnage to less than 150,000. Although no statistics were availa- 
ble, the closing of the Southern Reach had by 1990 made river 
traffic insignificant. 

Foreign economists have characterized the RTC's operations as 
inefficient, a result both of shortages of qualified staff and of barge 
capacity. The corporation had a virtual monopoly over river trans- 
port, although the southern regional government had established 
river feeder transport operations, and private river transport ser- 
vices were reported to be increasing until the resumption of the 
civil war. Despite its favored position, the RTC and its predeces- 
sor (SRC) experienced regular losses that had to be covered by 
government appropriations. In the late 1970s, the corporation pro- 
cured new barges, pusher-tugboats, and other equipment in an ef- 
fort to improve services, but this attempt proved useless because 
of the warfare that had continued from 1983. 

Civil Aviation 

In mid- 1991 scheduled domestic air service was provided by 
Sudan Airways, a government-owned enterprise operated by the 
Sudan Airways Company. The company began its operations in 
1947 as a government department. It has operated commercially 
since the late 1960s, holding in effect a monopoly on domestic ser- 
vice. In 1991 Sudan Airways had scheduled flights from Kharto- 
um to twenty other domestic airports, although it did not always 
adhere to its schedules. It also provided international services to 
several European countries, including Britain, Germany, Greece, 
and Italy. Regional flights were made to North Africa and the Mid- 
dle East as well as to Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Ugan- 
da. The Sudan Airways fleet in 1991 consisted of thirteen aircraft, 
including five Boeing 707s used on international flights, two Boe- 
ing 737s and two Boeing 727s employed in domestic and regional 
services, and four Fokker F-27s used for domestic flights. 

Sixteen international airlines provided regular flights to Khar- 
toum. The number of domestic and international passengers in- 
creased from about 478,000 in 1982 to about 485,000 in 1984. Air 
freight increased from 6 million tons per kilometer in 1982 to 7.7 
million tons per kilometer in 1984. As compared with the previ- 
ous year, in 1989 passenger traffic on Sudan Airways fell by 32 
percent to 363,181 people, reducing the load factor to 34.9 per- 
cent. By contrast, freight volume increased by 63.7 percent to 
12,317 tons. At the end of 1979, Sudan Airways had entered into 
a pooling agreement with Britain's Trade wind Airways to furnish 
charter cargo service between that country and Khartoum under 



180 



River steamers and barges were once major means of 
transporting passengers and goods on the Nile. 
Buffalo Cape on the Bahr al Ghazal River in Aali an Nil State, a river 
station where steamers took on wood for fuel; village huts in background 

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 



181 



Sudan: A Country Study 

a subsidiary company, Sudan Air Cargo. A new cargo terminal 
was built at Khartoum. 

Sudan Airways' s operations have generally shown losses, and 
in the early 1980s the corporation was reportedly receiving an an- 
nual government subsidy of about £Sd500,000. In 1987 the govern- 
ment proposed to privatize Sudan Airways, precipitating a heated 
controversy that ultimately led to a joint venture between the 
government and private interests. Like the railroads and river trans- 
port operators, however, Sudan Airways suffered from a shortage 
of skilled personnel, over staffing, and lacked hard currency and 
credit for spare parts and proper maintenance. 

In the early 1980s, the country's civilian airports, with the ex- 
ception of Khartoum International Airport and the airport at Juba, 
sometimes closed during rainy periods because of runway condi- 
tions. After the 1986 drought, which caused major problems at 
regional airports, the government launched a program to improve 
runways, to be funded locally. Aeronautical communications and 
navigational aids were minimal and at some airports relatively 
primitive. Only Khartoum International Airport was equipped with 
modern operational facilities, but by the early 1990s, Khartoum 
and seven other airports had paved runways. In the mid-1970s, 
IDA and the Saudi Development Fund agreed to make funds avail- 
able for construction of new airports at Port Sudan and Waw, recon- 
struction and improvement of the airport at Malakal, and 
substantial upgrading of the Juba airport; these four airports ac- 
counted for almost half of domestic traffic. Because the civil war 
resumed, improvements were made only at Port Sudan. Juba air- 
port runways were rebuilt by a loan from the European Develop- 
ment Fund, but the control tower and navigational equipment 
remained incomplete. 

Marine Ports and Shipping 

In 1990 Sudan had only one operational deep-water harbor, Port 
Sudan, situated on an inlet of the Red Sea. The port had been 
built from scratch, beginning in 1905, to complement the railroad 
line from Khartoum to the Red Sea by serving as the entry and 
exit point for the foreign trade the rail line was to carry. It operat- 
ed as a department of SRC until 1974 when it was transferred to 
the Sea Ports Corporation, a newly established public enterprise 
set up to manage Sudan's marine ports. Facilities at the port even- 
tually included fifteen cargo berths, sheds, warehouses, and storage 
tanks for edible oils, molasses, and petroleum products. Equipment 
included quay, mobile, and other cranes, and some forklift trucks, 
but much of the handling of cargo was manual. There were also 



182 



The Economy 



a number of tugboats, which were used to berth ships in the nar- 
row inlet. 

During the early 1970s, port traffic averaged about 3 million 
tons a year, compared with an overall capacity of about 3.8 mil- 
lion tons. Exports were somewhat more than 1 million tons and 
imports about 2 million tons; about half of the latter was petrole- 
um and petroleum products. By the mid-1970s, stepped up eco- 
nomic development had raised traffic to capacity levels. In 1985, 
however, largely as a result of the civil war, exports were down 
to 663 thousand tons (down 51 percent from the previous year), 
and imports were 2.3 million tons (down 25 percent from the previ- 
ous year). Physical expansion of the harbor and adjacent areas was 
generally precluded by natural features and the proximity of the 
city of Port Sudan. However, surveys showed that use could be 
increased considerably by modernization and improvement of ex- 
isting facilities and the addition of further cargo-handling equip- 
ment. In 1978, with the assistance of a loan from the IDA, work 
began on adding deep-water berths and providing roll-on/roll-off 
container facilities. A loan to purchase equipment was made by 
a West German group. The first phase was completed in 1982, 
and the second phase began in 1983, aided by a US$25 million 
World Bank credit. One of the major improvements has been to 
make the port more readily usable by road vehicles. Developed 
almost entirely as a rail- serviced facility, the port had large areas 
of interlacing railroad tracks that were mostly not flush with sur- 
rounding surfaces, thereby greatly restricting vehicular movement. 
Many of these tracks have been removed and new access roads con- 
structed. Much of the cleared area has become available for addi- 
tional storage facilities. 

In the early 1980s, the Nimeiri government announced a plan 
to construct a new deep-water port at Sawakin, about twenty kilo- 
meters south of Port Sudan. Construction of a new port had long 
been under consideration in response to the projected growth of 
port traffic in the latter part of the twentieth century. A detailed 
study for the proposed port was made by a West German firm in 
the mid-1970s, and plans were drawn up for three general cargo 
berths, including roll-on/roll-off container facilities, and an oil ter- 
minal. Major funding for the port, known as Sawakin, was offered 
in 1985 by West Germany's development agency Kreditanstalt fur 
Wiederaufbau and the DFC . After the Nimeiri government repeat- 
edly postponed work on the port, the German government allo- 
cated the funds instead for purchase of agricultural inputs. Once 
work resumed, however, Sawakin port opened in January 1991, 



183 



Sudan: A Country Study 

and was capable of handling an estimated 1.5 million tons of car- 
go a year. 

A national merchant marine, Sudan Shipping Line, was estab- 
lished in 1962 as a joint venture between the government and Yu- 
goslavia. In 1967 it became wholly government owned. From the 
initial two Yugoslav-built cargo vessels, the line had grown by the 
mid-1970s to seven ships, totaling about 52,340 deadweight tons. 
During 1979 and early 1980, eight more ships were added, including 
six built in Yugoslavia and two in Denmark. In 1990 the merchant 
marine represented a total of ten ships of 122,200 deadweight tons. 
The Yugoslav vessels were all multipurpose and included contain- 
er transport features. The Danish ships were equipped with roll- 
on/roll-off facilities. Sailings, which had been mainly between Red 
Sea ports and northern Europe, were expanded in the late 1980s 
to several Mediterranean ports. 

Pipelines 

By the early 1970s, operational problems on the Port Sudan- 
Khartoum section of Sudan Railways had resulted in inadequate 
supplies of petroleum products reaching Khartoum and other parts 
of the country. In 1975 construction of an oil pipeline from the 
port to Khartoum was begun to relieve traffic pressure on the rail- 
road. It was completed in mid- 1976, but leaks were discovered and 
the 815-kilometer-long pipeline, laid generally parallel to the rail- 
road, did not become operational until September 1977. As con- 
structed, its capacity was 600,000 tons a year, but that throughput 
was only attained in mid- 1981. In early 1982, steps were taken to 
add additional booster pumping stations to increase the rate to an 
annual throughput capacity of 1 million tons. The line carried only 
refined products, including gasoline, gas oil, kerosene, and avia- 
tion fuel obtained either from the refinery at the port or from import- 
holding facilities there. These fuels were moved in a continuous 
operation to storage tanks at Khartoum with some capacity offload- 
ed at Atbarah. Rail tank cars released by the pipeline were reas- 
signed to increase supplies of petroleum products in the western 
and southwestern regions of the country. 

Communications 

Domestic telecommunications in Sudan were sparse, and the sys- 
tem suffered from poor maintenance. In 1991 the country had only 
73,000 telephones, two-thirds of which were in the Khartoum area. 
Telex was available in the capital. A domestic satellite system with 
fourteen ground stations, supplemented by coaxial cable and a 
microwave network, linked telephone exchanges and broadcast 



184 



The Economy 



facilities within the country. Eleven cities had amplitude modula- 
tion (AM) radio stations, and Khartoum, Atbarah, and Wad Mada- 
ni had television stations with broadcasts in Arabic seven hours 
nightly. The country had an estimated 6 million radio receivers 
and 250,000 television sets in 1991. 

International telecommunications were modern and provided 
high-quality links to the rest of the world. A satellite ground sta- 
tion near the capital working with the International Telecommu- 
nications Satellite Organization's (Intelsat) Atlantic Ocean satellite 
permitted direct dialing of telephone calls between Sudan and Eu- 
rope, North America, and parts of Africa. In addition, a second 
satellite ground station was linked to the Arab Satellite Organiza- 
tion's (Arabsat) pan-Arab communications network. The Arab- 
sat network was used for live television broadcasts, news exchanges, 
and educational programming among the members of the League 
of Arab States (Arab League). 

Finance 
Banking 

The traditional banking system was inherited from the Anglo- 
Egyptian condominium (1899-1955). When the National Bank of 
Egypt opened in Khartoum in 1901 , it obtained a privileged posi- 
tion as banker to and for the government, a "semi-official" cen- 
tral bank. Other banks followed, but the National Bank of Egypt 
and Barclays Bank dominated and stabilized banking in Sudan until 
after World War II. Post- World War II prosperity created a de- 
mand for an increasing number of commercial banks. By 1965 loans 
to the private sector in Sudan had reached £Sd55.3 million. 

Before Sudanese independence, there had been no restrictions 
on the movement of funds between Egypt and Sudan, and the value 
of the currency used in Sudan was tied to that of Egypt. This situ- 
ation was unsatisfactory to an independent Sudan, which estab- 
lished the Sudan Currency Board to replace Egyptian and British 
money. It was not a central bank because it did not accept deposits, 
lend money, or provide commercial banks with cash and liquidity. 
In 1959 the Bank of Sudan was established to succeed the Sudan 
Currency Board and to take over the Sudanese assets of the Na- 
tional Bank of Egypt. In February 1960, the Bank of Sudan began 
acting as the central bank of Sudan, issuing currency, assisting the 
development of banks, providing loans, maintaining financial 
equilibrium, and advising the government. 

There were originally five major commercial banks (Bank of 
Khartoum, An Nilein Bank, Sudan Commercial Bank, the People's 



185 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Cooperative Bank, and the Unity Bank) but the number subse- 
quently grew. The public was dissatisfied with the commercial 
banks, however, because they were reluctant to lend capital for long- 
term development projects. Since the Nimeiri government decreed 
the 1970 Nationalization of Banks Act, all domestic banks have 
been controlled by the Bank of Sudan. 

In 1974, to encourage foreign capital investment, foreign banks 
were urged to establish joint ventures in association with Sudanese 
capital. Banking transactions with foreign companies operating in 
Sudan were facilitated so long as they abided by the rulings of the 
Bank of Sudan and transferred a minimum of £Sd3 million into 
Sudan. Known as the "open door" policy, this system was partly 
a result of Nimeiri' s disillusion with the left after the unsuccessful 
communist coup of 1971. Several foreign banks took advantage 
of the opportunity, most notably Citibank, the Faisal Islamic Bank, 
Chase Manhattan Bank, and the Arab Authority for Agricultural 
Investment and Development. 

In addition, the government established numerous specialized 
banks, such as the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (1959) to promote 
agricultural ventures, the Industrial Bank of Sudan (1961) to pro- 
mote private industry, the Sudanese Estates Bank (1966) to pro- 
vide housing loans, and the Sudanese Savings Bank established 
to make small loans particularly in the rural areas. The system 
worked effectively until the late 1970s and 1980s, when the decline 
in foreign trade, balance-of-payments problems, spiraling exter- 
nal debt, the increase in corruption, and the appearance of Islam- 
ic banking disrupted the financial system. 

Islamic Banking 

The Faisal Islamic Bank, whose principal patron was the Saudi 
prince, Muhammad ibn Faisal Al Saud, was officially established 
in Sudan in 1977 by the Faisal Islamic Bank Act. The "open door" 
policy enabled Saudi Arabia, which had a huge surplus after the 
1973 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
increases in the price of petroleum, to invest in Sudan. Members 
of the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the National Is- 
lamic Front, played a prominent role on the board of directors of 
the Faisal Islamic Bank, thus strengthening the bank's position in 
Sudan. Other Islamic banks followed. As a consequence, both the 
Ansar and Khatmiyyah religious groups and their political par- 
ties, the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party, formed their 
own Islamic banks. 

The Faisal Islamic Bank enjoyed privileges denied other com- 
mercial banks (full tax exemption on assets, profits, wages, and 



186 



The Economy 



pensions), as well as guarantees against confiscation or nationali- 
zation. Moreover, these privileges came under Nimeiri's protec- 
tion from 1983 onward as he became committed to applying Islamic 
doctrine to all aspects of Sudanese life. The theory of Islamic bank- 
ing is derived from the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad's ex- 
hortations against exploitation and the unjust acquisition of wealth, 
defined as riba, or, in common usage, interest or usury. Profit and 
trade are encouraged and provide the foundation for Islamic bank- 
ing. The prohibitions against interest are founded on the Islamic 
concept of property that results from an individual's creative labor 
or from exchange of goods or property. Interest on money loaned 
falls within neither of these two concepts and is thus unjustified. 

To resolve this dilemma from a legal and religious point of view, 
Islamic banking employs common terms: musharakah or partner- 
ship for production; mudharabah or silent partnership when one party 
provides the capital, the other the labor; and murabbahah or deferred 
payment on purchases, similar in practice to an overdraft and the 
most preferred Islamic banking arrangement in Sudan. To resolve 
the prohibition on interest, an interest-bearing overdraft would be 
changed to a murabbahah contract. The fundamental difference be- 
tween Islamic and traditional banking systems is that in an Islam- 
ic system deposits are regarded as shares, which does not guarantee 
their nominal value. The appeal of the Islamic banks, as well as 
government support and patronage, enabled these institutions to 
acquire an estimated 20 percent of Sudanese deposits. Politically, 
the popularity and wealth of Islamic banks have provided a finan- 
cial basis for funding and promoting Islamic policies in government. 

Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments 
Foreign Trade 

In 1989 Sudan's export earnings amounted to £Sd3, 023.1 mil- 
lion and its imports £Sd5,373.4 million. Export earnings dropped 
to an estimated £Sd 1,800 million in 1990, with imports remain- 
ing at the 1989 level. Agricultural products have dominated 
Sudanese exports since the condominium period, and in the 1980s 
they accounted for more than 90 percent of export receipts. Cot- 
ton, gum arabic, peanuts, sesame, and sorghum were the main 
commodities. Live animals; hides and skins; and peanut, cotton- 
seed, and sesame products (oil and meal) constituted the more 
important remaining export items (see table 8, Appendix). Sudan 
has long been the world's second largest exporter of long-staple 
cotton, and cotton exports constituted more than 50 percent of total 
exports by value in the 1960s but declined to about 30 percent in 



187 



Sudan: A Country Study 

the 1980s. Gum arabic was in second place until the 1960s when 
production of peanuts expanded to occupy that position. However, 
gum arabic returned to second place in the late 1980s. Sesame be- 
came the third most valuable export in the 1970s. Fluctuations have 
occurred in the earnings of these four principal commodities as the 
result of weather conditions, local price situations, and world market 
prices. 

Foodstuffs and textiles were Sudan's largest imports by value 
at the start of national independence. These commodities held that 
position into the mid-1970s, when they were surpassed by increased 
imports of machinery and transport equipment as the government 
began an intensive drive for economic development. The share of 
foodstuffs and textiles declined by roughly one-half during the de- 
cade, from 40.5 percent in 1971 to less than 20 percent in 1979. 
In 1986 manufactured goods, including textiles, accounted for 20 
percent of imports whereas wheat and foodstuffs represented about 
15 percent. Machinery and transport equipment, which had ac- 
counted for about 22 percent of imports in 1970, averaged 40 per- 
cent between 1975 and 1978, reaching a high of 45 percent in 1976, 
and dropped to 25 percent in 1986, reflecting the slowdown of eco- 
nomic development (see table 9, Appendix). 

Government plans for self-sufficiency through the development 
of import substitution industries achieved limited success in cer- 
tain cases. Notable was the reduction in imports of refined petrole- 
um products that resulted from the 1964 opening of the Port Sudan 
refinery. Substantial savings were made in foreign exchange ex- 
penditure until the rise in world crude petroleum prices after 1973. 
Crude oil and certain refined products accounted for only about 
1 percent of import values in 1973 but had increased to more than 
12 percent in 1986. Progress has been extremely slow in sugar 
production, and government factories were reported in the late 
1970s to be meeting about one-third of the domestic demand. Af- 
ter its opening in 1980, the new Kinanah sugar mill and refinery, 
which alone had a rated capacity sufficient to replace most current 
sugar imports, helped in 1981 to increase overall sugar produc- 
tion to 71 percent of estimated consumption. Domestic textile 
production had also increased gready from the 1960s, and the share 
of textiles in total imports had declined from about 20 percent at 
the end of the 1960s to less than 4 percent in 1980. 

In the early condominium era, Egypt had been Sudan's main 
customer. The development of the Gezira Scheme, however, result- 
ed in large-scale exports of cotton to Britain, which by the end of 
the 1920s was purchasing about 80 percent of Sudanese exports. 
Although development of the textile industry in other European 



188 



The Economy 



countries gradually cut into Britain's share of cotton exports, at 
the start of World War II that country still was the destination of 
almost half of Sudan's total export trade and at the time of Sudanese 
independence continued to be the largest customer. During the 
1960s, India, West Germany, and Italy emerged as major buyers; 
late in the decade Japan also became a major customer. In the late 
1980s, Britain remained an important export destination. Other 
major customers were France, China, and Saudi Arabia. In 1989 
Saudi Arabia was Sudan's main export market, buying an esti- 
mated 16.8 percent of Khartoum's exports, particularly sorghum 
and livestock. The United States, although not one of Sudan's 
largest purchasers, became a major customer in the latter 1980s, 
buying mainly cotton, gum arabic, and peanuts (see table 10, Ap- 
pendix). 

After the May 1969 coup, Khartoum took steps to expand trade 
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Exports to the Soviet 
Union rose dramatically in 1970 and 1971 as that country became 
Sudan's leading customer. After the abortive communist-led coup 
of 1971, however, relations deteriorated, and Soviet purchases 
dropped to almost nil. After 1985 overtures to improve economic 
relations with the Soviet Union met with little response. Econom- 
ic ties with China improved in the mid- and late 1980s, with ex- 
ports to Beijing reaching an estimated 7.3 percent of Khartoum's 
total exports in 1989, making it Sudan's fifth largest customer. 

Sudan's imports were provided by a wide range of countries, 
led by Saudi Arabia in the late 1980s. In 1989, Saudi Arabia sup- 
plied nearly 14.1 percent of Sudan's total imports, with petrole- 
um the chief import item. Britain was Sudan's main import source 
until 1980; in the late 1980s it became Khartoum's second largest 
provider, supplying an estimated 8.3 percent of the country's im- 
ports in 1989. Britain had well-established commercial and bank- 
ing operations in Khartoum and a leading position in exporting 
manufactured goods, vehicles, tobacco, beverages, chemicals, and 
machinery to Sudan. Among the ten or twelve other top suppli- 
ers, the United States, West Germany (Germany after 1990), 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, China, and India were most sig- 
nificant. Most were also major export customers. 

Through 1978 Iraq had been a prime source of Sudan's imports 
because it was the principal supplier of crude petroleum, a func- 
tion that was taken over by Saudi Arabia in 1979 after Iraq cut 
off oil supplies because Sudan had backed Egypt in the latter' s peace 
initiative with Israel. In the last years of the Nimeiri government, 
bilateral trade with Egypt was cut sharply but in April 1988, Sudan 
and Egypt signed a trade agreement valued at US$225 million. 



189 



Sudan: A Country Study 

In June 1991, Sudan ratified a US$300 million trade agreement 
with Egypt. Improved relations with Libya enabled Tripoli to be- 
come Sudan's third biggest importer in 1989. In January 1989, 
Sudan and Tripoli signed a US$150 million agreement for Sudan 
to buy Libyan crude oil. The two countries signed a trade pact 
in December 1989, with Sudan agreeing to purchase Libyan fuel, 
chemicals, fertilizer, cement, and caustic soda. 

Balance of Payments 

A reasonably accurate presentation of Sudan's balance of 
payments — the summary in money terms of transactions with the 
rest of the world — was hampered by what foreign economists con- 
sidered understatements in official statistics of imports and public 
sector loans. The lack of reliable statistical information was a 
problem, but the effects on the economy of mismanagement, fam- 
ine, and war were obvious. In the current account (covering trade, 
services, and transfer transactions), the trade balance throughout 
the two decades from 1960 to 1980 usually showed a deficit; only 
in 1973 was a relatively substantial surplus registered. After 1973 
the trade balance was unfavorably affected by higher petroleum 
import costs and the greater costs of other imports that resulted 
from the worldwide inflation engendered by oil price increases. The 
impact on the balance of payments was especially serious because 
of its coincidence with the implementation after 1973 of an inten- 
sive development program that required greatiy increased imports. 
The current account situation was not improved by the services 
sector (insurance, travel, and others), which regularly experienced 
a net loss, as did investment income. Transfers usually had a posi- 
tive balance, but one insufficient to offset the usual deficit in trade 
and services. Net inflows and disbursement of foreign loans and 
other capital failed to cover the shortage in the current account, 
and the overall balance of payments was regularly in deficit (see 
table 11, Appendix). 

The government from its earliest days had been forced to resort 
to external financing to cover balance of payments shortfalls. Deficits 
and debt service obligations were relatively insignificant until the 
mid-1970s. Particularly from 1974 to 1977, large-scale borrowing 
and new commitments were estimated at more than the equiva- 
lent of US$2.4 billion. At the end of 1979, outstanding public and 
publicly guaranteed debts (disbursed) totaled more than US$2.5 
billion, of which almost US$1 .8 billion was owed to governments, 
US$535 million to commercial lenders, and US$235 million to sup- 
pliers. In 1981 Sudan's debt burden was estimated at US$4 bil- 
lion. Little control over borrowing was exercised within the 



190 



The Economy 

government. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning offi- 
cially had responsibility for contracting foreign loans, but such loans 
frequently had been authorized directly by Nimeiri. Many were 
relatively short-term and at interest rates too high for Sudan, con- 
sidering its economic situation. Until the coup d'etat of Colonel 
Umar al Bashir on June 30, 1989, there was little fiscal control 
over currency and imports, and imports tended to include a large 
number of luxury goods. After 1989 there was no improvement 
in Sudan's foreign debt situation, despite a reduction in govern- 
ment subsidies for bread, a 50-percent reduction of wheat imports, 
and the end of sugar importation, which was expected to save an 
estimated US$400 million annually. Despite these measures, total 
foreign debt rose in 1990 to US$13 billion, with debt liabilities, 
including principal and interest, estimated at US$980 million in 
1988-89. 

In 1978 Sudan failed to meet its obligations fully — debt service 
payments owed that year amounted to 17.9 percent of export earn- 
ings. It was apparent that it would also not meet its obligations 
in 1979, and so it sought relief from creditors. In late 1979, acting 
through the so-called Paris Club, a group of industrialized credi- 
tor countries including the United States, Japan, and nine West 
European states, Sudan rescheduled an estimated US$400 million 
to US$500 million of the debts guaranteed by Western export credit 
agencies. The agreed payments were to be made over a seven-year 
period commencing after a three-year grace period. Rescheduling 
of another US$600 million in loans and interest with more than 
100 commercial banks — represented by the 5 main creditor 
banks — required a further two years; the agreement was signed 
at the end of 1981 . Despite repeated reschedulings of Sudan's debt 
burden, both arrears and debt service payments continued to in- 
crease. 

Since 1978 the government has undertaken various measures 
to improve the balance of payments situation. A 1979 devaluation 
of the overpriced Sudanese pound was carried out, reducing its 
value from the equivalent of US$2.87 to US$0.22. As of March 
31 , 1991 , the official exchange rate was US$1 = £Sd4.50. Since then 
Sudan's economy has steadily weakened, as have its relations with 
the IMF and the Paris Club. In 1989 Sudan had repaid the IMF 
only a token US$15 million and continued to resist IMF demands 
for further economic austerity measures. Despite declarations by 
the Sudanese government that it was determined to cooperate with 
international lending organizations, in mid- 1991 Sudan had made 
itself ineligible for debt relief because it was unable to service its 
debt. 



191 



Sudan: A Country Study 



* * * 

Despite the problem of obtaining reliable and current informa- 
tion, a number of significant books and monographs have been 
published recently on various aspects of Sudan's economy. Among 
these is El Wathiq Kameir and Abrahim Kursany's Corruption as 
the 'Fifth 3 Factor of Production in the Sudan, which should be read in 
conjunction with the two books by Mansour Khalid, Nimeiri and 
the Revolution ofDis-May and The Government They Deserve. These books 
not only unravel corruption but also provide insightful analyses 
of Sudanese governments. Tim Niblock's Class and Power in Sudan 
covers the whole of the condominium and ends with the Nimeiri 
regime. Of more contemporary interest is the sound analysis of 
Sudan's economy in Medani M. Ahmed's The Political Economy of 
Development in the Sudan. A more recent work is a collection of es- 
says, Sudan since Independence; several of these essays edited by Mud- 
dathir Abd al Rahim, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo, and Peter 
Woodward pertain to the economy. 

A very useful collection of essays is that edited by Ali Mohamed 
el Hassan, "Essays on the Economy and Society of the Sudan." 
More recent is a collection of essays on Sudan's economy edited 
by Paul van de Wei and Abdel Ghaffar Mohamed Ahmed, Per- 
spectives on Development in the Sudan. Ali Abdel Gadir Ali's, Some Aspects 
of Production in Sudanese Traditional Agriculture has insightful comments 
on Sudan's economy. Siddiq Umbadda's Import Policy in the Sudan, 
1966-1976 and Mekki El Shibly's Monetisation, Financial Intermedi- 
ation, and Self-Financed Growth in the Sudan, analyze the economy dur- 
ing the Nimeiri years. An assessment of Sudan's agricultural 
development is provided in Tony Barnett's and Abbas Abdelkarim's 
book, Sudan: The Gezira Scheme and Agricultural Transition. An im- 
portant journal specifically devoted to the Sudan's economy, par- 
ticularly during the Nimeiri regime, is Sudan Journal of Economic and 
Social Studies. 

Statistical information can be found in the Annual Reports of 
the Bank of Sudan (especially the 1989 edition), but their statisti- 
cal information becomes increasingly unreliable after the fall of the 
Nimeiri regime, reflecting the political instability. Moreover, af- 
ter the coup of June 30, 1989, the regime became increasingly secre- 
tive. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Country Report: Sudan, 
published quarterly, provides valuable data about Sudan's econo- 
my, as does the chapter on Sudan in the annual Europa volume 
Africa South of the Sahara. 



192 



The Economy 



Finally, Islamic banking as a relatively new phenomenon in 
Sudan cannot be ignored because of its impact on the economy 
and the powerful political influence these financial structures are 
enjoying in contemporary Sudan. Joseph Schacht's An Introduction 
to Islamic Law; Islamic Banking and Finance, edited by Chibli Mal- 
lat; and the influential work by A. Mirakhour and Z. Iqbal, Is- 
lamic Banking, are useful works on the subject. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



193 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




People's Palace in Khartoum, executive headquarters of the national government 



IN MID- 1991 SUDAN was ruled by a military government that 
exercised its authority through the Revolutionary Command Coun- 
cil for National Salvation (RCC-NS). The chairman of the fifteen- 
member RCC-NS and head of state was Lieutenant General Umar 
Hassan Ahmad al Bashir, who also served as prime minister, 
minister of defense, and commander in chief of the armed forces. 
The RCC-NS had come to power at the end of June 1989 as a 
result of a coup d'etat that overthrew the democratically elected 
civilian government of Sadiq al Mahdi. Although the RCC-NS 
initially stressed that its rule was a transitional stage necessary to 
prepare the country for genuine democracy, it banned all political 
party activity, arrested numerous dissidents, and shut down most 
newspapers. Subsequently, members of the RCC-NS claimed that 
Western- style democracy was too divisive for Sudan. In place of 
parliament, the RCC-NS appointed committees to advise the 
government in specialized areas, such as one concerning the legal 
system to bring legislation into conformity with the sharia, or Islamic 
law. 

The factors that provoked the military coup, primarily the closely 
intertwined issues of Islamic law and of the civil war in the south, 
remained unresolved in 1991 . The September 1983 implementation 
of the sharia throughout the country had been controversial and 
provoked widespread resistance in the predominantly non-Muslim 
south. The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and 
its military arm, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), 
were formed in mid- 1983. They became increasingly active in the 
wake of President Jaafar an Nimeiri's abolition of the largely au- 
tonomous Southern Regional Assembly and redivision of the south, 
and as his program of Islamization became more threatening. Op- 
position to the sharia, especially to the application of hudud (sing. , 
hadd), or Islamic penalties, such as the public amputation of hands 
for theft, was not confined to the south and had been a principal 
factor leading to the popular uprising of April 1985 that overthrew 
the government of Jaafar an Nimeiri. Although implementation 
of the sharia remained suspended for the next four years, north- 
ern politicians were reluctant to abolish Islamic law outright, 
whereas southern leaders hesitated to abandon armed struggle unless 
the legal system were secularized. The continuing conflict in the 
south prevented progress on economic development projects and 
eventually compelled the Sadiq al Mahdi government in the spring 



197 



Sudan: A Country Study 

of 1989 to consider concessions on the applicability of sharia law 
as demanded by the SPLM. 

On the eve of an historic government- SPLM conference to dis- 
cuss the future status of Islamic law in Sudan, a group of military 
officers carried out a coup in the name of the newly constituted 
RCC-NS. Their intervention in the political process halted fur- 
ther steps toward a possible cancellation of the suspended but still 
valid sharia. Although the RCC-NS initially announced that the 
sharia would remain frozen, the government encouraged courts, 
at least in the north, to base decisions on Islamic law. SPLM lead- 
ers charged that the government was unduly influenced by Islamic 
political groups and announced that the SPLA would not lay down 
its arms and discuss political grievances until the government 
abrogated the sharia. Because neither the RCC-NS nor its southern 
opponents were prepared to compromise on the sharia, the mili- 
tary conflict continued in the south, where the government's 
authority was limited to the larger towns and the SPLA or other 
militias controlled most of the secondary towns and rural areas. 

Although the RCC-NS banned all political parties following the 
1989 coup, members of this ruling body have not concealed their 
personal and ideological ties to the National Islamic Front (NIF), 
the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. RCC-NS policy de- 
cisions on many social, as well as political and economic issues, 
reflected strong NIF influence. For example, the RCC-NS purged 
hundreds of army personnel, senior civil servants, and teachers per- 
ceived as being insufficiently Islamic, decreed that men and women 
must sit in separate sections on public buses, and forbade any 
Sudanese female to leave the country without the written consent 
of her father or legal male guardian. Finally, on New Year's Eve 
1990, the government announced that the sharia would be applied 
in the north. 

The RCC-NS policies aroused antagonism in the north as well 
as the south, and consequently political instability has continued 
to dominate Sudan. During 1990, for example, the Bashir govern- 
ment announced that at least two alleged coup attempts within the 
military had been foiled. In addition, there were several instances 
of antigovernment demonstrations being violentiy suppressed. Op- 
position politicians, international organizations, and foreign govern- 
ments all accused the government of systematic human rights abuses 
in its efforts to quell dissent. Opposition to the Bashir government 
induced exiled leaders of banned political parties in the north and 
SPLA leaders in the south to meet on a number of occasions to 
work out a joint strategy for confronting the regime. Consequently, 



198 



Government and Politics 



in mid- 1991 the regime's stability seemed fragile and its political 
future uncertain. 

Further clouding the regime's prospects for stability was the threat 
of famine in many parts of the vast country as a result of the 
drought, which had been sporadic throughout the 1980s and par- 
ticularly severe since 1990, and of the continuing civil war. The 
Bashir government was preoccupied with the political ramifications 
of food shortages because it was acutely aware that riots by hun- 
gry Sudanese were one of the factors that had brought down the 
Nimeiri regime in 1985. Nevertheless, the government was deter- 
mined that any food aid the country received not reach SPLA- 
controlled areas. The efforts to mix politics and humanitarian 
assistance angered foreign aid donors and international agencies, 
resulting in food shipment suspensions that have aggravated the 
food shortages. 

Institutions of Government 

Since obtaining independence from Britain on January 1, 1956, 
Sudan has had a political history marked by instability. The mili- 
tary first intervened in politics in November 1958 by overthrow- 
ing the parliamentary government of Prime Minister Abd Allah 
Khalil (see The Abbud Military Government, 1958-64, ch. 1). The 
ensuing regime of Major General Ibrahim Abbud lasted for six 
years before dissolving itself in the face of widespread popular op- 
position in 1964. The country then again experimented with civilian 
democratic government, which was terminated by a military coup 
in 1969. Colonel J aafar an Nimeiri, leader of the junior officers 
who staged that coup, survived in power for sixteen years until over- 
thrown by a military coup in 1985. The new government under 
Lieutenant General Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab legalized 
political parties, scheduled elections, and handed over power to 
civilians in 1986. Sudan's third experiment in democratic rule was 
ended by yet another military coup on June 30, 1989. 

The leaders of the 1989 military coup abolished all the existing 
executive and legislative institutions of government, suspended the 
constitution, arrested many prominent civilian politicians, banned 
all political parties and partisan political activity, and restricted free- 
dom of the press. They established the Revolutionary Command 
Council for National Salvation, which was designated the legisla- 
tive authority of the country. The chairman of the RCC-NS was 
designated as head of state. The RCC-NS also appointed a cabi- 
net that served in many respects as the executive authority. Al- 
though the RCC-NS described its rule as transitional, pending the 
reestablishment of security and order throughout the country, 



199 



Sudan: A Country Study 

as of mid- 1991 the RCC-NS had not legalized political parties nor 
introduced permanent governmental institutions. 

Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation 

In mid- 1991 the RCC-NS remained the top decision-making 
body of the state. It consisted of fifteen members, all of whom were 
military officers. They were the original officers who had joined 
Bashir to carry out the 1989 coup. The most important members 
included Bashir, the chairman; Major General Az Zubair Muham- 
mad Salih, the vice chairman and deputy prime minister; Major 
General At Tijani Adam at Tahir; Colonel Salah ad Din Muham- 
mad Ahmad Karrar, a naval officer and chairman of the RCC- 
NS's economic committee; Colonel Muhammad al Amin Khalifa 
Yunis, chairman of the RCC-NS's peace and foreign relations com- 
mittee; Colonel Bakri Hassan Salih; and Major Ibrahim Shams 
ad Din, commander of the NIF's youth movement. Two mem- 
bers, Brigadier General Uthman Ahmad Uthman, chairman of the 
RCC-NS's political committee, and Colonel Faisal Madani, were 
reportedly placed under house arrest in 1991 after they had tried 
to resign from the RCC-NS. 

The RCC-NS had designated itself the legislative arm of govern- 
ment, but in practice it exercised some executive functions as well. 
Its chairman also served as prime minister and president of the repub- 
lic. Although the RCC-NS had not publicized the rules and proce- 
dures governing its deliberations, most political affairs analysts 
believed government decisions were based on a majority vote of 
members rather than the ultimate authority of the chairman. The 
RCC-NS also had not drawn up any regulations pertaining to mem- 
bership tenure or the selection of new members. The primary respon- 
sibility of the RCC-NS appeared to be preparing legislative decrees. 
Legislation was drafted in special committees, including committees 
for political issues, the economy, and foreign affairs, then placed 
before the RCC-NS for approval. In 1990 the RCC-NS created 
appointive civilian consultative councils to advise its committees. As 
of early 1991, five members of the RCC-NS also headed ministries. 

The RCC-NS appointed a secretary general who was responsi- 
ble for running the day-to-day affairs of the RCC-NS. The post 
of secretary general in the early 1990s went to a junior officer 
seconded to the RCC-NS. Colonel Abd al Mahmud was the first 
RCC-NS secretary general. He was replaced in June 1990 by 
Colonel Abd ar Rahim Muhammad Husayn. 

The Presidency 

The president served as head of state. As of early 1991, however, 
the RCC-NS had not defined the powers and duties of the office 



200 



Government and Politics 



nor specified the term of office. The presidency was neither an elec- 
tive nor an appointive position. In accordance with an RCC-NS 
decree, the chairman of the RCC-NS was designated the presi- 
dent of the republic. Since the 1989 coup, RCC-NS chairman 
Bashir, who was born in 1944, has been the president. At the time 
of the coup, Bashir had achieved only the rank of colonel. He was 
the commander of a paratroop brigade stationed at Al Mijlad in 
southern Sudan and had returned to Khartoum with 1 75 paratroop- 
ers only a few days prior to the coup. Bashir' s earlier experience 
included military training in Egypt and Malaysia, and service on 
the frontline with the Egyptian armed forces during the October 
1973 Arab-Israeli War. In the late 1970s, he was a military ad- 
viser in the United Arab Emirates. Soon after the coup, Bashir 
promoted himself to lieutenant general. 

Council of Ministers 

The RCC-NS appointed the Council of Ministers, or cabinet, 
which included civilian politicians and military officers. Cabinet 
composition varied, but in 1991 it included the prime minister; 
the deputy prime minister; some ministers of state and finance; 
and heads of about twenty other ministries. The main ministries 
included agriculture and natural resources, construction and pub- 
lic works, culture and information, defense, education, energy and 
mining, finance and economic planning, foreign affairs, health, 
higher education and scientific research, industry, interior, irri- 
gation, justice, labor and social insurance, trade and cooperation, 
transport and communications, and welfare and social development. 

Although the Council of Ministers was the designated executive 
arm of the government and a majority of ministers were civilians, 
in practice the council had no power independent of the RCC-NS. 
The prime minister, RCC-NS chairman Bashir, had authority to 
appoint and dismiss ministers, and he reshuffled the cabinet several 
times between 1989 and 1991. The important portfolios of defense 
and interior were held by RCC-NS members, and at least three 
other ministries were headed by RCC-NS officers. The civilian 
ministers could not undertake independent initiatives and had to 
obtain advance approval from the RCC-NS for any major policy 
decisions. 

Parliamentary Government 

The RCC-NS dissolved the elected legislature when it seized 
power in 1989. As of mid- 1991, no plans had been announced for 
new elections or for the creation of a new representative body. 



201 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Nevertheless, Sudan's postindependence political history, charac- 
terized by alternating periods of parliamentary democracy and mili- 
tary rule, suggested that there was support for a popularly elected 
assembly. The country's first parliament, the Legislative Assem- 
bly, was established during the final years of British colonial rule, 
and the country's first multiparty elections were held in 1948. Sub- 
sequently, the Constituent Assembly drew up a transitional con- 
stitution that provided for a two-chamber legislature: an indirectly 
elected upper house, called the Senate, and a House of Represen- 
tatives elected by direct popular vote. The British model of govern- 
ment was followed, that is, a parliamentary system in which the 
political party winning the most seats in the lower house formed 
the government. Multiparty elections for the House of Represen- 
tatives were held in 1953 and 1958. The second parliament had 
been in session only a few months before being forcibly dissolved 
by a military coup. Parliamentary government was restored briefly 
between 1964 and 1969, during which time there were two multi- 
party elections for the House of Representatives. 

Following the precedent set by the 1958 military coup, Nimeiri 
dissolved parliament and banned political parties when he seized 
power in May 1969. Five years later, in 1974, he permitted con- 
trolled elections for a new People's Assembly. In this and subse- 
quent balloting, candidates had to be approved by the government, 
and persons with known or suspected ties to the banned political 
parties were barred from participation. The People's Assembly 
never functioned as an institution independent of the executive and 
was dissolved after Nimeiri 's overthrow in April 1985. The first 
genuinely democratic parliamentary elections since 1968 were held 
in April 1986, but no political party won a majority of seats. Dur- 
ing the next three years, six successive coalition governments were 
formed. The assembly was dissolved and political parties again 
banned following the June 30, 1989, military coup. 

Constitutional Development 

One of the first acts of the RCC-NS after seizing power was 
to abolish by decree the transitional constitution of 1985, drafted 
following the overthrow of the Nimeiri government to replace the 
1973 Permanent Constitution. Bashir and other RCC-NS mem- 
bers initially promised that a constituent assembly would be con- 
vened to draw up a new constitution. During its first eighteen 
months, however, the RCC-NS government failed to address the 
issue of a constitution. Then in early 1991, in response to increas- 
ing criticism of its authoritarian and arbitrary rule, the RCC-NS 
announced the convening of a constitutional conference. Bashir 



202 



Government and Politics 



invited civilian politicians, including those opposed to the govern- 
ment, to attend the conference and discuss without fear of reprisal 
legal procedures that might be set forth in a constitutional docu- 
ment. Although representatives of some banned political parties 
attended the constitutional conference in April, the conclave's lack 
of an electoral mandate, its government sponsorship, and a boy- 
cott by major opposition groups served to undermine the legitimacy 
of its deliberations. 

The 1991 constitutional conference necessarily labored under a 
heavy historical legacy: drawing up a constitution acceptable to 
all elements of the country's diverse population has been an in- 
tractable political problem since Sudan became independent in 1956 
with a temporary constitution known as the Transitional Consti- 
tution. The primary reason for this situation has been the inability 
of the country's major religious groups, the majority Muslims and 
the minority non-Muslims, to agree on the role of the sharia, or 
Islamic law. Islamic political groups, led by the Muslim Brother- 
hood, have insisted that any constitution must be based on the 
sharia. The non-Muslims have been equally insistent that the coun- 
try must have a secular constitution. Despite the convening over 
the years of numerous committees, conferences, and constituent 
assemblies to discuss or draft a constitution, most Muslim and non- 
Muslim political leaders refused to compromise their views about 
the role of the sharia. The unresolved constitutional issue remained 
one of the major sources of disaffection in the predominantly non- 
Muslim south, where deep-seated fears of Islamization have been 
reinforced by the government's Islamic education policies during 
the Ibrahim Abbud military dictatorship (1958-64), Nimeiri's Sep- 
tember 1983 introduction of the Islamic sharia by decree, and the 
failure since 1985 to remove the sharia as the basis of the legal 
system. 

Regional and Local Administration 

Relations between the central government and local authorities 
have been a persistent problem in Sudan. Much of the present pat- 
tern of center-periphery political relationships — local officials ap- 
pointed by authorities in Khartoum — originated in the early part 
of the century. During most of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium 
period (1899-1955), the British relied upon a system called indig- 
enous administration to control local governments in nonurban 
areas. Under this system, traditional tribal and village leaders — 
nuzzar (sing., nazir), umada (sing., umda), and shaykhs — were en- 
trusted with responsibility for administrative and judicial functions 
within their own areas and received financial and, when necessary, 



203 



Sudan: A Country Study 

military support from the central authorities. Following World War 
II, pressures arising from younger and better educated Sudanese 
led the British in 1951 to abandon administration by local rulers 
in favor of a system of local government councils. As they evolved 
under successive national administrations following independence 
in 1956, a total of eighty-four such councils were created and en- 
trusted with varying degrees of community autonomy. This sys- 
tem, however, was plagued by problems of divided power, the 
councils being responsible to the minister of local government 
whereas provincial governors and district commissioners remained 
under the supervision of the minister of interior. Effectiveness varied 
from one local authority to another, but all suffered from inade- 
quate finances and a shortage of trained personnel willing to serve 
in small, isolated communities. In the south, such problems were 
compounded when hundreds of colonial officials were replaced by 
Sudanese civil servants, almost all of whom were northerners. In 
many rural areas of Sudan, the system in the early years of in- 
dependence was little different from the old indigenous adminis- 
tration dominated by the conservative, traditional elite, whereas 
in most cities the effectiveness of councils was seriously weakened 
by party politics. 

The Abbud regime sought to end the dual features of this sys- 
tem through the 1961 Local Government Act, which introduced 
a provincial commissioner appointed by the central government 
as chairman of the provincial authority, an executive body of offi- 
cials representing Khartoum. The 1961 law was not intended to 
be a democratic reform; instead, it allowed the central government 
to control local administration despite the existence of provincial 
councils chosen by local governmental and provincial authorities. 

Soon after coming to power in the military coup of 1969, the 
Nimeiri government abolished local and regional government struc- 
tures. The People's Local Government Act of November 1971 
designed a pyramidal structure with local community councils at 
the base and progressively higher levels of authority up to the ex- 
ecutive councils of the ten provinces. By 1980 community coun- 
cils included an estimated 4,000 village councils, more than 800 
neighborhood councils in cities and towns, 281 nomadic encamp- 
ment councils, and scores of market and industrial area councils. 
In theory, membership on these local councils was based on popu- 
lar election, but in practice the councils were dominated by local 
representatives of the Sudan Socialist Union, the only political party 
that Nimeiri permitted to function. Above the community coun- 
cils was a second tier of local government structures that included 
228 rural councils and 90 urban councils. A third tier consisted 



204 

















People's Palace, Khartoum, executive center of government, seen from the Nile 
Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington 
Throne room and council house of an Azande chief, southern Sudan 

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 

205 



Sudan: A Country Study 

of thirty-five subprovincial district councils, and at the apex were 
the province commissions, presided over by the province gover- 
nor appointed from Khartoum. 

Although there were some changes following Nimeiri's overthrow 
in 1985, the local government structures remained relatively in- 
tact. Parliament devolved more authority to community councils 
and reorganized the functions and powers of the province com- 
missions. In February 1991 , the RCC-NS instituted a major change 
in local government by introducing a federal structure. The feder- 
alism decree divided the country into nine states: Aali an Nil, Al 
Awsat, Al Istiwai, Al Khartum, Ash Shamali, Ash Sharqi, Bahr 
al Ghazal, Darfur, and Kurdufan. Generally, both the borders and 
names of the states are similar to the historical nine provinces of 
Sudan during the colonial period and early years of independence. 
The states were further subdivided into 66 provinces and 218 local 
government areas or districts. The RCC-NS appointed a gover- 
nor, deputy governor, and council of ministers for each state. These 
officials were responsible for administration and economic plan- 
ning in the states. They also appointed the province and district 
authorities in the states. The latter officials, for the most part the 
same persons who occupied local government posts before the fed- 
eral structure was introduced, continued to be responsible for 
elementary and secondary education, health, and various govern- 
ment programs and services in the cities, towns, and villages (see 
fig. 7). 

The Legal System 

The administration of justice traditionally was regarded by 
arabized Sudanese and a number of southern ethnic groups as the 
most important function of government. In precolonial times super- 
vision of justice was solely in the hands of the ruler. In the north, 
most cases were actually tried by an Islamic judge (qadi) who was 
trained in one of the Sunni (see Glossary) Islamic legal schools. 
Crimes against the government, however, were heard by the ruler 
and decided by him with the advice of the grand mufti, an expert 
in the sharia, who served as his legal adviser. 

Although the Muslim influence on Sudanese law remained im- 
portant, the long years of British colonial rule left the country with 
a legal system derived from a variety of sources. Personal law per- 
taining to such matters as marriage, divorce, inheritance, adop- 
tion, and family disputes was adjudicated in the sharia courts in 
the predominandy Muslim areas. Customary law, modified in vary- 
ing degrees by the impact of the sharia and the concepts introduced 
by the British, governed matters of personal law in other areas of 



206 



Government and Politics 



the country. Laymen, generally a chief or group of elders, pre- 
sided over local courts. In addition to personal law, these courts, 
which numbered more than 1 ,000, heard cases involving land titles, 
grazing rights, and other disputes between clans and tribes. 

The primary legal influence remained British because of the 
weight given to British legal precedents and because most of the 
lawyers and judges were British trained. After independence in 
1956, much discussion took place on the need to reform or abrogate 
the system inherited from the British. A commission was prepar- 
ing a revision of the legal system when Nimeiri and the Free 
Officers' Movement carried out the 1969 military coup against the 
elected civilian government (see The Nimeiri Era, 1969-85, ch. 1). 
The Nimeiri regime, which looked to Gamal Abdul Nasser's 
government in Egypt as a model, dissolved this commission and 
formed a new one dominated by twelve Egyptian jurists. In 1970 
this commission unveiled a new civil code of 917 sections, copied 
in large part from the Egyptian civil code of 1949, with slight modifi- 
cations based on the civil codes of other Arab countries. The next 
year draft commercial and penal codes were published. 

This major change in Sudan's legal system was controversial be- 
cause it disregarded existing laws and customs, introduced many 
new legal terms and concepts from Egyptian law without source 
material necessary to interpret the codes, and presented serious 
problems for legal education and training. The legal profession ob- 
jected that the Sudanese penal code, which was well established 
and buttressed by a strong body of case law, was being replaced 
by the Egyptian code, which was largely transplanted from a French 
legal system entirely alien to Sudan. Following a 1971 abortive coup 
attempt against the Nimeiri government and increasing political 
disillusionment with Egypt, the minister of justice formed a com- 
mittee of Sudanese lawyers to reexamine the Egyptian-based codes. 
In 1973 the government repealed these codes, returning the coun- 
try's legal system to its pre- 1970 common-law basis. 

Following the suppression of a coup attempt in late 1976, Nimeiri 
embarked on a political course of "national reconciliation" with 
the religious parties (see National Reconciliation, ch. 1). He agreed 
to a principal Muslim Brotherhood demand that the country's laws 
be based on Islam and in 1977 formed a special committee charged 
with revising Sudan's laws to bring them into conformity with the 
sharia. He appointed Hassan Abd Allah at Turabi, secretary general 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, as chairman of the committee. Non- 
Muslims viewed the committee with suspicion, and two southern 
politicians who had agreed to serve on the commission rarely par- 
ticipated in its work. Turabi' s committee drafted a total of seven 



207 



Sudan: A Country Study 










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208 



Government and Politics 



bills, which it sent to the People's Assembly for enactment. One 
of the proposed laws, the Liquor Prohibition Bill, prohibited the 
sale, manufacture, advertising, and public consumption of alco- 
hol among Muslims. Another was the Zakat Fund Legislative Bill, 
which made mandatory the collection of a tax from Muslims for 
a social welfare fund administered separately from government ac- 
counts. The Sources of Judicial Decisions Bill called for repealing 
the section of the existing civil procedure code that permitted judges 
to apply the concept of "equality and good conscience" in the ab- 
sence of a provision of law and provided that this be replaced by 
the Quran or the standards of conduct based on the words and prac- 
tice of the Prophet Muhammad. The Turabi committee also called 
for the imposition of hudud and for bans on the payment of interest 
on loans. 

During the next six years, only one of the Turabi committee's 
proposals, the law on zakat, was actually enacted. Following Turabi 's 
appointment as attorney general in November 1981, however, 
Islamizing the legal system proceeded in earnest. This process cul- 
minated in the summer of 1983 with the establishment of a three- 
member committee that revised Turabi 's earlier proposals. In 
September 1983, Nimeiri issued several decrees, known as the Sep- 
tember Laws, that made the sharia the law of the land. In Novem- 
ber the People's Assembly approved without debate legislation to 
facilitate the implementation of the sharia. These bills included the 
Sources of Judicial Decisions Bill, mentioned above, and a new 
penal code based on hudud. 

The imposition of Islamic law was bitterly resented by secula- 
rized Muslims and the predominantly non-Muslim southerners. 
The enforcement of hudud punishments aroused widespread oppo- 
sition to the Nimeiri government. Several judges who refused to 
apply the sharia were summarily dismissed. Their replacements, 
men with little or no legal training but possessing excessive zeal 
for the strict application of hudud, contributed to a virtual reign 
of terror in the court system that alienated many devout Muslims, 
including Sadiq al Mahdi, great-grandson of the religious ruler who 
defeated the British in 1885 (see The Khalifa, ch. 1). By early 1985, 
even Turabi believed it was time to disassociate the Muslim Brother- 
hood from Nimeiri' s vision of Islamic law. He resigned as attor- 
ney general and was promptly arrested. 

Following Nimeiri' s overthrow in April 1985, imposition of the 
harshest punishments was stopped. Nevertheless, none of the suc- 
cessor governments abolished Islamic law. Both the transitional 
military government of General Siwar adh Dhahab and the 
democratic government of Sadiq al Mahdi expressed support for 



209 



Sudan: A Country Study 

the sharia but criticized its method of implementation by Nimeiri. 
The complete abolition of the 1983 September Laws, however, re- 
mained a primary goal of the SPLM, which refused to end hostili- 
ties in the south until its demand was met. By early 1989, a reluctant 
Sadiq al Mahdi indicated his willingness to consider abrogation 
of the controversial laws. This process prompted his coalition part- 
ner, the NIF, organized by Turabi after Nimeiri' s overthrow, to 
resign from the government in protest. Subsequently, Sadiq al 
Mahdi announced that the cabinet would consider on July 1, 1989, 
draft legislation repealing the September Laws and would meet with 
SPLM leaders to resolve peacefully the country's civil war. 

The military coup of June 1989 occurred only twenty-four hours 
before the Sadiq al Mahdi government was scheduled to vote on 
rescinding the September Laws. Although the Bashir government 
initially retained the official freeze on implementation of those laws, 
it unofficially advised judges to apply the sharia in preference to 
secular codes. Turabi, who in 1983 had played an influential role 
in drafting the September Laws, was enlisted to help prepare new 
laws based on Islamic principles. In January 1991 , Bashir decreed 
that Islamic law would be applied in courts throughout the north, 
but not in the three southern provinces. 

Courts 

Prior to Nimeiri 's consolidation of the court system in 1980, the 
judiciary consisted of two separate divisions: the Civil Division 
headed by the chief justice and the Sharia Division headed by the 
chief qadi. The civil courts considered all criminal and most civil 
cases. The sharia courts, comprising religious judges trained in 
Islamic law, adjudicated for Muslims matters of personal status, 
such as inheritance, marriage, divorce, and family relations. The 
1980 executive order consolidating civil and sharia courts created 
a single High Court of Appeal to replace both the former Supreme 
Court and the Office of Chief Qadi. Initially, judges were required 
to apply civil and sharia law as if they were a single code of law. 
Since 1983, however, the High Court of Appeal, as well as all lower 
courts, were required to apply Islamic law exclusively. Following 
the overthrow of Nimeiri in 1985, courts suspended the applica- 
tion of the harsher hudud punishments in criminal cases. Each 
province or district had its own appeal, major, and magistrates' 
courts. Serious crimes were tried by major courts convened by 
specific order of the provincial judge and consisted of a bench of 
three magistrates. Magistrates were of first, second, or third class 
and had corresponding gradations of criminal jurisdictions. Local 
magistrates generally advised the police on whether to prepare for 



210 



Government and Politics 



a prosecution, determined whether a case should go to trial (and 
on what charges and at what level), and often acted in practice as 
legal advisers to defendants. 

In theory the judiciary was independent in the performance of 
its duties, but since 1958 the country's various military govern- 
ments have routinely interfered with the judicial process. For ex- 
ample, in July 1989 the RCC-NS issued Decree Number 3, which 
gave the president the power to appoint and dismiss all judges. 
Under the authority of this decree, Bashir dismissed scores of judges, 
reportedly because they were insufficiently committed to applying 
the sharia in their decisions, and replaced them with supporters 
of the NIF. One of the most extensive judicial firings occurred dur- 
ing September 1990, when more than seventy judges were dis- 
missed. The effect of these actions was to make the judiciary 
responsible to the president. 

In November 1989, the RCC-NS established special courts to 
investigate and try a wide range of violations, including particu- 
larly security offenses and corruption. The special security courts 
handled cases that dealt primarily with violations of the emergen- 
cy laws issued by the RCC-NS. The special corruption courts ini- 
tially investigated charges that the state brought against officials 
of the Sadiq al Mahdi government, but since 1990 they have dealt 
with cases of embezzlement, foreign-currency smuggling, and black 
market profiteering. Critics charged that there was a lack of due 
process in the special courts and that the regime used them as a 
means of silencing political opponents. Judges sitting in the spe- 
cial courts included both civilians and military officers. 

Human Rights 

International human rights organizations and foreign govern- 
ments, including the United States, have reported that since the 
Bashir government came to power in 1989, it systematically en- 
gaged in a range of human rights abuses against persons suspected 
of dissident political activity (see Security Organizations, ch. 5). 
The Sudanese Human Rights Organization was forcibly dissolved 
in July 1989, and scores of politicians, lawyers, judges, and teachers 
were arrested. According to a February 1991 report by Amnesty 
International, arbitrary arrest continued to be frequent, at least 
40 political prisoners with serious health conditions were not receiv- 
ing medical treatment, more than 200 political prisoners had been 
detained for more than a year without charges, torture was rou- 
tine, and some political prisoners were summarily executed after 
trials in which the accused were not afforded opportunities to present 
any defense. 



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Sudan: A Country Study 

Southern and Western Sudan 

Southern Sudan 

The three southern provinces of Al Istiwai, Bahr al Ghazal, and 
Aali an Nil were centers of opposition to Khartoum's authority 
since before independence. The first rebellion began in 1955 as 
a mutiny of southern troops who believed that the departure of the 
British would be followed by northern efforts to force arabization 
and Islamization on their region. The antigovernment movement 
gathered momentum after Sudan's independence in 1956 with the 
formation of opposition elements. The harsh treatment of southern 
civilians by northern armed forces and police caused a number of 
better educated southerners who served in government posts or were 
teachers to go into exile. Ultimately, in February 1962, many of 
these persons formed the Sudan Africa Closed Districts National 
Union. In April 1963, the group changed its name to the Sudan 
African National Union (SANU) and advocated outright indepen- 
dence for southern Sudan. Meanwhile, numerous less educated 
southern males, many of whom had been junior civil servants or 
former members of the Equatoria Corps, sought refuge in the bush 
and formed guerrilla bands, the Anya Nya, which began activities 
in 1963 (see Civil Warfare in the South; Paramilitary Groups, 
ch. 5). As the Anya Nya developed into an effective military force, 
it gradually succeeded in expelling central government officials from 
an increasing number of southern districts. In 1971, by which time 
Anya Nya controlled most rural areas, its military leaders formed 
a political organization, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SSLM). 

The Nimeiri regime recognized that the escalating civil strife in 
the south was a debilitating drain on the country's resources and 
a serious impediment to Sudan's economic development. In 1971 
Nimeiri agreed to negotiate a compromise with the SSLM. Sev- 
eral sessions of mediated discussions culminated in peace negotia- 
tions in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in February and March 1972. 
Under the provisions of the Addis Ababa accords, the central 
government and the SSLM agreed to a cease-fire, and Khartoum 
recognized the regional autonomy of the three southern provinces. 
After signing the accord, Nimeiri issued a decree for the establish- 
ment of a Southern Regional Assembly. The assembly's members 
were elected in multiparty elections, the first of which was held 
in 1973, with a second election five years later. Throughout the 
1970s, the Nimeiri government observed the Addis Ababa accords 
fairly faithfully, and the south' s relative political freedom contrasted 
sharply with the authoritarian rule in the rest of the country. 



212 



Government and Politics 



The Addis Ababa accords eventually were undermined by the 
same factors that had fueled southern rebellion in the 1960s: fears 
that the north was determined to force arabization and Islamiza- 
tion upon the south. These fears were revived, beginning in the 
late 1970s, by the increasing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood 
over central government policies. In 1981 Nimeiri virtually abro- 
gated the Addis Ababa accords by dissolving the Southern Regional 
Assembly. In addition to these major political developments, the 
general economic stagnation of the south, which by the early 1980s 
was plagued with high inflation, lack of employment opportunities, 
and severe shortages of basic goods, tended to reinforce southern 
suspicions of Khartoum. 

After Nimeiri appointed Muslim Brotherhood leader Turabi as 
attorney general in November 1981, southern confidence in the 
central government's motives eroded rapidly. A mutiny among 
about 1,000 southern troops in February 1983 stimulated attacks 
on government property and forces throughout the region. By Au- 
gust a former colonel in the Sudanese army, John Garang, had 
been instrumental in forming the Sudanese People's Liberation 
Movement (SPLM). When Nimeiri imposed the sharia on the 
whole country one month later, further inflaming attitudes among 
non-Muslims in the south, the SPLM rebellion, coordinated by 
its newly formed military arm, the Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army (SPLA), turned into a full-scale civil war (see Sudanese Peo- 
ple's Liberation Army, ch. 5). The intensification of fighting 
throughout 1984, and the SPLA's general success in expelling 
government forces from most rural districts and some towns were 
important factors contributing to Nimeiri 's overthrow in 1985. 

Unlike its predecessor, the SSLM, the SPLM sought, not seces- 
sion from Sudan, but a solution based on a secular, democratic, 
and federal political system. Because one of the first acts of the tran- 
sitional military government that overthrew Nimeiri was to sus- 
pend enforcement of the September Laws, Garang and other SPLM 
leaders initially were optimistic about resolving their grievances 
with Khartoum. The SPLM thus agreed to participate in negotia- 
tions with central government representatives and leaders of north- 
ern political parties. In 1986 SPLM leaders and several northern 
politicians met at Ethiopia's Koka Dam, where they signed an im- 
portant declaration stating their common commitment to democ- 
racy. Nevertheless, the primary issue separating the SPLM from 
the northern parties — the role of the sharia — remained unresolved. 
Sadiq al Mahdi, whom Nimeiri had imprisoned for his criticism 
of the manner in which the 1983 laws had been implemented, as 



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Sudan: A Country Study 



prime minister became reluctant to abrogate the sharia as the SPLM 
demanded. 

Muhammad Uthman al Mirghani, head of the Democratic Union- 
ist Party (DUP) and spiritual leader of the Khatmiyyah religious 
order, was one of the few northern politicians who recognized that 
ending the civil war and compromising on the issue of the sharia 
were inseparable. In November and December 1988, he met with 
Garang in Ethiopia and reached a tentative agreement that involved 
major government concessions with respect to the sharia. This 
agreement received the backing of many northern groups that 
wanted an end to the debilitating civil war. The NIF, however, 
strongly opposed the agreement and exerted considerable pressures 
on the Sadiq al Mahdi government to reject it. 

Sadiq al Mahdi' s temporizing on the Mirghani-Garang agree- 
ment sparked demonstrations in Khartoum by various labor unions 
and professional associations. Military officers who opposed con- 
tinuation of the fighting in the south intervened in February 1 989 
to demand that the government seriously negotiate an end to the 
civil war. The military's memorandum to the cabinet provoked 
a political crisis that led Sadiq al Mahdi to form a new coalition 
government without NIF participation. This National Salvation 
government was dedicated to compromise with the SPLM on the 
basis of the Mirghani-Garang agreement. Accordingly, it set up 
a special committee of legal experts to draft legislation for the repeal 
of the September Laws. 

The June 1989 coup made the Mirghani-Garang agreement a 
moot issue. Although the RCC-NS declared a unilateral cease-fire 
and announced its determination to settle the conflict in the south 
peacefully, its Islamic policies tended to alienate further, rather than 
to conciliate, the SPLM. Garang announced that the SPLA would 
continue the struggle but insisted that the SPLM was prepared to 
discuss a resolution of the civil war provided the government agreed 
not to enforce the sharia. Garang sent SPLM representatives to 
Ethiopia in August 1989 and to Kenya in December to discuss the 
war with RCC-NS representatives, but these meetings produced 
no results. The RCC-NS adopted the position that there could be 
no preconditions for peace talks. Consequentiy, the war continued, 
with the SPLA forces generally prevailing in military clashes with 
army contingents, especially in Al Istiwai, where support for the 
SPLM initially had been weak. In mid- 1991 the government still 
held several important southern towns, including the largest cities 
of Juba and Yei in Al Istiwai, but they were besieged by the SPLA 
and could be resupplied only by air. 



214 



Government and Politics 



Western Sudan 

Regional resentment of Khartoum was not limited to the south, 
but was present to varying degrees in other areas of Sudan, espe- 
cially the western state of Darfur. Although the ethnically diverse 
people of Darfur were predominantly Muslim, more than 40 per- 
cent were not Arabs and generally felt more affinity with related 
groups in neighboring Chad than with Khartoum. The civil strife 
in Chad during the 1980s inevitably spilled over into western 
Darfur, exacerbating historical tensions between the non-Arab Fur 
and Zaghawa ethnic groups (see Chad, this ch.). The perception 
among many Fur that the RCC-NS encouraged and even armed 
militia among their enemies inspired guerrilla attacks on central 
government facilities and forces in Darfur. The general sense of 
antagonism toward the RCC-NS was reinforced by the drought 
and the near-famine conditions that have afflicted Darfur since 1984. 
Like its predecessors, the RCC-NS failed to cope with the social 
and economic consequences of the environmental disaster, a situ- 
ation that increased alienation from the central government. By 
the early 1990s, much of Darfur was in a state of anarchy. 

Political Groups 

The RCC-NS banned all political parties following the 1989 coup 
and arrested several political leaders including the deposed prime 
minister, Sadiq al Mahdi. Nevertheless, all northern parties that 
existed at the time of the coup maintained their party structures 
outside the country or in southern areas controlled by antigovern- 
ment forces. Some banned political parties actually operated fairly 
openly in Khartoum and other urban centers. The National Islamic 
Front, whose leaders were considered to have close relations with 
several RCC-NS members, was particularly open. Both support- 
ers and opponents of the regime asserted that in the past most 
government decisions were made by a secretive council of forty 
men whose members included both top military leaders and promi- 
nent figures in the NIF, a coalition dominated by the Muslim 
Brotherhood. In addition, several cabinet ministers belonged to 
the NIF. With the exception of the NIF, however, the precoup par- 
ties generally did not cooperate with the military government and 
were committed to its overthrow. 

The RCC-NS attempted to broaden its legitimacy by meeting 
with members of the various opposition parties. Its first effort to 
reach out to the banned parties was to invite them to send represen- 
tatives to a National Dialogue Conference, held in Khartoum in 
the autumn of 1989. Most of the parties sent delegates, but the 



215 



Sudan: A Country Study 

SPLM was conspicuously absent. The substantive results of the 
National Dialogue Conference were meager because the RCC-NS 
controlled the agenda and did not permit any criticism of its rule. 
Various meetings in 1990 and 1991 appeared to be aimed at coopt- 
ing individuals rather than engaging in serious discussions about 
the country's government. The state-controlled media covered these 
meetings, but the participants rarely were prominent party lead- 
ers. In fact, Sadiq al Mahdi's Urama Party disassociated itself from 
contacts with the RCC-NS by announcing through its publications 
that the person with whom the RCC-NS met was not connected 
with the party. The DUP expelled two members for unauthorized 
contact with the government. 

After the 1989 coup, the banned parties gradually coordinated 
a common opposition strategy. Northern political leaders initiated 
a dialogue with the SPLM that resulted in early 1 990 in a formal 
alliance among the SPLM, the Umma Party, and the DUP. This 
grouping, known as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), an 
organization in exile, most of whose leaders lived in Cairo, provided 
the Umma and other parties with access to valuable radio trans- 
mitting facilities in SPLM-controlled areas. The NDA was further 
strengthened when several high-ranking military officers whom the 
RCC-NS had dismissed from service in 1989 established informal 
contacts with it. The most prominent of these officers was Lieu- 
tenant General Fathi Ahmad Ali, who had served as armed forces 
commander in chief prior to Bashir's coup. In January 1991, the 
NDA proposed to establish a government in exile for the purpose 
of overthrowing the Bashir regime. General Ali was named head 
of the government and Garang his deputy. In March 1991, the 
NDA met in Ethiopia with representatives of military officers, 
professional associations, trade unions, and the Sudanese Com- 
munist Party to discuss ideas for organizing a national govern- 
ment. 

Although all political parties remained officially banned in 1991, 
many precoup parties continued to operate underground or in exile. 
All the major Sudanese political parties in the north were affili- 
ated with Islamic groups, a situation that has prevailed since 
before independence in 1956. Among the important religious or- 
ganizations that sponsored political parties were the Ansar, the 
Khatmiyyah, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Although several secu- 
lar parties had been set up between 1986 and 1989, except for the 
long-established Sudanese Communist Party and the Baath (Arab 
Socialist Resurrection) Party, none of these had effective organi- 
zations after the coup. 



216 



Khartoum International Airport, Sudan's major air center 
Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington 

Umma Party 

During the last period of parliamentary democracy, the Umma 
Party was the largest in the country, and its leader, Sadiq al Mahdi, 
served as prime minister in all coalition governments between 1986 
and 1989. Originally founded in 1945, the Umma was the politi- 
cal organization of the Islamic Ansar movement. Its supporters fol- 
lowed the strict teachings of the Mahdi, who ruled Sudan in the 
1880s. Although the Ansar were found throughout Sudan, most 
lived in rural areas of western Darfur and Kurdufan. Since Sudan 
became independent in 1956, the Umma Party has experienced 
alternating periods of political prominence and persecution. Sadiq 
al Mahdi became head of the Umma and spiritual leader of the 
Ansar in 1970, following clashes with the Nimeiri government, dur- 
ing which about 3,000 Ansar were killed. Following a brief recon- 
ciliation with Nimeiri in the mid-1970s, Sadiq al Mahdi was 
imprisoned for his opposition to the government's foreign and 
domestic policies, including his 1983 denunciation of the Septem- 
ber Laws as being un-Islamic. 

Despite Sadiq al Mahdi 's criticisms of Nimeiri 's efforts to ex- 
ploit religious sentiments, the Umma was an Islamic party dedi- 
cated to achieving its own Muslim political agenda for Sudan. Sadiq 



217 



Sudan: A Country Study 

al Mahdi had never objected to the sharia becoming the law of the 
land, but rather to the "un-Islamic" manner Nimeiri had used 
to implement the sharia through the September Laws. Thus, when 
Sadiq al Mahdi became prime minister in 1986, he was loath to 
become the leader who abolished the sharia in Sudan. Failing to 
appreciate the reasons for non- Muslim antipathy toward the sharia, 
Sadiq al Mahdi cooperated with his brother-in-law, NIF leader 
Turabi, to draft Islamic legal codes for the country. By the time 
Sadiq al Mahdi realized that ending the civil war and retaining 
the sharia were incompatible political goals, public confidence in 
his government had dissipated, setting the stage for military inter- 
vention. Following the June 1989 coup, Sadiq al Mahdi was ar- 
rested and kept in solitary confinement for several months. He was 
not released from prison until early 1991. Sadiq al Mahdi indi- 
cated approval of political positions adopted by the Umma Party 
during his detention, including joining with the SPLM and northern 
political parties in the National Democratic Alliance opposition 
grouping. 

Democratic Unionist Party 

The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was similarly based on 
a religious order, the Khatmiyyah organization. Ever since the 
Khatmiyyah opposed the Mahdist movement in the 1880s, it has 
been a rival of the Ansar. Although the Khatmiyyah was more 
broadly based than the Ansar, it was generally less effective politi- 
cally. Historically, the DUP and its predecessors were plagued by 
factionalism, stemming largely from the differing perspectives of 
secular-minded professionals in the party and the more traditional 
religious values of their Khatmiyyah supporters. Muhammad Uth- 
man al Mirghani, the DUP leader and hereditary Khatmiyyah 
spiritual guide since 1968, tried to keep these tensions in check by 
avoiding firm stances on controversial political issues. In particu- 
lar, he refrained from public criticism of Nimeiri' s September Laws 
so as not to alienate Khatmiyyah followers who approved of im- 
plementing the sharia. In the 1986 parliamentary elections, the 
DUP won the second largest number of seats and agreed to par- 
ticipate in Sadiq al Mahdi' s coalition government. Like Sadiq al 
Mahdi, Mirghani felt uneasy about abrogating the sharia, as 
demanded by the SPLM, and supported the idea that the Septem- 
ber Laws could be revised to expunge the "un-Islamic" content 
added by Nimeiri. 

By late 1988, however, other DUP leaders had persuaded Mir- 
ghani that the Islamic law issue was the main obstacle to a peace- 
ful resolution of the civil war. Mirghani himself became convinced 



218 



Government and Politics 



that the war posed a more serious danger to Sudan than did any 
compromise over the sharia. It was this attitude that prompted him 
to meet with Garang in Ethiopia where he negotiated a cease-fire 
agreement based on a commitment to abolish the September Laws. 
During the next six months leading up to the June 1989 coup, Mir- 
ghani worked to build support for the agreement, and in the process 
emerged as the most important Muslim religious figure to advo- 
cate concessions on the implementation of the sharia. Following 
the coup, Mirghani fled into exile and he has remained in Egypt. 
Since 1989, the RCC-NS has attempted to exploit DUP faction- 
alism by coopting party officials who contested Mirghani 's leader- 
ship, but these efforts failed to weaken the DUP as an opposition 
group. 

The Muslim Brotherhood 

The Muslim Brotherhood, which originated in Egypt, has been 
active in Sudan since its formation there in 1949. It emerged from 
Muslim student groups that first began organizing in the univer- 
sities during the 1940s, and its main support base has remained 
the college educated. The Muslim Brotherhood's objective in Sudan 
has been to institutionalize Islamic law throughout the country. 
Hassan Abd Allah at Turabi, former dean of the School of Law 
at the University of Khartoum, had been the Muslim Brotherhood's 
secretary general since 1964. He began working with Nimeiri in 
the mid-1970s, and, as his attorney general in 1983, played a key 
role in the controversial introduction of the sharia. After the over- 
throw of Nimeiri, Turabi was instrumental in setting up the NIF, 
a Brotherhood-dominated organization that included several other 
small Islamic parties. Following the 1989 coup, the RCC-NS ar- 
rested Turabi, as well as the leaders of other political parties, and 
held him in solitary confinement for several months. Nevertheless, 
this action failed to dispel a pervasive belief in Sudan that Turabi 
and the NIF actively collaborated with the RCC-NS. NIF influence 
within the government was evident in its policies and in the presence 
of several NIF members in the cabinet. 

The Republican Brothers 

A small but influential religious party in the early 1 980s was the 
Republican Brothers. A Sufi shaykh, Mahmud Muhammad Taha, 
founded the Republican Brothers in the 1950s as an Islamic re- 
form movement stressing the qualities of tolerance, justice, and 
mercy. Taha came to prominence in 1983 when he opposed 
Nimeiri 's implementation of the sharia as being contrary to the 
essence of Islam. He was arrested and subsequently executed for 



219 



Sudan: A Country Study 

heresy in January 1985. The execution of such a widely revered 
religious figure — Taha was seventy-six — aroused considerable 
revulsion in Sudan and was one of the factors that helped precipi- 
tate the coup against Nimeiri. Although the Republican Brothers 
survived the loss of its leader and participated in the political process 
during the parliamentary period, it has not been politically active 
since 1989. 

Secular Political Parties 

The two most important secular political parties in the north were 
the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) and the Baath. The SCP 
was formed in 1944 and early established a strong support base 
in universities and labor unions. Although relatively small, the SCP 
had become one of the country's best organized political parties 
by 1956 when Sudan obtained its independence. The SCP also was 
one of the few parties that recruited members in the south. The 
various religiously affiliated parties opposed the SCP, and, conse- 
quently, the progression of civilian and military governments alter- 
nately banned and courted the party until 1971, when Nimeiri 
accused the SCP of complicity in an abortive military coup. Nimeiri 
ordered the arrest of hundreds of SCP members, and several lead- 
ers, including the secretary general, were convicted of treason in 
hastily arranged trials and summarily executed. These harsh mea- 
sures effectively crippled the SCP for many years. 

Following Nimeiri' s overthrow, the SCP began reorganizing, and 
it won three seats in the 1986 parliamentary elections. Since the June 
1989 coup, the SCP has emerged as one of the Bashir government's 
most effective internal opponents, largely through fairly regular pub- 
lication and circulation of its underground newspaper, Al Midan. 
In November 1990, Babikr at Tijani at Tayyib, secretary general 
of the banned SCP, managed to escape from house arrest and flee 
to Ethiopia. 

The Baath Party of Sudan was relatively small and sided with 
the Baath Party of Iraq in the major schism that divided this pan- 
Arab party into pro-Iraqi and pro-Syrian factions. The Baath re- 
mained committed to unifying Sudan with either Egypt or Libya 
as an initial step in the creation of a single nation encompassing 
all Arabic-speaking countries; however, the Baath's ideological 
reservations about the existing regimes in those two countries 
precluded active political support for this goal. The Nimeiri and 
Bashir governments alternately tolerated and persecuted the Baath. 
The RCC-NS, for example, arrested more than forty- five Baathists 
during the summer of 1990. Restrictions against the Baath were 



220 



Government and Politics 



eased at the end of year, presumably because Sudan supported Iraq 
during the Persian Gulf War. 

Sudanese People's Liberation Movement 

Although based almost exclusively in the three predominantly 
non-Arab southern states, the SPLM was the most important op- 
position force in Sudan (see Southern and Western Sudan, this ch.). 
Most of its early members were ethnic Dinka, and until the late 
1980s most recruits into its SPLA were of Dinka origin. The SPLM 
was strongest where the largest number of Dinka resided, that is, 
in Aali an Nil and Bahr al Ghazal. Both Nimeiri and Sadiq al Mahdi 
had tried to exploit historical ethnic tensions between the Dinka 
and other groups, such as the Nuer and Azande, as part of the 
effort to contain the spread of the civil war. The RCC-NS, however, 
tended to view all non-Muslims in the south as the same and in- 
discriminately bombed non-Dinka towns and armed the Arab 
militias that massacred civilians. The human rights group Africa 
Watch reported in 1990 that the kidnapping, hostage-taking, and 
other activities by militias in the south approached a reemergence 
of slavery. The effect of RCC-NS policies was to strengthen the 
appeal of the SPLM in non-Dinka areas, particularly the Azande 
territory of western Al Istiwai. By 1991 almost one-half of the SPLA 
forces were non-Dinka, although most of the higher-ranking officers 
remained Dinka. 

Information Media 

Since independence the mass media have served as channels for 
the dissemination of information supporting various political par- 
ties (during parliamentary periods) or official government views 
(during the years of military rule). Radio, an important medium 
of mass communication in the country's vast territory, has remained 
virtually a government monopoly, and television broadcasting has 
been a complete monopoly. The official Sudan News Agency 
(SUN A), first established in 1971, distributed news about the coun- 
try in Arabic, English, and French to foreign and domestic services. 

Newspapers 

Before the 1989 coup, Sudan had a lively press, with most polit- 
ical parties publishing a variety of periodicals. In Khartoum, twenty- 
two daily papers were published, nineteen in Arabic and three in 
English. Altogether, the country had fifty-five daily or weekly 
newspapers and magazines. The RCC-NS banned all these papers 
and dismissed more than 1,000 journalists. At least fifteen jour- 
nalists, including the director of the Sudan News Agency and the 



221 



Sudan: A Country Study 

editor of the monthly Sudanow, were arrested after the coup. Since 
coming to power, the RGC-NS has authorized the publication of 
only a few papers and periodicals, all of which were published by 
the military or government agencies and edited by official censors. 
The leading daily in 1991 was Al Inqadh al Watani (National Sal- 
vation). 

Radio and Television 

Radio and television broadcasting were operated by the govern- 
ment. In 1990 there were an estimated 250,000 television sets in 
the country and about 6 million radio receivers. Sudan Television 
operated three stations located in Omdurman, Al Jazirah, and 
Atbarah. The major radio station of the Sudan National Broad- 
casting Corporation was in Omdurman, with a regional station 
in Juba for the south. Following the 1989 coup, the RCC-NS dis- 
missed several broadcasters from Sudan Television because their 
loyalty to the new government and its policies was considered 
suspect. 

In opposition to the official broadcast network, the SPLM oper- 
ated its own clandestine radio station, Radio SPLA, from secret 
transmitters within the country and facilities in Ethiopia. Radio 
SPLA broadcasts were in Arabic, English, and various languages 
of the south. In 1990 the National Democratic Alliance began broad- 
casts on Radio SPLA's frequencies. 

Foreign Relations 

The 1989 coup accelerated the trend in Sudan's foreign policy 
of turning away from traditional allies, such as Egypt and the United 
States. This trend had begun following the overthrow of Nimeiri's 
government in 1985. As prime minister, one of Sadiq al Mahdi's 
foreign policy objectives was to ease the strain that had character- 
ized relations with Ethiopia, Libya, and the Soviet Union during 
the latter years of Nimeiri's rule. Nevertheless, the country's need 
for foreign economic assistance to deal with the consequences of 
drought and civil war generally curtailed the extent to which for- 
eign relations could be realigned. 

The Persian Gulf crisis and subsequent war in 1991 caught Sudan 
in an awkward position. Although Khartoum's officially stated po- 
sition was one of neutrality, the unofficial government position was 
one of sympathy for Iraq, stemming largely from a sense of ap- 
preciation for the military assistance Baghdad had provided since 
1989. Sudan's failure to join the anti-Iraq coalition infuriated Saudi 
Arabia, which retaliated by suspending much-needed economic as- 
sistance, and Egypt, which responded by providing aid to opponents 



222 



View of Khartoum, Sudan 's capital, showing the Blue Nile 

and the Blue Nile bridge 
Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington 

of the Bashir regime. After the RCC-NS sent the deputy leader 
of the NIF to the Islamic Conference in Baghdad that Iraqi Presi- 
dent Saddam Husayn organized in January 1991, Egypt withdrew 
its ambassador from Khartoum. The RCC-NS 's efforts to main- 
tain close relations with Iraq resulted in Sudan's regional isolation. 

Egypt 

In 1991 Sudan's relations with its most important neighbor were 
strained. This was partially a legacy of Cairo's close support of 
Nimeiri prior to 1985. Sudan was one of the few Arab countries 
that backed Egypt in 1979 after Anwar as Sadat had signed a 
separate peace agreement with Israel, and Nimeiri had taken a lead- 
ing role in the early 1980s to help rehabilitate Egypt's position with 
the rest of the Arab world. Nimeiri was in Egypt en route home 
from a trip to the United States when his government was over- 
thrown. Egyptian president Husni Mubarak granted Nimeiri po- 
litical asylum and rejected Sudan's subsequent calls for his 
extradition. Beginning in 1986, relations gradually improved, and 
they were relatively normal by the time the Bashir coup occurred. 

Relations with Egypt deteriorated steadily after the RCC-NS 
came to power. The Bashir regime was convinced that Egypt 



223 



Sudan: A Country Study 

supported opposition politicians, several of whom, including Mir- 
ghani, were granted political asylum; the NDA was also allowed 
to operate in Egypt. Mirghani and other leaders, including Nimeiri, 
issued regular criticisms of the government from the relatively safe 
haven of Cairo. The RGC-NS responded by providing asylum to 
Egyptian Islamic activists against whom were pending various 
criminal charges and by encouraging NIF supporters residing in 
Egypt to physically assault the organization's opponents. Relations 
were further strained early in 1990 when the Egyptian government 
invited a high-ranking SPLM delegation to Cairo. Even before the 
Persian Gulf crisis erupted in August, Mubarak accused Sudan 
of stationing Iraqi missiles on its soil and aiming them at the Aswan 
High Dam, a charge strongly denied by the RCC-NS. Relations 
only worsened after Sudan refused to join the Arab coalition against 
Iraq. As of mid- 1991, Egypt had not returned its ambassador to 
Khartoum and was openly providing financial support to the DUP, 
the SPLM, and other opposition groups. 

Libya 

Sudan's relations with Libya, its neighbor on the northwest, alter- 
nated between extreme hostility and cordiality throughout the 1980s. 
Nimeiri and Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi were especially 
antagonistic toward each other. Nimeiri permitted the Libyan Na- 
tional Salvation Front to broadcast anti-Qadhafi diatribes from radio 
transmitters located in Sudan. The Libyan government responded 
by training anti- Nimeiri opposition forces in Libya and providing 
financial and material support to the SPLM. Repairing relations 
with Libya has been a goal of the transitional, parliamentary, and 
military governments since 1985. The Sadiq al Mahdi government 
permitted Libya to station some of its military forces in Darfur, 
whence they assisted Chadian rebels in carrying out raids against 
government forces in Chad. The expanding relations between 
Sudan and Libya were not viewed favorably in Cairo, and in 1988, 
apparently in response to pressures from Egypt and the United 
States, the Sudanese government requested a withdrawal of the 
Libyan forces. 

Relations with Libya expanded again after the June 1989 coup. 
Khartoum and Tripoli both expressed interest in an eventual unifi- 
cation of their nations. In July 1990, the Libyan-Sudanese joint 
General Peoples' Committee held its first meeting, and the Coun- 
cils of Ministers of the two countries met in a combined session. 
Although a unity agreement was negotiated in 1990, the chief result 
of these meetings was not political union but greater economic 
cooperation. Libya and Sudan signed a trade and development 



224 



Government and Politics 



protocol that provided, among other things, for Libyan investment 
in agricultural projects in exchange for guaranteed access to 
Sudanese food supplies. The two countries also agreed to form a 
working committee to draft plans for easing travel restrictions be- 
tween Darfur and the Al Khalij area on the Libyan side of the 
border. Later in 1990, Qadhafi made an official state visit to Khar- 
toum. Although the Libyan leader expressed satisfaction with the 
progress made in relations between the two countries, he also lec- 
tured the RCC-NS on the inappropriateness of its close ties to the 
NIF. 

Chad 

Throughout the 1980s, relations with Chad, Sudan's neighbor 
on the west, were affected both by the civil strife in that country, 
which often spilled over into Darfur, and relations with Libya, which 
intervened in Chad's internal conflicts. At the time of the Bashir 
coup in June 1989, western Darfur was being used as a battieground 
by troops loyal to the Chadian government of Hissein Habre and 
rebels organized by Idris Deby and supported by Libya. Deby was 
from the Zaghawa ethnic group that lived on both sides of the Chad- 
Sudan border, and the Zaghawa of Darfur provided him support 
and sanctuary. Hundreds of Zaghawa from Chad had also fled into 
Sudan to seek refuge from the fighting. The RCC-NS was not pre- 
pared for a confrontation with Chad, which was already provid- 
ing assistance to the SPLM, and thus tended to turn a blind eye 
when Chadian forces crossed into Darfur in pursuit of the rebels. 

In May 1990, Chadian soldiers invaded the provincial capital 
of Al Fashir, where they rescued wounded comrades being held 
at a local hospital. During the summer, Chadian forces burned 
eighteen Sudanese villages and abducted 100 civilians. Deby's Patri- 
otic Movement for Salvation (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut) 
provided arms to Sudanese Zaghawa and Arab militias, ostensi- 
bly so that they could protect themselves from Chadian forces. The 
militias, however, used the weapons against their own rivals, prin- 
cipally the ethnic Fur, and several hundred civilians were killed 
in civil strife during 1990. The government was relieved when Deby 
finally defeated Habre in December 1990. The new government 
in N'Djamena signaled its willingness for good relations with Sudan 
by closing down the SPLM office. Early in 1991, Bashir visited 
Chad for official talks with Deby on bilateral ties. 

Relations with Other African States 

Since 1983, Sudan's relations with its other African neighbors, 
Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire, 



225 



Sudan: A Country Study 

have been affected by the civil war in the south. These five coun- 
tries hosted thousands of Sudanese refugees who had fled the fight- 
ing and provided various forms of assistance and/or sanctuary to 
the SPLM and SPLA. As of mid- 1991, most of the border area 
with the Central African Republic, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire was 
under SPLM control. The governments of Kenya and Uganda 
openly supported the SPLM's humanitarian organizations and 
facilitated the movement of international relief personnel and sup- 
plies into southern Sudan. The SPLM's most important foreign 
supporter, however, was the government of Colonel Mengistu Haile 
Mariam in Ethiopia. The Mengistu regime had provided military 
assistance, including facilities for training, to the SPLA and ex- 
tensive political backing to the SPLM. In retaliation, Khartoum 
had allowed Ethiopian rebels to maintain facilities in Sudan, the 
Eritrean People's Liberation Front at Port Sudan, and the Tigray 
People's Liberation Front at Al Qadarif. As of mid- 1991, it was 
not clear how the overthrow of the Mengistu regime would affect 
Ethiopia's relations with the SPLM and the Bashir government. 

Relations with Other Arab States 

Other than Egypt and Libya, Sudan's most important relations 
with Arab countries were with the oil-producing states of the Per- 
sian Gulf, in particular Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates. After 1974 these three countries became important 
sources of foreign economic assistance and private investment. Dur- 
ing the economic crises of the 1980s, Saudi Arabia provided Sudan 
with military aid, concessionary loans, outright financial grants, 
and oil at prices well below the cost of petroleum in the interna- 
tional market. By 1990 foreign capital transfers had become the 
Sudanese government's most important source of revenue. 

Despite its economic dependence, the Bashir regime refused to 
support the Saudi position during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91 . 
Other than the receipt of a small quantity of Iraqi military sup- 
plies, which the Bashir government used in its prosecution of the 
war in the south, its motive for its pro-Iraq stance remained ob- 
scure. In fact, relations between Baghdad and Khartoum, while 
correct, were limited in 1990. In the spring of that year, the Iraqi 
government had ignored official protests from Bashir and met with 
representatives of the banned Sudanese Baath Party and other op- 
position groups. The decision to side with Iraq adversely affected 
Sudan's relations with Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies. Riyadh 
retaliated by suspending all grants, project loans, and concession- 
ary oil sales, measures that had a devastating impact on Sudan's 
budget and economy. After Iraq was defeated, Bashir and other 



226 



Government and Politics 



RCC-NS members tried to repair the damaged relations with Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, but as of mid- 1991, these countries had not 
resumed their former largesse to Sudan. 

United States 

Sudan and the United States enjoyed generally close relations 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In fact, then- Vice President 
George Bush had paid an official visit to Khartoum only one month 
before Nimeiri's overthrow in April 1985, and Nimeiri himself was 
in Washington trying to obtain more United States aid when the 
mass demonstrations that culminated in his downfall erupted. Both 
the transitional military government and the parliamentary govern- 
ment viewed past United States support for Nimeiri suspiciously 
and were determined to end the de facto alliance that had devel- 
oped after 1979. Because the most visible symbol of this alliance 
was Operation Bright Star, the biennial joint military exercises that 
had taken place partly on Sudanese territory, one of the first pol- 
icy decisions was to terminate Sudan's participation in Operation 
Bright Star. Nevertheless, relations with the United States remained 
important while Sadiq al Mahdi was prime minister because 
Washington continued to be a significant donor of foreign aid. 

This situation changed following the 1989 military coup. Wash- 
ington terminated all economic assistance to Sudan in accordance 
with the provisions of a foreign assistance appropriations law that 
barred all United States assistance to a country whose democrati- 
cally elected government had been overthrown by the military. 
Although this legislation included mechanisms for the Department 
of State to waive the provision, the Bush administration chose not 
to do so. The RCC-NS viewed the aid cut-off as an unfriendly 
gesture. Subsequently, when the United States continued to pro- 
vide humanitarian assistance for the thousands of Sudanese being 
displaced by drought and civil war, administering this relief aid 
directly through the United States Agency for International De- 
velopment, the RCC-NS accused Washington of interfering in the 
country's internal affairs. Khartoum's reluctance to cooperate with 
the humanitarian program prompted United States officials in early 
1990 to criticize publicly the Bashir government for impeding the 
distribution of emergency aid and even confiscating relief supplies. 
These charges, which were echoed by the British, the French, and 
several international relief agencies, further antagonized the 
RCC-NS. 

In this atmosphere, it was perhaps inevitable that Bashir would 
mistrust the motives of the United States when it proposed a peace 
initiative to end the civil war. In May 1990, after temporizing for 



227 



Sudan: A Country Study 

several weeks, the RCC-NS rejected the United States proposals 
for a cease-fire. Khartoum's support for Iraq during the Persian 
Gulf war further strained relations between the two governments. 
Finally, in February 1991 , the United States withdrew all its diplo- 
matic personnel from Sudan and closed its embassy in Khartoum. 

Relations with Other Countries 

In 1991 Sudan was a member of several international organiza- 
tions including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, 
the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity. 

The policies of the RCC-NS, however, alienated all the Euro- 
pean countries that traditionally had provided economic and hu- 
manitarian assistance to Sudan. Britain suspended several million 
dollars of grants and loans for development projects in January 
1991 after the government released from prison five Palestinians 
who had been convicted of the 1988 terrorist murder of five Brit- 
ons at a Khartoum hotel. Subsequently, London broke diplomatic 
relations as well. The twelve-member European Community is- 
sued a statement in February 1991 expressing its collective "shock 
and dismay" at Khartoum's failure to cooperate with nations and 
international organizations trying to assist Sudanese victims of 
drought and civil strife. The RCC-NS tried to counterbalance these 
deteriorating relations with expanded ties to such countries as 
China, Iran, Nigeria, and Pakistan. None of these countries, 
however, had the resources to replace the significant and needed 
aid that had dried up in the Arabian Peninsula, Europe, and North 
America. 

* * * 

Several excellent studies exist of Sudan's politics since indepen- 
dence in 1956 and up to the overthrow of the Nimeiri regime in 
1985. There is a paucity, however, of published sources for the 
more recent years. The best overviews of pre- 1985 political his- 
tory are Peter Bechtold's Politics in the Sudan since Independence, Tim 
Niblock's Class and Power in Sudan, and Peter Woodward's Sudan, 
1898-1989: The Unstable State. An excellent analysis of the move- 
ment to establish the sharia as the basis for Sudan's law is Caro- 
lyn Fluehr-Lobban's Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



228 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Sudan 's national emblem, a prominent symbol in military insignia 



Sudan occupies a strategically sensitive area 

of the African continent, and the nation's military establishment, 
developed during the period of British colonial administration, has 
remained influential in independent Sudan. Problems of domestic 
origin have, however, been the paramount sources of national secu- 
rity concern. 

Sudan has experienced civil war during three-quarters of its ex- 
istence as an independent nation. Historical divisions between the 
Arab-dominated north and the predominantly Black African, non- 
Muslim south spawned civil strife that was settled only in 1972, 
after about seventeen years. Open conflict broke out again in 1983 
after President Jafaar an Nimeiri abrogated the peace accord by 
abolishing the Southern Regional Assembly, redividing the south 
into three regions, and imposing the sharia, or Islamic law, on the 
entire country. Since that time, the southern rebel forces, known 
as the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), have gradu- 
ally expanded the fighting, leaving the government forces in con- 
trol of only a few key garrison towns of the south. Essentially a 
revolt among the Dinka and Nuer peoples, the largest groups in 
the south, the conflict has spread beyond the southern region to 
southern Darfur, southern Kurdufan, and southern Al Awsat states. 
The struggle has been complicated by the government policy of 
arming militias in communities opposed to the SPLA. As a result, 
local intercommunal conflicts have been exacerbated, and the 
civilian population has been victimized by violence and atrocities. 
Millions have been forced to flee their homes in the south to es- 
cape the fighting and avert starvation. 

In spite of the pressures it faced in the south, the Sudanese mili- 
tary constituted the most stable institution in a nation beset by up- 
heaval and economic crisis. Initially having a reputation for 
nonpartisanship, the armed forces were generally accepted as the 
guardians of the state when confidence in elected leaders faltered. 
Nimeiri, who came to power in a military coup d'etat in 1969, was 
himself deposed by a group of officers in 1985. After a three-year 
period of civilian parliamentary government from 1986 to 1989, 
a group of middle-ranking officers again intervened to impose mili- 
tary rule. Aligned with the National Islamic Front (NIF), an Is- 
lamist (Muslim activist, also seen as fundamentalist) party, the new 
military clique purged the armed forces of potential dissenters, ar- 
rested suspected opponents, and introduced harsh internal security 



231 



Sudan: A Country Study 



controls. A politico-military militia, the Popular Defence Forces 
(PDF) was organized as an urban security force dedicated to the 
goals of the Islamist movement. 

Its economy in a crippled condition, Sudan has been almost en- 
tirely dependent on help from other countries to equip its armed 
forces. After severing military ties with the Soviet Union in 1977, 
Sudan turned to Egypt, China, the West European countries, and 
the United States for arms. In most cases, these purchases were 
financed by Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states. The 
reluctance of Western nations to supply weapons and munitions 
that could be used to support military operations in the south and 
the new military leaders' alienation from other Middle Eastern 
countries have made it increasingly difficult to procure arms and 
materiel. 

The Sudanese armed forces, numbering about 71,000 in the early 
1990s, were responsible for both internal and external security. Most 
troops were deployed to defend against SPLA attacks and contain 
the southern insurgency. Their effectiveness was impaired by poor 
morale and shortages of functioning weapons and essential sup- 
plies. Most of the armored vehicles, artillery, and aircraft from the 
Soviet Union were more than twenty years old and no longer ser- 
viceable as a result of lack of maintenance and spare parts. 

In addition to the questionable effectiveness of its armed forces, 
Sudan faced other security problems. Sudan had on its borders two 
states equipped with Soviet arms: Ethiopia on the east and Libya 
on the northwest. Although each of these states constituted a poten- 
tial threat, it was the seemingly unwinnable war in the south and 
the growing unpopularity of a military leadership fueled by strong 
Islamism that were the dominant national security issues. 

The Military in National Life 

The warrior tradition has played an important part in the his- 
tory of Sudanese society, and military involvement in government 
has continued in modern Sudan. Although Sudan inherited a 
parliamentary government structure from the British, the Sudanese 
people were accustomed to a British colonial administration that 
was inherently military in nature. British officers held high adminis- 
trative positions in both the provincial and central governments. 
At independence Sudan faced difficult problems that few believed 
could be solved by untested parliamentary rule in a country frag- 
mented by competing ethnic, religious, and regional interests. It 
seemed natural to turn to a national institution like the army that 
could address these problems through a system of centralized en- 
forcement and control. 



232 



National Security 



Development of the Armed Forces 

The military force that eventually became the Sudanese army 
was established in 1898, when six battalions of black soldiers from 
southern Sudan were recruited to serve with Britain's General 
Herbert Kitchener in his campaign to retake Sudan (see Recon- 
quest of Sudan, ch. 1). In the succeeding thirty years, no fewer 
than 1 70 military expeditions were sent to establish order, halt inter- 
tribal warfare, and restrain occasional messianic leaders, mostly 
in Darfur in the west. 

During the period of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899- 
1955), participation of southerners in northern units of the Sudanese 
armed forces was all but eliminated. The British had developed 
a policy of administrative separation of the Muslim-dominated 
northern Sudan and the mostly non-Muslim south, where the 
separate Equatoria Corps commanded by British officers was main- 
tained (see The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1899-1955, ch. 1). 
Sudanese troops in the north were commanded largely by Egyp- 
tian and British commissioned officers until an anti-British mu- 
tiny in 1924, apparently incited by Egyptian officers, caused 
Egyptian troops and units to be sent home. In 1925 local forces 
were designated the Sudan Defence Force (SDF), and the Sudanese 
assumed an increasing share of responsibility for its command. 

After 1900 the British sought to develop an indigenous officer 
class among educated Sudanese, mostly from influential northern 
families. Consequently, the SDF came to be viewed as a national 
organization rather than as an instrument of foreign control. The 
prestige of the 20,000-man SDF was enhanced by its outstanding 
performance in World War II against numerically superior Italian 
forces that operated from Ethiopia. In the decade between the end 
of World War II and Sudan's independence, the SDF did not grow 
significantly in size, but Sudanese assumed increasingly important 
posts as British officers were reassigned or retired. Sudanese officer 
candidates were screened and selected, but Sudanization of the 
armed forces in practice meant their arabization. The underdevel- 
oped education system in the south produced few qualified candi- 
dates, and most lacked fluency in Arabic, the lingua franca of the 
armed services. The British had hoped to use the recruitment of 
southerners into the army after World War II to spur their integra- 
tion into Sudanese national life. 

On the eve of independence, in 1955, the SDF's Equatoria 
Corps — made up almost entirely of southern enlisted men but in- 
creasingly commanded by northerners as the British withdrew — 



233 



Sudan: A Country Study 

mutinied because of resentment over northern control of national 
politics and institutions. Northern troops were sent to quell the re- 
bellion, and the Equatoria Corps was disbanded after most of its 
men went into hiding and began what became a seventeen-year 
struggle to achieve autonomy for the south. 

At independence in 1956, Sudan's 5,000-man army was regarded 
as a highly trained, competent, and apolitical force, but its character 
changed in succeeding years. To deal with the southern insurgency, 
the army expanded steadily to 12,000 personnel in 1959, and it 
leveled off at about 50,000 in 1972. After independence, the mili- 
tary — particularly the educated officer corps — lost much of its 
former apolitical attitude; soldiers associated themselves with par- 
ties and movements across the political spectrum. 

Role in Government 

On four occasions since independence, the Sudanese armed forces 
have stepped in to overthrow civilian political institutions and im- 
pose a period of military rule. In some instances, the military leader- 
ship introduced a measure of stability and renewal. The military 
enjoyed an advantage because they were accepted by the people 
as a balancing element against domination by one of the major 
social, political, or religious groupings that contested for civilian 
political power. The view of the military as an institution free from 
specific ethnic or religious identification raised expectations that 
the armed forces could achieve what civilian politicians could not. 
Almost invariably, however, the military leaders found themselves 
unskilled in dealing with the country's chronic economic problems 
and the chaotic conditions caused by civil war. Accustomed to wield- 
ing authority, the military regimes tended to become increasingly 
authoritarian. Major government initiatives foundered because they 
were imposed inflexibly with little regard for practical possibilities 
and the interests affected. 

The military's first intervention in Sudanese politics occurred 
in November 1958, hardly three years after independence. Civilian 
politicians appeared unable to cope with economic distress and the 
insurrection in the south. Major General Ibrahim Abbud, the 
armed forces commander, led the coup. Although the action was 
apparently planned in concert with leading politicians who en- 
visaged a short military rule, Abbud remained in power until 1964. 
Initially popular in comparison to the heads of the fractious, 
stalemated first civilian governments, Abbud was forced to step 
down when antiregime demonstrations rocked Khartoum. In spite 
of increasingly dictatorial methods, Abbud had been unable to im- 
pose economic order or bring an end to the fighting in the south. 



234 



National Security 



The army remained a pillar of support for the civilian regime that 
followed, and senior military officers continued to serve in politi- 
cal appointments (see Return to Civilian Rule, 1964-69, ch. 1). 
A number of field- grade officers, however, some of whom had been 
linked to Abbud's ouster, had littie loyalty to the political system 
and were impatient with the consensus-oriented civilian govern- 
ment. Disgruntled over the stalemate in the civil war, the intrac- 
table economic situation, and official repression of leftist and 
pan- Arab organizations, a small group calling itself the Free 
Officers' Movement took control in 1969. At its head was Jafaar 
an Nimeiri, then a colonel. 

From 1969 until 1971, a military government — the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC), composed of nine young officers and 
one civilian — exercised authority over a largely civilian cabinet. 
The RCC represented only a faction within the military establish- 
ment. Initially, it followed radical policies in cooperation with the 
Sudanese communists, carrying out nationalizations, escalating the 
war in the south, violently repressing the Ansar politico-religious 
sect, and suppressing democratic institutions. More than 300 high- 
ranking officers who had been influential in previous governments 
were arrested or removed from the army when they refused to sup- 
port the policies of Nimeiri and the RCC. Only one general officer 
was retained. Later, differences within the RCC between those 
officers with nationalist sympathies and leftist-oriented officers 
guided by the well-organized Sudanese Communist Party precipi- 
tated a communist-led coup attempt in 1971 . Officers heading loyal 
units resisted the leftist takeover, enabling Nimeiri to survive and 
regain control (see Revolutionary Command Council, ch. 1). 

After the RCC was dissolved in late 1971 , the country was tech- 
nically no longer ruled by a military government. Nimeiri' s mount- 
ing prestige forged him a broader base of support than he had 
achieved during the RCC years. Over the next decade, the mili- 
tary establishment remained Nimeiri' s major constituency and 
source of power and was, accordingly, well represented in the 
government. Military men were appointed to head important minis- 
tries, to undertake major domestic and international missions, and 
to assist in the founding and staffing of the country's sole political 
party, the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU). Defense ministers (who 
were general officers) served concurrently as secretaries general of 
the SSU. The National Security Council, whose members were 
generally military officers, served as an important arena for fram- 
ing political and economic policies. Eighteen seats in the largely 
powerless People's Assembly were reserved for armed forces per- 
sonnel. Nimeiri justified the predominance of military personnel 



235 



Sudan: A Country Study 

in the upper echelons of government by pointing out that they 
represented the most disciplined organization in Sudan and that, 
in a country riven by partisanship, the military as an institution 
was motivated by nationalist convictions. 

Although military officers remained prominent in the govern- 
ment, by the early 1980s Nimeiri increasingly acted as if the armed 
forces were an instrument of his personal political dictates rather 
than the source of his political power. The armed forces gave the 
support necessary for Nimeiri to survive numerous coup attempts 
(some by dissatisfied military elements), but the special relation- 
ship between Nimeiri and his high command seriously eroded. In 
an extraordinary move in 1982, Nimeiri retired General Abd al 
Majid Hamid Khalil — vice president, minister of defense, com- 
mander in chief of the armed forces, secretary general of the SSU, 
and generally regarded as the heir apparent — along with twenty- 
two other top-ranking officers. 

Following the purge, Nimeiri assumed personal command of the 
armed forces and for a time held the defense portfolio in the cabi- 
net. In 1983 large numbers of southern troops mutinied, and civil 
war broke out again after Nimeiri' s centralist and Islamist poli- 
cies had increased southern alienation. Nimeiri 's increasingly ar- 
bitrary actions also drove away his traditional sources of support, 
and the armed forces were of little help as resistance to his policies 
mounted in the form of massive demonstrations and strikes. 

While Nimeiri was en route home from a visit to Washington 
in 1985, he was deposed in a bloodless coup led by Minister of 
Defence Lieutenant General Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab. 
The new leadership formed a Transitional Military Council of 
fifteen officers to govern the country for a one-year period until 
civil authority could be restored. The council fulfilled its purpose 
when elections were held in April 1 986 and a civilian government 
took office. 

Coalition governments in the established pattern of Sudanese 
politics ruled from 1986 to 1989 under Prime Minister Sadiq al 
Mahdi. The government forces were unable to bring the southern 
insurrection under control, and Sadiq al Mahdi 's relations with 
the military were often stormy. In September 1986, the commander 
in chief of the armed forces and the chief of the general staff were 
forcibly retired along with about twenty other officers. In Febru- 
ary 1989, the army leadership presented Sadiq al Mahdi with an 
ultimatum, demanding that he make the coalition government more 
representative and that he bring the civil war to an end. In June 
1989, Sadiq al Mahdi 's government was overthrown in a coup led 
by Colonel Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir, a paratroop officer 



236 



National Security 



stationed in the south. Bashir headed a ruling Revolutionary Com- 
mand Council for National Salvation (RCC-NS) of fifteen officers, 
mostly of middle rank (see Revolutionary Command Council for 
National Salvation, ch. 4). The RCC-NS justified its action by 
citing the neglect of the armed forces by the Sadiq al Mahdi govern- 
ment and its failure to reverse the deteriorating economic situa- 
tion and reestablish security in the south. Bashir was head of state, 
prime minister, commander in chief of the armed forces, and 
minister of defense. The vice chairman of the RCC-NS, a major 
general, was named deputy prime minister. Other officers held the 
key domestic security portfolios of minister of interior, minister 
of justice, and attorney general. 

Like preceding military regimes, Bashir' s government was ini- 
tially welcomed as bringing an end to a period of political turbu- 
lence and paralysis of action. It was soon revealed, however, to 
be linked to the more orthodox Muslim elements of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the National Islamic Front (NIF) political party. 
Its violent suppression of political expression and cruel treatment 
of suspected opponents had a disillusioning effect. It dismissed or 
retired the army commander and 27 other generals composing the 
senior leadership, and up to 500 other officers. In April 1990, the 
RCC-NS executed twenty-eight officers, including senior officers 
removed by the junta, to put down a threatened coup against the 
regime. The RCC-NS 's ruthless action had the effect of intimidat- 
ing potential opposition. 

The harshness displayed by the Bashir military government and 
its incompetence in dealing with Sudan's economic difficulties had 
by the close of 1990 alienated nearly all governments to which it 
could turn for help. The Bashir junta justified its intervention as 
the only alternative to civilian mismanagement. Unlike other mili- 
tary governments, however, it followed policies that were highly 
partisan, bearing the distinct ideological imprint of the NIF and 
the Muslim Brotherhood. 

The Armed Forces in Sudanese Society 

When the British attempted to forge an indigenous officer class 
before World War II, most Sudanese officers came from upper and 
middle-class urban families that enjoyed inherited wealth and pres- 
tige. After that time, greater numbers were drawn from the emerg- 
ing class of merchants and civil servants inhabiting urban areas 
where formal elementary and secondary education was more easily 
obtainable. Officer cadets, who had to possess a fourth-year second- 
ary school certificate, were chosen on the basis of performance in 
a series of written and oral competitive examinations. A requirement 



237 



Sudan: A Country Study 

that cadets possess a good knowledge of Arabic had long eliminated 
many southerners educated in English who otherwise might have 
qualified. It was estimated that only 5 to 10 percent of all Sudanese 
officer cadets in 1981 were southerners. 

The quality of incoming officers, extremely high during the pre- 
independence period, was thought to have been lowered by the in- 
creased size of the army — particularly during the 1968-72 surge 
in personnel strength. The Sudanese Communist Party, which had 
become entrenched in the universities and trade unions during the 
1960s, contributed to the emergence of a generation of officers that 
was predominantly anti-Western. Many officers received their in- 
itial training from Soviet advisers. After the revolt against Nimeiri 
in 1971 , in which some communist officers were implicated, retri- 
bution fell on many of the officers with leftist leanings. The officer 
corps became increasingly conservative at a time when Nimeiri him- 
self was stressing nationalism for Sudan. The military faction that 
deposed Nimeiri in 1985 was not distinguished by any particular 
political orientation, although as individuals its members main- 
tained links with all the important social, religious, and ethnic 
groups. 

In spite of the linkage of the Bashir junta to the NIF and Nimeiri' s 
earlier Islamization program, it was generally believed that among 
career officers no more than 5 percent were dedicated to Muslim 
activism. Most officers were modern in outlook, of middle-class 
and urban backgrounds, and inclined to be nonsectarian. 

In the armed forces as a whole, the political and ethnic makeup 
was influenced by historical factors. From the time of the Anglo- 
Egyptian condominium, many nomadic peoples of northeastern 
Sudan had served in the military, as had members of the Khat- 
miyyah politico-religious sect. By the 1980s, however, Sudanese 
from the northeast and the Nile Valley were estimated to consti- 
tute no more than 20 percent of the military, although they con- 
tinued to be well represented in the officer corps. Many officers 
had ties to the Khatmiyyah group and to the Mirghani family and 
were supporters of the Democratic Unionist Party. Under the Bashir 
government, northerners continued to dominate the senior leader- 
ship, although numerous sensitive positions were held by officers 
with origins in the south. A general who was a Dinka led one of 
the brigades active in the fighting against the Dinka-led SPLA. 

In the early 1980s, it was estimated that members of the Ansar 
politico-religious group and other Sudanese from Darfur and Kur- 
dufan provinces accounted for approximately 60 percent of the 
army's enlisted manpower. The Ansar and other western Sudanese 
might have been even more numerous in the uniformed services 



238 



National Security 



had not recruitment restrictions been imposed during the Nimeiri 
regime, when these groups were perceived to be among the major 
sources of opposition to the national leadership. 

The presence in the armed forces of non-Muslim black southern- 
ers has been a source of contention in Sudan since the condomini- 
um period. Until after World War II, southerners were recruited 
for service only in the Equatoria Corps and rarely served along- 
side northern Sudanese. Recruitment was suspended after the 1955 
mutiny in the south, and when it was resumed the following year, 
southern volunteers were required to serve in the north under north- 
ern officers. The rebellion in the south discouraged southerners 
from joining the armed forces until the 1972 settlement. 

As part of the Addis Ababa accords ending the civil war, 6,000 
of the former Anya Nya (named after a tribal poison) guerrillas 
were to be integrated gradually into the national army's Southern 
Command to serve with 6,000 northerners. By including southern 
officers in the top echelon of the Southern Command, the two forces 
appeared to have meshed successfully. In 1982 it was estimated 
that southerners outnumbered northerners 7,000 to 5,000 in the 
Southern Command, but there were relatively few southerners sta- 
tioned in the north, and none held important positions. Nimeiri 's 
decision the following year to transfer southern troops to the north 
because of his doubts over their loyalty to the central government 
was resisted by the southerners and was one of a number of fac- 
tors that triggered the renewal of the civil war. 

External Security Concerns 

The largest nation in Africa, Sudan has a common frontier with 
eight other countries. It occupies a strategic location on the conti- 
nent. Its capital, Khartoum, is situated at the junction of the White 
Nile and the Blue Nile. Via its port on the Red Sea, Port Sudan, 
the nation is linked to the Arab countries of the Middle East. To 
the south, it is adjacent to the tropical lake country of central Africa. 
In the west, it is exposed to recurrent conflict among Chadian fac- 
tions and potential contention with Libya. Even under stable con- 
ditions, it would be impracticable for Sudan to devote sufficient 
military force to ensuring the security of its entire periphery. For- 
tunately, few problems have arisen necessitating a strong military 
presence along the boundaries with Egypt, Kenya, Central Afri- 
can Republic, and Zaire. Threats to the stability of the border area 
have generally been confined to Chad on the west, Ethiopia on 
the east, and, to a lesser degree, Uganda in the south. 

Relations between Sudan and Egypt have varied but in general 
in the 1970s and 1980s were characterized by differences over such 



239 



Sudan: A Country Study 

matters as use of the Nile waters. Egypt subscribed to a stable, 
militarily viable Sudan because it regarded Sudanese territory as 
providing depth to its own strategic defenses, buffering it from 
potential threats emanating from sub-Saharan Africa. The border 
between Egypt and Sudan was unguarded except for minimal polic- 
ing to discourage smuggling and drug trafficking. 

Sudan's Darfur Province contiguous with Chad was unstable 
during most of the 1980s. The instability resulted from the combi- 
nation of Chadian combatants operating from bases on Sudanese 
territory, Libyan troops and Libyan- supported units of the Islamic 
Legion crossing the border in search of rebels, and fighting among 
Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups (see Chad, ch. 4). Arms were 
easily available in the border zone. Conceivably, Libya might desist 
from further interference in Darfur following the victory — gained 
with Libyan help — of the Chadian rebels under Idris Deby in De- 
cember 1990. 

The 1,600-kilometer border between Ethiopia and Sudan was 
also disturbed; both nations provided each other's insurgents with 
military assistance and sanctuary. In the northeast, the Sudanese 
government supported the Eritrean People's Liberation Front oper- 
ating from Sudanese territory at Port Sudan. The Tigray People's 
Liberation Front was also given facilities at Al Qadarif. Ethiopia 
retaliated by providing the SPLA insurgents in the south with sup- 
plies and bases. Sudan periodically accused Ethiopia of carrying 
out bombing raids against the estimated 100,000 Eritrean refugees 
living in camps and villages in eastern Sudan. 

A comparable situation prevailed on Sudan's border with Uganda. 
In 1986 and 1987, the president of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, 
accused Sudan of allowing its territory to be used as a haven in 
cross-border attacks by 3,000 members of the former Ugandan army 
loyal to the deposed dictator, Idi Amin Dada. Sudan, in turn, 
charged that SPLA units were receiving aid from Uganda. In 
mid- 1990, the Sudanese government announced that an agreement 
had been reached providing for the establishment of border secu- 
rity posts and that each country would prohibit its territory from 
being used for hostile attacks against the other. 

Civil Warfare in the South 

Except for a period of tenuous peace between 1972 and 1983, 
Sudan has been the scene of armed rebellion in the south since be- 
fore the nation became independent in 1956. The second stage of 
the Sudanese civil war entered its ninth year in 1991. The pro- 
tracted struggle pitting the mostly Muslim north against the ad- 
herents of indigenous faiths and of Christianity in the south has 



240 



One of about 200 burnt-out huts in Yei; destruction of homes was a common 
form of reprisal during the civil war in southern Sudan. 

Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 

resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths — mostly noncombat- 
ants — and has forced millions to flee the south in search of food 
and escape from violence. The rebel forces controlled most of the 
rural areas of the south as of mid- 1991 , besieging the government 
troops holding the major towns. Both sides were guilty of violence 
against civilians, but the government's policy since 1985 of arm- 
ing undisciplined tribal militia bands was responsible for the most 
flagrant cruelties. 

First Civil War, 1955-72 

In August 1955, five months before independence, southern 
troops of the Equatoria Corps, together with police, mutinied in 
Torit and other towns. The mutinies were suppressed although some 
of the rebels were able to escape to rural areas. There they formed 
guerrilla bands but, being poorly armed and organized, presented 
no extensive threat to security. The later emergence of a secessionist 
movement in the south led to the formation of the Anya Nya guer- 
rilla army, composed of remnants of the 1955 mutineers and recruits 
among southern students. Active at first only in Al Istiwai, Anya 
Nya carried its rebellion to all three southern provinces between 
1963 and 1969. In 1971 a former army lieutenant, Joseph Lagu, 



241 



Sudan: A Country Study 

united the ethnically fragmented guerrilla bands in support of a 
new political movement, the Southern Sudan Liberation Move- 
ment (SSLM). The war ended in March 1972 with an agreement 
between Nimeiri and Lagu that conceded to the south a single 
regional government with defined powers. 

Renewed Civil Warfare, 1983- 

Under the terms of the 1972 peace settlement, most of the Any a 
Nya fighters were absorbed into the national army, although a num- 
ber of units unhappy with the agreement defected and went into 
the bush or took refuge in Ethiopia. Angry over Sudan's support 
for Eritrean dissidents, Ethiopia began to provide help to Sudan's 
independent rebel bands. The rebel forces gathered more recruits 
among the Dinka and Nuer people, the largest groups in the south, 
and eventually adopted the name of Any a Nya II. 

Those original Anya Nya who had been absorbed into the army 
after the 1972 peace accord were called upon to keep the guerrillas 
in check and at first fought vigorously on behalf of the national 
government. But when in 1983 Nimeiri adopted policies of redivid- 
ing the south and imposing Islamic law, the loyalty of southern 
soldiers began to waver. Uncertain of their dependability, Nimeiri 
introduced more northern troops into the south and attempted to 
transfer the ex-guerrillas to the north. In February 1983, army units 
in Bor, Pibor Post, and Pochala mutinied. Desertions and muti- 
nies in other southern garrisons soon followed. 

In mid- 1983 representatives of Anya Nya II and of the mutinous 
army units meeting in Ethiopia formed the Sudanese People's 
Liberation Army (SPLA). John Garang, a Dinka Sudanese, was 
named its commander and also head of the political wing, the 
Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The southern 
forces in rebellion failed to achieve full unity under Garang, and, 
in a struggle for power, the dissident units composed of elements 
of Anya Nya II were routed by Garang' s forces. The defeated rem- 
nants, still calling themselves Anya Nya II, began to cooperate with 
the national army against the SPLA. 

Still scarcely an effective fighting force, the SPLA relied at first 
on ambushes of military vehicles and assaults on police stations 
and small army posts, mainly in the Nuer and Dinka areas of Aali 
an Nil Province and northern and eastern Bahr al Ghazal Province. 
An SPLA attempt to invade eastern Al Istiwai in early 1985 was 
met with stiff resistance by the army and government militias. But 
by 1986 the SPLA was strong enough to hold the important town 
of Rumbek in southern Bahr al Ghazal for several months and was 
also able to press an attack against Waw, the provincial capital. 



242 



National Security 



During 1987, the SPLA took Pibor Post and Tonga in Aali an Nil, 
and by the beginning of 1988, it had captured a number of towns 
on the Ethiopian border and near the White Nile. Advancing north- 
ward into Al Awsat Province, it held Kurmuk and Qaysan for a 
time in late 1987. 

The SPLA was opposed by many communities in Al Istiwai Prov- 
ince where the Dinka and Nuer were not popular. The national army 
was assisted by a militia of the Mundari people, but the SPLA was 
gradually able to consolidate its position in eastern Al Istiwai. By 
1988 the SPLA controlled the countryside around Juba, the major 
southern city, besieging at least 10,000 government troops, who were 
virtually cut off from supplies except for what could be delivered 
by air. During a general offensive in early 1989, the SPLA cap- 
tured Torit and other strategic towns of eastern Al Istiwai. From 
May to October 1989, an informal truce prevailed. After the con- 
flict resumed, the areas being contested were principally in western 
and central Al Istiwai, focusing on the government garrisons at Juba 
and Yei (see fig. 8). The fighting often consisted of ambushes by 
the more lightly armed but mobile guerrillas against government 
convoys moving supplies from the north. With captured weapons 
and arms imported from Ethiopia and other African countries, the 
SPLA was increasingly capable of conducting orthodox warfare em- 
ploying artillery and even armored vehicles, although its forces still 
avoided conventional engagements against government units. 

Anya Nya II began to crumble in 1987, many units and their 
commanders deserting to the SPLA. But since 1985, the govern- 
ment had been encouraging the formation of militia forces in areas 
where opposition to the Dinka- and Nuer-dominated SPLA was 
strongest. These militias were soon playing a major role in the fight- 
ing and were partly responsible for the ravages that the civilian 
population had been forced to endure. The arming of tribal groups 
inflamed existing intercommunal conflicts and resulted in the 
deliberate killing of tens of thousands of noncombatants and a vast 
displacement of civilians. 

Millions of villagers were forced from their homes as a conse- 
quence of the fighting and the depredations of militias, the SPLA, 
and Anya Nya II. Devastation of northern Bahr al Ghazal by the 
roving murahalin (Arab militias) forced large numbers of destitute 
people to evacuate the war zone in 1986 and 1987, many of them 
making their way to northern Sudan to escape starvation. Raid- 
ing decreased in 1988 and diminished further in 1989 as a result 
of depopulation of the land and a stronger SPLA presence in north- 
ern Bahr al Ghazal. Nevertheless, the migrations continued because 
of the severe food shortage. Almost 1 million southerners were 
believed to have reached Khartoum in 1989, and hundreds of 



243 



Sudan: A Country Study 



International 

boundary 

Administrative 

boundary 

State boundary 

I 1 Territory controlled by 
Sudanese People's 
Liberation Army (SPLA) 

• Towns in SPLA hands 

® Government garrison 

® National capital 

100 200 Kilometers 
I ' r- 1 1 



DARFUR 



\ 



? f 



r~1 




yr iJaysan 
Malut^J Kunpuk^? 



\ ^ Tonga (§>, 

-^bahralghazalV, \ AN . rr 



i 



A 



Rumbek^ 

S_/' 



Pocha1a\ 
9Kongor \ 

*Pibor \ 
x >Sor pos f « 



\ „ Maridi AL IStlWAI 
x . Nzara • ^ V" HI 

^ YambioJIolion « mjuba 



/ 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative. 



Figure 8. The Civil War in Southern Sudan, Spring 1991 



thousands had appeared in other towns and cities. About 350,000 
Sudanese refugees were registered in Ethiopia in 1989, at least 
100,000 were in Juba, and 28,000 crossed into Uganda to escape 
the fighting in southern Al Istiwai. 

Sudanese People's Armed Forces 

The armed forces of the national government, known as the 
Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF), were believed to have 



244 



National Security 



a total personnel strength of about 71 ,500 in 1991 . The army num- 
bered about 65,000 officers and enlisted men. The navy had perhaps 
500, and the air force and air defense command each had a com- 
plement of about 3,000. 

General Bashir, the chairman of the RCC-NS and head of state 
since the coup of June 1989, was also supreme commander of the 
armed forces and minister of defense. A colonel at the time of the 
coup, Bashir subsequently assumed the rank of lieutenant general. 
The SPAF chief of staff, Lieutenant General Ishaq Ibrahim Umar, 
was in immediate command of the armed forces. The general staff 
included deputy chiefs of staff for operations, administration, and 
logistics, who also held the rank of lieutenant general. The com- 
mander of the air force, the commander of air defense command, 
division commanders, and most military governors held the rank 
of major general. A retired major general was appointed minister 
of state for defense affairs to serve as Bashir' s deputy in the Ministry 
of Defence (see fig. 9). The actual responsibilities and influence 
of senior officers depended greatly on their political status, ethnic 
affiliation, and other factors in addition to their positions in the 
chain of command. 

Army 

The army was basically a light infantry force in 1991, supported 
by specialized elements. Operational control extended from the 
headquarters of the general staff in Khartoum to the six regional 
commands (central, eastern, western, northern, southern, and 
Khartoum). Each regional command was organized along divisional 
lines. Thus, the Fifth Division was at Al Ubayyid in Kurdufan 
(Central Command), the Second Division was at Khashm al Qirbah 
(Eastern Command), the Sixth Division was assigned to Al Fashir 
in Darfur (Western Command), the First Division was at Juba 
(Southern Command), and the Seventh Armored Division was at 
Ash Shajarah near Khartoum (Khartoum Command). The Air- 
borne Division was based at Khartoum International Airport. The 
Third Division was located in the north, although no major troop 
units were assigned to it. Each division had a liaison officer attached 
to general headquarters in Khartoum to facilitate the division's com- 
munication with various command elements. 

This organizational structure did not provide an accurate pic- 
ture of actual troop deployments. All of the divisions were under- 
strength. The Sixth Division in Darfur was a reorganized brigade 
with only 2,500 personnel. Unit strengths varied widely. Most 
brigades were composed of 1,000 to 1,500 troops. Each battalion 
varied in size from 500 to 900 men, and a company might have 



245 



Sudan: A Country Study 




246 



National Security 



as few as 150 and as many as 500. In the south, the First Division 
was supplemented by a number of independent brigades that could 
be shifted as the requirements of the conflict dictated. According 
to The Military Balance, 1991-1992, the main army units were two 
armored brigades, one mechanized infantry brigade, seventeen in- 
fantry brigades, one paratroop brigade, one air assault brigade, 
one reconnaissance brigade, three artillery regiments, two anti- 
aircraft artillery brigades, one engineering regiment, and one special 
forces battalion. 

The army did not have its own general headquarters but func- 
tioned under the immediate control of the deputy chief of staff for 
operations. Headquarters and training facilities were maintained 
in or near the national capital area for most of its specialized corps. 
These included the armored, artillery, signal, and medical service 
administrations; the transportation and supply corps; and the en- 
gineering branch. Among other support elements were the mili- 
tary police and the border guards. 

The Sudanese army's inventory of armaments and equipment 
was extremely varied, reflecting its shifting military relations with 
other nations in a position to supply arms. At different times, Brit- 
ain, the Soviet Union, China, the United States, Libya, and Egypt 
have been important sources of weaponry (see Foreign Military 
Assistance, this ch.). Much of the equipment delivered to Sudan, 
particularly from the Soviet Union, was obsolescent, and main- 
tenance has been seriously deficient. Because Sudan had been 
deprived of support from a number of countries and was unable 
to afford foreign exchange to pay for needed spare parts, much 
of the existing stock of arms was believed to be inoperable. The 
army was virtually immobilized at times for lack of fuel and am- 
munition. 

During the 1970s, the bulk of the army's armored strength con- 
sisted of T-54 and T-55 medium tanks delivered by the Soviet 
Union early in the decade. About seventy Chinese Type 62 light 
tanks were also delivered in 1972. During the early 1980s, this 
equipment was supplemented by M-41, M-47, and M-60A3 tanks 
produced in the United States. Most of the Soviet tanks were be- 
lieved to be unserviceable, and only the M-60A3 tanks were con- 
sidered to be up-to-date. The Sudanese army also had a mixed 
collection of armored personnel carriers (APCs), armored recon- 
naissance vehicles, and other wheeled fighting vehicles. The most 
modern of these were 36 M-113 APCs and 100 Commando-type 
armored cars from the United States, and 120 Walid APCs from 
Egypt (see table 12, Appendix). 



247 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Artillery pieces included a number of guns and howitzers mostly 
of United States and Soviet origin. All of the artillery was towed 
with the exception of 155mm self-propelled howitzers acquired from 
France in 1981 . The army's modest antitank capability was based 
on the jeep-mounted Swingfire guided-wire missile, manufactured 
in Egypt under British license. 

Air Force 

The air force has been largely dependent on foreign assistance 
since its inception in 1957, when four primary trainer aircraft were 
delivered by Egypt. The British provided most aircraft and train- 
ing (some in Sudan and some in Britain) before 1967. After that 
time, Soviet and Chinese advisers and technicians assumed a sup- 
portive role, and their equipment became the foundation for the 
Sudanese air force in the 1970s. These aircraft included Soviet- 
built MiG-17 and MiG-21 fighter-bombers and Chinese-built J-5 
(essentially the same as the MiG-17) and J-6 (practically identical 
to the Soviet MiG-19) fighter-bombers. Seven Northrop F-5Es and 
two F-5Fs were delivered by the United States beginning in 1981 , 
but plans to acquire additional F-5s never materialized because 
funds were not available. Libya transferred five Soviet MiG-23s 
in 1987. 

As of 1990, combat aircraft were organized into two fighter- 
ground attack squadrons (one with the nine F-5s and the other 
with ten J-5s), and one fighter squadron with J-6s. A second fighter 
squadron of MiG-21 s and MiG-23s was listed, although it was be- 
lieved that as of 1991 all of the MiGs were nonoperational with 
the exception of one MiG-23. The combat squadrons were armed 
with Soviet Atoll and American Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. 
Sudan had no bomber force. In 1986 it was reported that Libyan 
Tu-22 bombers had been used against rebel positions in the south. 
Other bombing attacks were carried out by transport planes (see 
table 13, Appendix). 

The actual state of readiness of the combat arm of the air force 
was uncertain, but it was believed that much of the equipment was 
not in serviceable condition owing to a shortage of parts and in- 
adequate maintenance. Pilot proficiency training was limited by 
fuel shortages that kept aircraft grounded. A small contingent of 
Chinese technicians assisted with maintenance and pilot training. 
A few training aircraft were also supplied by the Chinese. The air 
force had been of little value in providing air cover for ground oper- 
ations in the south. The SPLA boasted that its shoulder-fired 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) had brought down many aircraft, 



248 



Sudanese army soldiers in T-54 tanks 
Courtesy Thomas Ofcansky 

claiming that several jet fighters had been destroyed, as well as a 
number of helicopters and transports. 

The transport arm of the air force was of central importance in 
maintaining supply links with beleaguered southern garrisons. The 
single transport squadron received six C-130H Hercules transports 
from the United States in 1978 and 1979. Although one was 
damaged by an SPLA missile in 1987, the five aircraft still opera- 
tional in 1991 provided airlift capability essential to government 
garrisons in the south. The air force also had two Canadian-built 
DHC-5D Buffalo transports and two Soviet An- 12 heavy cargo 
transports, as well as four smaller Casa C-212 Aviocars from Brazil. 

The air force had a number of unarmed helicopters available 
for ground support operations against the southern rebels, although 
it was estimated that as many as 50 percent were not in flying con- 
dition. The newest helicopter models were French-designed SA-330 
Pumas assembled in Romania and Agusta/Bell 212s manufactured 
in Italy. 

The two main bases of the air force were at Khartoum Interna- 
tional Airport and Wadi Sayyidna Air Base north of Omdurman. 
The air force also had facilities at civilian airports, including those 
at Atbarah, Al Fashir, Juba, Malakal, Al Ubayyid, Port Sudan, 
and Wad Madani. 



249 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Air Defense Command 

The air defense command maintained its headquarters at Port 
Sudan and was commanded by a major general. A secondary com- 
mand post was at Omdurman. One of its two brigades was equipped 
with antiaircraft guns and the other was armed with SAMs (see 
table 14, Appendix). The three battalions of SAMs had been in- 
troduced to provide high- and medium- altitude air defense for Port 
Sudan, Wadi Sayyidna, and Khartoum. In the absence of Soviet 
technicians who had serviced the missiles and associated radar dur- 
ing the 1970s, the SA-2 systems were considered to be nonopera- 
tional. 

The second air defense brigade was deployed to provide tactical 
air defense in the Western Command and Southern Command. 
In addition to Vulcan 20mm self-propelled guns supplied by the 
United States, it was equipped with a variety of weapons whose 
operational status was uncertain. Fire control and acquisition radar 
for the Vulcan and other systems was provided by the United States, 
Egypt, and France. The vulnerability of Sudanese air defenses was 
exposed in 1984 when a Libyan Tu-22 bomber was able to overfly 
much of the country in daylight, dropping bombs in the vicinity 
of the national radio station at Omdurman at a time of tension 
between Nimeiri and Qadhafl. 

Navy 

The navy, formed in 1962, was the smallest branch of the coun- 
try's military establishment. Its personnel strength was uncertain 
but was estimated at 500 officers and men. Headed by a brigadier 
general from headquarters in Port Sudan, the service was respon- 
sible for coastal and riverine defense and for deterring smuggling 
along the Red Sea coast. A Nile River patrol unit was based at 
Khartoum. 

The navy was formed originally around a nucleus of four armed 
coastal patrol boats provided by Yugoslavia. Subsequently, river 
patrol boats, landing craft, and auxiliary vessels were also obtained 
from Yugoslavia, and a Yugoslav training staff was on hand until 
1972. In 1975 the Yugoslav patrol boats were replaced by two 
seventy-ton patrol craft and four ten-ton patrol craft transferred 
from Iran and armed with machine guns. In 1989 four new 19.5-ton 
riverine fast patrol craft armed with 20mm and 7.62mm machine 
guns were delivered by Yugoslavia for operations on the White Nile. 
The purpose of the new craft was to protect river convoys of sup- 
plies and troops to the south. The operational status of the two large 
patrol craft was regarded as uncertain in 1990. The general standard 



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of efficiency of the navy was considered to be inadequate as a con- 
sequence of a lack of maintenance and spare parts. Most auxiliary 
vessels had drifted into a state of total disrepair (see table 15, Ap- 
pendix). 

The navy was assigned two Casa C-212 aircraft, operated by air 
force crews, which had a limited capacity to carry out maritime recon- 
naissance over the Red Sea. The airplanes were unarmed. 

Personnel 

The Sudanese armed forces have not been the source of any strain 
on the nation's manpower resources. In 1990 there were an esti- 
mated 5,600,000 males between the ages of 15 and 49, of whom 
3,400,000 were fit for military service. The number reaching the 
military age of eighteen annually was approximately 273,000. The 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
estimated that, as of 1989, only 2.5 persons per 1,000 of popula- 
tion were in the armed forces. Among Sudan's neighbors, cor- 
responding figures were Egypt 8.7 per 1,000, Ethiopia 5.0 per 
1,000, and Libya 21.0 per 1,000. 

In the first years after independence, recruitment notices report- 
edly attracted ten applicants for each vacancy. Poorer Sudanese, 
particularly westerners and southerners, were attracted to the armed 
forces in great numbers. Not all could be accommodated, so that 
selection of enlisted men was fairly strict, based on physical condi- 
tion, education, and character of the applicant. Although the adult 
literacy rate in Sudan was then estimated to be no more than 20 
percent, enlisted personnel were required to have some ability to 
read and write. The recruit enlisted for three years, and if his record 
remained good, he could reenlist for further three-year periods until 
he had served a total of twenty years, at which time he was retired 
with the highest rank he had attained. Soldiers who received tech- 
nical training could be obliged to sign an understanding that they 
would remain on active duty for nine years. 

There were reports as of the late 1980s that the morale of the 
army had suffered because soldiers from other areas of Sudan dis- 
liked assignment to the south, where they faced an interminable 
war in which they had no personal interest and in which a military 
victory seemed unattainable. Newer recruits, many from the west, 
felt isolated and threatened in the besieged garrison towns. Large 
numbers of government troops whose homes were in the south had 
reportedly deserted to the SPLA, their motivation for continuing 
the struggle against the insurgency drained by food shortages and 
lack of needed supplies. Both under the Sadiq al Mahdi govern- 
ment and immediately after the June 1989 coup, the leadership 



251 



Sudan: A Country Study 

announced that conscription would be introduced to permit an ex- 
pansion of the government's efforts in the south, but the rate of 
enlistments had apparently remained high enough so that it had 
not been necessary to impose a draft. It was possible that, in the 
light of widespread economic distress, the army was still regarded 
as a means of escape from poverty. 

Pay rates of both officers and noncommissioned officers gener- 
ally have been equal to or better than those of civilians of com- 
parable status. Base pay was extremely low by United States 
standards; a colonel received the equivalent of about US$150 a 
month in 1990. Military personnel were, however, entitled to ex- 
tensive additional benefits. Housing was provided for senior per- 
sonnel commensurate with their office and rank, and generous 
housing allowances were provided for others. Free medical care 
was provided to all armed forces personnel and their families. 
Although the country was suffering from a food scarcity, essential 
goods were available at commissaries at subsidized prices. Items 
severely rationed in the civilian economy, such as tea, coffee, sugar, 
and soap, as well as bread produced by military bakeries, could 
be purchased at low prices and resold at a considerable profit. This 
trade offered a welcome supplement to the incomes of the junior 
ranks. Officers outside Khartoum usually held second jobs. En- 
listed personnel were likely to set themselves up as small farmers 
or traders with profits from the resale of rationed goods. Officers 
of field grade and above could purchase imported automobiles free 
of duty; higher-ranking officers were assigned full-time cars and 
drivers. Gasoline was also available at low prices. In addition, senior 
officers had numerous opportunities to travel abroad at govern- 
ment expense. 

Retirement income was virtually as high as the active duty salary, 
and most of the privileges of military service continued. 

The behavior of government soldiers in the south and in the areas 
where the SPLA was active was the subject of critical reports by 
Amnesty International, Africa Watch, and other international 
human rights groups. Amnesty International described numerous 
incidents in which the army was responsible for the deliberate kill- 
ing or mistreatment of civilians from ethnic groups suspected of 
supporting the SPLA. Very few SPLA prisoners of war were held 
by the government; many cases were documented of captured SPLA 
fighters, including wounded, being executed without trial. 

Few if any prosecutions resulted in connection with the alleged 
violations. The United States Department of State has confirmed 
Amnesty International's conclusion that the Sadiq al Mahdi govern- 
ment appeared to condone human rights abuses by the military, 



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citing the cases of generals who received promotions after service 
in areas where atrocities occurred. There was limited evidence of 
a shift in attitude by the Bashir government after it assumed power 
in 1989. Two of the implicated generals were forced to retire from 
government service, and some soldiers were relieved, although not 
disciplined, after a series of revenge killings and other violations 
against civilians in Waw. 

Although the Bashir government had announced its intention of 
purging the armed services of women after it came to power in 1989, 
large-scale dismissals did not take place. As of 1991 , it was reported 
that about 2,000 women were in uniform, 200 of them officers 
through the rank of lieutenant colonel. The women were assigned 
to a range of military duties in the medical service as nurses, dieti- 
tians, and physical therapists, and in administration, translation, 
military intelligence, communications, and public affairs. 

Training 

The SPAF established numerous institutions for training its mili- 
tary personnel. Foreign military observers believed that the train- 
ing offered was of a professional caliber within the limitations of 
available resources. The Military College at Wadi Sayyidna, near 
Omdurman, had been Sudan's primary source of officer training 
since it opened in 1948. A two-year program, emphasizing study 
of political and military science and physical training, led to a com- 
mission as a second lieutenant in the SPAF. In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, an average of 120 to 150 officers were graduated from 
the academy each year. In the late 1950s, roughly 60 graduated 
each year, peaking to more than 500 in early 1972 as a result of 
mobilization brought on by the first southern rebellion. Students 
from other Arab and African countries were also trained at the Mili- 
tary College, and in 1982 sixty Ugandans were graduated as part 
of a Sudanese contribution to rebuilding the Ugandan army after 
Amin's removal from power. It was announced in 1990 that 600 
members of the National Islamic Front's associated militia, the 
Popular Defence Forces (PDF), had been selected to attend the Mili- 
tary College to help fill the ranks of the officer corps depleted by 
resignations or dismissals (see Paramilitary Groups, this ch.). 

The Military College's course of study, while rigorous, was re- 
portedly weak in scientific and technical instruction. Junior officers 
were, however, given opportunities to continue their education at 
the University of Khartoum. Many officers also studied abroad. 
It was estimated that at least 50 percent had received some school- 
ing in Egypt. Others were sent to the United States, Britain (pilots 
and mechanics), Germany (helicopter pilots), and Middle Eastern 
countries. Most high naval officers had been trained at the Yugoslav 



253 



Sudan: A Country Study 

naval academy; other naval officers were detailed for training in 
the states of the Persian Gulf. Opportunities for training abroad 
were greatly curtailed, however, as a result of international disap- 
proval of the policies of the Bashir government. 

Since the early 1970s, the Staff College in Omdurman has gradu- 
ated fifty-five to sixty majors and lieutenant colonels annually with 
masters' degrees in military science. Officers from other Arab 
countries — Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates — at- 
tended, as well as some Palestinians. Since 1981 the High Mili- 
tary Academy in Omdurman, a war college designed to prepare 
colonels and brigadier generals for more senior positions, offered 
a six-month course on national security issues. The academy was 
commissioned to produce strategic analyses for consideration by 
the Bashir government. 

In addition to the academies, the SPAF also operated a variety 
of technical schools for junior and noncommissioned officers, in- 
cluding infantry, artillery, communications, ordnance, engineer- 
ing, and armored schools, all in the vicinity of Khartoum. An air 
force training center at Wadi Sayyidna Air Base was constructed 
with Chinese help to train technicians in aircraft maintenance, 
ground control, and other skills. In the army, recruitment and basic 
training of enlisted personnel were not centralized but were the 
responsibility of each division and regional command. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

Before 1970 the highest officer grade in the rank structure was 
that of fariq (equivalent to a lieutenant general), but new grades 
were added when Nimeiri became a general and, later, a field 
marshal. As of 1991, however, there were no officers higher than 
lieutenant general, and only five, including Bashir, at that rank 
(see fig. 10). 

The army service uniform was dark green, with insignia of rank 
displayed in gold on shoulder boards. It differed only slightly from 
police officer uniforms, which were another shade of green with 
black shoulder boards. A green beret was standard in the army 
except for airborne units, which wore red berets. The police wore 
black berets. Officers of field grade and above frequently wore ser- 
vice caps. The air force uniform was blue, although the insignia 
of rank were the same as for the army. The standard naval uni- 
form was white with blue shoulder boards. 

Defense Costs 

The civil war in the south had a devastating impact. Not only 
were military operations in the south a great expense, but the 



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National Security 



economy was disrupted by the fighting, and perhaps 3 million per- 
sons were displaced from or within the war zones. Because of secrecy 
restrictions dating from the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, no sub- 
stantial information on the defense budget was released publicly 
or provided to the People's Assembly, which, however, had been 
suspended in 1989. Various official and unofficial estimates of the 
size of defense expenditures and the burden imposed on the econ- 
omy by the military establishment have differed widely. A United 
States government agency estimated the defense budget at US$610 
million in 1989, representing 7.2 percent of gross national product 
(GNP — see Glossary). The Sudanese government has estimated 
the cost of conducting the war at about US$1 million a day. 

Although the specific components of military spending were not 
available, it was known that the principal category of the defense 
budget was personnel-related costs. Most large purchases of arms 
had been financed with credits from the supplying countries. Finan- 
cial assistance from other countries, principally the Arab oil- 
producing states of the Persian Gulf, had made these credit pur- 
chases possible. Arms imports had fallen since the resumption of 
the civil war in 1983, as a result of the unwillingness of Western 
countries to supply weapons that could be used in the hostilities, 
and of subsequent cutbacks in financial aid from the Middle East. 
The total amount of funds for military procurements available 
through loans, grants, direct purchases, and barter arrangements 
was not made public. 

Paramilitary Groups 

Various militia groups, supplied and supported by the govern- 
ment, have served as important adjuncts to the armed forces in 
the fighting in the south. Beginning in 1983, when the first militias 
were formed under Nimeiri, the government increasingly relied 
on the militias to oppose the SPLA. The militias were given arms 
and ammunition but usually operated independently of the army. 
No reliable data were available on the size of militia forces, although 
it has been roughly estimated that 20,000 men participated in militia 
activities at one time or another. 

The Any a Nya II group, formed among southern mutineers from 
the army (after first splitting off from the rebel movement and ob- 
taining weapons and training from the SPAF), was a major factor 
in the war between 1984 and 1987. Predominantly from the Nuer, 
the second largest ethnic group in the south, Anya Nya II fought 
in rural areas of Aali an Nil on behalf of the government. Anya 
Nya II emerged as a significant factor in the war in that province, 
disrupting SPLA operations and interfering with the movement 



255 




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National Security 



of SPLA recruits to the Ethiopian border area for training. Any a 
Nya II units were structured with military ranks and were based 
near various army garrisons. The government assisted the group 
in establishing a headquarters in Khartoum as part of regime ef- 
forts to promote Anya Nya II as an alternative southern political 
movement in opposition to the SPLA. Eventually, however, SPLA 
military success led to a decline in morale within Anya Nya II and 
induced major units, along with their commanders, to defect to 
the SPLA beginning in late 1987. By mid- 1989, only one Anya 
Nya II faction remained loyal to the government; it continued its 
close relations with the government after the Bashir coup and re- 
tained its political base in Khartoum. 

Some of the most devastating raids and acts of banditry against 
the civilian population were perpetrated by the militias known as 
murahalin, formed among the Rizeiqat, Rufaa al Huj, Misiriyah, 
and other groups, all members of the cattle-raising Baqqara Arab 
nomad tribes in Darfur and Kurdufan. These Arab communities 
traditionally competed for pasture land with the Dinka of north- 
ern Bahr al Ghazal and southern Kurdufan. Raiding by the mura- 
halin between 1985 and 1988 precipitated a vast displacement of 
Dinka civilians from Bahr al Ghazal. Although already armed, the 
murahalin were given arms and ammunition and some covert train- 
ing by the SPAF. Some joint counterinsurgency operations also 
took place in conjunction with government forces. According to 
Amnesty International, the raids carried out by the murahalin were 
accompanied by the deliberate killing of tens of thousands of 
civilians; the abduction of women and children, who were forced 
into slavery; the looting of cattle and other livestock; and the burning 
of houses and grain supplies. By late 1988, the growing presence 
of the SPLA reduced the threat of the murahalin against villages 
and cattle camps. Moreover, the devastation was so severe that 
little was left to plunder. Dinka refugees moving north to escape 
famine were still exposed to militia attacks, however. 

The Rizeiqat murahalin were responsible for one of the worst 
atrocities of the war when, in retaliation for losses suffered in an 
engagement with the SPLA, more than 1 ,000 unarmed Dinka were 
massacred at the rail junction of Ad Duayn, most of them burned 
to death. The tactics of the Misiriyah murahalin were similar to those 
of the Rizeiqat; their ambushes of refugees and attacks on villagers 
in northeastern Bahr al Ghazal were among the most murderous 
and destructive of any perpetrated by the militia groups. The 
government armed the Rufaa al Huj as a militia in 1986, after the 
SPLA appeared in southern Al Awsat Province to recruit follow- 
ers among the non-Arab peoples of the area. In the early months 



257 



Sudan: A Country Study 

of 1987, combined operations by the SPAF and the Rufaa al Huj 
militia against non-Arab populations in retaliation for the SPLA 
offensive resulted in many atrocities. 

The government also armed as militias a number of southern 
non-Arab tribes opposed to the SPLA. In 1985 members of the 
Mundari in Al Istiwai, who were hostile to the Dinka because of 
their ruthless behavior, were recruited to help counter the grow- 
ing SPLA threat in that province. Most of the Mundari dissoci- 
ated themselves from the militia, however, as the presence of the 
SPLA strengthened in Al Istiwai. In Bahr al Ghazal, the govern- 
ment formed a militia concentrated around Waw, and established 
a training base for it there. Hostile relations with the Dinka in the 
area spawned considerable violence, culminating in massacres in 
August and September 1987 among Dinka who had taken refuge 
in Waw. 

In February 1989, Sadiq al Mahdi proposed that the murahalin 
militias be institutionalized into popular defense committees. 
Although the armed forces apparently went ahead with the forma- 
tion of some such committees, the proposals were strongly opposed 
by other political groups in Khartoum, who feared that the mura- 
halin would become a factional fighting unit loyal to Sadiq al 
Mahdi' s Umma Party. 

In October 1989, the Bashir government promulgated the Popu- 
lar Defence Act, whose original purpose seemed to be to proceed 
with the plan of the previous government to give legitimacy to the 
militias as auxiliaries of the SPAF. The government established 
a new paramilitary body, the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), to 
promote the political objectives of the government and the NIF. 
This action did not, however, result in the disappearance of the 
existing militias. The PDF was under the command of a brigadier 
general of the army, and its recruits were armed with AK-47 as- 
sault rifles. According to the government, the weapons would be 
stored in army depots and distributed only when needed. 

Both men and women ostensibly were enrolled on a voluntary 
basis, although some coercion was reported. Military officers and 
civil servants at all levels were also recruited, particularly those wish- 
ing to demonstrate their loyalty to the Islamic activist movement. 
Membership in the PDF was required for admission to a univer- 
sity and for most significant positions in northern society. 

The original period of training was to be for up to three months, 
and refresher training could last up to fifteen days a year. In June 
1990, the government held a graduation for the second PDF training 
class, numbering 1 ,287 persons. According to the chief of the PDF, 
more than ten PDF camps would be located in various parts of 



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the country; each camp would be capable of training three groups 
of 5,000 a year. The government's target was a PDF personnel 
of 150,000, but independent observers doubted that this goal could 
be achieved with available resources or that the PDF would assume 
more than a marginal role in maintaining internal security. 

Foreign Military Assistance 

Sudan lacked a reliable source of military materiel as of mid- 1991 , 
even though the country faced a severe shortage of equipment and 
of support items. Most of its weaponry of Soviet design was more 
than twenty years old and could be kept operational only with the 
limited help provided by Libya and China. As a result, most of 
the Soviet tanks, artillery, missiles, and aircraft were not in ser- 
viceable condition. Western suppliers were unwilling to provide 
arms for use against the southern insurgents. Military credits previ- 
ously available from Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Persian 
Gulf had been cut off as a reaction to Sudan's continued support 
of Iraq, following Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Egypt, normally 
an important source of both equipment and training, had severely 
curtailed its cooperation with the Bashir government. Some as- 
sistance, particularly in the form of munitions, had been provided 
by Iraq, but this help had ended in August 1990. Although Libya 
and China continued to provide some military items, the supply 
from China was limited by the strict financial terms imposed by 
the Beijing authorities. 

Except for a production line for small caliber ammunition, Sudan 
has never had an arms industry. Consequently, foreign sources 
for weapons, equipment, ammunition, and technical training have 
been indispensable. After independence British advisers helped train 
the Sudanese army and air force, and British equipment predomi- 
nated in the ground forces. Relations between the government in 
Khartoum and London were periodically strained, however, and 
after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, diplomatic and military ties 
were severed. Military links with the United States and the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany (West Germany) were also broken for 
a time. 

The breach with the Western nations was followed by a period 
of close military cooperation with the Soviet Union between 1968 
and 1971. Sudan benefited from the Soviet Union's first signifi- 
cant military assistance program in a sub-Saharan Africa coun- 
try. By 1970 it was estimated that there were 2,000 Soviet and East 
European technical advisers in the country. About 350 Sudanese 
received training in the Soviet Union and other communist coun- 
tries. Soviet assistance corresponded with a dramatic growth in the 



259 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Sudanese armed forces from 18,000 in 1966 to nearly 50,000 by 
1972. The bulk of the equipment used by the ground and air forces 
throughout the 1970s and until the early 1980s was of Soviet ori- 
gin, including tanks, artillery, and MiG combat aircraft. 

Vulnerabilities resulting from overreliance on one arms supplier 
became obvious when relations with the Soviet Union cooled con- 
siderably following the coup attempt against Nimeiri in 1971 . Soviet 
and East European military advisers were expelled from Sudan for 
a year. After relations were repaired, previously arranged deliver- 
ies of tanks were completed and a new purchase of combat aircraft 
was negotiated. Military agreements with the Soviet Union re- 
mained in force until 1977, but Sudan began to pursue a policy 
of diversifying its arms sources. When Moscow promised exten- 
sive military aid to the revolutionary regime in neighboring Ethio- 
pia, the Sudanese government expelled all ninety Soviet military 
advisers and ordered the military section of the Soviet embassy in 
Khartoum closed. 

After its relations with the Soviet Union chilled again, Sudan 
turned to China, which supplied the SPAF initially with light 
weapons and later delivered fighter aircraft and light tanks. As of 
the mid-1980s, about fifty Chinese advisers provided maintenance 
support for tanks and aircraft, including Soviet equipment previ- 
ously supplied, and trained Sudanese pilots and aircraft mechanics. 

Military cooperation with Britain resumed in 1973, although it 
was confined mainly to training and instruction at the Military Col- 
lege and the armored, infantry, and signals schools. Yugoslavia 
assisted in founding the Sudanese navy; for more than a decade 
it provided all of the vessels and the bulk of officer and technical 
training. The Yugoslav naval support program was not renewed 
in 1972, however, because of frustrations the Yugoslavs had en- 
countered in accomplishing their mission. In 1989 four more river 
craft were acquired from Yugoslavia, and subsequendy a Yugo- 
slav delegation was reported to have visited Khartoum to discuss 
a revival of training assistance. 

The purchase of weapons from Western countries was financed 
largely by oil-rich Arab states that were pleased to see Soviet in- 
fluence in Sudan ended. Arab financial assistance, especially from 
Saudi Arabia, was instrumental in the purchase in 1977 of six C-130 
Hercules transport aircraft from the United States, estimated to 
cost US$74 million, and two Buffalo transports from Canada. Saudi 
assistance was also credited for Sudan's acquisition of ten light 
helicopters and as many as 4,000 vehicles from West Germany. 
In addition, Saudi Arabia in 1980 supplied the SPAF with seventy 



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National Security 



used American-built M-41 and M-47 tanks from its reserve in- 
ventory. 

Until 1985 Sudan maintained its closest military ties with Egypt. 
Under a twenty-five-year defense agreement signed in 1976, the 
two countries established a joint defense council, a joint general 
staff organization, and a permanent military committee to imple- 
ment decisions of the joint council and the staff organization. Since 
1986 Egypt has provided Egyptian-manufactured Swingfire anti- 
tank missiles, Walid armored personnel carriers, ammunition, and 
other equipment to Sudan. Although Sadiq al Mahdi declared his 
intention to abrogate the defense pact in order to meet a key SPLA 
condition for peace, Bashir reaffirmed the pact after his takeover 
in 1989. The internal repressions of the new government and 
Sudan's refusal to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, 
however, produced discord between the two nations, and Egypt 
rejected appeals from Sudanese leaders for additional military aid. 

Until 1976 United States military aid to Sudan was negligible, 
consisting primarily of training in the United States for a small 
number of Sudanese officers. Soon after officially agreeing in 
November 1976 to provide Sudan with selected arms, the United 
States sold Sudan transport aircraft financed by Saudi Arabia, fol- 
lowed several years later by F-5 combat airplanes. Believing that 
Sudan was threatened by neighboring Ethiopian and Libyan forces 
heavily armed by the Soviet Union, Washington adopted a grow- 
ing role in Sudan's security. Between fiscal year (FY — see Glos- 
sary) 1979 and FY 1982, military sales credits rose from US$5 
million to US$100 million. Subsequent aid was extended on a grant 
basis. In addition to aircraft, United States aid consisted of APCs, 
M-60 tanks, artillery, and Commando armored cars. United States 
grant aid reached a peak of US$101 million in FY 1982; at the 
time, this amount constituted two-thirds of all United States mili- 
tary assistance to sub-Saharan Africa. Between the inception of the 
program in 1976 and its virtual termination in 1986, military grants 
and sales credits to Sudan totaled US$154 million and US$161 mil- 
lion, respectively. Sudan granted the United States naval port fa- 
cilities at Port Sudan and agreed to some airport prepositioning 
rights for military equipment for contingent use by the United States 
Central Command. Sudanese and United States forces participated 
in joint maneuvers designated Operation Bright Star in 1981 and 
1983. 

When civil war again erupted in the south in 1983, military grants 
and credits from the United States dropped abruptly, and in 1985 
Sudan terminated Operation Bright Star. After FY 1987, no as- 
sistance was extended with the exception of less than US$1 million 



261 



Sudan: A Country Study 

annually for advanced training for Sudanese officers and training 
in the maintenance of previously supplied equipment. Military aid 
was formally suspended in 1989 under a provision of the United 
States Foreign Assistance Act prohibiting assistance to countries 
in arrears on interest payments on previous loans. In March 1990, 
the United States also invoked a provision of the act barring as- 
sistance to regimes overthrowing a democratic government. 

According to a survey by AC DA of sources of arms imported 
by Sudan, Sudan obtained about US$350 million in military arms 
and equipment between 1983 and 1988. The United States was 
the largest supplier, accounting for US$120 million. China and 
France each provided US$30 million and Britain US$10 million. 
About US$160 million came from unidentified sources, probably 
largely from Egypt and Libya, and as purchases from other Western 
suppliers financed by Arab countries. 

Sudanese People's Liberation Army 

The SPLA was formed in 1983 when Lieutenant Colonel John 
Garang of the SPAF was sent to quell a mutiny in Bor of 500 
southern troops who were resisting orders to be rotated to the north. 
Instead of ending the mutiny, Garang encouraged mutinies in other 
garrisons and set himself at the head of the rebellion against the 
Khartoum government. Garang, a Dinka born into a Christian 
family, had studied at Grinnell College, Iowa, and later returned 
to the United States to take a company commanders' course at Fort 
Benning, Georgia, and again to earn advanced economics degrees 
at Iowa State University. 

By 1986 the SPLA was estimated to have 12,500 adherents or- 
ganized into twelve battalions and equipped with small arms and 
a few mortars. Recruits were trained across the border in Ethio- 
pia, probably with the help of Ethiopian army officers. By 1989 
the SPLA's strength had reached 20,000 to 30,000; by 1991 it was 
estimated at 50,000 to 60,000. Many members of the SPLA con- 
tinued their civilian occupations, serving in individual campaigns 
when called upon. At least forty battalions had been formed, bearing 
such names as Tiger, Crocodile, Fire, Nile, Kalishnikov, Bee, 
Eagle, and Hippo. 

In addition to Garang, who as commander in chief adopted the 
rank of colonel, other senior officers included a field commander, 
a chief of staff, and a chief of staff for administration and logistics. 
Most of these officers, as well as zonal commanders, held the rank 
of lieutenant colonel; battalion commanders were majors or cap- 
tains. Promotion was based on seniority and the number of bat- 
tles fought. Consequently, most of the senior leadership and field 



262 



SPLA soldier guarding 
a cattle vaccination program 
near Kapoeta, June 1988 
Courtesy Roger Winter 



SPLA-built bridge on road between 
Kapoeta and Torit in 
eastern A I Istiwai, 1990 
Courtesy Roger Winter 



Sudan: A Country Study 

commanders were members of the Dinka group. Others were from 
the Nuer and Shilluk groups. Members of some other groups from 
Al Istiwai were given commands to help win over members of their 
groups. 

The SPLA claimed that its arms came from captured govern- 
ment stocks or were brought by troops deserting from the SPAF. 
It admitted to having received a considerable amount of support 
and materiel from Libya before 1985 because of Libya's hostility 
toward Nimeiri and its desire to see him overthrown. It denied 
receiving arms from Ethiopia, although it operated from bases in 
Ethiopia, and outside observers believed that that country furnished 
the bulk of the SPLA's weaponry. The government's claims that 
the SPLA had Israeli advisers and received equipment from Israel 
were generally discounted. Its small arms included Soviet, United 
States, and German assault rifles. According to The Military Balance, 
1991-1992, the SPLA also had 60mm mortars, 14.5mm antiaircraft 
guns, and Soviet SA-7 shoulder-fired SAMs. Other sources claimed 
that the SPLA had captured or otherwise acquired howitzers, heav- 
ier mortars, BM-21 truck-mounted rocket launchers, jeep-mounted 
106mm antitank recoilless rifles, and about twenty armored vehi- 
cles. It had a supply of land mines that were widely used. 

Amnesty International and Africa Watch have cited deliberate 
killings by the SPLA of SPAF and militia prisoners captured in 
combat, and of civilians believed to be informers or opposed to 
the insurgency movement. Although about 300 government troops 
were being held by the SPLA as of mid- 1989, there were reports 
that after the capture of Bor, surrendering soldiers, possibly num- 
bering in the hundreds, were shot. Indiscriminate SPLA rocket 
and mortar attacks on government-held towns resulted in many 
civilian casualties. 

State of Internal Security 

A population divided among nearly 600 ethnic groups and tribal 
units and a conspicuous split between a largely Arab population 
in the north and black, non-Muslim southerners meant that Sudan's 
government had a high potential for instability. Political movements 
based on these regional, tribal, religious, and socioeconomic divi- 
sions have been responsible for numerous breakdowns of author- 
ity. Nimeiri' s autonomy solution for the south in 1972 ended the 
first civil war. His decision in 1981 to abolish the Southern Regional 
Assembly and the later redivision of the south into three regions, 
however, revived southern opposition and helped to reignite the 
southern insurgency. Dissatisfaction with Nimeiri 's rule also grew 
in the north as economic distress became more acute. The 1985 



264 



National Security 



military coup that ousted Nimeiri was preceded by massive demon- 
strations in Khartoum triggered by price increases of food staples. 
The traditional political parties that dominated civilian politics re- 
emerged in 1986 after a year of transitional military rule. Most 
parties continued to reflect sectarian loyalties rather than to pro- 
mote national interests. Unable to function effectively through shift- 
ing political coalitions and unable to end the war in the south, 
civilian authority was again overturned, to be replaced by the 
authoritarian rule of Bashir on June 30, 1989. 

The new military government immediately invoked emergency 
legislation banning strikes and other work stoppages as well as un- 
authorized political meetings. Political parties and trade unions were 
dissolved and their property frozen or seized. Leading members 
of the main political parties were arrested, as were senior mem- 
bers of the Sudan Bar Association and other prominent figures 
thought to be unfriendly to the new regime. More than 100 trade 
unionists were detained, while others were dismissed from the civil 
service, the army, and the police. 

Although some political prisoners had been released by early 
1990, evidence of continued opposition to the military government 
brought harsh repressive measures. In December 1989, a promi- 
nent physician was sentenced to death (later commuted to imprison- 
ment) for organizing a doctors' strike. Another doctor was sentenced 
to fifteen years' imprisonment. In March 1990, the government 
announced that it had crushed a coup conspiracy, arresting promi- 
nent members of the Umma Party and military officers. Less than 
a month later, the regime alleged that it had discovered another 
coup plot among the military and executed twenty-eight high- 
ranking officers whom it claimed were implicated. 

Although the military government was widely unpopular, its 
ruthless suppression of any manifestation of discontent appeared 
to have frightened the internal opposition into silence. A number 
of exiled politicians active in the previous Sadiq al Mahdi govern- 
ment announced the formation of an opposition organization, the 
National Democratic Alliance, in early 1990. The SPLA radio sta- 
tion in Ethiopia allotted broadcasting time to the alliance, but the 
group, brought together by political expediency, had difficulty or- 
ganizing effective opposition to the Bashir regime. Former armed 
forces chief of staff, Lieutenant General Fathi Ahmad Ali, was 
among the exiled dissidents and became head of the National 
Democratic Alliance. Military purges, however, had left the major- 
ity of active officers silent for fear of dismissal and loss of their com- 
mands. Infiltration of informers into the SPAF made any form of 
dissident activity risky. Curfews were imposed, and detachments 



265 



Sudan: A Country Study 



of troops guarding bridges and other key points minimized the pos- 
sibility of military action to topple the regime. At the Khartoum 
International Airport, the Airborne Division, which was considered 
loyal to the government, was available at short notice to help repel 
a coup attempt. 

The presence of as many as 1 million refugees from southern 
Sudan in the vicinity of Khartoum was potentially destabilizing, 
but the refugees were weak and too divided into ethnic and regional 
groups to be a political threat. Student groups had in the past been 
involved in demonstrations that contributed to the downfall of un- 
popular governments, but the loyalty of the majority of students 
was uncertain. 

The small communist movement, with considerable support 
among educated Sudanese and involvement in student and union 
organizations, was among the opposition elements to the Bashir 
government. The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) played an 
important role in the first years of Nimeiri's rule but was harshly 
suppressed and forced underground after participation in the un- 
successful coup against Nimeiri in 1971. Although Nimeiri's cam- 
paign of reconciliation with his political opponents in 1977 enabled 
some prominent SCP members to resurface, communists arrested 
for organizing strikes and demonstrations comprised the largest 
single group of political prisoners. The SCP's role in the urban 
demonstrations of 1985 contributed to Nimeiri's overthrow. The 
SCP became active in parliamentary politics in 1986 but was among 
the political groups banned by the Bashir regime. It joined with 
other parties in underground opposition to the military govern- 
ment. Several communists were rounded up and detained without 
charge after the 1989 coup, allegedly for instigating a protest against 
the government among students at the University of Khartoum. 

Internal Security Agencies 

Apart from in the south, domestic order in Sudan was a shared 
responsibility of the military, the national police force, and secur- 
ity organs of the Ministry of Interior. Martial law was in effect 
in government-controlled areas of the south and in some northern 
areas as well. 

Sudan Police Force 

The Sudan Police Force (SPF) had its beginnings in 1898 when 
a British army captain was placed in the central administration for 
police duties, and thirty British army officers directly responsible 
to him were detailed to organize provincial police establishments. 
The arrangement proved overly centralized, however, and complete 



266 



National Security 



decentralization of police control was introduced in 1901. As great 
differences arose in the standards and performance of the police 
in the various provinces, a modified form of administrative con- 
trol by the central authorities was decreed in 1908, with the provin- 
cial governors retaining operational control of the forces. The SPF 
was officially established by the British in 1 908 and was absorbed 
by the Sudanese government on independence in 1956. 

It was technically and economically impractical for the police 
to cover the entire area of Sudan; therefore, a system of communal 
security was retained for more than seventy years. The central 
government gave tribal leaders authority to keep order among their 
people. They were allowed to hire a limited number of "retain- 
ers" to assist them in law enforcement duties. This system was 
finally abolished by the Nimeiri government in the early 1970s. 

Under Nimeiri, command and administration of the SPF was 
modified several times. The police were responsible to the minister 
of interior until 1979, when the post of minister of interior was 
abolished and various ministers were made responsible for differ- 
ent areas of police work. This arrangement proved unwieldy, 
however, and the Police Act of 1979 instituted a unified command 
in which the head of the force reported directly to the president. 
After Nimeiri's fall, the cabinet position of minister of interior was 
restored, and the director general of police was made responsible 
to him. 

Central police headquarters in Khartoum was organized into di- 
visions, each commanded by a police major general. The divisions 
were responsible for criminal investigations, administration, train- 
ing, public affairs, passport control, immigration, and security af- 
fairs. The main operational elements were the traffic police and 
the riot police. The 1979 legislation brought specialized police units, 
such as that of the Sudan Railways, under the authority of the SPF 
headquarters. The Khartoum headquarters maintained liaison and 
cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organization 
(Interpol) and with agencies involved in combating international 
drug traffic. 

The government's new system of administration delegated many 
powers to the regional level, but law enforcement outside major 
urban areas remained provincially oriented. Thus, the national 
police establishment was subdivided into provincial commands, 
which were organized according to the same divisions found in the 
national headquarters. Local police directors were responsible to 
provincial police commissioners, who in turn were responsible to 
the SPF director general in Khartoum. Each provincial command 
had its own budget. 



267 



Sudan: A Country Study 

The SPF expanded from roughly 7,500 officers and men at in- 
dependence in 1956 to approximately 18,000 in 1970 and 30,000 
by the mid-1980s. Except for the south where internal security in 
government-held areas was the responsibility of military and security 
organs, the police establishment was distributed roughly in propor- 
tion to population density but was reinforced in areas where there 
was a likelihood of trouble. In some places, the police were too thinly 
scattered to provide any real security. It was reported that there 
were no police stations along the Nile from the town of Wadi Haifa 
on the Egyptian border south to Dunqulah, a distance of about 
300 kilometers. Elsewhere in the north, police posts could be staffed 
by as few as two police with insufficient transport or communica- 
tions equipment to patrol their district. Efforts to control smug- 
gling were apparently the responsibility of the armed forces and 
the security authorities. 

Police officer cadets usually received two years of training at the 
Sudan Police College near Khartoum. The institution was equipped 
to provide theoretical and practical instruction; it also served as 
a training school for military personnel who required police skills 
in their assignments. In addition to recruit training, the college 
offered instruction in aspects of criminal law, general police duties, 
fingerprinting, clerical work, photography, and the use of small 
arms. Enlisted recruits usually underwent four months of training 
at provincial headquarters. Although not numerous, women served 
in the SPF in limited capacities. They were generally assigned to 
administrative sections, to juvenile delinquency matters, or to crimi- 
nal cases in which female Sudanese were witnesses or defendants. 
The Bashir government announced plans to remove women from 
the police, but, according to one report, a number of women were 
actually promoted to higher positions because of the mass firing 
of senior male police officers. 

Provincial police had traditionally enjoyed good relations with 
the community, but during the Nimeiri regime many people re- 
garded them more as the object of fear than as a source of secu- 
rity. The police were said to have acted appropriately — firmly but 
with restraint — during civil demonstrations in the first half of the 
1980s. Since the resumption of civil war in 1983, serious abuses 
of human rights have not generally been attributed to the police, 
as they have been to the armed forces, government militias, and 
security organizations. Police treatment of persons under arrest 
could be harsh. Police patrols in Khartoum have harassed or beaten 
people occasionally without apparent motive. Public order cam- 
paigns in Khartoum, often targeting southern refugees, could result 
in roundups of thousands charged with illegal street vending or 



268 



Police post near Yet, western Al Istiwai State 
Police force in Maridi 
Courtesy Robert O. Collins 



269 



Sudan: A Country Study 



loitering. In urban areas police reportedly often acted against refu- 
gees, stealing from them and beating them for minor infractions. 
Refugees seldom had recourse to the legal system when attacked 
by the police. The police were known to have inflicted floggings 
summarily for drinking alcohol or for curfew violations. Brutality 
increased after the 1989 coup, but roundups and floggings declined 
somewhat after officials of the Bashir government promised closer 
supervision of the police. 

Security Organizations 

The Sudanese internal security and intelligence apparatus evolved 
into a feared and hated institution after Nimeiri came to power 
in 1969. During the period of Revolutionary Command Council 
rule (1969-71), the military intelligence organization was expanded 
to investigate domestic opposition groups. After the council was 
abolished, the organization's responsibilities focused on evaluat- 
ing and countering threats to the regime from the military. It also 
provided a 400-man Presidential Guard. 

The Office of State Security was established by decree in 1971 
within the Ministry of Interior. The new agency was charged with 
evaluating information gathered by the police and military intelli- 
gence; it was also responsible for prison administration and pass- 
port control. The sensitive central security file and certain other 
intelligence functions were, however, maintained under the presi- 
dent's control. In 1978 the presidential and Ministry of Interior 
groups were merged to form the State Security Organisation (SSO). 
Under the direction of Minister of State Security Umar Muham- 
mad at Tayyib, a retired army major general and close confidant 
of the president, the SSO became a prominent feature of the Nimeiri 
regime, employing about 45,000 persons and rivaling the armed 
forces in size. This apparatus was dismantled in 1985. 

According to the United States Department of State's Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990, government surveillance, 
which was previously rare, became intense after the 1989 coup. 
Efforts were made to prevent contact between Sudanese and foreign- 
ers. Civilians, especially suspected dissidents, were harassed, church 
services were monitored, and activities of journalists were closely 
supervised. Neighborhood "popular committees" used their con- 
trol over the rationing system to monitor households. 

The Bashir government created a new security body. Generally 
referred to as "Islamic Security" or "Security of the Revolution," 
it was under the direct control of a member of the RCC-NS. Its 
purpose was to protect the Bashir regime against internal plots and 
to act as a watchdog over other security forces and the military. 



270 



National Security 



It quickly became notorious for indiscriminate arrests of suspected 
opponents of the regime and for torturing them in its own safe 
houses before turning them over to prison authorities for further 
detention. A similar organization, Youth for Reconstruction, mobi- 
lized younger Islamic activists. 

Criminal Justice System 

The Sudanese criminal code embodied elements of British law, 
the penal code of British colonial India, and the Egyptian civil code 
(see The Legal System, ch. 4). In 1977 Nimeiri formed a commit- 
tee, dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, to revise the legal code 
according to the sharia (Islamic law). In September 1983, the 
Nimeiri government introduced a version of the sharia prescrib- 
ing harsh corporal punishments for such crimes as murder, theft, 
drinking alcohol, prostitution, and adultery. These "September 
Laws," sometimes known as hudud (sing., hadd, penalty prescribed 
by Islamic law) provided for execution, flogging, amputation, and 
stoning as modes of punishment for both Muslims and non- 
Muslims. During the final twenty months of Nimeiri's rule, at least 
ninety persons convicted of theft had their hands amputated. The 
military and civil governments succeeding Nimeiri between 1985 
and 1989 suspended the September Laws. Progress on a new Is- 
lamic penal code to replace the September Laws was delayed by 
the legislature pending a constitutional assembly that would include 
the SPLA. Although flogging, consisting normally of forty lashes, 
was limited to offenses involving sex or alcohol, it was often in- 
flicted summarily. In 1989 the RCC-NS extended flogging as a 
punishment for a much wider range of offenses. Extreme hudud sen- 
tences such as amputations were not handed down, however, and 
many hudud sentences imposed under the Sadiq al Mahdi govern- 
ment were converted to jail terms and fines. 

In the regular criminal court system, extensive guarantees of due 
process were prescribed for accused persons. These courts consisted 
of a panel of three judges. The judicial process involved a police 
or magistrate's investigation and an arrest warrant preceding the 
arrest. Trials were held in public except when the accused requested 
a closed trial. The accused had to be brought before a court within 
forty-eight hours of arrest, informed of the charges, and provided 
with access to an attorney of the accused's choice. There were legal 
aid services for the poor, but, because resources were limited, legal 
aid was apportioned to those facing serious charges and those most 
in need. Bail was permitted except in some capital cases. Defen- 
dants had the right to speak, to present evidence on their own behalf, 



271 



Sudan: A Country Study 

and to appeal judgments through a series of courts from the magis- 
trate level to the High Court of Appeal. 

Under the state of emergency imposed by the Sadiq al Mahdi 
regime in 1987, the government had wide powers in areas declared 
to be emergency zones to arrest and preventively detain for an in- 
definite period anyone suspected of contravening emergency 
regulations. Military personnel could not be arrested by civilian 
authorities, nor was there provision for judicial review of actions 
by the armed forces. The Sadiq al Mahdi government declared 
emergency zones in the southern and western areas of the country 
and used the detention powers on people suspected of sympathy 
with the rebellion. 

On seizing power in 1989, the RCC-NS declared a state of emer- 
gency for the whole of Sudan and granted itself broad powers. The 
government initially detained more than 300 people without war- 
rants, including many prominent political and academic figures, 
journalists, alleged leftists, and trade unionists. About sixty judges 
who petitioned against the government's action were also detained. 
Many of the original detainees were released within several months, 
but they were replaced by others. There were an estimated 300 
to 500 detainees at the close of 1990; some reports claimed as many 
as 1,000 detainees. 

After the 1989 coup, the regular civilian courts continued to han- 
dle ordinary criminal offenses, including theft and some capital 
crimes, although the court system was seriously backlogged and 
the judiciary was less independent of the executive than previously. 
After experimenting with various forms of special courts, the 
RCC-NS established special security courts in November 1989. 
These courts were formed by the military governors of the regions 
and the commissioner of the national capital. The courts had three- 
member panels of both military and civilian judges. They tried 
persons accused of violating constitutional decrees, emergency regu- 
lations, and some portions of the criminal code, notably drug crimes 
and currency violations. The new security courts did not extend nor- 
mal protections to the accused. Attorneys were permitted to sit with 
defendants but were not permitted to address the courts. Sentences 
imposed by the courts were to be carried out immediately, with the 
exception that death penalties were to be reviewed by the chief justice 
and the head of state. The special security courts gained a reputa- 
tion for harsh sentences. Two defendants convicted of illegal pos- 
session of foreign currency and another convicted of drug smuggling 
were executed and others were sentenced to death for similar crimes, 
although the sentences were not carried out. 



272 



Trial in Tambura, western Al Istiwai State, with stolen goods (honey in 
cans) and judges in foreground, accused on the right 
Courtesy Robert 0. Collins 

In areas of the south affected by the war, normal judicial proce- 
dures could not be applied and civil authorities were made redun- 
dant by the application of the state of emergency. Units of the armed 
forces and militias ruled by force of arms, and in many cases the 
accused were summarily tried and punished, especially for offenses 
against public order. In war- torn southern Kurdufan the govern- 
ment authorized a system of justice administered by village elders, 
and a similar system was reportedly in effect in areas controlled 
by the SPLA. 

Incidence of Crime 

The widespread instability and clashes between ethnic groups 
arising from the civil war were accompanied by breakdowns of law 
and order in many parts of the country. Killings, rapes, and thefts 
of personal possessions, food, and livestock were committed by 
various militia groups and frequentiy by the SPLA and the govern- 
ment armed forces as well. Large areas of Sudan became depopu- 
lated as a result of the fighting and migrations in search of safety. 
The availability of weapons contributed to the prevalence of ban- 
ditry, especially along the Chad, Zaire, and Uganda borders. In 
the western province of Darfur, the police wielded little authority, 



273 



Sudan: A Country Study 

and lawlessness prevailed. Smuggling was also common, particu- 
larly along the Ethiopian border. 

The collapse of security in many areas was not fully reflected 
in available statistics on crime, although some indications of the 
pattern of criminality did emerge. According to the most recent 
data reported by Sudan to Interpol covering the year 1986, more 
than 135,000 criminal offenses were recorded, reflecting a rate of 
650 crimes per 100,000 of population. More than 1,000 homicides 
occurred, and 3,300 sex offenses were registered, including 600 
rapes. There were 7,300 serious assaults. The more than 100,000 
thefts of various kinds constituted by far the most common category 
of crime. They included armed robbery (33,000 cases), breaking 
and entering (22,500), theft under aggravated circumstances 
(1,900), and automobile theft (1,500). There were 15,000 cases of 
fraud and 3,600 drug infractions. 

Sudan was not a major international narcotics marketplace. Most 
narcotics consumed in Sudan consisted of marijuana grown in the 
eastern part of the country. Penalties for narcotics use were simi- 
lar to those for alcohol and could include flogging. In nearly all 
categories except narcotics violations, Sudan reported more offenses 
than Egypt, a country with more than twice the population. This 
discrepancy may be accounted for by more accurate police records 
on the extent of criminal activity or by different definitions of the 
offenses reported to Interpol. 

Sudanese authorities claimed to have solved more than 70 per- 
cent of most forms of robbery and theft and 53 percent of all crimes 
reported. Only 25 percent of homicides, 40 percent of general sex 
offenses, and 32 percent of rape cases were recorded as solved. 

Prison System 

General supervision of the Sudan Prison Service was carried out 
by the director general of prisons, who was responsible for the coun- 
try's central prisons and reformatories. Provincial authorities 
managed detention centers and jails in their administrative juris- 
dictions. The central prisons were Kober in Khartoum North, 
Shalla in Al Fashir, Darfur State, and Port Sudan on the Red Sea. 
It was reported that there were about 1 40 local prisons and deten- 
tion centers in the early 1990s. 

Prison conditions were generally poor. Treatment of prisoners 
varied widely, however. Some were restricted by shackles, whereas 
others were allowed to return home at night. There were persis- 
tent reports of beatings and other forms of mistreatment, includ- 
ing torture, of detainees and other political prisoners in the central 
penal institutions, although these were apparently inflicted by 



274 



National Security 



security officials and not regular prison guards. After reports ap- 
peared that detainees of the Bashir government were being sub- 
jected to torture, Amnesty International was allowed to visit a select 
group of prisoners at Kober, where prison conditions were reputed 
to be the best in Sudan. Facilities at the large prison at Port Sudan 
were spartan. Although treatment was not brutal, extreme heat 
contributed to the harsh living conditions. The most primitive con- 
ditions were said to be at Shalla. In general, political prisoners wel- 
comed transfer to prison to escape physical abuse from security 
personnel. 

Although conditions at prison hospitals were described as fair, 
a number of political prisoners complained of being denied treat- 
ment for medical problems. Trade unionists arrested after the 1989 
coup and held at Kober Prison submitted a protest alleging the 
denial of family visits and of adequate medical treatment, while 
challenging the legal grounds for their arrests. In retaliation, the 
government transferred many of them to Shalla Prison, 600 kilo- 
meters from Khartoum. The Sudanese regime's violations of the 
civil rights of its citizens in 1991 continued to be a source of con- 
cern not only to members of the opposition in Sudan but also to 
the international community in general. 

* * * 

Details on military units and equipment are available from The 
Military Balance published annually by the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies in London. Further information on the sources 
of Sudan's arms can be found in Forecast International/DMS Market 
Intelligence Report: Middle East and Africa. Reports by two interna- 
tional human rights organizations give accounts of the conflict in 
the south, the role of various militia groups, and the abuses com- 
mitted by all of the fighting units, especially against the civilian 
population. These are Amnesty International's Sudan: Human Rights 
Violations in the Context of Civil War, published in 1989, and Africa 
Watch's Denying "The Honor of Living": Sudan, A Human Rights Dis- 
aster, published in 1990. 

The Southern Sudan by Douglas H. Johnson provides a concise 
account of the fighting in the south through 1988. The section on 
Sudan by Gwynne Dyer in World Armies includes an abbreviated 
history of the Sudanese armed forces until 1983. Articles by John 
O. Voll in Current History in 1986 and 1990 discuss the record of 
military regimes in Sudan as alternatives to civilian government. 

United States- Sudanese military relations are recounted in 
Jeffrey A. Lefebvre's "Globalism and Regionalism: U.S. Arms 



275 



Sudan: A Country Study 

Transfers to Sudan" in Armed Forces and Society. Information on the 
criminal courts system and the record of the Bashir government 
with respect to judicial processes and human rights can be found 
in the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices published 
by the United States Department of State. (For further informa- 
tion and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



276 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Population Distribution and Density by Province, 1983 

3 Population of Major Towns, Census Years 1973 and 1983 

4 Enrollment, Teachers, and Institutions by Level of Educa- 

tion, 1985-86 

5 Government Budget, 1983-84, 1984-85, and 1985-86 

6 Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1985-86 to 1988-89 

7 Principal Crops, 1986-88 

8 Principal Exports, 1986-89 

9 Principal Imports, 1986-89 

10 Principal Trading Partners, 1987-89 

11 Balance of Payments, 1986-88 

12 Major Army Equipment, 1991 

13 Major Air Force Equipment, 1991 

14 Major Air Defense Equipment, 1991 

15 Major Naval Equipment, 1991 



277 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



Table 2. Population Distribution and Density 
by Province, 1983 



Province Population Density 1 





1,471,540 


6.8 




4,026,668 


28.3 




1,406,181 


5.3 




1,802,299 


85.5 




1,067,098 


2.2 




2,208,199 


6.5 




2,265,510 


10.6 




3,093,660 


6.8 




3,074,797 


8.1 


SUDAN 


20,415,952 2 


8.6 



1 Inhabitants per square kilometer. 

2 Adjusted total population in 1983 was 21,593,000. 



Source: Based on information from Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 
Department of Statistics, 1983 Preliminary Census Results, Khartoum, 1984, passim; 
and Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Department of Statis- 
tics, Khartoum, unpublished data. 



279 



Sudan: A Country Study 



Table 3. Population of Major Towns, Census 
Years 1973 and 1983 



Town 1973 1983 



Al Qadarif 


66,465 


119,002 


Al Ubayyid 


90,073 


139,446 




99,652 


142,909 




333,906 


476,218 




150,989 


341,155 






526,284 


Port Sudan 


132,632 


212,741 




106,715 


141,065 



n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 
Department of Statistics, 1983 Preliminary Census Results, Khartoum, 1984, passim. 



Table 4. Enrollment, Teachers, and Institutions by 
Level of Education, 1985-86 



Level 


Enrollment 


Teachers 


Institutions 




235,943 


5,569 


4,003 




1,766,738 


50,389 


7,009 


Secondary 

General 2 








542,788 


21,970 


n.a. 


Teacher training 1 


3,444 


479 


n.a. 




23,150 


1,280 


n.a. 




569,382 


23,729 


n.a. 


Universities and higher 








institutes 1 


37,367 


2,165 


n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 

1 1985 figures. 

2 1986 figures. 



Source: Based on information from "Sudan — Statistical Survey," The Middle East and North 
Africa, 1991, London, 1990, 801. 



280 



Appendix 



Table 5. Government Budget, 1983-84, 1984-85, and 1985-86 1 
(in millions of Sudanese pounds) 2 

1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 



Revenues 

Direct taxes 404.5 300.5 351.6 

Indirect taxes 839.9 984.6 1,222.6 

Other 224.6 200,4 216.2 

Total revenues 1,469.0 1,485.5 1,790.4 

Expenditures 

Ordinary budget 

Defense and security 260.6 462.0 473.1 

Economic services 74.3 196.0 208.0 

Social services 69.9 160.8 182.0 

Loan repayments 212.0 118.0 465.4 

Provincial governments 270.3 360.5 557.0 

Other 755.6 1,214.9 1,492.8 

Total ordinary budget 1,642.7 2,512.2 3,378.3 

Development budget 

Agricultural sector 135.4 139.1 96.3 

Industrial sector 119.2 110.1 74.6 

Transportation and communications 67.6 52.1 57.9 

Services sector 59.4 54.3 32.5 

Other 101.4 97.4 107.8 

Total development budget 483.0 453.0 369.1 

Total expenditures 2,125.7 2,965.2 3,747.4 



1 Years ending June 30. 

2 For value of the Sudanese pound — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from "Sudan — Statistical Survey," The Middle East and North 
Africa, 1991, London, 1990, 799. 



281 



Sudan: A Country Study 



Table 6. Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 
1985-86 to 1988-89 1 
(in percentages) 



Sector 


1985-86 


1986-87 


1987-88 


1988-89 




32.0 


34.0 


32.0 


36.0 


Commerce 


22.0 


15.0 


15.0 


n.a. 


Transportation and 












10.0 


11.0 


11.0 


n.a. 




10.0 


7.0 


8.0 


8.2 


Construction 


4.0 


5.0 


6.0 


4.6 






n.a. 


n.a. 


1.8 




10.0 


n.a. 


n.a. 


11.5 


Other services 


12.0 


26.0 


25.0 


37.8 


TOTAL 2 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 



n.a. — not available; included in other categories. 

1 Years ending June 30. 

2 At factor cost. Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 



Table 7. Principal Crops, 1986-88 
(in thousands of tons) 



Crop 


1986 


1987 


1988 




80 


80 


65 


Cotton, seed 


413 


546 1 


394 2 


Cottonseed 1 


271 


300 


290 


Cotton lint 1 


150 


174 


130 


Dates 2 


120 


125 


120 




128 


130 


128 


Millet 


285 


153 1 


550 1 


Peanuts (in shell) 


379 


434 


527 1 




216 


258 


278 1 




2,282 


1,300 


4,640 1 




4,500 


5,000 


4,500 




155 


160 


158 




130 


127 


125 


Wheat 


199 


157 


181 1 


Yams 2 


116 


118 


120 



1 Unofficial estimate. 

2 Food and Agriculture Organization estimate. 



Source: Based on information from "Sudan — Statistical Survey," The Middle East and North 
Africa, 1991, London, 1990, 798. 



282 



Appendix 



Table 8. Principal Exports, 1986-89 
(in millions of Sudanese pounds) * 



Commodity 1986 1987 1988 1989 



Cotton 366.7 455.2 978.4 1,348.8 

Sesame 58.8 134.8 269.0 333.3 

Gum arabic 141.7 267.1 281.6 313.0 

Sorghum (durra) n.a. 248.8 106.7 297.1 

Sheep and lambs 66.8 42.9 124.5 192.5 

Other 199.2 348.3 530.2 538.4 



TOTAL 833.2 1,497.1 2,290.4 3,023.1 



n.a. — not available. 

* For value of the Sudanese pound — see Glossary. 



Table 9. Principal Imports, 1986-89 
(in millions of Sudanese pounds) * 



Commodity 


1986 


1987 


1988 


1989 




481.4 


1.0 


1,042.6 


1,178.5 


Petroleum and petroleum 










products 


292.6 


7.9 


1,044.6 


1,082.2 




405.7 


4.9 


776.1 


826.4 






368.9 


507.8 


786.6 


Chemicals 


342.9 


248.1 


500.9 


399.1 




120.5 


199.6 


402.2 


412.8 


Other 


687.2 


312.5 


497.9 


687.8 


TOTAL 


2,402.2 


2,612.9 


4,772.1 


5,373.4 



n.a. — not available. 

* For value of the Sudanese pound — see Glossary. 



283 



Sudan: A Country Study 



Table 10. Principal Trading Partners, 1987-89 
(in percentages) 



Country 


1987 


1988 


1989 


Exports 










17.2 


17.2 


n.a. 






n.a. 


16.8 


Italy 


10.7 


10.7 


7.4 






8.0 


n.a. 


Japan 


7.4 


7.4 


10.9 




7.0 


7.0 


8.0 






n.a. 


7.3 






n.a. 


6.5 




4.7 


4.7 


n.a. 


Imports 










12.1 


6.6 


n.a. 




10.4 


11.8 


14.1 




10.0 


9.3 


8.3 


Netherlands 


6.5 


6.4 


5.3 


Japan 


6.2 


n.a. 


n.a. 






n.a. 


6.0 


Italy 


6.0 


5.6 


n.a. 






5.9 


5.8 



n.a. — not available. 



284 



Appendix 



Table 11. Balance of Payments, 1986-88 1 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1986 


1987 


1988 




QOC o 








-633.7 


- 694.8 


-948.5 




306.9 


-429.7 


-521.5 




OOQ Q 




171 
1 / 1 .0 




- 272.8 


-323.1 


-341.3 




-350.9 


- 560.6 


-691.2 


Private unrequited transfers (net) 


... - 89.3 


133.7 


216.3 






194.6 


1 17.0 




1 7 A 


939 A 


— jjo.U 




-110.4 


- 235.7 


63.1 




15.1 


322.4 


5.0 




-95.3 


86.7 


68.1 


Errors and omissions (net) 


-89.4 


- 185.3 


7.5 




-83.1 


- 142.6 


44.7 




248.0 


295.4 


287.1 




-37.6 


- 178.3 


49.5 



1 Figures may not add because of rounding. 

2 f.o.b. — free on board. 



Source: Based on information from "Sudan — Statistical Survey," The Middle East and North 
Africa, 1991, London, 1990, 800. 



285 



Sudan: A Country Study 



Table 12. Major Army Equipment, 1991 



Type and Description 



Country of 
Origin 



In 

Inventory 



Main battle tanks 

T-54/55 Soviet Union 200 

Type 59 China 10 

M-60A3 United States 20 

Light tanks 

Type 62 China 70 

Armored reconnaissance vehicles 

AML-90 France 6 

Saladin Britain 15 

Ferret -do- 50 

BRDM 1/2 Soviet Union 30 

Armored personnel carriers 

BTR-50/152 -do- 40 

OT-62/64 Czechoslovakia 30 

M-113 United States 36 

V- 100/ 150 Commando -do- 80 

Walid Egypt 100 

Artillery 

M-101, 105mm United States 18 

Model 56, 105mm -do- 6 

D-74, 122mm -do- 4 

M-1938, 122mm -do- 24 

Type 54/D-30, 122mm Soviet Union/ 42 

China 

M-46/Type 59-1, 130mm -do- 27 

D-20, 152mm Soviet Union 4 

M-114A1, 155mm United States 12 

AMX Mk F-3, 155mm, self- 
propelled France 6 

Multiple rocket launchers 

BM-21, 122mm Soviet Union 4 

Antitank weapons 

Swingfire guided-wire missiles Egypt 4 

M-1942 76mm guns Soviet Union 18 

M-1944 100mm guns -do- 20 

B-10 82mm recoilless rifles -do- 30 

M-40A1 106mm recoilless rifles United States 100 

Mortars 

M-43, 120mm Soviet Union 12 

AM-49, 120mm -do- 24 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1991-1992, London, 1991, 119. 



286 



Appendix 



Table 13. Major Air Force Equipment, 1991 



Type and Description 



Country of 
Origin 



In 

Inventory 



Fighter ground attack aircraft 

F-5E/F United States 9 

J-5 China 10 

J-6 -do- 9 

Fighter aircraft 

MiG-21 1 Soviet Union 8 

MiG-23 2 -do- 3 

J-6 China 6 

Counterinsurgency aircraft 

BAC-167 Mk Strikemaster 1 Britain 3 

BAC Jet Provost Mk 55 -do- 3 

Transport aircraft 

C-130H Hercules United States 5 

An-24 Soviet Union 5 

DHC-5D Buffalo Canada 2 

C-212 Aviocar Brazil 4 

EMB-110P -do- 6 

F-27 Friendship Netherlands 1 

Falcon 20/50 executive jet France 2 

Maritime reconnaissance aircraft 

Casa C-212 Aviocar Brazil 2 

Helicopters 

AB-212 Italy 11 

IAR/SA-330 Puma France/ 15 

Romania 

Mi-4 Soviet Union 4 

Mi-8 -do- 14 

Mi-24 (armed) -do- 2 

Training aircraft 

MiG-15U -do- 4 

MiG-21 U -do- 4 

JJ-5 China 2 

JJ-6 -do- 2__ 

1 Nonoperational. 

2 One operational. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1991-1992, London, 1991, 119; 
and Forecast International/DMS Market Intelligence Report, Middle East and Afri- 
ca, Greenwich, Connecticut, 1990. 



287 



Sudan: A Country Study 



Table 14. Major Air Defense Equipment, 1991 



Type and Description 



Country of 
Origin 



In 

Inventory 



Antiaircraft guns 

M-167 Vulcan, 20mm United States n.a. 

M-163 Vulcan, 20mm, self- 
propelled -do- n.a. 

ZU-23-2, 37mm Egypt n.a. 

M-1939/Type 63, 37mm China 120 

L-60 Bofors, 40mm Sweden 60 

KS-12, 85mm Soviet Union n.a. 

KS-19, 100mm -do- n.a. 

Surface-to-air missiles 
SA-2 high altitude, 

radar-guided -do- 18 launchers 

SA-7 man-portable, 

short-range -do- n.a. 

Redeye United States n.a. 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1991-1992, London, 1991, 119. 



Table 15. Major Naval Equipment, 1991 



Country of In 
Type and Description Origin Inventory 



Patrol craft 

Coastal, 70 tons (from Iran), each with 

one Oerlikon 20mm gun West Germany 2 

Sewart, 10 tons (from Iran), each with 

one 12.7mm machine gun United States 4 

Inshore (river operations) type 15, 19.5 tons, 

each with one Oerlikon 20mm gun and two 

7.62mm machine guns Yugoslavia 4 

Amphibious craft 

Sobat (DTM-221) LCU, 410 tons -do- 2 

Source: Based on information from Jane's Fighting Ships, 1991-92, Coulsdon, Surrey, United 
Kingdom, 1991, 512-13. 



288 



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303 



Sudan: A Country Study 

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ton Post.) 



304 



Glossary 



dinar — Sudanese unit of currency introduced in May 1992 to 
replace the Sudanese pound (q.v.). One dinar was worth ten 
Sudanese pounds. 

fiscal year (FY) — An annual period established for accounting pur- 
poses. The Sudanese fiscal year extends from July 1 to the fol- 
lowing June 30. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a 
period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods 
for final consumption and intermediate production are assumed 
to be included in the final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregat- 
ed and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes 
and subsidies are included; when these indirect taxes and sub- 
sidies have been eliminated, the result is GDP at factor cost. 
The word gross indicates that deductions for depreciation of 
physical assets have not been made. Income arising from in- 
vestments and possessions owned abroad is not included, only 
domestic production. Hence, the word domestic is used to dis- 
tinguish GDP from gross national product (q.v.). 

gross national product (GNP) — The gross domestic product (q. v. ) 
plus net income or loss stemming from transactions with for- 
eign countries, including income received from abroad by 
residents and subtracting payments remitted abroad to non- 
residents. GNP is the broadest measurement of the output of 
goods and services by an economy. It can be calculated at mar- 
ket prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because 
indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP 
is often calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes and 
subsidies. 

hadith — Tradition based on the precedent of the Prophet Muham- 
mad's words and deeds that serves as one of the sources of Is- 
lamic law. 

hafr (pi., hafri) — An excavated water reservoir fed by rainfall. 

imam — A word used in several senses. In general use and lower- 
cased, it means the leader of congregational prayers; as such, 
it implies no ordination or special spiritual powers beyond suffi- 
cient education to carry out this function. It is also used figura- 
tively by many Sunni (q. v. ) Muslims to mean the leader of the 
Islamic community. Among Shia (q. v. ) Muslims, the word takes 



305 



Sudan: A Country Study 



on many complex and controversial meanings; in general, 
however, it indicates that particular descendant of the House 
of Ali who is believed to have been God's designated repository 
of the spiritual authority inherent in that line. The identity of 
this individual and the means of ascertaining his identity have 
been the major issues causing divisions among Shia. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for sta- 
bilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main 
business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members 
(including industrialized and developing countries) when they 
experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequent- 
ly carry conditions that require substantial internal economic 
adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing 
countries. 

jazirah — Peninsula or island; with upper case, term refers to the 
cultivated lands south of Khartoum between the Blue Nile and 
the White Nile. 

jizzu — Located in the area of 16° north latitude in northwest Darfur 
and in Chad; region beyond the semidesert where the late rains 
produce a combination of grass and herbaceous plants in winter 
such that camels and sheep can graze without additional water 
supply. 

khalwa — Small Islamic rural school that stressed memorization of 
the Quran and provided some instruction in the reading and 
writing of Arabic. 

naziriyah (pi., nazuriyat) — Formerly, among nomadic and semino- 
madic Arab groups, an administrative and local court under 
a nazir, comprising several umudiyat (q.v.). A naziriyah includ- 
ed either an entire tribe or a section of a large tribe. 

qoz — General term used for sand dunes. 

Sahel — A narrow band of land bordering the southern Sahara, 
stretching across Africa. It is characterized by an average an- 
nual rainfall of between 150 and 500 millimeters and is main- 
ly suited to pastoralism. 

sharia — Traditional code of Islamic law, both civil and criminal, 
based in part on the Quran. Also drawn from the hadith (q. v.); 
the consensus of Islamic belief (ijma; i.e., consensus of the 
authorities on a legal question); and analogy (qiyas; i.e., an 
elaboration of the intent of law). 

shaykh — Leader or chief. Word of Arabic origin used to mean either 
a political or a learned religious leader. Also used as an 
honorific. 



306 



Glossary 



Shia (from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali) — A member of the smaller 
of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shia supported the 
claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right to the caliphate 
and leadership of the Muslim community, and on this issue 
they divided from the Sunni (q. v.) in the first great schism 
within Islam. Later schisms have produced further divisions 
among the Shia over the identity and number of imams (q. v.). 
Shia revere Twelve Imams, the last of whom is believed to be 
in hiding. 

the Sudan — Historical term for the geographical region stretching 
across Africa from Cape Verde on the Atlantic coast to the 
Ethiopian plateau in the east between about 8° and 16° north 
latitude; characterized by savanna and semiarid steppe. Term 
derived from Arabic biladas sudan (literally, land of the blacks). 
Not to be confused with Sudan, the country. 

Sudanese pound (£Sd) — Until May 1992, Sudanese currency con- 
sisted of 1,000 millimes = 100 piasters = 1 Sudanese pound. 
As of March 31, 1991 , the official exchange rate was US$1 = 
£Sdl.30; from February 1985 to October 1987, the official ex- 
change rate was set at US$1 = £Sd2.50. The Sudanese pound 
was gradually being replaced by the dinar (q.v.). 

sudd — Barrier or obstruction; with lower case the term designates 
clumps of aquatic vegetation that block the Nile channel; with 
upper case, the term is used loosely for the entire White Nile 
swamps. 

Sunni (from sunna meaning ' 'custom," giving connotation of or- 
thodoxy in theory and practice) — A member of the larger of 
the two great divisions of Islam. The Sunnis supported the tradi- 
tional method of election to the caliphate and accepted the 
Umayyad line. On this issue they divided from the Shia (q.v.) 
in the first great schism within Islam. 

Three Towns — Sudanese reference to the cities of Khartoum, Khar- 
toum North, and Omdurman. Located in close proximity to 
the juncture of the White Nile and Blue Nile rivers, they form 
a single metropolitan area. 

transhumant — Transhumance is the seasonal movement of livestock 
along well-established routes by herders or by an ethnic group 
as a whole. 

umudiyah (pi., umudiyaf) — Formerly a political division under an 
umda, encompassing a number of villages in the case of seden- 
tary peoples or a section of a tribe in the case of nomadic peo- 
ples. Among nomadic or seminomadic peoples, several such 
divisions constituted a naziriyah (q.v.). 



307 



Sudan: A Country Study 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has as its 
primary purpose the provision of loans to developing countries 
for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund 
but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 
to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much 
easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel- 
oped countries. The president and certain senior officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC . The three institu- 
tions are owned by the governments of the countries that sub- 
scribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF— q. v.). 



308 



Index 



AAAID. See Arab Authority for Agricul- 
tural Investment and Development 

Aali an Nil (province/state), 48, 63, 93, 
206; agriculture in, 153, 158; civil war 
in, 242-43; Dinka in, 80, 87, 93, 221; 
land tenure in, 146; militias in, 255; 
opposition of, to Islamization, 212; 
Sudanese People's Liberation Army 
presence in, 50 

Aba Island, 42 

Abbas I, 16 

Abbud, Ibrahim, xxiv, 35-36 
Abbud government (see also Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces), xxiv, 
36-37, 199, 234; arabization under, 
xxiv, 37; civil war under, 234; economy 
under, 37, 234; education under, 37, 
203; government dissolved by, 37; Is- 
lamization under, 203; missionaries ex- 
pelled by, xxiv, 37; opposition to, 36, 
37, 234; problems in, 36, 234; promises 
of, 36; southern policies of, 36-37, 204, 
234 

Abd al Latif, Ali, 29; exiled, 29 

Abd al Qadir al Jilani, 104 

Abd al Wahab, Ahmad: in coup of 1958, 

35-36; as member of Ansar, 36 
Abu Hamad, 23; rail transportation to, 

173 

Abujabira, 170 

Abu Klea. See Abu Tulayh 

Abu Tulayh (Abu Klea), 20 

AC DA. See United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS), 119 

Ad Damazin irrigation project, 131 

Addis Ababa accords (1972), xxv, 85, 212, 
242, 264; abrogated, 213, 231, 239; 
signed, 46, 52; terms of, 44-46, 239 

AFESD. See Arab Fund for Economic and 
Social Development 

African- Arab relations. See north-south di- 
vision 

African Development Bank, 168; agricul- 
tural credit from, xxviii 

African heritage (see also south; southern- 
ers), 3, 94 



Africa Watch, 17, 221, 252, 264 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan, 186 
agricultural production, 134, 135; decline 

of, 49; growth of, 142, 152 
agricultural products (see also cotton), 118, 
162; dates, 35; millet, 64, 144; peanuts, 
xxvi, 63, 64, 144, 149, 150, 187, 188; 
as percentage of exports, 142; sesame, 
xxvi, 63, 64, 144, 153, 187, 188; sor- 
ghum, xxvi, 63, 144, 150, 151, 153, 
187; wheat, 144, 149, 188 
Agricultural Reform Corporation, 150 
agricultural sector: in drought, xxv; as 
percentage of gross domestic product, 
xxvi 

agriculture (see also livestock raising), xxvi, 
127; in Al Jazirah, 12; commercial 
xxvi, 64; under five-year plans, 130; 
forests converted to, 158; loans for, 49, 
135; as public enterprise, 128; share of 
labor force, 139, 142; subsistence, 144; 
traditional, 128, 142 

agriculture, irrigated, 129, 142, 144, 
147-51; in Al Jazirah, 63; area for, 147; 
for cotton, 148; in Khashm al Qirbah, 
63 

agriculture, mechanized, 144, 151-52; 
area cultivated, 153; operators of, 152, 
153 

agriculture, rainfed, 129, 142, 144, 
151-53; mechanized, 151, 156, 158; 
traditional, 151 

Ahfad University College, 116 

Ahmose I, 4 

AID. See United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

air defense command, 250; headquarters, 
250; materiel of, 250; number of per- 
sonnel in, 245; state of readiness of, 250 

air force, 248-49; aircraft of, 248; bases, 
249; helicopters of, 249; insignia of, 
254; materiel of, 248; number of per- 
sonnel in, 245; ranks of, 254; state of, 
248; training in, 248; transport arm of, 
249; uniforms of, 254 

airports, 182, 245, 249, 266 



309 



Sudan: A Country Study 



Akordat, 21 

Al Awsat (province/state), xxvi, 206; 
agriculture in, 152, 153, 158; Arabs in, 
72; civil war in, 231, 243, 257-58; eth- 
nic groups in, 81 ; land registration in, 
146; refugees in, 67; university in, 114 
Al Azhar University, 16 
Al Bahr al Abyad. See White Nile 
Al Bahr al Azraq. See Blue Nile 
Albanians, 14 
Al Butanah, 62 

Al Fashir, 13; airport, 249; army in, 245; 

electric generation in, 167 
Al Fasi, 105 

Ali, Fathi Ahmad, xxxii, 52, 216, 265 

Ali, Muhammad, xxiv 

Alier, Abel, 87 

Al Inqadh al Watani, 222 

Al Istiwai (province/state), xxx, 48, 64, 
206; Anya Nya in, 241; civil war in, 
243; ethnic groups in, 81, 87, 93; health 
care in, 121; land tenure in, 146; lan- 
guage in, 71; language of instruction 
in, 71; opposition of, to Islamization, 
212; religion in, 107; Sudanese People's 
Liberation Army presence in, 50, 214, 
258; Sudanese People's Liberation 
Movement influence in, 221 

Al Jazirah, xxvi, 10, 12; cotton cultiva- 
tion in, 26; farming in, 12, 15, 63; 
herding in, 12, 15; under Mahdiyah, 
21; television station in, 222 

Al Jazirah College of Agriculture and 
Natural Resources, 114 

Al Junayd irrigation project, 130 

Al Khartum (province/state), 74, 146, 
206; Arabs in, 72; irrigation projects in, 
149; manufacturing in, 163; refugees 
in, 67 

Alliance of Professional and Trade Unions, 
40 

Al Mahdi al Muntazar. See Mahdi 
Al Matammah, 20 
AlMidan, 220 

Al Ubayyid: airport, 249; army in, 245; 
Egyptian garrisons in, 15; electric 
generation in, 167; Mahdi' s siege of, 19 

Aiwa, 8, 12 

Amin Dada, Idi, 240 

Amnesty International, 211, 252, 264, 
275 

Anglican Church. See Church of England 
Anglo-Belgian treaty, 25 



Anglo -Egyptian accord, xxiv 

Anglo-Egyptian condominium (see also 
British rule), 23-32; administration of, 
24; army under, 233; banking under, 
185; borders of, 24-25; dam built by, 
149-50; economic development under, 
25, 26-27, 129; established, xxiv, 3; eth- 
nic communities under, 89; executive 
council of, 24; governor general of, 23- 
24, 26; indirect rule under, 26, 57, 203- 
4; judicial system under, 24; land tenure 
under, 24; local government councils, 
204; north-south conflict under, xxiii; 
religion under, 94; repudiated by Egypt, 
31; resistance to, 24; southern social 
order under, 93; taxes under, 24; terms 
of, 23-24; transition from, 31 

Anglo-Egyptian Nile Expeditionary Force, 
22 

An Nilein Bank, 185 

Ansar (see also Mahdi), 19-20, 46, 105, 
106; affiliated with Abbud government, 
36; battle of, against Nimeiri govern- 
ment, 42, 217; British indirect rule sup- 
ported by, 26; defeat of, 21, 23; Egypt 
invaded by, 21; Ethiopia invaded by, 
21 ; Islamic bank formed by, 186; Khar- 
toum destroyed by, 20; under Mah- 
diyah, 21; in military, 238-39; under 
Nimeiri government, 42, 47, 235; po- 
litical party of, 216, 217; as rival of 
Khatmiyyah, 218; support of, for 
Khalil, 34; in Umma Party, 30; Umma 
support for, 40, 217 

Anya Nya rebels (see also civil war), xxiv, 
37, 85, 212; arms imports by, 38, 43; 
conflicts in, 38; formation of, 241; 
government operations against, 44; in- 
corporated into army, 46, 239, 242; 
number of, 43; rural areas controlled 
by, 43; in Southern Sudan Liberation 
Movement, 44; support for, 82; train- 
ing of, 43 

Anya Nya II, 255-57; attack by, on Chev- 
ron employees, 171; defections from, 
257; formation of, 242, 255; morale in, 
257; structure of, 257; training of, 255; 
weapons of, 255 

Arab Authority for Agricultural Invest- 
ment and Development (AAAID), 135, 
151, 186 

Arab countries (see also under individual 
countries): aid from, 132, 135, 136-37, 



310 



Index 



232, 260-61; investment from, 162; 
military assistance from, 259; relations 
with, 226-27; training of military 
officers in, 253-54 

Arab Fund for Economic and Social De- 
velopment (AFESD), 49, 135, 175 

Arab heritage (see also Arabs; north), 3; 
claimed by Nubians, 10-11 

Arabia, 14; Nubian trade with, xxiii, 10 

Arabian Peninsula, 66 

Arabic, 69, 85; classical, 71; colloquial, 
70-71; Juba, 71-72; as language of 
government, 71; as language of instruc- 
tion, xxx, 71, 111, 118; as language of 
mass media, 71, 185, 221, 222; as lan- 
guage of military, 233, 238; as lingua 
franca, 69, 70, 233; Modern Standard, 
70, 71; in Nubia, 8; as official lan- 
guage, xxvi, 31, 32, 46, 57, 71; in 
south, 31, 32; varieties of, 70-72 

Arab Investment Company, 151 

Arab-Israeli War (1973), 201 

arabization: under Abbud, xxiv, 37; of 
armed forces, 233; under Bashir, xxx; 
under British, 27; as cause of civil war, 
xxx; facilitated by intermarriage, 9,11; 
facilitated by Islam, 11; fears of, 213; 
of Jaali, 73; of Nile River Valley, 71; 
of Nubians, 74; of south, xxiv, 85, 212 

Arab League. See League of Arab States 

Arab nationalism, 34 

Arabs, xxiii, 9-11; Christian, 72; differ- 
ences among, 57, 74; distribution of, 72; 
early contact of, with Nubians, 9-10; 
Egypt ruled by, 10; influence of, on 
Nilotes, 80; invasion of Nubia by, 9; and 
Meroe, 6; nationalist movement among, 
29; nomadic, 73, 74, 75, 78, 89-91; as 
percentage of population, xxvi, 72; 
privileged position of, in Nubia, 10-11; 
racial background of, 86; sedentary, 73, 
74, 75; siege of Dunqulah by, 9; slaves 
used by, 10, 86; as tenants, 92; tribal 
conflicts among, 73-74; tribes of, 73, 74 

Arabsat. See Arab Satellite Organization 

Arab Satellite Organization (Arabsat), 
185 

archaeological exploration, 3-4 
armed forces (see also military; see also under 
individual branches), 244-55, 255, 265; 
Arabic in, 233, 238; arabization of, 
233; under Bashir, 231, 253; desertion 
from, 251; development of, 233-34; 



ethnic groups in, 238; human rights 
abuses by, 252, 273; internal security 
operations of, 268; literacy rate in, 251 ; 
under Nimeiri, 236; nomads in, 238; 
personnel in, 232, 245, 259-60; politi- 
cal groups in, 238; purged, 231, 236, 
265; racial segregation in, 239; role of, 
in foreign policy, xxxi; role of, in gov- 
ernment, 234-37; in south, 273 
army, 245-48; Anya Nya incorporated 
into, 46; armored strength of, 247; ar- 
tillery of, 248; economic problems of, 
18; headquarters of, 247; indigenous 
officers in, 233, 237-38; insignia of, 
254; morale of, 251; mutiny by, 29, 32, 
35, 43, 213, 234, 236, 242, 262; num- 
ber of personnel in, 234, 245; opera- 
tional control of, 245; opposition to 
British officers in, 233; opposition of, 
to Sadiq al Mahdi government, 39; or- 
ganizational structure of, 245; origins 
of, 233; purged, 198, 265; ranks of, 
254; recruitment, 254; Southern Com- 
mand, 239; southern officers in, 239; 
support units of, 247; training, 254; 
training facilities of, 247; uniforms of, 
254; units of, 247; unit strengths of, 
245-47 

Ar Rusayris. See Roseires Dam 
asbestos, 165 
Ashigga Party, 30 
ashraf, 73 

Ash Shajarah, 245 

Ash Shamali (province/state), 206; Arabs 
in, 72; land registration in, 146; refu- 
gees in, 67 

Ash Sharqi (province/state), 63, 206; 
agriculture in, 152, 153, 158; refugees 
in, 67 

Asia, 18 

As Saltana az Zarqa. See Black Sultanate 
As Sudd, xxv, 62-63, 64, 65, 157; oil 

prospecting at, 171 
As Suki irrigation project, 150 
Assyria, 5 
Aswan, 21 

Aswan High Dam, 65, 149; resettlement 
of Nubians near, 74, 148-49 

Atbarah, 23, 66, 157; airport, 249; elec- 
tric generation in, 167; rail transpor- 
tation from, 173; television station in, 
222 

Atbarah River, 65, 74, 149 



311 



Sudan: A Country Study 



Atta, Hisham al, 43 
Atuot people, 72 
austerity measures, 49, 138 
aviation, 180-82 
Avungara people, 17 
Awadallah, Babikr, 41, 42 
Axum, 6 
Aydhab, 10 

Azande people, 17, 81-82, 88, 93; birth 
rate of, 82; conflicts of, with Dinka, 82, 
221; government of, 82; as percentage 
of population, 81; religion of, 107; sleep- 
ing sickness among, 82; support of, for 
Any a Nya guerrillas, 82 

Azande Scheme, 82 

Azania Liberation Front, 38 

Azhari, Ismail al, 31, 38, 40 

Azhari government, 322; brought down 
by religious coalition, 34; secularization 
under, 34 

Baath Party, 216, 220-21, 226; desire of, 
for unification with Egypt or Libya, 
220; opinions of, 220 

Badi II Abu Duqn, 13 

Badi IV, 15 

Badri, Babikr, 115, 116 

Bahr al Ghazal (province/state), 18, 27, 
44, 48, 63, 64, 93, 118, 206; civil war 
in, 242, 243; Dinka in, 80, 87, 93, 221, 
257; Egyptian garrisons in, 16; ethnic 
groups in, 81; land tenure in, 146; lan- 
guage of instruction in, 71; migration 
from, 16; militias in, 258; opposition 
of, to Islamization, 212; petroleum in, 
xxvi; Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army presence in, 50 

Bahr al Ghazal River, 65 

Bahr al Jabal River, 63, 78 

Baka people, 83 

Baker, Samuel, 17 

Bakht ar Ruda, 110 

Bakr, Ahmad, 13 

balance of payments, 190-91; deficit, 190; 

problems, 186 
balance of trade, 190 
Ballanah (Nobatia), 6, 8 
banking, Islamic, 132, 186-87; growth of, 

134; theory of, 187 
banking system, 128, 185-86; attempt to 

Islamize, 132; joint ventures in, 186; 

origins of, 185; problems with, 186 



Bank of Khartoum, 185 

Bank of Sudan, 131, 185; domestic banks 
controlled by, 186; purges of, 129 

banks: commercial, 185-86; Islamic, xxvii, 
186-87 

Banna, Hasan al, 106 

Baqqara people, 10, 18, 20-21, 73, 78; 
agriculture of, 156; as Ansar, 19, 21; 
bush empires of, 17; as camel herders, 
90; as cattle herders, 90, 154-56; iden- 
tification as, 75; under Mahdiy ah, 21; 
migration of, 156; in militias, 257; ra- 
cial background of, 85; slave raiding 
by, 90; slave trade with, 16, 17 

Baraka Delta, 63; cotton cultivation in, 
148 

Barbar, 23 

Barclays Bank, 185 

Bari people, 81; religion of, 107 

Bashir, Umar Hassan Ahmad al, 197, 200, 
265; background of, 201; coup by, xxv, 
53, 128, 236-37; roles of, 245; visit to 
Libya by, xxxi 

Bashir government. See Revolutionary 
Command Council for National Sal- 
vation 

Bata Shoe Company, 162 

Bayyudah Desert, 20 

Beja people, 62, 75; Amarar, 75; Arab an- 
cestry claimed by, 11, 75; Bani Amir, 
75; Bisharin, 75; characteristics of, 75; 
Hadendowa, 19, 20, 75; language of, 
75; in Sudanese People's Liberation 
Movement, 95 

Belgian Congo {see also Zaire), 25 

Belgium: army of, 21; claims of, to Afri- 
can territory, 21 

Bentiu: oil production at, 170 

Berti people, 76-77 

Bir an Natrun, 61 

birth rate, 67 

Bittar Group, 162 

black market activity, 211 

Black Sultanate (As Saltana az Zarqa), 
12 

Blemmyes, 6 

Blue Nile, xxv, 4, 57, 62, 63, 64-65, 89; 

drainage of, 64 
Blue Nile Grid, 167-68 
Blue Nile Health Care Project, 121 
Boma Plateau, 58 
Bongo people, 83 
Bor, 65, 242 



312 



Index 



borders, 57; under Anglo-Egyptian con- 
dominium, 24-25; conflicts on, xxxi, 
240, 273, 274; security of, 239, 274 

Borno, 13 

bourgeoisie, 97, 98 

Britain: aid from, 136, 175, 227, 228; air 
service to, 180; cotton exports to, 188- 
89; defense of Egypt by, 14; invasion 
by, xxiv; materiel from, 247, 248, 259, 
262; occupation of Sudan by, 21-23; 
position of, in Egypt, 18; southern pol- 
icy of, 26-29, 31; trade with, 136, 189; 
training of military officers in, 253, 259, 
260 

British Ministry of Overseas Develop- 
ment, 157 

British Overseas Development Adminis- 
tration, 168 

British Petroleum, 170 

British rule (see also Anglo-Egyptian con- 
dominium): arabization of south dis- 
couraged under, 27; Azande Scheme 
under, 82; closed-door ordinances under, 
27, 30, 31, 86; industrialization dis- 
couraged under, xxvi; influence of, 3, 80; 
Islam in south discouraged under, 27; na- 
tionalist demands under, 31; nomads 
under, 91; north-south division reinforced 
by, 3, 233; self-determination agreement 
under, xxiv; sharecropping under, 151 

budget deficit, 132 

bureaucracy: under Ottoman-Egyptian 

rule, xxiv 
Burri, 168 
Burundi, 65 
Bviri people, 82 

Cairo, 16, 26 

camels, 154, 156; Egyptian import em- 
bargo on, 35; herding of, 90; number 
of, 154 

Canada, 170, 260 

capital accumulation, xxvii 

carnelian, 4 

Carter, Jimmy, xxx 

Catholics, Roman, 85, 107 

cattle, 75, 154; Baqqara, 154; cultural 
context, 154; diseases of, 154; effects of 
drought on, 154; Egyptian import em- 
bargo on, 35; herding, 90, 154-56; im- 
portance of, 91, 108; Nilotic, 154; 
number of, 154; ownership of, 80; raid- 



ing, 88; in religion, 108; trade in, xxiii, 
10; as wealth, 91 
census: 1955-56, 74; 1983, 67; problems 
with, 67 

Central African Republic, 225, 239 

Central Planning Agency, 134 

Chad, 215; air service to, 180; assistance 
by, to Sudanese rebels, 225; civil war 
in, 225, 239, 240, 273 

Chad Radio, 71 

Chase Manhattan Bank, 186 

Chevron Overseas Petroleum Corpora- 
tion, 166; departure of, 87, 128, 171; 
exploration by, 168-70; guerrilla attack 
on, 171; infrastructure developed by, 
179; oil discovered by, 127 

China: aid from, 127, 137, 157, 178; 
materiel from, xxx, xxxi, 248, 259, 260, 
262; military assistance from, 232, 260; 
relations with, 228; trade with, 189; 
trade agreement with, 137 

Christianity (see also under individual denomi- 
nations), 85, 107; literacy encouraged 
by, 8; in Nubia, 8; in south, 47, 58; as 
symbol of resistance, 107 

Christian missionaries, 58; expelled, xxiv, 
37, 110; in Nubia, 8; in south, 27 

Christian missions: dissolved, 107; med- 
ical facilities of, xxiv, 27; schools of, 
xxiv, 27, 35, 85, 110 

Christians, xxiii; as percentage of popu- 
lation, 85, 100 

chrome, 164-65; export of, 165; mined, 
164 

Church of England, 27, 107 
Church Missionary Society, 27 
Citibank, 186 

civil code: of 1949, 207; of 1970, 207 

civil law: under Anglo-Egyptian con- 
dominium, 24 

civil service, 96; attempts to arabize, xxx; 
northerners in, 33; purges of, 129, 198, 
265; southerners in, 27, 212; transition 
in, from condominium, 33 

civil war (see also Any a Nya rebels; 
Sudanese People's Liberation Army), 
xxiv, 3, 37, 51, 58, 78, 80, 109, 121, 
199, 231, 240-44, 251; under Abbud, 
234; arabization as cause of, xxx; at- 
tempts to end, 49, 214, 264; deaths 
from, xxxii, 43, 69, 241; destruction of 
schools by, 112; economic cost of, xxvii, 
xxxii, 49, 128, 222, 234, 254-55; effect 



313 



Sudan: A Country Study 



of, on development, 87, 178, 182; ef- 
fect of, on economy, 127, 130, 183, 
190; effect of, on environment, 160; ef- 
fect of, on ethnic groups, 85, 93, 95; 
effect of, on industry, 162; effect of, on 
livestock, 153, 154, 156; effect of, on 
political systems, 96; medical facilities 
destroyed by, 118; under Nimeiri, 235; 
origins of, 43; problems caused by, 
xxxii, 65, 170; refugees from, 67, 68, 
84, 241; resumption of, 48, 127, 128, 
236, 239; as security issue, 232; sharia 
as cause of, 197, 213, 214, 218-19 
climate, 65-67; dry season, 66; rainfall, 

66; temperature, 65, 66; winds, 66 
closed-door ordinances, 27, 86; demand 

for abolition of, 30, 31 
Code of Civil Procedure (1902), 24 
College of Mechanical Engineering, 114 
Collo people. See Shilluk people 
communications {see also telecommunica- 
tions), 89, 184-85; infrastructure, 34 
communists (see also Sudanese Communist 
Party), 38; opposition of, to Revolu- 
tionary Command Council for National 
Salvation, 266; reinstated, 39; role of, 
in Revolutionary Command Council, 
41, 42 

Congolese rebels: arms supplied to Anya 
Nya by, 43 

Congo River basin, 66 

Constituent Assembly, 32, 46, 202; creat- 
ed, xxv 

constitution: need for permanent, 34, 36; 
suspended, 49, 199 

constitutional conference, 202-3 

constitutions: draft, 40, 46-47; of 1952, 
30-31; of 1971, 43; Permanent Consti- 
tution, 202; Transitional Constitution, 
32-33, 37, 41, 202, 203 

construction, 139 

Coptic church, 72; authority of, over Nu- 
bian church, 8; power of, 8; support of, 
by Nubians, 11 

Coptic language, 8 

corruption, 186; embezzlement, 132-33, 
211; in export companies, 133-34; in 
national government, 35, 49, 132-34, 
48; in real estate, 133 

cotton, 63, 127; under Abbud, 36; in 
Azande Scheme, 82; as commercial 
crop, xxvi, 62; cultivation, 92, 144, 
148, 153; excessive reliance on, 34; ex- 



port of, 137, 187-89; in Gezira Scheme, 
26, 89, 160; irrigation for, 147-48, 149, 
150; marketing of, 36; markets for, 
136; prices of, 34; profits, 150; sales of, 
35 

Council of Ministers, xxviii, 201; com- 
position of, 201 

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
1990 (United States Department of 
State), 270 

coups d'etat, 234; attempted, xxiv, xxxii, 
36, 39, 43, 47, 198, 207, 235, 236; of 
1958, xxiv, 35-36, 141, 199, 202, 234; 
of 1969, xxiv, 41, 141, 199, 207, 231; 
of 1985, xxv, 49, 199, 231, 236; of 
1989, xxv, 53, 128, 198, 199, 202, 210, 
214, 218, 222, 231, 236-37, 265 

courts (see also sharia), 210-11; under 
Anglo-Egyptian condominium, 24; 
backlogs in, 272; Civil Division, 210; 
religious and secular combined, 210; 
secular, xxiv; sentences in, 272; Shar- 
ia Division, 210; special corruption, 
211; special security, 211, 272 

crime, 273-74; banditry, 273; categories 
of, 273, 274; by militias, 273-74; rate, 
274; solution of, 274 

criminal code, 271 

criminal justice system, 271-72; judicial 
process under, 271-72; trials under, 
271-72 

currency, xxvii; devaluations, 138, 191; 
shortage of hard, 162; tied to Egyptian 
currency, 185; value of, 134 

Cush (see also Meroe), 4-5; Egyptian in- 
fluence on, 4-5; in Egypt's New King- 
dom, xxiii, 4-5; religion in, 5; trade of, 
with Egypt, 4; Upper Egypt conquered 
by, xxiii, 5 

Dafalla, Gazuli, 50 
Daju people, 76-77 

Darfur (province/state), 13, 14, 18, 19, 
61, 118, 206; agriculture in, 153; anar- 
chy in, 77, 215, 273-74; under Anglo- 
Egyptian condominium, 24; autonomy 
of, xxix, 86; Chadian civil war in, 225, 
239, 240; civil war in, 231; conquered 
by Ansar, 19; conquered by Egypt, 16, 
18; ethnic groups in, 86; famine in, 69; 
grazing in, 64; Islamic religious orders 
in, 105, 217; military personnel from, 



314 



Index 



238-39; militias in, 257; Nubians in, 

74; refugees in, 67 
death rate, 67, 68 
debt, domestic, 131 

debt, external, 49, 128, 130, 138, 186, 190; 

canceled by Denmark, 136; causes of, 

xxvii; failure to repay, 132; in 1991, 134; 

in 1992, xxvii; outstanding amount, 

135, 190; rescheduling, 191 
Deby, Idris, 225, 240 
deforestation, 160 

Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), 40, 
48, 51, 52, 216, 218-19, 238; antigov- 
ernment actions of, 216; Egyptian sup- 
port for, 224; factions in, 218; Islamic 
bank formed by, 186; as Khatmiyyah 
party, 218; as rival of Ansar, 218 

demonstrations: antigovernment, 35, 37, 
40, 49, 197, 198, 214, 234, 265; police ac- 
tions in, 268; by students, xxv, 265, 266 

denationalization, 131 

Deng, William, 37 

Denmark, 136 

Department of Statistics, 67 

desert {see also under individual deserts), xxv, 
57, 58-61; area of, 145 

desertification, 68-69, 145, 152, 158, 166 

Development and Promotion of Industrial 
Investment Act of 1972, 161 

Development Finance Company (DFC), 
175, 183 

DFC. See Development Finance Company 

Dhahab, Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh, xxv, 
17-18; coup by, 49, 199, 236 

Dhahab government, 199; relations of, 
with Sudanese People's Liberation 
Movement, 50; sharia under, 209-10 

Didinga Hills, 58, 63 

Didinga people, 81 

Digna, Usman, 19 

Dinar, Ali (sultan), 25 

Dindar River, 61, 64 

Dinka people (Jieng), xxvi, xxx, 29, 
78-80, 88, 93, 257; armed conflict of, 
80, 82; in civil war, 231, 242; distribu- 
tion of, 80; dominance of, 87; govern- 
ment efforts to destroy, xxxiii; massacre 
of, 258; origins of, 16; as percentage of 
population, 87; political system in, 95; 
refugees, 257; religion among, 108; 
self-esteem of, 86; in Sudanese People's 
Liberation Army, 262; in Sudanese 
People's Liberation Movement, 221; 



tribal groups of, 80, 95 

dissidents, 47, 48, 197 

Doctors Without Borders (Medecins sans 
Frontieres), 122 

Dongotona Mountains, 58, 63 

drought, xxv, 66, 68, 118, 145; deaths 
from, xxxii, 69; desertification caused 
by, 68-69; economic cost of, xxvii, 
xxviii, 134, 222; effect of, on agricul- 
ture, 158; effect of, on irrigation, 148, 
151; effect of, on livestock, 153, 154, 
156; effect of, on unemployment, 139; 
political ramifications of, 199, 214; 
refugees from, 84, 128 

drug trafficking, 240, 267, 274 

Dunqas, Amara, 12 

Dunqulah, 4; ancient, 8; Arab siege of, 9; 
captured by British, 23; electric gener- 
ation in, 167; Mamluk attempts to con- 
quer, 12; Mamluks in, 14; Muqurra 
and Nobatia merged into, 9; Muslim 
ascendancy in, 11 

DUP. See Democratic Unionist Party 

eastern Sudan, 62 

economic development, 129-35; under 
Anglo-Egyptian condominium, 25, 26- 
27, 28; expenditures, 131; foreign aid for, 
135; imports for, 188; need for, 34; ob- 
stacles to, 172, 197; projects, 127, 134, 
186; railroads in, 174; under Sadiq al 
Mahdi, 39; slowdown of, 188; in south, 2 

economic plans {see also under individual 
plans), 129-30, 206; problems with, 134 

economy, 49, 121; under Abbud, 37, 234; 
attempt to Islamize, 132; attempt to re- 
form, xxvii; destruction of, under the 
Khalifa, 23; deterioration of, 191; growth 
of, 127; importance of clay plains in, 61; 
problems, 127, 134, 234, 237; recovery 
programs, 132; straitened circumstances 
of, xxv; World Bank insistence on re- 
structuring of, xxvii 

education {see also under schools), 89, 110- 
18; under Abbud, 37, 203; abroad, 
111; under Anglo-Egyptian condomin- 
ium, 110; attempts to arabize, xxx; 
British model for, 111; curriculum, 
110; demand for, 110; English as lan- 
guage of, 71; girls', 115-16; govern- 
ment control of, 206; higher, 110, 
113-14; inadequacy of, 113; reform, 



315 



Sudan: A Country Study 



115, 116-18; reorganization of, 111- 
12; spending on, 110; technical and 
vocational, 111-12; to train civil ser- 
vants, 110 

Egypt (see also Turkiyah), 10, 201, 239; 
aid by, to Sudanese rebels, 222-23, 
224; aid from, 132, 135, 136-37, 232; 
Anglo-French debt commission in, 18; 
Ansar invasion of, 21 ; Arab rule of, 10; 
army of, 14, 15, 16; asylum granted by, 
to exiled Sudanese, 223-24; border 
conflict with, xxxi; British position in, 
18; condominium repudiated by, 31; 
and Cush, xxiii, 4-5; desire for union 
with, xxiv, 31, 220; exports to, 188; 
French invasion of, 14; Hyksos inva- 
sion of, 4; import embargo by, 35; in- 
dependence declared by, 26; influence 
of, xxiii, xxiii, 3, 207; invasion by 
(1820), 3, 14; investment from, 162; 
Mamluk rule of, 11-12; Mamluks 
purged from, 14; materiel from, 247, 
248, 250, 259, 262; Middle Kingdom 
of, 4; military assistance from, 232, 
259; military ties with, 261; moderni- 
zation in, 16; nationalist riots in, 26; 
New Kingdom of, 4; Nimeiri given asy- 
lum by, 49, 223; Nubian trade with, 
xxiii; occupation by, 15; Ottoman rule 
of, 12, 14; relations with, xxxi, 3, 34, 
222-24, 226-27, 239-40; Sadiq al 
Mahdi exiled to, 42; slave trade with, 
14, 16; trade agreement with, 189-90; 
training of military officers in, 253; trib- 
ute to, 5; Upper Egypt, xxiii, 5, 10; war 
of, with Assyria, 5; water disputes with, 
36, 148, 240 

Egypt, Upper, xxiii, 5, 10 

elections: of 1948, 30, 202; of 1952, 30; 
of 1953, 202; of 1958, 34, 202; of 1965, 
38; of 1967, 39; of 1968, 40; of 1969, 
40-41; of 1974, 47, 202; of 1986, 51, 
202 

electric power, 128, 139, 166-68; demand 
for, 168; distribution of, 166-67; gener- 
ation of, 168; hydroelectric, xxvii, 149, 
166; in rural areas, 167; shortages of, 
168 

elites: Arab, 96; under Bashir, 97; bour- 
geoisie, 97, 98; in Darfur, 14; differ- 
ences among, 96; educated, 93-94, 97, 
233, 237; ethnic, 97; intermarriage 
among, 98; languages of, 69; Muslim, 



96; national, 96-98; opposition of, to 
Sadiq al Mahdi government, 39; polit- 
ical development among, 26; religious, 
96, 97; southern, 96-97; tribal, 96, 97; 
urban, 57, 96-98 
Emergency Drought Recovery Project, 
xxviii 

employment, 138-39, 162-63 

energy (see also under kinds of energy): from 
forestry products, 144; loans for, 135; 
petroleum for, xxvi; sources, 166-71; 
supply, 166-71 

English, xxvi, 57; as language of educa- 
tion, 71, 111, 115; as language of mass 
media, 221 , 222; as language of south, 
46; spoken by elite, 69; spoken in south, 
71; as symbol of resistance, 107 

environment, 68 

Equatoria, 21; Egyptian garrisons in, 16 
Equatoria Corps, 43, 212, 233, 233-34, 

239; mutiny of, 234, 241 
Equatoria Province (see also Al Istiwai), 

17, 27, 44 
Eritrea, 21, 30 

Eritrean People's Liberation Front, 226, 
240 

Ethiopia, xxxi, 81, 232, 239, 260, 261; 
air service to, 180; Ansar invasion of, 
21; assistance by, to Sudanese rebels, 
xxxi, 226, 240, 242, 262, 264; border 
disturbances with, 240, 274; migration 
of Falasha from, 84; refugees in, 85, 
225, 242, 244; relations with, 222, 225 

ethnic communities: under Anglo-Egyptian 
condominium, 89; change in, 88; descent 
in, 88; nomadic, 88; religion in, 88; semi- 
sedentary, 88; settled, 88 

ethnic communities, arabized, 89-93; 
competition among, 89; nomadic, 89, 
90; setded, 89-90 

ethnic groups (see also tribes; see also under 
individual groups), xxiii, xxx, 72-88; an- 
cestry of, 10; conflicts among, 87; dif- 
ferences among, 57; impact of civil war 
on, 85; number of, xxvi, 69, 264; 
religion of, 107-10 

ethnicity, 69; impact of migration on, 84; 
of Muslims, 72 

Europe: exports to, 165; military as- 
sistance from, 232, 259; Sudanese ex- 
iles in, 43; trade with, 189 

European Community, 228; aid from, 
xxviii, 127, 132 



316 



Index 



European Development Fund, 175, 182 
exchange rate, xxvii 
exiles, 43 

export earnings, 187; from agricultural 
products, 187; in 1990, 187 

exports, 183; agricultural, xxvi, 142, 187; 
livestock, xxvi; markets for, 189; value 
of, 134 



factionalism, 35, 37 
factories, 49 

Faisal ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud (king), 134 
Faisal Islamic Bank, 133, 186; privileges 

of, 186-87 
Faisal Islamic Bank Act (1977), 186 
Falasha, 84 

Fallata. See Fulani people 

family, 98-99 

family planning, 68 

famine, xxv, 49, 66, 78, 87, 109, 119; 
deaths from, xxxii, 49, 69, 118; eco- 
nomic cost of, xxvii, xxviii, 134; impact 
of, 93, 95, 96, 190; political ramifica- 
tions of, 199, 214; refugees from, 67, 
84, 243-44; relief efforts, xxxiii; risk of, 
69 

Faras, 8 

farms, state, 152 
Faruk (king), 31 

Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- 
many), 120; aid from, 136, 168, 178, 
183; air service to, 180; military as- 
sistance from, 260; relations with, 259; 
trade with, 136, 189; training of mili- 
tary officers in, 253 

financial sector, 185-87; disruptions to, 
186; nationalization of, 128 

Fisheries Administration, 157 

fishing, 144, 156-58; ice plants for, 157; 
production, 156-57; source of, 157; 
work force in, 139 

five-year plan of 1968-72, 130 

Five-Year Plan of Economic and Social 
Development (1970-74), 130 

floods, 154 

Fodikwan, 165 

food production, 68 

foreign economic assistance, 34, 135-37; 
from Arab countries, 132, 135, 136-37, 
232, 260-61 ; from Arab Fund for Eco- 
nomic and Social Development, 175; 
from Britain, 136, 175, 227, 228; from 



China, 127, 137, 157, 178; from De- 
velopment Finance Company, 175; 
from European Community, xxviii, 
127, 132; from European Development 
Fund, 175; from France, 136, 175, 227, 
228; from International Development 
Association, 175; from Iran, xxviii, 
xxxi; from Italy, 178; from Japan, 136, 
175; from Kuwait, xxxi, 136; from 
Libya, xxvii, xxxi; need for, 222; from 
Norway, 127, 136; role of, in develop- 
ment, 135, 178; from Saudi Arabia, 
xxxi, 136, 226; from Soviet Union, 40; 
Umma's call for greater, 34; from 
United States, xxviii, 34, 127, 132, 
135-36, 176, 227, 260-61; from West 
Germany, 136, 168, 178, 183; from 
Yugoslavia, 127, 178 

foreign exchange: costs for oil imports, 
168; reserves, depleted, 35 

foreign investment, 161; from Arab coun- 
tries, 162; dependence on, 162; from 
Kuwait, 127, 151, 178; from Saudi 
Arabia, 127, 135, 151, 186; shortfall in, 
130 

foreign military assistance, 232, 259-62; 
for air force, 248; from Arab countries, 
259; from China, 232, 260; cutbacks in, 
255; from Egypt, 232, 259; from Iran, 

xxx, xxxi; from Iraq, 259; for navy, 
250; from Saudi Arabia, 232, 259, 261; 
from Soviet Union, 40, 232, 238, 250, 
259; from United States, 261-62; from 
West Germany, 260; from Yugoslavia, 
250, 260 

foreign policy: civil war as basis for, xxx; 

military role in, xxxi; nonaligned, 47; 

objectives, 222 
foreign rebels: support for, in Sudan, 226, 

240, 242 

foreign relations, 222-28; with Arab 
countries, 226-27; with China, 228; 
with Egypt, xxxi, 3, 34, 222-24, 
239-40; with Ethiopia, 222, 225; with 
Iran, 136, 228; with Iraq, 222, 226; 
with Kuwait, 226, 227; with Libya, 

xxxi, 190, 222, 224-25, 239, 240, 250; 
with Nigeria, 228; with Saudi Arabia, 
226; with Soviet Union, 137, 222, 260; 
with United States, 35, 227-28, 259 

foreign technical assistance, 34; from 
Soviet Union, 40; from United States, 
34, 25, 176 



317 



Sudan: A Country Study 



foreign trade, 57, 186, 187-90; Arab- 
Nubian, 9, 10; with British, 136, 189; 
with China, 137, 189; with Egypt, 188, 
189-90; with Libya, 190; by Nubian 
kingdoms, xxiii, 9, 10; with Saudi Ara- 
bia, xxvi, 189; with Soviet Union, 189; 
with United States, 189; with West 
Germany, 136, 189 

forest (see also fuel), 158-60; area of, 
158-60; converted to agricultural use, 
158; depletion of, 166; gum arabic 
production from, xxiii, 144, 158; land 
area of, 158; reserve, 160; woodlands 
of, 158 

forestry, 144, 158-60; exports from, 144; 
production, 158, 160; work force in, 
139 

Forestry Administration, 145, 158, 160 
France, 170; aid from, 136, 175, 227, 

228; claims of, to African territory, 21; 

invasion of Egypt by, 14; materiel 

from, 248, 249, 250, 262; trade with, 

189 

Free Officers' Movement: coup by, xxiv, 
41, 207, 235 

French: as language of mass media, 221 

fuel: charcoal, 144, 158, 160, 166; con- 
sumption of, 166; firewood, 144, 158; 
vegetable matter, 166; wood, 166 

Fulani people, 78, 87 

Funj Dynasty, 73 

Funj Empire, 12-13; decline of, 13; econ- 
omy of, 12; government of, 12; sultan 
of, 12-13; wars of, 13 

Funj people, 12-13; in Sudanese People's 
Liberation Movement, 95; tribal home- 
land (dar) of, 12-13; warrior aristocracy 
of, 13 

Fur people, 13-14, 75, 214; competition 
of, with Arabs, 86-87; conquered by 
Funj, 13; converted to Islam, 13; gov- 
ernment efforts to destroy, xxxiii, 225; 
slave trade by, 14; in Sudanese People's 
Liberation Movement, 95; sultanate of, 
ended, 25; tribal identification of, 75 

Garang, John, xxx, 50, 87, 128, 216, 219; 
background of, 262 ; in Nimeiri govern- 
ment, 41; Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army under, 214, 242; Sudanese Peo- 
ple's Liberation Movement under, 213, 
214 



gas, natural, 166 

gasoline, 48; embezzled, 133 

GDP. See gross domestic product 

gems: trade in, xxiii, 10 

General Peoples' Committee, 224 

genocide: by Bashir regime, xxxiii 

geographical regions, 58-63; central clay 

plains, 61-62; east, 62; north, 58-61; 

northern clay plains, 62; southern clay 

plains, 62; west, 61 
Geological Survey Administration, 164 
Gezira Board, 89 

Gezira Light Railway, 172, 175-76; net- 
work, 175; purpose, 175-76 

Gezira Scheme, 35, 62, 89, 129, 146, 175; 
under Anglo-Egyptian condominium, 
25-26, 160-61, 188-89; electric power 
for, 167; health problems in, 121; Mana- 
qil Extension, 148, 172; origins of, 148 

girls: education for, 115-16; in labor 
force, 138; role of, 116 

Gladstone, William, 20 

GNP. See gross national product 

goats, 154, 156 

gold, 15; mined, 4; mines, 164; trade in, 
xxiii, 4, 10; as tribute, 5 

Gordon, Charles George, xxiv; fight of, 
with Mahdi, 19-20; resignation of, 18; 
slave trade abolished by, 17-18 

government, local, 203-6; abolished, 204; 
under Bashir, 206; under Nimeiri, 204- 
6; relation of, to national government, 
xxix, 203; structure of, 206 

government, national, 85; administration 
of, 96; Arabic used in, 71; atrocities by, 
39; coalition, 236; education subsidized 
by, 27; health programs of, 119; inflex- 
ibility in, 234; military involvement in, 
232, 234-37; mission schools taken over 
by, 35; operations against Any a Nya 
rebels, 44; relation of, to regional gov- 
ernments, xxix, 203; spending, 131; 
sponsorship of militias, 255, 257, 258; 
talks of, with Sudanese People's Liber- 
ation Movement, 198 

government, regional, 203-6; abolished, 
204; relation of, to national govern- 
ment, xxix, 203 

government in exile (see also National 
Democratic Alliance), 216 

Graduates' General Conference, 30 

grain, 10 

Great Lakes region, 3 



318 



Index 



Greece, 180 

gross domestic product (GDP), 134; 
agriculture as percentage of, xxvi, 142; 
industry as percentage of, xxvi; manu- 
facturing as percentage of, 162; min- 
ing as percentage of, 164 

gross national product (GNP): defense 
budget as percentage of, 255 

gum arabic: export of, 10, 16, 158, 187, 
188; production of, xxvi, 64, 77, 144, 
158, 173 

Gum Arabic Company, 158 

gypsum, 165 



haboob dust storm, 66-67 
Habre, Hissein, 225 
hafri, 61 

Haile Selassie, 44 
Hajar Asalaya Sugar Project, 151 
Haifa al Jadidah irrigation project, 149 
Hausa language, 70 
Hausa people, 78 
health, 118-22; illnesses, 118-19 
health care: availability of, 120; primary, 
120-21 

health care personnel, 119-20; commu- 
nity, 120 

health care system, 118; dearth of sup- 
plies in, 118; government control of, 
206 

herding, 12 

hides: trade in, 4 

High Court of Appeal, 210 

High Executive Council, 46 

High Military College, 254 

horses, 154; trade in, 10 

House of Representatives, 202 

hudud, xxxii; suspended, 210 

Hufrat an Nahas, 165 

humanitarian aid, 199, 227 

human rights, 211; organizations, 211, 
252 

human rights violations, 211; by armed 
forces, 252; by government, xxx, 198, 
237, 241; by militias, 221, 231, 241, 
243; by Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army, xxx, 241 

hunting, 139 

Husayn, Abd ar Rahim Muhammad, 200 
hydrology, 64-65 
Hyksos, 4 



ICRC. See International Committee of the 
Red Cross 

IDA. See International Development As- 
sociation 

IDC. See Industrial Development Corpo- 
ration 

Idris, Ahmad ibn (Sayyid), 105 
Idrisiyah Muslims, 105 
IFC. See International Finance Corpo- 
ration 

ILO. See International Labour Organi- 
sation 

Imatong Mountains, 58, 63, 160 

imports, 183, 190, 191; of food, 188; of 
machinery, 188; of manufactured 
goods, 188; of petroleum, 188; restric- 
tions on, 35; sources of, 136, 189; of 
textiles, 188; of transport equipment, 
188; value of, 134 

import substitution, 162, 188 

incense: trade in, 4 

income per capita, xxvi, 130 

independence: declared, xxiv, 32; desire 
for, xxiv; impact of, on social order, 93; 
politics of, 32-36; preparation for, 
30-31 

India, 10, 18; trade with, 189 
Indians, 6 

Industrial Bank of Sudan, 186 

industrial development, 161 

Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC), 161 

industrialization: discouraged by British, 
xxvi; need for investment in, xxvii 

industrial production, 134 

industrial sector: denationalization of, 
162; under five-year plans, 130; loans 
for, 49; nationalization in, xxvii; as per- 
centage of gross domestic product, xxvi; 
private enterprises in, 129; as public en- 
terprise, 128 

infant mortality, 67, 121 

inflation, 131-32; in 1970s, 137-38; in 
1980s, 49, 138; in 1991, 138; in 1992, 
xxvii 

infrastructure, 170 

Ingessana Hills, 58, 61, 164, 165 

Ingessana Hills Mines Corporation, 164, 
165 

inland waterways (see also Nile River), 
172, 178-80; obstacles in, 178-79; 
transportation on, 178, 179-80 

Institute of Higher Technical Studies, 114 



319 



Sudan: A Country Study 



insurance industry, 128 

Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Organization 

Interim Action Program, 130, 131, 176 

intermarriage, 10, 11 

internal security, xxxii, 232, 264-66 

internal security forces {see also under in- 
dividual agencies), 266-71; Islamic secu- 
rity, 270-71; Office of State Security, 
270; Presidential Guard, 270; problems 
of, in civil war, xxxii; State Security 
Organisation, 270 

International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), xxxiii 

International Confederation of Arab 
Trade Unions, 142 

International Criminal Police Organiza- 
tion (Interpol), 267, 274 

International Development Association 
(IDA), 135, 153, 168, 175, 183 

International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
170; loans from, 135 

International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
xxxiii, 138, 139, 145 

International Monetary Fund, 49, 132; 
debt arrears to, 138; financing agree- 
ment with, 138; relations with, 191; 
Sudan declared bankrupt by, 49 

International Petroleum Corporation: 
concession to, xxxi 

International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Organization (Intelsat), 185 

Interpol. See International Criminal Police 
Organization 

Iran: aid from, xxviii, xxxi; military as- 
sistance from, xxx, xxxi; oil from, xxxi; 
relations with, 136, 228 

Iraq, 139, 189; military assistance from, 
259; relations with, 222, 226; support 
for, in Persian Gulf War, 226, 228, 259 

iron, 165 

Ironstone Plateau (Jabal Hadid), 63 
irrigation (see also agriculture, irrigated): 
for commercial crops, 147-48; electric 
power for, 167; form of, 147; funding for, 
149; in Gezira Scheme, 26; government- 
sponsored projects, xxvi; in Meroe, 6; 
nationalization of, 150; Nile used for, 
xxvi, 147; projects, 130, 131, 149-50; 
pumps used for, 150, 151; traditional, 
147 

Islam (see also Muslims; sharia), xxiii, 46, 
85; alms in, 101-2; arabization facil- 



itated by, 11; under British, 27; conver- 
sions, 13; cult of the saint in, 103-4; dis- 
tribution of, 102-3; evil eye in, 109-10; 
fakih in, 103; five pillars of, 101; imam 
in, 103; influence of, on north-south di- 
vision, 9; introduction of, 9-14; Nubian 
conversion to, xxiii, 9; as official religion, 
47; personal conduct in, 102; pilgrimage 
in, 102; Ramadan in, 101; spread of, 9, 
17; theology of, 100-104; as unifying fac- 
tor, 57 
Islam, Shia, 101 

Islam, Sufi, 58; history of, 104; practice of, 

104; turuq in, 104-5 
Islam, Sunni, 57-58, 100-101 
Islamic Charter Front, 47, 51 
Islamic Conference, 223 
Islamic Development Company, 133-34 
Islamic Legion, 240 
Islamic movements, 104-7 
Islamic security, 270-71 
Islamic University of Omdurman, 114 
Islamization: under Abbud, 203; attempts 

at, 87, 132; under Bashir, 198; fears of, 

in south, 203, 212, 213; of legal system, 

209; under Nimeiri, 197 
Ismail (pasha), 16; forced to abdicate, 18; 

southern policy of, 17-18 
isolation, 223 

Israel, 84; Anya Nya trained by, 43; arms 
supplied by, to Anya Nya, 38, 43 

Italy: aid from, 178; air service to, 180; 
army of, 21, 233; invasion of Sudan by, 
30; trade with, 189 

Italian East Africa, 30 

ivory: trade in, xxiii, 4, 10, 16 

Jaali people, 10-11, 88; ancestry of, 10; 
arabization of, 73; resistance of, to Egyp- 
tian invaders, 15 

Jabal al Auliya Dam, 65, 157 

Jabal Hadid. See Ironstone Plateau 

Jabal Marrah, 58, 61, 75 

Japan: aid from, 136, 175; trade with, 136, 
165, 189 

jazirah, 62 

Jazira Scheme. See Gezira Scheme 
JECS. See Job Evaluation and Classification 
Scheme 

Jieng people. See Dinka people 
jihad, xxiv 
jizzu, 61 



320 



Index 



Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme 
QECS), 140 

Johns-Manville, 165 

Jonglei Qunqali) Canal, 65, 127, 128, 131 

Jordan, 254 

journalists, 221-22, 272 

Juba, 118, 214; airport, 182, 249; army 
in, 245; atrocities against civilians in, 
39; civil war in, 243; electric genera- 
tion in, 167; refugees in, 244 

judges, 210-11; appointment of, 211; dis- 
missal of, 211; duties of, 210-11; im- 
prisoned, 272 

Juhayna people, 10-11, 73, 88; ancestry 
of, 10; migrations of, 10; tribes of, 10 

Junayd irrigation project, 150 

Kababish people, 10, 91 
Kaduqli, 131 
Kakwa people, 81 
Kanuri people, 13 
K arm ah, 4 

Karrar, Salah ad Din Muhammad Ahmad, 
200 

kashif: rule of, 11-12 
Kashta, 5 

Kassala, 20, 30, 74; Egyptian garrisons 

in, 15, 19 
Kawahla people, 73, 93 
Kaylak, Muhammad Abu al, 13 
Keira clan, 13 

Kenya, 239; aid from, to Sudanese rebels, 
xxxi, 225; air service to, 180; refugees 
in, 85, 225 
Khalifa, the (see also Abdallahi ibn Mu- 
hammad), 21; death of, 23 
Khalifa Yunis, Muhammad al Amin, 200 
Khalil, Abd Allah, 34; coup by, 35-36 
Khalil, Abd al Majid Hamid, 236 
Khalil government, 199; issues confront- 
ing, 34; resignation of, 38 
Khartoum, xxvi, 74, 250; Ansar destruc- 
tion of, 20; army in, 245; demonstra- 
tions in, 40; Egyptian garrisons in, 15, 
19; elites in, 96; industries in, 157; navy 
in, 250; police in, 268; population of, 
68; rail transportation to, 173; rainfall 
in, 66; as seat of government, 15; 
shanty towns around, xxxiii; tempera- 
tures in, 66 
Khartoum Institute of Technical College 
(Khartoum Polytechnic), 114 



Khartoum International Airport, 182, 
245, 249, 266 

Khartoum North: electricity generation 
in, 168; elites in, 96; population of, 68 

Khashm al Qirbah: agriculture in, 63; 
army in, 245; irrigation project, 130; 
Nubians in, 74 

Kashm al Qirbah Dam, 149, 157, 167 

Khashoggi, Adnan, 171 

Khatim al Khalifa, Sirr al, 37 

Khatim government, 37-38 

Khatmiyyah Muslims, 16, 19, 26, 30, 
105; affiliated with Abbud government, 
36; alienated by Azhari, 34; history of, 
105; Islamic bank formed by, 186; in 
military, 238; political influence of, 
134, 214; political party of, 216, 218; 
salient features of, 105; uprising by, 51 

Kinanah, 127; factory at, 131, 162; irri- 
gation project, 131; sugar mill, 188 

Kinanah Limited, 151 

Kinanah Sugar Project, 151 

Kitchener, Herbert, xxiv; Ansar defeated 
by, 23; as commander of Egyptian 
army, 21, 23, 173, 233 

Kober Prison, 49, 274, 275 

Koka Dam Declaration (1986), xxv, 50, 
213; support for, 50 

Korean War, 150 

Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau, 183 
Kuraymah, 173 

Kurdufan (province/state), 13, 14, 19, 23, 
30, 51, 118, 206; agriculture in, 153, 
158; army in, 245; civil war in, 231; 
ethnic groups in, 83, 257; grazing in, 
64; Islamic religious orders in, 105, 
217; military personnel from, 238-39; 
militias in, 257, 273; petroleum in, 
xxvi; refugees in, 67 

Kurmuk, 243 

Kusti: factory at, 131; oil refinery at, 170- 
71 

Kuwait, 139; aid from, xxxi, 136; invest- 
ment from, 127, 151, 178; relations 
with, 226, 227; training of military 
officers from, 253 

Lado Enclave, 25 

Lagu, Joseph (see also Southern Sudan 
Liberation Movement), xxiv, 38, 44, 
46, 241-42 

Lahure, Saturino, 37 



321 



Sudan: A Country Study 



Lake Fajarial, 62 

Lake Nasser. See Lake Nubia 

Lake No, 62 

Lake Nubia, 63, 65, 148-49; fishing in, 

144, 157 
lakes, 157 
Lake Shambe, 62 
Lake Victoria, 65 

landownership, 145-46; customary, 146; 
by state, 146 

land registration, 145 

land tenure, 92, 145-46; under Anglo- 
Egyptian condominium, 24; hired labor 
for, 92; wages for workers in, 92 

land use, 144-45; cultivation, 145; forest, 
145; grazing, 145; pasture, 145 

languages (see also under individual languages), 
69-72; acquisition of, by migrants, 69; 
Afro-Asiatic, 69-70; differences among, 
57; distribution of, 69-71; lingua fran- 
cas, 69, 70; in Meroe, 6; multilingual- 
ism, 69, 70; Niger-Kurdufanian, 69, 70; 
Nilo-Saharan, 69, 70; number of, xxvi, 
69, 70; as political instrument, 69; of 
south, xxvi, 58; as symbol of identity, 69 

League of Arab States (Arab League), 185, 
228 

legal system {see also sharia), 206-11; under 
Anglo-Egyptian condominium, 24; Brit- 
ish influence on, 207; customary, 206-7; 
Egyptian influence on, 207; Islamization 
of, 209; precolonial, 206; problems in, 
207; revisions of, 207-9 

Legislative Assembly, 30, 202; boycott of 
elections for, 30; elections for, 30 

Libya, 232, 261; aid from, xxviii, xxxi; 
Bashir's visit to, xxxi; desire for union 
with, 220, 224; economic cooperation 
with, 137, 224-25; materiel from, 247, 
248, 259, 262; relations with, xxxi, 190, 
222, 224-25, 239, 240, 250; support of, 
for Sudanese rebels, 224, 264; trade 
with, 190 

Libyan Desert, 58 

Libyan National Salvation Front, 224 
limestone, 165 

lineages: minimal, 91-92; in nomadic so- 
ciety, 90-91, 93; ruling, 93 

Liquor Prohibition Bill, 209 

literacy: encouraged by church, 8; rate, 
111, 251 

livestock, 153-56; camels, 154, 156; cat- 
tle, 154-56; effects of drought on, 153, 



154; export of, 187; goats, 154, 156; 

number of, 154; sheep, 154, 156 
livestock raising (see also agriculture), xxvi, 

146; in Darfur, 64; methods of, 144; 

traditional, 153; work force in, 139, 142 
loans, 185 

Local Government Act (1961), 204 
location, 239 



Madani, Faisal, 200 

Madi people, 83; religion of, 107 

Mahdi (see also Ansar; Mahdist movement; 
Mahdiyah), xxiv, 105, 217; background 
of, 18; death of, 20; exile of, 19; family 
of, 73; jihad of, xxiv, 19; Muhammad 
Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah revealed 
as, xxiv, 18; self-proclaimed Mahdi, xxiv, 
106; theology of, 19, 20 

Mahdi, Abd ar Rahman al, 30, 34, 35 

Mahdi, Al Hadi al (imam), 36, 39, 40, 42 

Mahdi, Sadiq al (elder), 36 

Mahdi, Sadiq al (younger), xxiv, xxv, 
xxxii, 36, 40, 46, 51, 209; amnesty 
granted to, 47; arrested, 215, 217, 218; 
exiled to Egypt, 42; meeting of, with 
Nimeiri, 47 

Mahdi al Muntazar, Al. See Mahdi 

Mahdi government, 39, 128, 197; agree- 
ment of, with Sudanese People's Liber- 
ation Movement, xxv, 210; coalitions 
of, xxv, 40, 51-52, 214, 217, 218, 236; 
corruption in, 51; dissolved, 51, 52; 
ethnic groups under, 221; factionalism 
in, 51; foreign policy under, 222; for- 
eign relations under, 227; goals of, 39; 
human rights abuses under, 252-53; 
legal charges against, 211; military 
under, 236; militias under, 258; nomads 
under, 91; opposition to, 39; overthrown, 
xxv, 40, 53, 236-37; priorities of, 51; 
sharia under, 209-10, 213-14; state of 
emergency under, 272 

Mahdist movement (see also Mahdi; Mah- 
diyah), xxiv, 19, 57, 106; as threat to 
regional stability, xxiv 

Mahdist uprisings: under Anglo-Egyptian 
condominium, 24 

Mahdiyah (see also Mahdi; Mahdist move- 
ment), 18-23, 172; established, 20; 
purged, 21; sharia under, 21 

Mahjub, Abd al Khaliq, 40, 42; deport- 
ed, 42 



322 



Index 



Mahjub, Muhammad Ahmad, 38, 40; 
resignation of, 39 

Mahjub government, 38-39, 40; com- 
munists under, 38; southern problem 
under, 38 

Mahmud, Abd al, 200 

Majdhubiyah Muslims, 105 

Malakal, 118; airport, 249; electric gener- 
ation in, 167 

malnutrition, 118; among children, 118- 
19; economic cost of, xxvii; seasonal, 
119 

Mamluks, xxiii; in Dunqulah, 14; Egypt 
ruled by, 11-12, 14; intervention of, in 
Nubia, 11, 12; purged from Egypt, 14; 
slave trading by, 12, 14 

Manaqil irrigation project, 130 

Mandari people, 81 

manufactured goods, 10 

manufacturing, 139, 160-64; under Anglo- 
Egyptian condominium, 160- 61; food 
processing, xxvi; import substitution, 
xxvi; output, 163; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 162; poor planning 
in, 163-64; private-sector, 161; public- 
sector, 161; textiles, xxvi 

marble, 165 

marriage: among elites, 98 

Masalit people, 76-77 

mass media, 221-22; government monop- 
oly on, 221; languages of, 221 

materiel {see also Sudanese People's Liber- 
ation Army; see also under individual 
branches of armed forces), 247; from Brit- 
ain, 247, 248, 259, 262; from China, 
xxx, xxxi, 248, 259, 260, 262; condi- 
tion of, 232, 259; from Egypt, 247, 248, 
250, 259, 262; from France, 248, 249, 
250, 262; from Libya, 247, 248, 259, 
262; procurement, 232, 247, 255, 259; 
shortages of, 232, 259; sources of, 262; 
from Soviet Union, 44, 247, 248, 260; 
from United States, 247, 248, 250, 262; 
from Yugoslavia, 250 

Mechanized Farming Corporation (MFC), 
152-53; corruption in, 133; farms oper- 
ated by, 153 

Medecins sans Frontieres. See Doctors 
Without Borders 

medical facilities: destroyed in civil war, 
118; provided by Christian missions, 
27; of Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army, 118 



medicine: availability of, 120; embezzled, 
133 

Meina al Mak Dam, 64 

Mengistu Haile Mariam, xxxi, 226 

merchant marine, 172, 184 

Meroe (see also Cush; Nubia), xxiii, 5-6; 
destruction of, 6; extent of, 5; influences 
on, 6; irrigation in, 6; language in, 6; 
move by Cush to, 5; pharaonic tradi- 
tion in, 5-6; political system in, 6; pop- 
ulation density in, 6; queen mother in, 
6; relations of, with Egypt, 6; succes- 
sor to, 6-9 

MFC. See Mechanized Farming Corpo- 
ration 

mica, 165 

Middle East: air service to, 180; Sudanese 
exiles in, 43 

migration, 84-85; of elite ("brain drain"), 
68; to escape civil war, 68, 139; to es- 
cape famine, 67, 139, 243; impact of, 
on ethnicity, 84; internal, 67, 68, 84; of 
Nilotic peoples, 16; of Nubians, 10, 74; 
urban, 84 

military (see also armed forces), 216; as- 
sistance, 135; coup attempts by, 36, 
234, 237; coups by, 231, 234; involve- 
ment in government, 232, 234-37; 
problems of, in civil war, xxxii; recruit- 
ment, 239, 251 

Military College, 253, 260 

military officers: anti-Western sentiment of, 
238; under Bashir, 238; benefits for, 252; 
black-market activities of, 252; executed, 
237; indigenous class of, 237-38; moon- 
lighting by, 252; under Nimeiri, 238; pay 
rates for, 252; in political appointments, 
235-36; purged, 237, 236; retirement in- 
come of, 252; southern, 239; women as, 
253 

military personnel, 251-52; conscription 
of, 252; deserters, 251; enlistment rate, 
251, 252; morale of, 251 

military spending, 254-55; budget for 
1989, 253 

military training, 253-54; abroad, 253- 
54; for enlisted personnel, 254; for for- 
eign personnel, 253, 254; for officers, 
253 

militias (see also under individual groups), 
xxxii, 231, 243, 255-59; government 
support for, 258; human rights abuses 
by, 221, 231, 241, 243, 257, 258, 273; 



323 



Sudan: A Country Study 



looting by, 257, 273; Nuer in, 255; 
number participating in, 255; in south, 
273 

minerals, 164 

Minex Company, 165 

Minimum Standard of Wages Order, 140 

mining, 139, 162, 164-66; as percentage 
of gross domesic product, 164 

Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Re- 
sources, 145, 152, 201 

Ministry of Construction and Public 
Works, 201 

Ministry of Culture and Information, 201 

Ministry of Defence, 201, 245 

Ministry of Education, 201 

Ministry of Energy and Mining, 201 

Ministry of Finance and Economic Plan- 
ning, 139, 191, 201; Department of 
Statistics, 137; purges of, 129 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 201 

Ministry of Health, 120-21, 201 

Ministry of Higher Education and Scien- 
tific Research, 201 

Ministry of Industry, 201 

Ministry of Interior, 201 

Ministry of Irrigation, 201 

Ministry of Justice, 201 

Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance, 
201 

Ministry of Trade and Cooperation, 201 
Ministry of Transport and Communica- 
tions, 201 

Ministry of Welfare and Social Develop- 
ment, 201 

Mirghani, Ali al, 30, 34 

Mirghani, Muhammad Uthman al, 51, 
52, 105, 214, 218-19; exiled, 219, 224 

Mirghani family, 105, 238 

Mirghani-Garang agreement, 214 

Misiriyah militias, 257 

Moru people, 83; religion of, 107 

mountains, 58, 63 

Mouvement Patriotique du Salut. See 

Patriotic Movement for Salvation 
Mubarak, Husni, 223 
Muhammad, Abdallahi ibn {see also the 

Khalifa), 18, 20, 21 
Muhammad (Prophet), 187 
Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd 

Allah. See Mahdi 
Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub: coalition 

under, xxiv; as prime minister, xxiv 
Muhammad Ali, 14, 17 



Mundari people, 243; militia of, 258 

Muqurra, 8, 9 

murahalin. See militias 

Murle people, 81 

Museveni, Yoweri, 240 

Muslim Brotherhood {see also National Is- 
lamic Front), xxviii, 106-7, 47, 186, 
209, 219; elites as members of, 98, 219; 
influence of, on government, 48, 51, 
106-7, 116, 128, 198, 203, 207-9, 213, 
215, 237, 271; origins of, 219; politi- 
cal party of, 216 

Muslim religious orders, xxiii, 88-89, 
104-7, 216; influence of, 88; landowner- 
ship by, 92; Nimeiri's attempt at recon- 
ciliation with, 46 

Muslims (see also Islam; sharia), xxiii, 9; 
Arab, 72-74; Beja, 75; Berti, 76-77; 
conquest of Nubia by, xxiii; Daju, 76- 
77; ethnicity of, 72-78; Fur, 75; Masalit, 
76-77; nationalist movements among, 
29; Nubian, 74; as percentage of popu- 
lation, 100; political ascendancy of, 11; 
strikes by, 47; subjugation of North 
Africa by, 9; Sunni, 57-58; West Afri- 
can, 77-78; Zaghawa, 75-76 



Naath people. See Nuer people 
Naguib, Muhammad, 31 
Napata, 5, 6 

Nasir faction of Sudanese People's Liber- 
ation Army, xxx 

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 34, 42 

National Bank of Egypt, 185 

National Communists, 42 

National Democratic Alliance (NDA), 
xxxii, 216, 218, 265; broadcasts by, 
222, 265; Egyptian support for, 224 

National Dialogue Conference, 215-16; 
results of, 216 

National Economic Salvation Program, 
xxvii 

National Front, 46, 47; dissolved, 47 
National Front for Professionals, 37 
National Islamic Front (NIF), xxviii, 51, 
186, 210, 219, 258; political influence 
of, xxviii, 51, 52, 107, 116, 128, 134, 
198, 214, 215, 219, 231, 237; training 
of military officers from, 253 
nationalist movements, 29-30; desire of, 
for independence, xxiv, 29-30; desire 



324 



Index 



of, for unification of Sudan, 29; desire 
of, for union with Egypt, xxiv, 29-30 
nationalists: opposition of, to indirect 

rule, 26; riots by, 26 
nationalization, 128, 161, 235; abandon- 
ment of, 131, 162 
Nationalization of Banks Act (1970), 186 
National Oil Company of Sudan, 171 
National Population Committee, 67 
national reconciliation, 47-49; test of, 48 
National Salvation government, 214 
National Security Council, 235 
National Unionist Party (NUP), 30, 35, 
47; boycott of 1948 elections by, 30; 
coalitions of, 40; desire of, for union 
with Egypt, 31, 32; in 1958 elections, 
34-35; in 1965 elections, 38; in 1967 
elections, 39; political influence of, 134 
National Unity Day, 46 
navy, 250-51; aircraft of, 251; insignia 
of, 254; materiel of, 250; military as- 
sistance to, 260; mission of, 250; num- 
ber of personnel in, 245; operational 
status of, 250-51; ranks of, 254; train- 
ing of, 250; uniforms of, 254; vessels 
of, 250 

NDA. See National Democratic Alliance 
Ndogo people, 82 
Netherlands: trade with, 136, 189 
Newbold, Sir Douglas, 30 
newspapers, 221-22; closed, 197, 221; 

purged, 221-22 
NIF. See National Islamic Front 
Nigeria, 13; air service to, 180; relations 

with, 228 

Nile River (see also Blue Nile; White Nile), 
xxv, 65; archaeological exploration 
along, 3-4; drainage of, 64; Dunqulah 
Reach, 179; importance of, xxiii, xxv, 
57, 64; as inland waterway, 172; trans- 
portation on, 178-79; used for irriga- 
tion, xxvi, 147 

Nile River Valley, 58, 59; arabization of, 
9; ethnic groups in, 10 

Nile Waters Agreement (1959), 148, 240; 
shortage under, 127 

Nilotes, 78-81, 93; age-sets in, 95; home 
of, 78, 80; influences on, 80; as percen- 
tage of population, 78; relations among, 
80; religion among, 108 

Nilotic peoples (see also under individual peo- 
ples), xxiii, 16-17; clans of, 94; religion 
of, 107; social organization of, 94 



Nilotic plain, 62, 63 

Nimeiri, Jaafar an, 187; attempt by, to 
reconcile with Muslim groups, 46; coup 
by, xxiv, 41, 199, 202, 235; elected to 
first term, xxiv, 43; elected to second 
term, xxv, 47; exiled, 49, 223; over- 
thrown, 49, 209; parliament dissolved 
by, 202; as prime minister, 42, 47 

Nimeiri government (see also Revolution- 
ary Command Council), xxiv, 41-49; 
Addis Ababa accords under, xxv, 212, 
231, 264; Ansar under, 235; battle of, 
against Ansar, 42, 217; cabinet of, 41; 
civil war under, 235; corruption in, 
132-33; coup attempts against, 236; 
education reorganized under, 111-12; 
end of, 103, 128; ethnic groups under, 
221; foreign relations under, 222; gov- 
ernment structure under, xxix, 204-6; 
internal security under, 270; legal sys- 
tem under, 207; military under, 236, 
239; nationalization under, 235; nomads 
under, 91; opposition to, xxv; Septem- 
ber Laws of, 203, 271; sharia imposed 
by, 87, 103, 203, 213, 219, 231, 242; 
south under, xxv, 136, 197, 204, 231, 
242; state of emergency under, 47; tribal 
authority under, 95; unions under, 142 

Nobatae, 6 

Nobatia (Ballanah), 6, 8, 9 

nomads, 57; administration of, 91; Arab, 
89-91; gardening by, 90; leaders of, 91, 
93; lineages in, 90-91, 93; marriage 
among, 90; in military, 238; organiza- 
tion of, 90; power among, 91; settled, 
93; social organization of, 93; as ten- 
ants, 92; water for, 61 

non-Muslims, 78-83; Azande, 81-82; Bari, 
81; Bviri, 82; Didinga, 81; ethnicity of, 
72; Kakwa, 71; Mandari, 81; Murle, 81; 
Ndogo, 82; Nilotes, 78-81; Nuba, 83 

north (see also north-south division), xxiii; 
British indirect rule by shaykhs in, 26; 
legal system in, 206; Muslims in, 57- 
58; repression of south by, xxiv; tem- 
peratures in, 66 

North Africa, 180 

North America, 43 

northerners: anti-Islamist, xxxii; forbid- 
den to enter south, xxiii; protests by, 
against removal of subsidies, xxxii 

north-south division, 3, 58, 85, 92, 231, 
240, 264; education and, 27; influence 



325 



Sudan: A Country Study 



of Islam on, 9; language and, 69; by 
race, 85; reinforced under British, 3, 
233; in Sudan Political Service, 28-29; 
violence in, 32, 86 

Norway: aid from, 127, 136 

Nuba Mountains, 51, 58, 61, 83; lan- 
guages spoken in, 70; mining in, 165 

Nuba people, 83; economy of, 83; govern- 
ment efforts to destroy, xxxiii; lan- 
guages of, 83; social organization of, 
83; in Sudanese People's Liberation 
Movement, 95 

Nubia, 4, 6-9; Arab invasion of, 9; Arab 
position in, 10-1 1 ; Arab threat to, 8-9; 
Christianity in, xxiii, xxiii, 8, 11; Chris- 
tian missions in, xxiii; contacts of, with 
Arabs, xxiii; dark age of, 11; decline of, 
11; Greek influence on, 8; Greek lan- 
guage in, 8; introduction of Islam to, 
9-14; Islam in, xxiii; kingdoms of, xxiii, 
10; Muslim conquest of, xxiii; political 
system in, 8; queen mother in, 8; war- 
rior aristocracy in, 8 

Nubian Desert, 58 

Nubian language, 8 

Nubian people, xxvi, 74, 86; arabization 
of, 74; displaced by Lake Nubia, 
148-49; distribution of, 74; early con- 
tacts of, with Arabs, 9-10; homeland 
of, 74; intermarriage of, with Arabs, 
10, 11; as Muslims, 74; resetdement of, 
74, 148-49; as tenants, 92; urban 
migration of, 74 

Nuer people (Naath), xxvi, xxx, 72, 80, 
87, 89, 93; in civil war, 231, 242; con- 
flicts of, with Dinka, 80, 221; in 
militias, 255; origins of, 16; religion 
among, 108; self-esteem of, 86; in 
Sudanese People's Liberation Army, 
264; tribal groups of, 80 

Nujumi, Abd ar Rahman, 21 

NUP. See National Unionist Party 

Nurses' Training College, 115 

Nyala: electric generation in, 167; factory 
at, 131 

Nyiking, 80 

October Revolution (1964), 37, 141 
Office of Chief Qadi, 210 
Office of State Security, 270 
oil (see also petroleum): discovery of, 87, 
127; exploration for, xxxi, 166, 168, 



170; foreign exchange costs of, 168; 

refinery, 161, 170-71; reserves, 171; 

revenues lost to civil war, xxxii 
Omdurman, 23; air defense command in, 

250; elites in, 96; population of, 68; 

television station in, 222 
Omdurman Ahlia University, 115 
OPEC . See Organization of the Petroleum 

Exporting Countries 
Operation Bright Star, 227, 261 
Organization of African Trade Union 

Unity, 142 
Organization of African Unity, 228 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 

Countries (OPEC), 186 
Ottoman-Egyptian rule, xxiv, 12; 

bureaucracy introduced by, xxiv; secu- 
lar courts introduced by, xxiv 
Ottoman Empire: defense of Egypt by, 

14; influence of, on Nilotes, 80; rule of 

Egypt by, 12, 14 
Ottoman Porte, xxiii 
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, 121 



Painkhy, 5 
Pakistan, 228 

Paris Club: relations with, 191 
parliament, 201-2; under Azhari, 33; 
closed by Abbud, 37; corruption in, 35; 
dissolved, 40, 49, 201, 202; factional- 
ism in, 35, 37 
Patriotic Movement for Salvation (Mouve- 

ment Patriotique du Salut), 225 
Payasama, Stanislaus, 38 
PDF. See Popular Defence Forces 
PDP. See People's Defence Party 
People's Assembly, 47, 209, 235; elec- 
tions, 48, 202 
People's Cooperative Bank, 185-86 
People's Defence Party (PDP), 34, 35, 38, 
40 

People's Local Government Act (1971), 
204 

Persian Gulf War: alienation of interna- 
tional community in, xxx-xxxi, 136, 
222-23, 224, 226, 259; repatriated work- 
ers during, xxxiii, 139; support for Iraq 
in, 221, 228, 259 

petroleum {see also oil): discovery of, 164; 
for electric generation, 168; explora- 
tion, 164; exported, 170; imported, 
168, 170, 183, 188, 190; pipeline, 171; 



326 



Index 



production, 171; resources, xxvi, 168- 

71; use, 168-71 
PEWC. See Public Electricity and Water 

Corporation 
physicians, 118, 119 
Pibor Post, 242, 243 
pipelines, 184; capacity of, 184; problems 

on, 184 
plain of the Sudan, 58 
Pochala, 242 

police, 266-70; actions of, 268-70; ad- 
ministration of, 265, 267; communal, 
267; distribution of, 268; insignia of, 
254; mutiny by, 241; under Nimeiri, 
267; number of, 268; organization of, 
267; origins of, 266-67; purged, 265; 
ranks of, 254; responsibilities of, 268; 
training of, 268; uniforms of, 254; units 
of, 267; women in, 268 

Police Act (1979), 267 

political development, 26, 27 

political instability, 199 

political parties: banned, xxviii, 36, 41, 

197, 198, 199, 202, 215, 265, 266; 
under Bashir government, xxviii, 197, 

198, 199, 202, 215; factions in, 50; 
under Khatim government, 37; under 
Nimeiri government, 42, 202; reli- 
gious, 207; representing south, 37; 
revival of, 50-51; secular, 220-21; 
underground activities of, 216 

Popular Defence Act (1989), xxix, 258 
Popular Defence Forces (PDF), 258; 
camps, 258-59; created, xxxii, 232; 
membership in, 116, 258; number of 
personnel in, 258, 259; training of, 258; 
training of military officers from, 253 
population (see also ethnic groups; see also 
under individual ethnic groups), 67-69; un- 
der age eighteen, 68; Arabs as percen- 
tage of, xxvi, 72; Azande as percentage 
of, 81; birth rate, 67, 82; Christians as 
percentage of, 85, 100; death rate, 67, 
68; density, 6, 68; destruction of, under 
the Khalifa, 23; Dinka as percentage of, 
87; distribution of, xxvi; family plan- 
ning, 68; fertility rate, 68; growth rate, 
67; infant mortality, 67; life expec- 
tancy, 68; Muslims as percentage of, 
100; Nilotes as percentage of, 78; in 
1983, 67; in 1990, xxvi, 67; Nubian, 
74; projected, 67-68; rural, 68; urban, 
xxvi, 68; West Africans as percentage 



of, 77; workforce as percentage of, 138, 
142 

ports, 182-84; capacity of, 183; facilities, 
182-83; traffic in, 183 

Port Sudan, xxxi, 25, 26, 30, 74, 172, 
182-83, 250; air defense command in, 
250; airport, 182, 249; built, 182; elec- 
tric generation in, 167; improvements 
in, 183; navy in, 250; oil refinery, 170, 
171, 188; port facilities, 182-83; rail 
transportation to, 173; United States fa- 
cilities in, 261 

Port Sudan Prison, 274, 275 

Power Project: III, 136, 168; IV, 168; V, 
168 

Presbyterians, 27 
presidency, 200-201 
Presidential Guard, 270 
press: Arabic used in, 71; restrictions on, 
199 

price controls, xxvii 
prices, 137-38 
prime minister, 33 

prisoners: political, 266, 274; treatment 

of, 274-75 
prison system, 274-75 
private sector: enterprises controlled by, 

128, 161; investment, 131; irrigated 

agriculture in, 129; loans to, 185 
professional associations, 37, 47, 216; 

banned, 42; demonstrations by, 214 
Public Electricity and Water Corporation 

(PEWC), 167 
public sector: earnings, 131; enterprises 

controlled by, 128; investment, 130-31, 

132; wages, 139 



Qadhafi, Muammar al: state visit by, 

xxxi, 225 
Qadiriyah brotherhood, 104 
Qallabat, 21 

Qash Delta, 62; cotton cultivation in, 148 

Qash River, 62, 63 

Qaysan, 243 

qoz, 61, 64, 178 

Quran, 9, 70, 116, 187 

Quraysh people, 10 



Rabak, 131 

radio, 185, 221, 222; receivers, 222; sta- 
tions, 222 



327 



Sudan: A Country Study 



Radio Omdurman, 250; Arabic used in, 
71 

Radio SPLA, 222 

Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi: state 
visit by, xxxi 

Rahad River, 61, 64 

Rahad River irrigation project, 127, 131 

railroads, xxvii, 172-76; constructed by 
British, 23, 25, 129, 172-73; efforts to 
improve, 175; foreign assistance for, 
175; gauge of, 173; history of, 172-73; 
importance of, 175; for military use, 
172-73; network, 173; for trade, 173 

rainfall, 63, 66 

rain forests, xxv, 12, 57 

RCC-NS. See Revolutionary Command 
Council for National Salvation 

Red Sea, 3, 4, 6, 62; fishing in, 144, 157 

Red Sea Hills, 51, 58, 62; mining in, 164 

refugees, foreign, xxx, 68; from Chad, 84, 
128, 134; economic cost of, xxvii, 
xxviii; from Eritrea, 128, 134, 240; 
from Ethiopia, 84, 128, 134; number 
of, 84, 134; from Uganda, 128, 134 

refugees, Sudanese, 84-85, 128; from civil 
war, xxxii, 43, 231, 242, 243, 257; from 
famine, 243-44; international aid to, 
xxxiii; number of, xxxii, 67, 84, 266; 
public order campaigns against, 268-70 

religion {see also under individual religions), 
xxiii; differences among, 57; Egyptian, 
adopted in Cush, 5; under Egyptian 
rule, 15-16; in south, 58 

religion, traditional, xxiii, 58, 85, 88, 
107-10; ancestors in, 108-9; believers, 
as percentage of population, 100; cat- 
tle in, 108; evil eye in, 109-10; pan- 
theon of, 107-8; rain in, 109; sorcerers 
in, 109-10; spirits in, 107-8 

religious conflicts, 240 

religious leaders, 97 

Republican Brothers, 219-20 

reservoirs, 157 

Revolutionary Command Council, xxiv, 
41-43, 235; Ansar as threat to, 42; dis- 
solved, 235; problems in, 235; role of 
communists in, 41, 42 

Revolutionary Command Council for 
National Salvation (RCC-NS), 53, 
197, 198, 199-200, 219, 237, 265; 
armed forces under, 231, 253; civilian 
consultative councils, 200; committees 
of, 197, 200; constitutional conference 



of, xxix; coup attempts against, xxxii; 
economy under, 237; education reform 
under, 116; elites under, 97; foreign re- 
lations under, 223-24; functions of, 
xxviii, 200; genocide programs of, 
xxxiii; government structure under, 
xxix; humanitarian aid rejected by, 
227-28; human rights abuses by, 198, 
211, 265; influence of Muslim Brother- 
hood in, 237; influence of National 
Islamic Front in, 219, 237; instability 
of, 199; judiciary under, 211; media 
under, 222; members of, xxviii, 200; 
militias under, 221; opposition to, 
xxxii, xxxiii, 198, 214, 220, 232; parlia- 
ment dissolved by, 202; peace talks 
of, with Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army, xxx; physicians harassed by, 
118; policies under, xxviii; political 
parties banned by, 198, 215; political 
parties under, xxviii, 202, 216; politi- 
cal prisoners under, 274, 275; popular 
committees under, xxix, 270; popular 
conferences under, xxix; prob- 
lems in, xxxiii; protests against, 17; 
purges by, 128, 198, 211, 231, 265; 
repression under, 265, 272; sharia 
under, 210, 271; state of emergency 
under, 272; surveillance under, 270; 
ties of, to National Islamic Front, 198; 
unions under, 140; women under, 268 

River Transport Corporation (RTC): 
cargo carried by, 179-80; efforts to im- 
prove, 180; inefficiency in, 180; pas- 
sengers carried by, 179-80 

Rizeiqat militias, 257 

roads, 120, 176-78; attempts to improve, 
176-78; development of, 131, 176; fi- 
nancing for, 178; impassable, 176; 
mined by Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army, 176, 178; network of, xxvii, 172, 
176; paving projects, 178 

Romans, 6 

Roseires Dam (Ar Rusayris), 64, 130, 
149, 179; electricity generated by, 167; 
fishing in, 157 
Royal Dutch Shell, 170 
RTC. See River Transport Corporation 
Rufaa al Huj people, 87; militia of, 257 
rural areas: administration of, 46; con- 
trolled by Anya Nya, 43; population of, 
68 

Rwanda, 65 



328 



Index 



Saad, Abd Allah ibn, 9-10 
Sadat, Anwar as, 223 
Saddam Husayn, 223 
Sadiq al Mahdi. See Mahdi, Sadiq al 
Salih, Az Zubair Muhammad, 200 
Salih, Bakri Hassan, 200 
Sammaniyah Muslims, 18 
Samnah, 4 

Sannar, 12, 13, 19, 20; factory at, 131; 
irrigation dam near, 26, 64; rail trans- 
portation to, 173; surrender of, to 
Egypt, 14-15 

SANU. See Sudan African National Union 

SANU- Williams, 38 

Satit irrigation project, 131 

Saudi Arabia, 139; aid from, xxxi, 136, 
226; aid suspended by, 222; exports to, 
xxvi; investment by, 127, 135, 151, 
186; military assistance from, 232, 259, 
261; oil from, 226; relations with, 226; 
trade with, 189 

Saudi Development Fund, 135 

Save the Children Fund, 69, 121 

Sawakin, 10, 19, 20, 23, 25, 157-58 

Sawakin port, 183-84 

Sawba, 5, 8 

Say id, Ahmad as, 52 

schools: distribution of, 113; private, 112; 
technical, 112-13, 113 

schools, intermediate: enrollment in, 110; 
girls', 115; number of, 110 

schools, junior secondary: girls', 115; 
number of, 112 

schools, primary, 110, 113; destroyed by 
civil war, 112; enrollment in, 110; 
girls', 115; language of instruction in, 
71; in north, 110; number of, 110, 112; 
operated by Sudanese People's Liber- 
ation Army, 112; in south, 110, 112; 
system of, 112 

schools, secondary: English as language 
of instruction in, 71; enrollment in, 
110; girls', 115; number of, 110 

SCP. See Sudanese Communist Party 

SDF. See Sudan Defence Force 

Sea Ports Corporation, 182 

"security of the revolution," 270-71 

Self-Determination Agreement (1952), 
xxiv, 30 

Senate, 202 

SennarDam, 26, 64, 148, 179; electric- 
ity generation by, 167; fishing behind, 
157; nationalized, 148 



September Laws {see also sharia), 48, 203, 
207-9, 218, 271; demands for repeal of, 
210, 213, 217, 219; suspended, 271 

service sector, 139, 190 

Shaiqiyah people, 15 

Shalla Prison, 274, 275 

Shams ad Din, Ibrahim, 200 

Shandi: electric generation in, 167; fac- 
tory at, 131 

shanty towns, 139 

sharia {see also Islam; Muslims), 9; under 
Anglo-Egyptian condominium, 24, 
206-7; under Bashir, 210; call for re- 
peal of, xxv ; as cause of civil war, 214, 
218-19, 242; courts, 210; Egyptian 
judges in, 24; hudud under, 209, 271; 
imposition of, xxv, xxviii, xxx, 46, 48, 
87, 102-3, 136, 197, 198, 203, 213, 
219, 231, 271; under Mahdiyah, 21; 
national division on, xxix, 51, 80, 198; 
under Nimeiri, 203, 213, 242; opposi- 
tion to, 50, 100, 197-98, 209, 219; 
precolonial, 106; role of, 203; under 
Sadiq al Mahdi, 213; support for, 209, 
218; under Turkiyah, 15 

Sharif, Muhammad ash, 18 

shaykhs, 93 

sheep, 154, 156 

Sheikan, 19 

Shilluk people (Collo), xxvi, 13, 80; 
government of, 80-81; origins of, 16; 
political organization of, 94, 108; 
prophets in, 94; religion among, 108; 
self-esteem of, 86; settlement of, 80; in 
Sudanese People's Liberation Army, 
264 

Shukriya people, 10 
Sinjah, 64 

Six- Year Plan of Economic and Social De- 
velopment (1977-82), 131-32, 164 
Slatin, Rudolf, 19 

slave raiding, 11, 88; by Baqqara tribes, 
90; by Mamluks, 12, 14; in south, 16 
slavery, 10, 221 

slaves, 4, 92; physical appearance of, 86; 
as soldiers, 14, 15; as tribute, 5, 10 

slave trade, 4, 9, 19; abolition of, 16, 17, 
27; with Egypt, 14, 16; Egyptian mo- 
nopoly on, 17; by Funj, 12; by Fur, 14; 
private, 17; revival of, 18; in south, 17 

smuggling, 133, 211, 240, 250, 268, 274 

Sobat River, 65 

social services, 27 



329 



Sudan: A Country Study 



social status, 97-98 

social stratification, 92 

soils, 63-64; clay zone, 63-64; fertility of, 
153; kinds of, 63; laterite, 64; sandy, 64 

soldiers: unemployed, 18 

Solong, Sulayman, 13 

Sources of Judicial Decisions Bill, 209 

south {see also north-south division), xxiii, 
50, 212-14; under Abbud, 36-37, 204, 
234; Arab control of commercial sec- 
tor in, 27; Arabic as official language 
in, 31, 32; arabization of, xxiv, 85, 212; 
autonomy of, 212, 264; British indirect 
rule in, 26, 204; British policy in, 
26-29; closed-door ordinances in, 27; 
communities of, 93; economic develop- 
ment of, 28; fear by, of Islamization, 
203, 213; fear by, of northern domina- 
tion, 32, 33, 204, 213; government con- 
trol of, xxix-xxx; ignored by British, 
xxiv; isolation of, 17, 27, 28, 35; lan- 
guages in, xxvi, 68, 71; militias in, 273; 
need to stabilize, 34; under Nimeiri, 
xxv, 136; political parties representing, 
37, 51, 220; provinces of, 27; redivided 
under Nimieri, xxv, 197, 231, 242, 
264; regional autonomy for, 46; reli- 
gion in, 58; repression of, by north, 
xxiv; slave raiding in, 16; slave trade 
in, 17; Sudanese People's Liberation 
Movement in, xxx; women in, 100 

southerners: in army, 46, 238; in civil 
service, 27, 212; communities of, 93; 
conflicts among, 87; fear by, of north- 
ern domination, xxiii; rejection of, in 
government, 35; self-esteem of, 86 

Southern Front, 38; in 1968 elections, 39 

southern policy, 50; of Abbud, 36-37; of 
British, 26-29, 31, 86; of Mahjub, 38; 
of Nimeiri, 43 

Southern Region, 48; redivision of, 48 

Southern Regional Assembly, 44-46; 
abolished, xxv, 48, 197, 213, 231, 264; 
established, 212 

Southern Sudanese Political Association, 
50 

Southern Sudan Liberation Movement 

(SSLM) {see also Joseph Lagu), 212; 

amnesty for, 46; formed, xxiv, 44, 242; 

governing infrastructure of, 44 
Soviet Union: economic assistance from, 

40; materiel from, 44, 247, 248, 260; 

military assistance from, 40, 232, 238, 



250, 259; planning assistance from, 
130; relations with, 137, 222, 260; tech- 
nical assistance from, 40; trade with, 
189 

SPLA. See Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army 

SPLM. See Sudanese People's Liberation 

Movement 
SRC. See Sudan Railways Corporation 
SRWU. See Sudan Railway Workers 

Union 

SSLM. See Southern Sudan Liberation 

Movement 
SSO. See State Security Organisation 
SSU. See Sudan Socialist Union 
Stack, Sir Lee, 26, 29 
Staff College, 254 

State Security Organisation (SSO), 48, 
270 

strikes, 47, 48-49, 140, 141, 142, 236, 
266; prohibited, 141, 265; protesting 
military government, xxv; protesting 
sharia, xxv 

student associations, 42 

students: demonstrations by, xxv, 265, 
266; opposition of, to Sadiq al Mahdi 
government, 39; strikes by, 47 

subsidies: on food, 138; on petroleum 
products, xxvii; protests against re- 
moval of, xxxii; reduction of, xxvii, 
191; removal of, 138; on sugar, xxvii 

Sudan Administrative Conference (1946): 
response to, 31; terms of, 31 

Sudan Africa Closed Districts National 
Union {see also Sudan African National 
Union), 212 

Sudan African National Union (SANU) 
{see also Sudan Africa Closed Districts 
National Union), 37, 212; in 1967 elec- 
tions, 39; in 1968 elections, 39 

Sudan Air Cargo, 180-82 

Sudan Airways, 172, 180; fleet, 180; inter- 
national service, 180; number of pas- 
sengers, 180; pooling agreement of, with 
Tradewind Airways, 180-82; problems 
in, 182 

Sudan Airways Company, 180 
Sudan Bar Association, 265 
Sudan Commercial Bank, 185 
Sudan Currency Board, 185 
Sudan Defence Force (SDF), 26; forma- 
tion of, 233; in World War II, 30, 233 
Sudan Development Corporation, 151 



330 



Index 



Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) (see 
also communists), 36, 37, 38, 40, 43, 
51, 141, 216, 220; abolished, 39; coup 
attempt by, 235; declared legal, 39; 
execution of leaders of, 220; opposition 
of, to Revolutionary Command Coun- 
cil for National Salvation, 220, 266; 
support for, 220, 238 

Sudanese Estates Bank, 186 

Sudanese Federation of Employees and 
Professionals Trade Unions, 142 

Sudanese Human Rights Organization, 
211 

Sudanese-Kuwaiti Transport Company, 
178 

Sudanese Mining Corporation, 164, 165 
Sudanese National Oil Company, 170 
Sudanese People's Armed Forces. See 

armed forces 
Sudanese People's Liberation Army 
(SPLA), 48, 128, 252, 258, 262-64; at- 
tack by, on Chevron operation, 128; 
desertions to, 251, 257; ethnic groups 
in, 264; foreign aid for, xxxi, 226, 240, 
262; formed, 197, 242; human rights 
violations by, 264, 273; materiel for, 
248-49, 264; medical facilities of, 118; 
number of personnel in, 262; officers 
in, 262-64; opposition of, to division 
of south, xxv ; peace talks in, xxx; peace 
talks of, with government, xxx; power 
of, in south, 12, 231; schools operated 
by, 112; split in, xxx; training of, 262; 
transportation disrupted by, 176, 178, 
179 

Sudanese People's Liberation Movement 
(SPLM), 48, 128, 216; agreement of, 
with Sadiq al Mahdi, 5, 210; amnesty 
for, 50; Egyptian support for, 224; for- 
eign aid for, xxxi, 224, 225, 226; 
formed, 197, 213; goals of, 213; in 
Koka Dam Declaration, xxv; members 
of, 221; opposition of, to division of 
south, xxv; sharia opposed by, 100, 
210; solidarity under, 95; support for, 
221; talks of, with government, 198 
Sudanese Savings Bank, 186 
Sudan Gezira Board, 148, 172 
Sudan Medical Association, 118 
Sudan National Broadcasting Corpora- 
tion, 222 
Sudan News Agency, 221 
Sudanow, 222 



Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 25-26, 148 

Sudan Police College, 268 

Sudan Political Service, 24; north-south 
division in, 28-29 

Sudan Prison Service, 274 

Sudan Railways, 129, 141, 172; extent of, 
173; financial problems in, 173-75; in- 
efficiency of, 173; network, 173; police 
of, 267; problems in, 173-75; tonnage 
transported by, 175; worker productiv- 
ity in, 174 

Sudan Railways Corporation (SRC), 172, 
182 

Sudan Railway Workers Union (SRWU), 

140, 142 
Sudan Shipping Line, 184 
Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), xxix, 42, 

46, 95, 204, 235; dissolved, 49; purged, 

47; strikes by, 142 
Sudan Television, 222 
Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation 

(SWTUF), 141 
Suez Canal, 18, 31 

sugar, 127; cultivation, xxvi, 144, 149, 
150; domestic production, 150-51, 188; 
factories, 130, 149, 150-51, 161, 162, 
188 

Suhayni, Abd Allah as, 24 
Supreme Commission, 32-33, 38 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (see 
also Abbud government), xxiv, 36, 37 
Supreme Court, 39, 40, 210 
swamps, 145 

SWTUF. See Sudan Workers Trade 
Unions Federation 



Taha, Mahmud Muhammad, 219-20 
Taharqa, 5 

Tahir, At Tijani Adam at, 200 
Tawfiq, 18 

tax collectors: under Egyptian rule, 15, 
18; Mahdi 's denunciation of, 19; by 
Mamluks, 12 

taxes: under Anglo-Egyptian condomin- 
ium, 24; for development, 131 

Tayyib, Babikr at Tijani at, 220 

Tayyib, Umar Muhammad at, 270 

teachers: foreign, 111; purged, 198; train- 
ing of, 111, 113 

telecommunications (see also communica- 
tions), 184-85; extended by British, 25 

telephones, 184 



331 



Sudan: A Country Study 



television, 185, 222; sets, 222; stations, 

222 
telex, 184 

Ten- Year Plan of Economic and Social 
Development (1961-70), 129-30; aban- 
doned, 130; mismanagement of, 129- 
30 

textiles, 188-89; domestic, 188; imported, 

188 
Theodora, 8 

Three Towns (see also Khartoum; Khar- 
toum North; Omdurman): language 
in, 69; migration to, 84, 156 

Tigray People's Liberation Front, 226, 
240 

Tijani, Ahmad at, 105 

Tijaniyah brotherhood, 105 

TMC. See Transitional Military Council 

toic, 63 

Tonga, 243 

topography, 58 

Torit: army mutiny at (1955), 43, 241; 
civil war in, 243; faction of Sudanese 
People's Liberation Army, xxx 

torture, 211, 271, 274, 275 

Total, 171 

Trades and Tradesmen's Union Ordi- 
nance (1948), 141 

Trade Unions Act (1971), 142 

Tradewind Airways, 180-82 

Transitional Military Council (TMC), 
xxv, 49, 236; creation of, 49; failures 
of, 50; in Koka Dam Declaration, xxv 

Transitional National Assembly, xxix 

transportation, xxvii, 49; under five-year 
plans, 130; infrastructure, 34, 172; on 
inland waterways, xxvii; loans for, 135; 
problems caused by, xxvii, 172; prob- 
lems in, 120; as public enterprise, 128; 
road, 128 

Treaty of Alliance (1936), 29 

tribes (see also ethnic groups; see also under 
individual tribes): Arab, 73-74; authority 
of, 95; distinctions among, 12; home- 
lands of, 12-13,16; under the Khalifa, 
23; lineages in, 73, 88; membership in, 
74; warfare among, 27 

Turabi, Hassan Abd Allah at, 51, 52, 
210; arrested, 209, 219; attack on, 
xxviii; as attorney general, 213, 219; 
background of, xxviii, 219; revision of 
legal system by, 207 

Turkiyah, 14-18; bureaucracy under, 15; 



jihad against, 19; legal system in, 15; 
religious orthodoxy under, 15-16 
Tushkah, 21 



Uganda, 65, 239; aid from, to Sudanese 
rebels, xxxi, 225, 240; air service to, 
180; border conflicts with, 240, 273; 
training of military officers from, 253; 
refugees in, 226, 244 

Umar, Ishaq Ibrahim, 245 

Umayyads, 73 

Umma Party, 47, 216, 217-18, 265; as 
Ansar political party, 217; coalitions of, 
34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 51, 52; established, 
30, 217; Islamic bank formed by, 186; 
under Mirghani government, 34; under 
Nimeiri government, 217; in 1958 elec- 
tions, 34; in 1965 elections, 38; in 1967 
elections, 39; in 1968 elections, 39; in 
1978 elections, 48; in 1986 elections, 
51; opposition of, to Bashir govern- 
ment, 216; support by, for Ansar, 40 

Umma-NUP coalition, 38, 39 

Umma-PDP coalition, 34, 35 

Umm Diway karat, 23 

Umm Ruwabah, 167 

unemployment, 139 

UNF. See United National Front 

unions, 140-42, 216; banned, 140, 141, 
265; demonstrations by, 214; govern- 
ment control of, 42, 140; officials of, ex- 
ecuted, 141; officials of, imprisoned, 
140, 141, 272, 275; origins of, 141; 
purges of, 129; support of, for Sudanese 
Communist Party, 220, 238 

United Arab Emirates, 201, 226; train- 
ing of military officers from, 253 

United National Front (UNF), 37 

United Nations, 228 

United Nations Development Programme, 
145 

United Nations Food and Agriculture Or- 
ganization (FAO), 145, 160 

United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 67 

United Nations World Food Programme 
(WFP), 69, 121; Operation Lifeline 
Sudan, xxxiii 

United States, 48, 84, 170, 211; aid from, 
xxviii, 34, 127, 132, 135-36, 176, 227, 
260-61; joint venture with, 162; 
materiel from, 247, 248, 250, 262; 



332 



Index 



military assistance from, 261-62; relations 
with, 35, 227-28, 259; technical assist- 
ance from, 34, 35, 176; trade with, 189 

United States Agency for International 
Development (AID), 136, 227; Food 
for Peace Program, 136 

United States Arms Control and Disar- 
mament Agency (AC DA), 251, 262 

United Tribes Society (see also White Flag 
League): founded, 29 

Unity Bank, 186 

universities: admission to, 116, 258; sup- 
port of, for Sudanese Communist 
Party, 220, 238 

University of Cairo, 114 

University of Juba, 88, 114 

University of Khartoum, 110, 219; anti- 
government protests in, 37; Arabic as 
language of instruction in, 71 , 118; En- 
glish as language of instruction in, 71, 
111, 118; enrollment, 114; faculty dis- 
missed from, 118; training of military 
officers in, 253 

Upper Egypt. See Egypt, Upper 

Upper Nile, 16 

Upper Nile Province (see also Aali an Nil), 
27, 44 

uranium, 165; concession, 165-66 

urban areas: administration of, 46; con- 
trolled by government forces, 43; mi- 
gration to, 74, 84; population of, 68; 
services in, 89 

urbanization, 57 

Uthman, Uthman Ahmad, 200 

Verona Fathers, 27 

villages: class structure in, 92; land tenure 
in, 92; officials in, 92 

Wadai (Chad), 77 

Wadi Haifa, 20, 23, 157 

Wadi Sayyidna Air Base, 249, 250, 254 

Wad Madani, 249 

wages, 139-40; minimum, 140; public 

sector, 139 
Wahhabi Muslims, 14 
water: under Nile Waters Agreement, 

148; for nomads, 61 
Waw, 118; airport, 182; atrocities against 

civilians in, 39; civil war in, 242, 258; 

electric generation in, 167 
Wawat, 4 

West Africans, 77-78; origins of, 77; as 



percentage of population, 77; as 
tenants, 92 
West Germany. See Federal Republic of 
Germany 

western Sudan, 61, 215; government con- 
trol of, xxix; geography of, 61; topog- 
raphy of, 61 

WFP. See United Nations World Food 
Programme 

White Flag League (see also United Tribes 
Society), 29 

White Nile, xxv, 4, 57, 62, 63, 64, 65, 90; 
drainage of, 64; Southern Reach, 179, 180 

White Nile Basin, 17 

White Nile Petroleum Company, 170 

Wingate, Sir Reginald, 24 

Wolseley, Lord Garnet Joseph, 20 

women: associations of, 42; circumcision 
of, 99, 100; in labor force, 138; in Mah- 
dist movement, 19; as military officers, 
253; raiding for, 88; responsibilities of, 
98-99; restrictions on, 99; segregation 
of, 99; in south, 100; work by, outside 
the home, 99; zar cult of, 99 

workers: remittances from, 134-35 

Workers' Affairs Association, 141 

Workers' Congress, 141 

work force, 138-39; in agriculture, 139; 
as percentage of population, 138 

World Bank, xxvi, 49, 138; credit from, 
183; credit denied by, xxvii, 137; grant 
from, xxvii-xxviii; loans from, 127, 
135, 149, 168 

World Health Organization, 119 

World War II, 25; Sudan Defence Force 
in, 30, 233 

Yambio, 66 

Yei, 214; civil war in, 243 

Yohannes IV, 21 

Youth for Reconstruction, 271 

Yugoslavia: aid from, 127, 178; joint ven- 
tures with, 184; materiel from, 250; 
military assistance from, 250, 260; 
training of military officers in, 253-54 

Zaghawa people, 75-76, 215, 225; 

government efforts to destroy, xxxiii; 

location of, 75 
Zaire, 225-26, 239, 273 
Zakat Fund Legislative Bill, 209 
zar cult, 99 

Zubayr, Rahman Mansur az, 19 



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